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I. FOREWORD 
 
It gives me great satisfaction and pride to introduce this report for Transparency International 
Vanuatu. 
Vanuatu’s first National Integrity System report was released in 2004, with an update published in 
2006. Transparency International Vanuatu is pleased to release our third National Integrity System 
report. 
Unfortunately, as Vanuatu has developed over the past three decades, so too has corruption in the 
various levels of government and related institutions.  This has had widespread damaging effects on 
the country's political, economic and social development.  The ongoing debilitating effects of 
entrenched corruption was the driving force that compelled us, after a gap of some eight years, to 
ask for this third National Integrity System report to be done, which is more far reaching than the 
previous two studies. 
This corruption manifests itself in many ways including: hiring and dismissing public officials based 
on political cronyism, “islandism” and nepotism; fabricating costly “deeds of release” to settle 
invented law suits against the government; passport sales; by-passing proper procedures; and the 
widespread illegal acquisition and sale, for personal benefit, of state assets, especially public land, 
by certain leaders.  Although these shocking abuses have been widely reported in the media and in 
ombudsman’s public reports going back to the mid 1990s, very little has ever been done to punish or 
prosecute the wrongdoers or to recover for the public what has been in effect stolen from them.   
 
This lack of action has prompted corrupt leaders and other officials to believe that they are in fact 
above the law, in effect exempt from due legal process.  This feeling of “immunity” has led to a 
mentality of “impunity”. 
This 2014 National Integrity System report adopts the new methodology developed by the 
Transparency International movement. In addition to the standard pillars associated with the 
Transparency International National Integrity System approach, TI-V has added a fourteenth pillar, 
customary authorities. This has been done because traditional kastom remains a large influence in 
Vanuatu, with the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs having constitutional recognition, and consultative 
authority in terms of legislative reform and policy development. 
Transparency International Vanuatu is fortunate to have retained the services of the lead researcher 
who was involved in all three National Integrity System reports, and as such commenced the project 
fully versed in the project content, process and intention.  This historical expertise proved extremely 
useful.  
A full National Integrity System report takes on average two years to complete, however, due to 
financial and time limitations Transparency International Vanuatu has completed this work in less 
than thirteen months and this is to be commended. 
Transparency International Vanuatu would like to thank all those involved in this project, and in 
particular recognise the support of Transparency International’s head office in Berlin for making the 
funds available to undertake the project. 
This was truly a team effort, and I would like to acknowledge all Transparency International Vanuatu 
team members.  Whether directly involved or not, every team member played a role in ensuring the 
success of this project. 
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I would also like to acknowledge the outstanding commitment of all external members of the 
advisory group, as well as all those involved in the consultative processes which have led to the 
completion and recommendations contained within this report. 
Without their tireless contribution, this report would not have been possible. 
Our hope is that this report will be a useful instrument for both the leaders and employees within 
official institutions, and the public, to help everyone understand and assess the various authorities 
within the country, so that we can all work together to restore integrity to all levels of government 
and build a better, stronger and happier Vanuatu, not just for ourselves but for our children.  
 
 
Marie-Noelle Ferrieux-Patterson 
Chairperson 
Transparency International Vanuatu 
(until June 2014) 
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II. ABOUT THE NATIONAL 
INTEGRITY SYSTEM 
ASSESSMENT 
 
The National Integrity System assessment approach used in this report provides a framework to 
analyse both the vulnerabilities of a given country to corruption as well as the effectiveness of 
national anti-corruption efforts. The framework includes all principal institutions and actors that form 
a state. These include all branches of government, the public and private sector, the media, and civil 
society (the ‘pillars’ as represented in the diagram below). The concept of the National Integrity 
System has been developed and promoted by Transparency International as part of its holistic 
approach to fighting corruption. While there is no blueprint for an effective system to prevent 
corruption, there is a growing international consensus as to the salient institutional features that 
work best to prevent corruption and promote integrity.  
 
 
 
A National Integrity System assessment is a powerful advocacy tool that delivers a holistic picture of 
a country’s institutional landscape with regard to integrity, accountability and transparency. A strong 
and functioning National Integrity System serves as a bulwark against corruption and guarantor of 
accountability, while a weak system typically harbours systemic corruption and produces a myriad of 
governance failures. The resulting assessment yields not only a comprehensive outline of reform 
needs but also a profound understanding of their political feasibility. Strengthening the National 
Integrity System promotes better governance across all aspects of society and, ultimately, 
contributes to a more just society. 
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Definitions 
The definition of “corruption” used by Transparency International is as follows: 
 
‘The abuse of entrusted power for private gain. Corruption can be classified as 
grand, petty and political, depending on the amounts of money lost and the 
sector where it occurs.’1  
 
“Grand corruption” is defined as ‘Acts committed at a high level of government that distort policies or 
the functioning of the state, enabling leaders to benefit at the expense of the public good.’2 “Petty 
corruption” is defined as ‘Everyday abuse of entrusted power by low- and mid-level public officials in 
their interactions with ordinary citizens, who often are trying to access basic goods or services in 
places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other agencies.’3 “Political corruption” is 
defined as ‘Manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources 
and financing by political decision makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status 
and wealth.’4 
The Vanuatu National Integrity System Advisory Group decided that it needed a simple definition of 
“National Integrity System” to help explain what, ideally Vanuatu’s National Integrity System should 
be. The definition that was agreed to is:  
 
‘A system where all institutions cooperate and support each other to fulfil their 
roles effectively, efficiently and with accountability and transparency.’ 
Objectives 
The key objectives of the National Integrity System Vanuatu assessment are to generate: 
 an improved understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of Vanuatu’s National 
Integrity System within the anti-corruption community and beyond. 
 momentum among key anti-corruption stakeholders in Vanuatu for addressing priority 
areas in the National Integrity System. 
The primary aim of the assessment is therefore to evaluate the effectiveness of Vanuatu’s 
institutions in preventing and fighting corruption and in fostering transparency and integrity. In 
addition, it seeks to promote the assessment process as a springboard for action among the 
government and anti-corruption community in terms of policy reform, evidence-based advocacy or 
further in-depth evaluations of specific governance issues. This assessment should serve as a basis 
for key stakeholders in Vanuatu to advocate for sustainable and effective reform. 
Methodology 
In Transparency International’s methodology, the National Integrity System is formed by 13 pillars 
representing all key public and private institutions in a country’s governance system. In Vanuatu’s 
assessment, to pay due attention to the importance of custom, it was decided to add an additional 
pillar, “Customary Authorities”. This pillar looks specifically at the role of the Malvatumauri Council of 
Chiefs within the National Integrity System. 
The Vanuatu assessment addresses 14 pillars: 
                                                        
1
 Transparency International, The Anti-Corruption Plain Language Guide (Berlin: Transparency International, 2009) 14. 
2
 Ibid, 23. 
3
 Ibid, 33. 
4
 Ibid, 35. 
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CORE GOVERNANCE 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
 PUBLIC SECTOR AGENCIES 
 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
ACTORS 
 
Legislature 
 
 
Public sector 
 
Anti-corruption agencies*  
 
Executive 
 
 
Law enforcement 
agencies 
 
Media 
 
Judiciary 
 
Electoral management 
body 
 
Civil society 
  
Ombudsman 
 
Political parties 
 
  
Supreme audit institution 
 
 
Business 
  
 
 
Customary authorities 
 
 
As Vanuatu does not have any anti-corruption agencies, as defined by Transparency International, 
this pillar is not assessed as part of the Vanuatu report. Instead a short discussion of the potential 
role of such an agency is presented.  
Each of the other 13 pillars is assessed along three dimensions that are essential to its ability to 
prevent corruption:  
 its overall capacity, in terms of resources and independence 
 its internal governance regulations and practices, focusing on whether the institutions in 
the pillar are transparent, accountable and act with integrity 
 its role in the overall integrity system, focusing on the extent to which the institutions in 
the pillar fulfil their assigned role with regards to preventing and fighting corruption 
 
Each dimension is measured by a common set of indicators. The assessment examines for every 
dimension both the legal framework of each pillar as well as the actual institutional practice, thereby 
highlighting any discrepancies between the formal provisions and reality in practice. 
 
 
DIMENSION  
 
 INDICATORS (LAW AND PRACTICE) 
 
Capacity  
 
 
Resources 
Independence  
 
 
Governance  
 
 
Transparency 
Accountability 
Integrity  
 
 
Role within governance 
system  
 
Pillar-specific indicators  
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The assessment does not seek to offer an in-depth evaluation of each pillar. Rather it seeks 
breadth, covering all relevant pillars across a wide number of indicators in order to gain a view of the 
overall system. The assessment also looks at the interactions between pillars, as weaknesses in a 
single institution could lead to serious flaws in the entire system. Understanding the interactions 
between pillars helps to prioritise areas for reform. 
In order to take account of important contextual factors, the evaluation is embedded in a concise 
analysis of the overall political, social, economic and cultural conditions – the “foundations” – in 
which the 14 pillars operate (see Chapter IV Country Profile: Foundations for the National Integrity 
System). 
 
POLITICS 
 
SOCIETY 
 
ECONOMY 
 
CULTURE 
 
The National Integrity System assessment is a qualitative research tool. It is guided by a set of 
“indicator score sheets”, developed by the Transparency International secretariat. These consist of a 
“scoring question” for each indicator, supported by further guiding questions and scoring guidelines. 
The following scoring and guiding questions, for the resources available in practice to the judiciary, 
serve as but one example of the process:  
PILLAR Judiciary 
INDICATOR NUMBER 3.1.2 
INDICATOR NAME Resources (practice) 
SCORING QUESTION To what extent does the judiciary have adequate levels of financial 
resources, staffing and infrastructure to operate effectively in practice?   
GUIDING QUESTIONS Is the budget of the judiciary sufficient for it to perform its duties? How is 
the judiciary’s budget apportioned? Who apportions it? In practice, how 
are salaries determined (by superior judges, constitution, law)? Are 
salary levels for judges and prosecutors adequate or are they so low that 
there are strong economic reasons for resorting to corruption? Are 
salaries for judges roughly commensurate with salaries for practising 
lawyers? Is there generally an adequate number of clerks, library 
resources and modern computer equipment for judges? Is there stability 
of human resources? Do staff members have training opportunities? Is 
there sufficient training to enhance a judge’s knowledge of the law, 
judicial skills including court and case management, judgment writing 
and conflicts of interest?  
MINIMUM SCORE (1) The existing financial, human and infrastructural resources of the 
judiciary are minimal and fully insufficient to effectively carry out its 
duties. 
MID-POINT SCORE (3) The judiciary has some resources. However, significant resource gaps 
lead to a certain degree of ineffectiveness in carrying out its duties. 
MAXIMUM SCORE (5) The judiciary has an adequate resource base to effectively carry out its 
duties. 
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The guiding questions used by Transparency International worldwide for each indicator were 
developed by examining international best practices, as well as by using our own experience of 
existing assessment tools for each of the respective pillars, and by seeking input from (international) 
experts on the respective institutions. These indicator score sheets provide guidance for the 
Vanuatu assessment, but, when appropriate, the lead researcher has added questions or left some 
questions unanswered, as not all aspects are relevant to the national context. The full toolkit with 
information on the methodology and score sheets are available on the Transparency International 
website.
5
  
To answer the guiding questions, the research team relied on four main sources of information: 
national legislation, secondary reports and research, interviews with key experts and street surveys. 
Secondary sources included reliable reporting by national civil society organisations, international 
organisations, governmental bodies, think tanks and academia.  
To gain an in-depth view of the current situation, a minimum of two key informants were interviewed 
for each pillar – at least one representing the pillar under assessment, and one expert on the subject 
matter but external to it. In addition, more key informants, that is, people “in the field”, were 
interviewed. Professionals with expertise in more than one pillar were also interviewed in order to 
get a cross-pillar view.  
As there is limited research on corruption in Vanuatu, a series of street surveys was conducted in 
Port Vila. Each survey had a small number of respondents (usually 50) and used a convenience 
sample, with the researcher approaching people in the street. These methodological limitations 
mean that the street survey data must be treated with caution. This data does, however, provide a 
valuable “public perspective”, and raises issues that can be researched more thoroughly in the 
future. 
The scoring system 
While this is a qualitative assessment, numerical scores are assigned in order to summarise the 
information and to help highlight key weaknesses and strengths of the integrity system. Scores are 
assigned on a 100-point scale in 25-point increments including five possible values: 0, 25, 50, 75 
and 100. The scores prevent the reader getting lost in the details and promote reflection on the 
system as a whole, rather than focusing only on its individual parts. Indicator scores are averaged at 
the dimension level. The three dimension’s scores are then averaged to arrive at the overall score 
for each pillar, which provides a general description of the system’s overall robustness. 
 
VERY STRONG 
 
81-100 
 
STRONG 
 
61-80 
 
MODERATE 
 
41-60 
 
WEAK 
 
21-40 
 
VERY WEAK 
 
0-20 
 
                                                        
5
 www.transparency.org/policy_research/nis/methodology [accessed 21 December 2013]. 
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The scores are not suitable for cross-country rankings or other quantitative comparisons, due to 
differences in data sources across countries applying the assessment methodology and the 
absence of an international review board tasked to ensure comparability of scores.  
Consultative approach and plausibility of findings  
The assessment process in Vanuatu had a strong consultative component, seeking to involve the 
key anti-corruption actors in government, civil society and other relevant sectors. This approach had 
two aims: to generate evidence and to engage a wide range of stakeholders with a view to building 
momentum, political will and civic demand for reform initiatives.  
The consultative approach drove data gathering. Interviews and street surveys engaged both key 
stakeholders and the public. There were four other main parts to consultations: an advisory group, 
information to stakeholders and the public via media and public meetings, discussion papers, and a 
national integrity validation workshop.  
 
NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM ADVISORY GROUP 
 
Mark Bebe, 
Former Director General 
 
Andrew Napuat, 1
st
 Political 
Advisor Minister of Lands 
 
Hon. Ralph Regenvanu, 
Minister of Lands 
 
Francis Bryard,  
Education specialist 
 
Marie Noelle Ferrieux 
Patterson, Chairperson 
Transparency International 
Vanuatu 
 
Michael Taurakoto,  
CEO Wan Smolbag 
 
Bryan Death (until Decr 2014), 
Tourism Councillor Vanuatu 
Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry 
Steve Namali,  
National Custom Land Officer 
Malvatumauri Council Of 
Chiefs 
 
Pastor Shem Them, Secretary 
Vanuatu Christian Council 
 
Bob Makin,  
Freelance journalist 
 
Jeff Joel Patunvanu, 
Private Secretary of Leader of 
the Opposition (at the time the 
report was written) 
 
Evelyn Toa,  
President Media Association of 
Vanuatu 
Viran Molisa, 
Solicitor General 
Rebecca Solomon, 
Vanuatu National Youth 
Council 
 
 
The members of the advisory group met six times (31 July 2013, 19 September 2013, 19 November 
2013, 17 December 2013, 6 March 2014 and 17 April 2014). At the meetings, extensive feedback 
was given by the advisors to the lead researcher on the methodology (for example, identifying 
interviewees and street survey questions) and findings. Each section of the draft report was critically 
reviewed and indicator scores were validated by the advisory group. As peer reviewer, Dr Tess 
Newton Cain also provided comments on the draft report. 
Discussion papers were released to the public and preliminary findings were regularly published in 
the newspaper from August 2013. In April 2014 a public meeting on the National Integrity System 
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Assessment was held in Port Vila. Feedback on the press releases, discussion papers and feedback 
given at the public meeting all contributed to revisions of the report.  
In April and May a number of key stakeholders were re-interviewed to confirm recommendations 
and in May 2014 the assessment process culminated in a consultative national integrity validation 
workshop where the findings of the evaluation were discussed among key stakeholders and 
recommendations for priority actions were finalised.  
The assessment of each pillar went through a series of internal and external reviews. The 
Transparency International secretariat and the advisors reviewed drafts and agreed upon or 
adjusted the preliminary scores assigned by the lead researcher. Several draft chapters were 
reviewed by representatives of the institutions under assessment to correct errors of fact. The draft 
report was updated with the outcomes of the national integrity workshop. The full report was 
reviewed by the Transparency International Secretariat, the advisory group, and one external 
academic reviewer who provided an extensive set of comments and feedback.  
A number of interviewees have changed positions between the time of the interview and the 
publication of the report. Notes record the position that the person held at the time of the interview. 
Limitations 
As discussed in this report, political instability is a major challenge for Vanuatu. Two days after the 
validation workshop was held in May 2014 there was a successful vote of no confidence and the 
government changed, with Joe Natuman becoming the new Prime Minister in replacement of Moana 
Carcasses. In a number of places the guiding questions on the indicators score sheets ask for 
assessments of the current executive or the current government. This report reflects activities of the 
Carcasses led government, which was in place at the time of writing the report.  
Further, report deadlines meant that it was not possible to re-validate findings with representatives 
of the new government. That said, the opposition which is now in government was represented on 
the advisory group and senior public servants and official office holders which were involved in the 
validation workshop have not changed since the change of government. 
While the methodology is developed to be robust and replicable, it does not claim to cover the full 
spectrum of issues on integrity and governance in Vanuatu. Applying a global assessment 
framework means that, necessarily, questions are not tailored to the Vanuatu context.  Due to the 
prescribed approach of the assessment and time and budget limitations, research has been centred 
on Port Vila.  
Assessments of performance are somewhat subjective. In some areas there were competing views 
as to what the main issues were. This report represents a consensus position, with the consensus 
having been agreed through a series of consultative processes. This leaves scope for ongoing 
discussion about the assessment. 
This assessment does not pretend to be complete in all aspects, but should be considered as a 
resource for determining steps to take in strengthening the National Integrity System of Vanuatu. It 
can also be used as a benchmarking tool to measure progress over time.  
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III. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
National Integrity System: A system where all institutions cooperate and 
support each other to fulfil their roles effectively, efficiently and with 
accountability and transparency. 
Definition by Vanuatu National Integrity System Advisory Group 
In 2013, Transparency International Vanuatu commenced a National Integrity System assessment.  
This is the third National Integrity System assessment that has been done in Vanuatu, with previous 
assessments occurring in 2004 and 2006.  The assessment focuses on an evaluation of the key 
public institutions and non-state institutions in a country’s governance system with regard to (1) their 
overall capacity, (2) their internal governance systems and procedures, and (3) their role in the 
overall integrity system. The assessment examines both the formal legal framework of each pillar 
and the actual institutional practice. The analysis highlights discrepancies between the formal 
provisions and reality on the ground, making it clear where there are gaps in the integrity system.  
 
It is Transparency International’s hope that the Vanuatu assessment will generate a set of concrete 
recommendations for the country’s key institutions and other local stakeholders to pursue in order to 
strengthen transparency, accountability and integrity. It should also provide a set of good 
governance benchmarks for the citizens of Vanuatu to hold their government and elected officials to 
account through public dialogue, policy engagement and voting.  
 
Overall assessment of the National Integrity System  
The following diagram visualises the scores for the pillars and illustrates their relative strength. The 
overall score for each pillar is made up of the quantitative assessment of the three dimensions: 
capacity, governance and role. The foundations represent the country profile analysis of the political-
institutional foundations, socio-political foundations, socio-economic foundations and socio-cultural 
foundations. 
 
 
  
15 NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT VANUATU 
 
 
Whilst the diagram shows that there are weaknesses across all pillars, it should be remembered that 
Vanuatu is a developing country that has been independent for less than 35 years. The scores 
within the National Integrity System framework are not, however, adjusted to take these factors into 
account. Instead, the National Integrity System framework presents ideal standards for all countries. 
As such they are aspirational. 
 
Vanuatu is currently in a position where it is able to act to achieve these aspirational standards. The 
country rests on solid socio-cultural foundations. Despite weaknesses in the state widespread civil 
unrest is not currently a feature of life. Human rights are protected in law and usually respected in 
practice. Traditional governance helps to ensure order throughout the country and the traditional 
economy helps to ensure that most people have access to food, water and shelter. 
 
It can also be observed that the 2014 Vanuatu National Integrity System assessment found that 
almost every pillar is currently undertaking activities to strengthen various aspects of capacity and 
governance. If all of these activities are completed then it can be expected that the next assessment 
of Vanuatu’s National Integrity System will show considerable improvements.  
 
National Integrity System pillars  
The judiciary is one of the strongest institutions of the Vanuatu National Integrity System. This 
finding is very important as it shows that the institution entrusted to provide oversight and uphold the 
rule of law has relatively high levels of integrity. This study shows that it is largely independent, 
although it lacks some resources. In order for the judiciary to effectively act as a check, however, 
cases must be brought before it. Weaknesses in other agencies mean that this does not always 
happen.  For example, even when and recommendations of the Office of the Ombudsman and the 
Office of the Auditor General are effectively issued, the lack of prosecutions means that the judiciary 
cannot act to uphold the rule of law.  
 
The media is another institution that performs better than most. Whilst capacity for sustained 
investigative journalism is limited, it is active in reporting on allegations of corruption. The media is 
also active in informing the public about government activities. As such it helps to bring a degree of 
transparency to government operations. 
 
The assessment reveals that there are particular concerns about the political and electoral 
processes in Vanuatu. The electoral management body should be mentioned first because of its 
pivotal role in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process. Vanuatu’s electoral roll has long 
been acknowledged to be inaccurate and there are concerns about the degree to which the 
Electoral Office can operate independently. There are also frequent allegations of wrongdoing by 
candidates during elections and election petitions are regularly brought to court following national 
elections. Prosecutions for electoral misconduct do not, however, occur. No agency has oversight of 
electoral campaign financing.  
 
Weaknesses in the electoral process are of particular concern given the governance challenges 
facing political parties. Whilst political parties “score high” this is because they can operate very 
independently. There are no checks on political party financing and no other external mechanisms to 
ensure accountability or integrity. There is also an increasing number of political parties contesting 
national elections. Political parties often rely on support for individual leaders, rather than a shared 
philosophy or commitment to a particular policy platform. The increasing number of independent 
candidates contesting national elections is, maybe, a reflection of this dynamic. 
 
The increasing number of political parties is a sign of the increasingly fragmented nature of politics. 
Government is by coalition. The executive changes frequently in attempts to maintain power 
balances and support from coalition members. Motions of no confidence in the prime minister are 
frequent, but are usually opportunistic rather than policy driven. As both the legislature and the 
executive frequently have their attention diverted by “horse-trading” their roles as central 
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accountability mechanisms and developers of sustainable national policy initiatives are undermined. 
Some issues relate to lack of capacity, and increased training and support for members of the 
legislature would help them to fulfil their ideal roles better.  
 
The ombudsman and the supreme audit institution both have limited human resource capacity to 
act effectively as watchdogs. There is also, often, little follow up by the legislature, the executive and 
other agencies in response to reports issued by these bodies. Another problem which undercuts the 
ability of these pillars to hold leaders to account is that, although leaders are required to file annual 
returns disclosing assets and liabilities, the law does not permit routine scrutiny of these returns.  
These weaknesses undermine the integrity of a number of pillars within the National Integrity 
System.  
 
Law enforcement, in respect of the key anti-corruption law, the Leadership Code Act, is weak. 
There has never been a prosecution under the Leadership Code Act. The Office of the Public 
Prosecutor has not been functioning well and in 2013 the public prosecutor resigned rather than 
face a commission of inquiry. Some investigations and prosecutions of misappropriation offences do 
occur and the Department of Customs is becoming more active in detecting crimes in relation to tax 
avoidance. These prosecutions are not, however, directed at leaders. 
 
The public sector does have a code of conduct and regularly processes disciplinary complaints. 
However, there are currently no ongoing programmes to encourage ethical behaviour by public 
servants. Nor does the public sector have a defined role in respect of educating the public about 
corruption. The public sector is sometimes undermined by strong influence of the executive on 
appointments in the sector. 
 
Civil society organisations are able to operate freely and some are active in promoting national 
integrity. This sector suffers from lack of capacity and lack of coordination, however. Internal 
governance is also a challenge for many civil society organisations. Whilst civil society organisations 
can and do, at times form successful partnerships with government agencies on policy advocacy 
and public awareness, there is a perception that civil society organisations are not consistently 
viewed by the government as relevant stakeholders in the policymaking process. 
 
Business is not usually perceived within Vanuatu as having a clear role to play in upholding national 
integrity. Whilst businesses support civil society organisations in areas such as sports and provision 
of health services, ongoing business partnerships supporting anti-corruption activities are lacking. 
Few businesses have voluntary codes of good corporate practice. In general there is a reactive 
approach regarding integrity issues, with businesses responding to government initiatives that would 
potentially impact on the operation of the private sector. 
 
Traditional authorities operate throughout the entire country quite independently of the state and 
are central to community governance, particularly outside of the urban areas. There is integration of 
traditional authorities and the state through the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs. This body has 
limited resources, which hinders its activities, although recent constitutional amendments increase 
its ability to act as a check on the legislature in respect of making laws affecting aspects of custom.   
 
Vanuatu does not have an independent anti-corruption institution. Such an institution is 
recommended in the United Nations Convention against Corruption, which Vanuatu is a party to. 
 
Policy themes and recommendations  
The Vanuatu National Integrity System assessment has yielded a number of concrete 
recommendations to address the weaknesses identified through the research and to strengthen the 
anti-corruption safeguards in the country. Pillar-specific recommendations are presented at the end 
of each pillar assessment. Common themes in issues across pillars are: 
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The functioning of most pillars is weakened by failures within the legislature and executive to play 
their role in the “cycle of accountability” and to maintain a stable policy direction. These failures 
largely stem from lack of POLITICAL INTEGRITY. Unless lack of political integrity is addressed it 
will be impossible to consistently develop laws, policies and practices that support national integrity. 
There are significant gaps in the legal frameworks for ACCOUNTABILITY of institutions and 
individuals and the practical implementation of those frameworks. Accountability mechanisms act to 
reduce the gap between law and practice. Unless accountability mechanisms are strengthened laws 
will continue to have little impact on practice. 
Laws and practices tend not to support TRANSPARENCY of actions by institutions and individuals. 
Transparency increases detection of bad behaviour, which in turn enhances accountability. Unless 
transparency is improved it will remain difficult to hold institutions and individuals to account and to 
develop public will for change. 
In many instances it would be unfair to attribute weak performance to intentional corruption. Instead 
technical knowledge and, more fundamentally, an embedded understanding of roles, responsibilities 
and good practice is often lacking. This indicates a lack of HUMAN RESOURCE CAPACITY. As 
well as developing specific human resource capacity, all reforms and strategies to strengthen 
national integrity should be designed to be achievable within Vanuatu’s resource constraints. 
National integrity ultimately rests on each person’s internal ethical foundation. This gives rise to an 
embedded understanding of roles, responsibilities and good practice. AWARENESS to engage both 
“hearts and minds” is critical. Whilst it is easier to build knowledge of rules, systems and behaviours, 
developing internal ethical awareness that is appropriate to a modern democracy must not be 
overlooked. 
 
These themes also suggest a number of priorities amongst recommendations. The main pillars 
involved with political integrity are: political parties, which should be at the heart of developing 
political groupings based on shared philosophies and policy platforms; the electoral management 
body, which administers the system by which political leaders are selected; the legislature, where 
elected representatives should make laws and monitor activities in accordance with the political 
philosophies and policies that they were elected to further; and the executive which should develop 
and implement policy for the good of the Republic of Vanuatu as a whole.  
 
When all of these pillars work well there is a bridge between the public and national political 
processes and public confidence that elected representatives act with integrity. When these pillars 
do not work well public confidence in the political system is undermined. The political system can 
end up being perceived as a system in which political leaders can and do act in their own self-
interest, rather than the national interest. This perception is reinforced by lack of effective 
accountability mechanisms.  
 
Vanuatu is currently facing a crisis in political integrity. Fragmentation of political parties, ongoing 
instability in government and serious deficiencies in the electoral system are some of the problems 
that are openly acknowledged by both the government and the opposition to be issues that must be 
addressed as a matter of urgency. The apparent political will to take steps to address issues of 
political integrity is an encouraging sign.  
 
The following five priority recommendations will help to establish better frameworks within which 
political integrity can be (re)established.   
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In order to enhance political integrity the government must take action as soon as possible 
to:  
 
 
1. develop laws to regulate political parties and independent candidates for election, and in 
particular party finances and campaign finances. 
 
 
2. implement an accurate electoral roll and voting system which is not subject to abuse.  
 
 
3. revise the Standing Orders of Parliament, regulation of members’ allocations and rules about 
the use of motions of no confidence. 
 
 
4. revise the Ombudsman Act and Leadership Code Act to expand the Ombudsman’s powers and 
ensure that there are consequences  for breaches of the Leadership Code. 
 
 
5. enact the Right to Information Bill and revise the Government Act to ensure transparency of the 
executive. 
 
 
All of these changes should be made in a transparent and consultative manner which builds both 
awareness of roles, responsibilities and good practice within a democracy and public and political 
will for change. This is particularly important as some of these changes may require amendments to 
the Constitution which will need to be supported by a public referendum.  
 
A large number of more specific recommendations lie behind these five priority recommendations. 
Most of these recommendations are not new, but have instead been talked about for a decade or 
more. Vanuatu needs to move beyond talk, and take action. In order to continue momentum that 
currently exists in Vanuatu’s political environment and which has been developed whilst undertaking 
this National Integrity System assessment, the key activities for taking the recommendations in this 
report forward are: 
 
 
1. The Vanuatu government must establish a national integrity committee made up of both 
government and non-government representatives. The national integrity committee must 
develop and implement a plan for strengthening national integrity, using the outcomes of this 
report as a starting point for this plan.  
 
 
2. The government should declare 2015 to be the Year of National Integrity and the national 
integrity committee should use this as a focus for implementing changes. 
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IV. COUNTRY PROFILE: 
FOUNDATIONS FOR THE 
NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM 
 
The political, social, economic and cultural foundations of the Republic of Vanuatu, formerly known 
as the New Hebrides, are particularly affected by two factors. First, Vanuatu has only been 
independent for 33 years. Vanuatu was grouped into a single administrative area by English and 
French colonial authorities who commenced colonial administration (in law, if not in practice) in 
1906.  Vanuatu gained Independence in 1980. The indigenous population did not form a single state 
or a homogeneous ethnic grouping prior to colonisation. Traditional authority was not centralised. 
Instead societies were clan or village based. The communitarian values these small scale societies 
were based on are very different to the values of a modern representative democracy.
6
 As a result in 
contemporary Vanuatu the operation of a democratic nation state is confronted by the lack of 
connection between the system of governance established on Independence and traditional forms of 
authority. It has been observed that, ‘Prior to Independence, authority was either exercised by force 
by the two colonial powers or else was traditional and achieved its legitimacy through belief in the 
sanctity of traditions, kastom and obedience to community leaders … At Independence there was a 
sudden shift to a different type of authority and a different, legal-rational basis of legitimacy.’7  
 
Second, Vanuatu’s population of approximately 250,000 people8  is dispersed over 64 islands. Only 
six islands have a population of more than 10,000 people (Efate, Espiritu Santo, Tanna, Malekula, 
Pentecost and Ambae).
9
 ‘Geographical considerations combined with resource considerations 
means that many parts of state legal systems are concentrated in urban areas, and simply do not 
have a presence in “the outer islands” or rural areas.’10 As a result, ‘many people see the state 
government as a remote concept with little impact on their lives’.11  The absence of state authority in 
many areas complicates the challenge of developing a sense of nationhood, the values associated 
with democratic governance and an effective National Integrity System. 
 
Politics 
 
Score: 25 
 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE COUNTRY SUPPORTIVE TO AN EFFECTIVE NATIONAL 
INTEGRITY SYSTEM? 
 
Civil and political rights are protected by law and generally respected. Representative 
democracy is also embedded in law, but democratic processes are not always followed in 
social practice. This contributes to political instability, which undermines the quality and 
                                                        
6
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7
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consistency of leadership. This in turn undermines development of an effective and 
consistent National integrity System. 
 
A range of civil and political rights, including freedom of expression, freedom of association and 
freedom from discrimination are enshrined in the Constitution.
12
 If constitutional rights are violated 
individuals have redress in the Supreme Court.
13
 The United States Department of State observed 
that Vanuatu does have a ‘freely elected government’14 and did not observe issues with the violation 
of civil liberties or political rights such as the freedom of association and freedom of speech in 2012. 
The Brookings Institute index of 141 weak states assesses states on their economic, political, 
security and social welfare performance. Vanuatu scores well, with an overall score of 7.7 out of 10, 
which places it in the top quintile of countries.
15
 Vanuatu faces a number of human rights concerns, 
however. The United States Department of State observes that a number of human rights abuses 
are present, including ‘violence against women … police violence, poor prison conditions, arrests 
without warrants, an extremely slow judicial process, government corruption, and discrimination 
against women.’16 Violations of the rights of women are particularly pervasive. 
 
Notwithstanding its constitutional form and generally positive civil and political rights record, the 
Vanuatu political environment is somewhat unstable, which leads to weaknesses in governance. 
The current political environment is becoming increasingly fragmented.
17
 Since the election in 1991 
no one party has garnered enough seats to be able to govern on its own, resulting in the necessity 
of government by coalition.
18
  There are currently sixteen parties and four independents in 
parliament.
19
  Large coalitions are inherently unstable and there are frequent changes in cabinet, 
coalition and government. For instance, between the 2008 and 2012 elections the prime 
ministership changed seven times, with four of these changes subsequently being voided by court 
action.
20
  The need to maintain coalitions may also lead to political compromises that undermine 
“good governance”. Van Trease observes that the last prime minister to survive a full four year term, 
Ham Lini, ‘managed to do so because he refused to take action … or make decisions that could 
jeopardize the coalition. Maintaining political stability was his prime objective.’21  
 
Increasing fragmentation within politics has, to a degree, been influenced by traditional culture and 
the traditional “big man” model of authority. Power under the “big man” model of authority may be 
obtained through, amongst other things, developing influence through exchange.
22
 The development 
of influence through exchange affects the perception of the role of political leaders and the operation 
of the democratic process. At election time, candidates tend not to attract support on the basis of 
clearly articulated policy positions and are not expected to act as a voice for those policy positions 
within parliament. Instead, members of parliament are ‘expected to provide access to resources and 
“development” funds. Indeed, all members of parliament act as central nodes in networks of 
distribution and exchange focused on access to state resources.’23 The legal structure facilitates this 
dynamic. As discussed in the legislature pillar members of parliament are provided a representation 
allowance VT387,167 (US$3,870) per month.
24
 This allowance combines their “salary” and an 
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annual allocation of VT2 million (US$20,000) to be spent in their constituency.
25
 There is no 
requirement that members of parliament account for the constituency allocation in any way.  
 
This dynamic undermines the operation of policy or values based politics. It also creates an 
incentive for destabilising coalition governments. Because government, and particularly cabinet, 
positions allow members of parliament greater access to resources with which to provide returns to 
their constituencies, a situation occurs in which ‘members of parliament are forced into frantic efforts 
to join government and gain access to the state’s funds. This… [diverts] the attention of members of 
parliament from their institutional roles as law makers, overseers of government, and 
representatives.’26  
 
The nature of the instability within Vanuatu’s political institutions affects continuity of policy and the 
ability of the executive to implement consistent policy. It also affects the law making role of the 
legislature and its ability to act as a check on the executive. These things reduce the ability to 
implement changes that would enhance the National Integrity System. 
 
Society 
 
Score: 50 
 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SOCIAL GROUPS AND BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS AND THE 
POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE COUNTRY SUPPORTIVE OF AN EFFECTIVE NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM? 
 
Vanuatu is ethnically and linguistically diverse. Violent “inter-island” disputes have risen on 
occasion, particularly in urban areas. The main group that experiences socially rooted 
political exclusion is women. A growing source of tension is the relationship between 
indigenous ni-Vanuatu and non-indigenous citizens and residents but this tension is 
currently not so pronounced as to be destabilising. 
 
About 95% of the population is indigenous ni-Vanuatu.
27
 Although the indigenous population is 
broadly Melanesian, the cultural environment is diverse. Over 100 linguistically distinct cultures 
exist, leading a former President of Vanuatu to observe that Vanuatu is ‘like 100 nations inside one 
country.’28 This diversity reduces the potential for large scale race based conflict because there is no 
single dominant race that stands in opposition to one or more minorities.  
 
Conflicts between different indigenous ethnic groups do sometimes break out. These particularly 
occur in urban areas, where a diverse population comes together and jealousies between 
communities may exist. There are also weaker customary authority systems to help maintain order. 
Most notably, in 2007 a violent conflict between Ambrym and Tanna communities living in Port Vila 
led to a state of emergency being declared. There were three deaths and a number of 
hospitalisations. A number of properties were also burned.
29
  
 
The ethnic diversity, as well as reducing a sense of nationhood, also fosters a political environment 
of patronage. As discussed in the politics section above, parliamentarians tend to have a patron-
client relationship with their constituencies. Part of the reason for this is the extreme cultural 
diversity, coupled with the fact that customary social systems continue to be an important aspect of 
social ordering. ‘Kinship ties, often referred to as the wantok system, are central to custom, and are 
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the basis of political groupings, which tend to be small and localised.’30 These factors can lead to 
“islandism” within politics, with political leaders acting in the local, rather than national, interest.   
 
The links between politicians and communities mean that civil society, in the sense of non-
government organisations (NGOs), does not necessarily play a mediation role between the political 
system and the public. Instead, civil society tends to be active in mediating between “introduced” 
values such as human rights and democracy and traditional culture. 
 
A further division in society is the “Anglophone/Francophone” divide. One legacy of Vanuatu’s 
colonial history is a dual education system, with some educated in French and some in English. For 
the first 12 years post- Independence, government was Anglophone, with the opposition being 
Francophone. While the proliferation of parties and the attendant growth of coalition government has 
resulted in the Anglophone/Francophone divide being less obvious, changes between Francophone 
and Anglophone dominated ministries can create instability and inefficiency as staffing, policies and 
programmes may shift to favour one linguistic group over the other. The most notable area that 
Anglophone/Francophone politics and policy shifts affects is education, as Vanuatu maintains a dual 
English/French education system. 
 
Although Melanesian societies can be either matrilineal or patrilineal, Vanuatu society is patriarchal 
and ‘there is an enormous division among ni-Vanuatu based on gender.’31 Violence against women 
is endemic. A 2011 survey found that ‘over half of ever-partnered women (51%) experienced some 
type of physical violence in their lifetime, and one in three (33%) were physically abused in the last 
12 months.’32  This survey also found that violence against women is viewed as normal or 
acceptable by women. Three in five women (60%) agreed with at least one justification for a man to 
beat his wife. More than half of the women interviewed (53%) believe that if bride price is paid, a 
woman becomes the husband’s property.33  
 
Women are underrepresented in politics, with only 17 of the 346 candidates contesting the 2012 
national election being female. ‘Since Independence in 1980, only 5 women have ever been elected 
to Vanuatu’s National Parliament.’34 There is awareness of this issue, however, and in 2013 
Parliament passed an amendment reserving 30% of seats in municipal councils for women.  
 
There is, maybe, growing resentment towards non-indigenous Vanuatu citizens. Former Prime 
Minister Moana Carcasses, who was in position at the time that this report was being researched 
and written, is a naturalised citizen and has been publically attacked on this basis.
35
 An amendment 
to the Representation of the People Act in 2012, which attempted to require rural candidates to 
either be indigenous to their electorate or adopted into their electorate, was ruled to be 
unconstitutional as creating race-based discrimination.
36
 Families who have been in Vanuatu for 
generations are not always recognised as “local”, particularly if they of Asian descent. More 
generally anti-Asian sentiment is growing.
37
 The tensions between “foreign” and “local” are part of 
wider post-colonial issues as to the extent to which development can fit with local culture,
38
 
particularly if it poses a threat to customary land ownership.
39
  They also reflect reactions to 
historical exploitation during the colonial period.
40
 It is somewhat telling that a book on minority rights 
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in the Pacific does not recognise non-indigenous citizens of non-Pacific descent as being 
“minorities”, despite the fact that they are numerical and political minorities and have no right to own 
land.
41
 
 
Economy 
 
Score: 25 
 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE COUNTRY SUPPORTIVE TO AN EFFECTIVE 
NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM? 
 
Vanuatu has a small formal economy, which limits the resources available for government 
programmes. There is a divide between resources in rural and urban areas. There is also a 
divide between people engaged in the cash economy and those who are not. The presence of 
a strong informal traditional economy in rural areas means that “poverty” in the form of 
starvation and destitution are not significant problems for Vanuatu. Rather mainstream 
poverty analysis raises concern about lack of opportunity to access goods such as 
education. Poverty has a particular impact on women. 
 
Vanuatu is on the UN list of least developed countries, primarily because its economy is small and 
remote and is vulnerable to natural shocks and trade shocks.
42
 Part of the reason for this is that 
Vanuatu’s economy relies on agriculture and tourism and both of these sectors are vulnerable to 
natural disasters including cyclones, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and tsunamis. The vulnerability 
of agriculture to shifts in world commodity prices and the vulnerability of tourism to the economic 
performance of its major tourism markets (currently Australia and New Zealand) are other factors 
outside of Vanuatu’s control that contribute to the vulnerability of the economy.43 Political instability 
has also, at times, resulted in mismanagement and hindered foreign investment, particularly in the 
1990s.
44
 Conversely, relative political stability has been used to partially account for periods of 
economic growth.
45
 
 
Economic growth is further hindered because the development of local business is limited by weak 
infrastructure, particularly outside of urban areas. Grid electricity supply is primarily limited to the 
urban areas.
46
 Inter-island shipping is not always reliable, access to airstrips is limited and flights 
between islands are very costly. Road networks are poor.
47
 These factors limit access to the primary 
domestic markets for goods and services. As a result business activity is almost entirely urban 
based.  Costs of production are also high. This is, in part, because many goods used in the process 
of production need to be imported
48
 and Vanuatu’s remoteness makes transportation costs 
associated with importation high.
49
 Similarly, the cost of exporting goods by ship or by plane is a 
hindrance to the development of export markets.
50
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In terms of human development, in 2011 Vanuatu was in the bottom third of medium development 
countries on the UN human development index (HDI), with a rank of 125 out of 197 countries.
51
  The 
HDI ranks countries based upon life expectancy at birth, the average number of years of education 
people over the age of 25 have received and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita.
52
 The 2011 
HDI stated that income per capita was US$3,950 (2005, purchasing power parity).
53
 Since 1985 life 
expectancy has increased 16.6% to 71 years and average years of education has increased 13%.
54
 
Functional literacy, which requires that a person be able to read and write, was estimated in 1999 to 
be 30% for women and 37% for men.
55
 The 2009 census data stated that the percentage of the 
population who could read and write a simple sentence (so have basic literacy, which may not be 
the same as functional literacy) was 84.8%.
56
 Functional literacy is further complicated by the dual 
education system that Vanuatu maintains, with both English and French schools being provided by 
the State. When considering literacy by language, 64% of the population can read and write a 
simple sentence in English, 37% can read and write a simple sentence in French and 74% can read 
and write a simple sentence in Bislama,
57
 a pidgin that is the national language of Vanuatu.
58
 
 
The state does not fund social security benefits such as old age, unemployment or disability 
benefits. Instead the continuation of traditional lifestyles within the informal economy provides a 
“social safety net” that mitigates against poverty. The majority of the labour force operates within the 
informal economy, with 2009 census data indicating that about 61% of the labour force engages in 
subsistence agriculture, unpaid family work or “subsistence plus surplus” activities that involve 
producing some goods for sale at markets, as their principal economic activity. The fact that the 
Constitution protects customary land ownership has helped to ensure the continuation of traditional 
economic structures.  
 
In rural areas, where people primarily reside on their customary land ‘ni-Vanuatu still live in 
“subsistence affluence”, enjoying plentiful natural resources in an unspoilt environment.’59 Whilst 
‘lack of economic opportunity and growing demand for the trappings of modern life are placing 
stresses on rural communities’60 these stresses are different from those experienced in urban areas, 
where many people are immigrants from other islands, so do not have “free” customary land on 
which to dwell. Ninety-two per cent of the rural population, as compared to 41% of the urban 
population has free access to customary land.
61
  In contrast urban dwellers often live in densely 
populated settlements that restrict opportunities to engage in subsistence activities and require more 
cash for food and other basic needs such as housing, water and cooking fuel.
62
 The basic needs 
poverty line reflects this, with the estimated poverty line in Port Vila being almost four times higher 
than the poverty line in rural Vanuatu.
63
  
 
The social safety net provided by the traditional economy means that households below the poverty 
line are unlikely to be starving. Instead, in Vanuatu, poverty relates more to poverty of opportunity, 
with households faced with hard choices between for example, spending money on power, water, 
schooling and clothing.
64
 It can be observed that in rural areas, where state services such as 
healthcare and education and physical infrastructure such as central water and electricity supply are 
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often minimal or entirely absent, poverty of opportunity exists even if income far exceeds the basic 
needs poverty line. 
 
Aid is an important source of income for the country. In 2010 overseas development assistance 
accounted for 16% of gross national income.
65
 The tax base has, in the past, been largely 
dependent on taxes on international trade, which in 2009 accounted for 38% of tax revenue.
66
 In 
2012 Vanuatu joined the World Trade Organisation and there is some concern that obligations 
created by membership will lower tax revenue.
67
 Vanuatu has also suffered tax revenue losses 
through its participation in the Melanesian Spearhead Group Trade Agreement. It has been 
observed that ‘financing continued public investment while preserving low debt will require additional 
tax revenue measures’.68  Whilst the Vanuatu government is exploring ways to strengthen its tax 
base, a fragile business sector and low rates of participation in the cash economy by much of the 
population poses particular challenges. 
 
This socio-economic environment hinders the development of an effective National Integrity System 
in a variety of ways. Government has limited resources to commit to policy initiatives to strengthen 
integrity and limited options for increasing revenue. Households who are struggling to pay bills are 
more likely to forego educating their children. Low education levels reduce informed debate, which 
in turn can reduce demand for change. Low income households are also less likely to be able to 
afford to participate in debates about national issues that are, maybe, far removed from their daily 
realities, as radios, newspapers, transport to meetings all take money. In general, Vanuatu citizens 
are economically weak and thus their focus is on day-to-day living. They are not afforded the luxury 
of time and the resources to attend to broader societal issues, instead needing to focus on the need 
to provide food and shelter to their families.
69
  Inequality and lack of opportunity is also a potential 
driver of unrest and crime, which can divert resources into basic law and order maintenance 
functions. 
Culture 
 
Score: 50 
 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE PREVAILING ETHICS, NORMS AND VALUES OF SOCIETY SUPPORTIVE TO AN 
EFFECTIVE NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM? 
 
Recent data suggests that two-thirds of the population values honesty. However, there is a 
low level of trust that others are acting in accordance with local values. There is also a 
perception that “things are getting worse”. A previous National Integrity System study 
identified a culture of fear of confronting leaders and more recent data supports this finding. 
 
Surveys such as the World Values Survey, conducted by the World Values Survey Association, and 
the Global Barometer, conducted by the Globalbarometer network, which measure levels of public 
trust or “public-mindedness” have not been conducted in Vanuatu. However, the Alternative 
Indicators of Well-being for Melanesia Vanuatu Pilot Study Report 2012 provides some data on how 
culture affects integrity. This study asked respondents how important ten “Melanesian values” were 
to them personally and how important they thought each value was to others in society. The table 
below reports both whether people think the value is important for themselves and whether they 
think other people in society see it as an important value.
70
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As the table above indicates, honesty, whilst important to two-thirds of respondents, was not as 
widely valued as being respectful.  Reciprocity was also more valued, as was a strong family.  This 
data is consistent with commentary in the 2004 Vanuatu National Integrity System study that found, 
‘One obvious source of conflict [between the national integrity system and culture] is the Melanesian 
notion of gift giving, which to Western eyes can appear as bribery. The wantok system, which is a 
system of relationship and reciprocity between kin and villagers, is also blamed for nepotism within 
the public service.’71 
 
It is also interesting to note that respondents’ perceptions of others value systems indicated a lack of 
faith that values were well respected by others. This is consistent with the finding that only 30% of 
respondents had a high level of trust in their neighbours.
72
 It is also consistent with the finding that 
perceptions of the level of community co-operation were not high, with only 22% of urban dwellers 
and 46% of rural dwellers reporting community co-operation to be strong.
73
  
 
Respondents also perceived that the cultural environment had deteriorated over the past two to 
three years: positive values of respectfulness, family priority, co-operation and faithfulness were 
perceived to have gotten weaker by the majority of respondents (70%, 64%, 61% and 58% 
respectively). At the same time negative values of dishonesty, and greed and selfishness were 
perceived to have gotten stronger (by 72% and 78% of respondents respectively).
74
 This data 
suggests that in Vanuatu there is widespread mistrust that others are “doing the right thing”. 
 
Whilst this study did not directly address levels of participation and apathy in state governance, it did 
measure participation in community governance. As the chart below indicates, the majority of 
respondents did attend meetings.  
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Of those that attended meetings, 67% actively participated by speaking sometimes or always. Whilst 
attendance and participation was lower for females and young people,
75
 this data indicates that, at a 
community level, “public mindedness” is present. It also suggests that developing a stronger (two-
way) link between community governance structures and national governance structures may be a 
mechanism to both build awareness of issues and increase public participation.  
 
Another aspect of culture that affects the operation of the National Integrity System is fear. Respect 
for leaders and family may, at times, be closely associated with unquestioning acceptance. The 
2004 National Integrity System Study reported that, ‘People may rather live with the consequences 
of poor and corrupt government than face the hazards of confrontation with those in power. Th[e] 
fear of Black Magic is deeply entrenched … This belief greatly reduces the courage required for 
people to stand up for what is right in the political and social spheres’.76 The Alternative Indicators 
Study supports the presence of this fear, with 65% of respondents being very or slightly afraid of 
black magic.
77
 There is a more general sense of personal insecurity, with 58% also being afraid of 
violent personal attack.
78
 This study does not explore the extent to which confronting those with 
authority creates fear of negative consequences. Anecdotes of people who saw corruption but were 
too afraid of negative consequences (not only violence and black magic) to do anything were 
collected during the course of this research, which suggests that there is, to a degree, a cultural 
dynamic that reinforces silence at times. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
Each pillar assessment concludes with specific recommendations. When implementing pillar 
recommendations foundations should not be overlooked. The following four general foundational 
recommendations should be borne in mind when implementing any and all of the specific pillar 
recommendations. 
1. Politics are affected by clientelistic relationships, which are not conducive to developing a 
policy-led democratic political system.  The members of parliaments’ allocations reinforce 
clientilism as does the system of political appointees, discussed later in the section on the 
executive. Clientilism (or more broadly the wantok system) affect other pillars also.  When 
implementing reforms to pillars, the potential impact of clientilism and ways in which clientilism 
may be reduced should always be considered. 
2. Vanuatu’s society is patriarchal. Gender imbalances affect women in a number of ways, 
including through underrepresentation in politics. When implementing reforms to pillars, 
increasing gender equity, particularly in the political sphere, should always be considered.   
3. Vanuatu’s domestic economy is limited, and this contributes to inequality of service delivery. All 
measures to build national integrity and address corruption should bear in mind the need to 
promote a strong domestic economy and reduced inequality of service delivery. 
4. Vanuatu’s traditional culture remains strong, and community governance engages many 
people. The potential for working with community governance structures (including women’s 
groups, youth groups, religious/faith based groups and chiefly structures) to build commitments 
to national governance should be taken into account when developing all measures to build 
national integrity and address corruption. 
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V. CORRUPTION PROFILE 
 
Vanuatu has been included in two Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer reports, 
in 2010/11 and 2013. These reports indicate that the majority of people in Vanuatu think that 
corruption is a problem. In 2013 63% of Vanuatu respondents indicated that corruption was a 
serious problem, 23% indicated it was a problem and 12% said it was a slight problem.
79
 There is 
also an increasing perception that corruption is getting worse, with 79% in 2013 responding that 
corruption had increased in the past two years.
80
 This can be compared with 2010/11 data, where 
only 64% said that corruption had gotten worse in the past 3 years.
81
 In 2013 13% of respondents 
stated they had paid a bribe in respect of a government service in the past 12 months.
82
 Again this is 
an increase on 2010/11, where only 10% reported having paid a bribe.
83
 
Increasing perceptions of corruption affect almost all institutions. As the table below indicates, in this 
survey all institutions in Vanuatu were perceived to be affected by corruption to some degree. 
Between 2010/11 and 2013 the perceived level of corruption in all institutions except for the media 
increased. 
 
There is little faith that the government is effective in combating corruption, with 56% of respondents 
in 2013 indicating that government efforts to respondent to corruption were ineffective, and a further 
13% indicating efforts were neither effective nor ineffective.
84
 
There are few other studies which go into depth about corruption in Vanuatu. Vanuatu is a 
developing country with limited human resource capacity. As such it is not surprising that there is 
only a small body of academic research. Official reports by government agencies and grey literature, 
including material produced by aid donors and NGOs contributes more to understandings about 
corruption in Vanuatu.  
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The need for “good governance” gained prominence in Vanuatu’s development agenda with the 
introduction of the Comprehensive Reform Programme (CRP) in 1997.
85
 It was popularly understood 
that the CRP was needed because mismanagement and corruption had driven Vanuatu to ‘the 
verge of bankruptcy’,86 although the CRP documentation suggests instead that Vanuatu was not 
bankrupt but instead the catalysing issue was a ‘crisis in confidence in [the] government.’87  This 
crisis in confidence had been driven, in part, by increasing political instability,
88
 an issue that 
continues today. Another factor which contributed to this crisis in confidence was that Vanuatu 
appointed its first ombudsman in 1995 and this office had begun to uncover corruption by political 
leaders.
89
 In Vanuatu there is literature around all three of these areas: the CRP and subsequent 
government development agendas;
90
 political instability;
91
 and the Office of the Ombudsman.
92
 
There is also literature around specific areas that appear to be particularly susceptible to corruption, 
such as land leasing,
93
 and literature that focuses on specific pillars (which has been referenced in 
the foundations and each pillar chapter, as appropriate). The literature does not necessarily directly 
discuss corruption, however. 
A major milestone in the discussion of corruption throughout the Pacific was the National Integrity 
Systems Pacific (NISPAC) project, conducted in 2003/2004.
94
 The NISPAC project conducted 
National Integrity System studies across 12 Pacific countries, including Vanuatu.
95
 The 2004 
Vanuatu National Integrity System Report
96
 was the first holistic assessment of corruption issues 
and integrity across the key institutions of governance. A further Vanuatu National Integrity System 
assessment, updating the 2004 report, was conducted in 2006.
97
 
The previous National Integrity System reports focussed on the performance of the central 
government and state institutions, although as the 2004 Vanuatu National Integrity System Report 
observes, ‘corruption occurs in all levels of society.’98 In particular it is acknowledged that local level 
governance, including municipal and provincial councils is particularly subject to mismanagement 
and corruption.
99
 
Types of corruption occurring in Vanuatu, which have been identified in the past include: political 
appointments; conflicts of interest; and not following formal procedures,
100
 although both this 
national integrity assessment and previous national integrity assessments identify a wide range of 
misbehaviour. All these stem from a fundamental ‘lack of respect for the rule of law or a wilful refusal 
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to be bound by the rules’,101 which facilitates a wide range of corrupt behaviours. This, coupled with 
lack of enforcement,
102
 indicates one of the central causes of corruption. 
Other causes of corruption identified in the 2004 and 2006 National Integrity System reports include: 
the lack of examples of good leadership; mismanagement due to lack of capacity; and low pay 
within the public sector.
103
 Each of these causes “feeds off” each other and reinforces an 
environment of poor practice. Lack of will to change or lack of a sense of personal responsibility due 
to gaining benefits from current weaknesses in national integrity is another cause that affects both 
political leaders and those who benefit from political leaders.
104
 Lack of will to change is exacerbated 
by weak political parties that do not articulate and promote clear policies,
105
 which in turn can help to 
drive voter awareness and strengthen the notion of accountability to the people via electoral 
processes.  
Lack of outrage at misbehaviour by leaders can appear to be acceptance of the status quo,
106
 a 
behaviour that is reinforced by cultural norms of not publically challenging leaders.
107
 It should be 
observed, however, that street surveys conducted as part of the 2014 Vanuatu National Integrity 
System study suggest that there is public will to change laws that provide personal benefit but 
weaken integrity.
108
 A survey on bribery in elections indicate that people think that both those who 
give and receive bribes should be punished.
109
 A follow up survey
110
 of 25 people carried out in 
January 2014 indicated that 36% of people would report bribery if they saw it happening. 
Street surveys also suggest lack of knowledge about how to complain and/or fear of consequences, 
rather than apathy, account for apparent acceptance of the status quo. For instance, lack of 
knowledge about how to complain to the ombudsman reduces complaints.
111
 Of the 64% that would 
not report bribery in the follow up street survey on bribery in elections, all said that they do not know 
where to report to and would also be worried about getting in trouble themselves or getting other 
people in trouble. None said that they would not report because they did not think agencies would 
do anything.  
Whilst these surveys suggest that there is some public will to change, the 2006 report observes that 
‘petty corruption is generally perceived as being acceptable’,112 and that this perpetuates corruption. 
The use of go-betweens with personal connections to facilitate transactions between government 
and business that may otherwise take time was noted in 2004, and was largely accepted s a cost of 
living in a fairly small country.
113
 In a number of areas in this report it was noted that personal 
connections can make a big difference to how matters are handled. 
The difficulty of defining corruption, and in particular separating out behaviours that are acceptable 
in custom but not acceptable in a modern democracy were also discussed as causes of corruption in 
the 2004 Vanuatu National Integrity System Report, although this report was careful to note that 
Melanesian culture ‘does not condone behaviour that benefits that individual at the expense of the 
community. Instead there is a mismatch between introduced notions of corruption and local 
culture.’114 An example of this mismatch is where cultural values of reciprocity and respecting family, 
discussed in the foundations section, may clash with the concept of nepotism in appointments.  
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The mismatch between custom and democratic politics was discussed in more detail in the 2006 
report, with political leaders acting more as “big-men” in a patron-client relationship with their 
constituencies.
115
 As discussed in the foundations chapter of this report, commentators indicate that 
as fragmentation of political parties has increased, so too has this instability driven “big-man” 
politics. 
Costs of corruption noted in the 2004 and 2006 Vanuatu National Integrity System reports include: 
loss of government revenue, which in turn leads to the inability to carry implement government 
services and projects; appointment of people for reasons other than merit, which undermines 
service delivery; lack of investor confidence; lack of respect by the international community and 
donors; and political instability.
116
   
Whilst, as discussed in the next section on anti-corruption activities, a number of positive changes 
are currently in progress, the impact of these changes is yet to be assessed. It can be observed, 
however, the Global Corruption Barometer 2013 recorded that 80% of Vanuatu respondents thought 
that corruption had increased over the past two years.
117
 Fifty-six per cent (56%) of respondents 
thought that government’s actions against corruption were ineffective.118 
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VI. ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTIVITIES 
 
Whilst Vanuatu does not have an anti-corruption strategy good governance is included as a priority 
strategy within the Vanuatu Priorities and Action Agenda (PAA), which is the national development 
plan. The priorities of the PAA 2006-2015 included adequately resourcing the Office of the 
Ombudsman and the Office of the Auditor General and reviewing the Ombudsman Act to increase 
prosecutions following  reports.
119
 The 2012 review of the PAA includes ‘promot[ion of] political 
stability through constitutional changes, political parties legislation, and other changes to support 
stability’120 as a strategy in relation to achieving good governance. Specific indicators relating to this 
strategy include ‘Registration of political parties legislation designed and approved by Parliament; 
Government act amendments drafted and approved by Parliament; People’s Representation act 
amendments drafted and approved by Parliament’.121 Strengthening the Office of the Ombudsman 
and the Office of the Auditor General remain strategies for achieving good governance.
122
 
 
Since the last national integrity assessment in Vanuatu many anti-corruption activities have been 
implemented. One change that affects a number of pillars is that in 2010 Vanuatu ratified the UN 
Convention against Corruption.
123
 In 2013 it was subject to its first country review pursuant to this 
Convention. The review focussed on compliance with chapter 3 of the UN Convention Against 
against Corruption and has identified a number of challenges for implementation and areas where 
technical assistance is required.
124
 Another change impacting upon a number of pillars is that in 
November 2011 the government established the Office of the Government Chief Information Officer 
(OGCIO).
125
 The OGCIO has the role of facilitating the development of information and 
communication technology use by government agencies, with the aims of both enhancing efficiency 
and service delivery by government and improving transparency and accountability.
126
 As the work 
of the OGCIO progresses it is expected that more information, including annual reports and 
corporate plans, from a wide number of government agencies, will become available. The 
government also completed a Right to Information Policy in December 2013.
127
 Implementation of 
this policy is expected to see an increase in transparency across a number of pillars.  
A number of positive changes in capacity of some pillars can be seen. For instance, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is assisting parliament to strengthen capacity in relation 
to the operation of committees, in particular the Public Accounts Committee.
128
 The judiciary is 
implementing a wide scale improvement plan that will, amongst other things, improve capacity of 
judges and court support staff.
129
 The Vanuatu Police Training College has continued to be 
strengthened through the Vanuatu Australia Police Project.
130
 In 2011 914 police officers underwent 
training at this facility.
131
 In 2012 the Vanuatu Institute of Public Sector Administration and 
Management, which provides training the public servants, was established.
132
 Since the last National 
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Integrity System report in 2006 the Vanuatu Institute of Technology has instituted certificate and 
diploma programmes in journalism.
133
 
There are also positive changes to governance of some pillars. For instance, in 2013 parliament 
started to broadcast sessions live over the internet and television, enhancing transparency.
134
 A 
number of laws relating to financial transactions, which enhance transparency and accountability of 
the private sector, have been passed.
135
 In 2013 the government signed an agreement to implement 
an independent police complaints authority, which will enhance accountability of police officers.
136
 
The Office of the Auditor General is undertaking reforms in order to comply with international 
accounting standards, which will enhance the integrity of the office.
137
 Regulatory authorities have  
been established to oversee the delivery of key services in the areas of utilities and 
telecommunications by private sector entities.
138
 The Vanuatu Association of NGOs is developing a 
five year plan that includes producing a manual for board governance.
139
 
This assessment found wide agreement that some pillars were generally beginning to improve. For 
instance, the Office of the Auditor General has begun to clear long-standing backlogs of audit 
reports.
140
 The judiciary is implementing changes to case management to increase efficient 
processing of disputes.
141
 
One of the main drivers of reform initiatives has been aid donor programmes, and in particular, 
Australian Aid. Australian Aid has a number of multi-year programmes in areas such an education, 
health, infrastructure development, governance, and law and justice
142
 that align with the 
Government Priorities and Action Agenda and help to provide a degree of policy stability in the face 
of political instability. Conversely, however, externally driven projects may lack stakeholder buy-in 
and be unsustainable in the long-term.
143
 
Not all anti-corruption activities are externally driven. In the 2012 national elections some parties 
campaigned on anti-corruption platforms.
144
 The former government led by Moana Carcasses 
attempted to position itself as “anti-corruption” through measures such as releasing a 100 Day Plan 
when it first gained power. Example actions on this list that had an anti-corruption focus included 
establishing a public concerns monitoring group, extending the legal powers of the ombudsman and 
consultation with political parties on reform of the political system.
145
 Whilst none of these actions 
have been completed, the development of the 100 Day Plan suggests that “being anti-corruption” is 
now seen as a useful political position to assume. Growing awareness in the area of anti-corruption 
has, maybe, helped to contribute to moves by a number of political parties both within the 
government and the opposition to begin to publically discuss political integrity.
146
 The government 
established in May 2014 following the ousting of Carcasses has indicated that it is committed to 
continuing the political integrity agenda.
147  
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VII.1. LEGISLATURE 
 
SUMMARY 
Overall pillar score: 38.9 
Dimension Indicator Law Practice 
Capacity 
62.5 
Resources 50 50 
Independence 100 50 
Governance 
29.2 
Transparency 25 25 
Accountability 50 25 
Integrity 50 0 
Role 
25 
Executive oversight 25 
Legal reforms 25 
 
A new Clerk of Parliament assumed his position in June 2013 and the management of parliament is 
undergoing some change. The operation of Vanuatu’s Parliament has become more open, with 
video now being broadcast live over the internet. Recordings are also available on the parliament 
website. The backlog of Hansards has also been reduced and a number of other plans to strengthen 
the functioning of committees with the assistance of agencies such as UNDP and the Parliament of 
Queensland are underway. The administration of parliament does, however, suffer from lack of 
human resources.  
Whilst the administration of the legislature is developing there is considerable concern about the 
performance of members of parliament. Parliament is currently comprised of representatives of 16 
political parties and four independent members. This necessarily means government is a coalition. 
Coalitions are unstable and motions of no confidence are frequent. The causes of instability are 
discussed further in the foundations section, and are, in large part, a reflection of the socio-cultural 
environment in which democracy operates. As such, instability is not able to be simply cured by law 
reforms. 
Internal politicking, including changes in executive positions, occurs in order to maintain coalitions or 
succeed in motions of no confidence. This weakens the ability for the legislature to play its role as 
the central accountability mechanism for public entities and expenditure. It also distracts members of 
parliament from their role as representatives of the people. Members do little to inform their 
constituencies about the work of parliament or represent their concerns in parliament. There is also 
little public information about Bills, or opportunities for the public to contribute to discussion 
associated with legislative changes. Public trust in members of parliament is low.  
STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION 
Vanuatu’s constitutional form is a representative democracy. Parliament is formed through national 
elections which occur at intervals of no more than four years.
148
 Parliament is unicameral and is 
comprised of 52 members. Once parliament is elected the members of parliament collectively form 
the legislature. The executive is drawn from parliament, with members voting to elect the prime 
minister,
149
 who then appoints his (Vanuatu has only ever had male prime ministers) cabinet.
150
 The 
speaker of parliament and one or more deputy speakers are elected by parliament.
151
  Two ordinary 
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sessions of parliament are held each year, in March and August. Extraordinary sessions can be 
called outside of these times.
152
 
 
There are currently eight standing committees of parliament: the Standing Orders Review 
Committee; the Institutions Committee; the Privileges Committee; the Committee on Economic 
Policy; the Public Accounts Committee; the Committee on Social Policy; the Committee on the 
Members of Parliament Ethics and Integrity; and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and External 
Trade.
153
 Each is made up of seven members of parliament, selected by the prime minister and the 
leader of the opposition. No members of standing committees can be ministers. As discussed in the 
foundations and executive sections, frequent changes in ministers mean that committees are largely 
comprised of new members of parliament and less prominent backbenchers.  
 
The Parliament (Administration) Act came into force in 2006 and outlines the administrative structure 
of parliament. This Act establishes a four member Parliamentary Management Board, comprised of 
the speaker of parliament, the prime minister, the leader of the opposition and the parliamentary 
counsel.
154
 The Parliamentary Management Board has the responsibility for overseeing the 
management of parliament, including parliamentary committees.
155
 The primary administrator is the 
clerk of parliament, who is appointed by the president on advice of the Parliamentary Management 
Committee.
156
 The Act requires four assistant clerks to be appointed,
157
 along with other staff as is 
necessary.
158
 There is also provision for the speaker to directly appoint staff to assist him.
159
 
ASSESSMENT 
Capacity 
Resources (law) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS IN PLACE THAT PROVIDE THE LEGISLATURE WITH ADEQUATE 
FINANCIAL, HUMAN AND INFRASTRUCTURE RESOURCES TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT ITS DUTIES?  
 
Members set their own levels of allowances. However, there are few statutory requirements 
as to administrative support that must be provided to the legislature. 
 
Section 22(1) of the Parliament (Administration) Act provides that ‘prior to each fiscal year, the 
Board must direct the clerk of parliament to prepare an estimate of the sums that Parliament will be 
required to provide for the payment of the expenses of parliament and its Members.’ The clerk must 
also ‘prepare the estimate for Parliament within the ceiling established for Parliament for the fiscal 
year by the Council of Ministers.’160 By law members of parliament set their own allowances, 
including representation and travel allowances.
161
 The estimate provided by the clerk of parliament 
must include these statutorily determined sums.  
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In terms of human resources the law requires the appointment of a clerk of parliament and four 
assistant clerks.
162
 Whilst other staff can be appointed there is no statutory requirement that they be 
appointed, although there is an assumption, in law, that parliamentary counsel will exist.
163
  
Resources (practice) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE LEGISLATURE HAVE ADEQUATE RESOURCES TO CARRY OUT ITS DUTIES IN 
PRACTICE? 
 
Although individual members are provided with adequate allowances, the efficient 
administration of parliament is hindered by resource issues. 
The operations of parliament are hindered in part by lack of staff and in part by issues relating to 
management of staff.
164
 Whilst parliament does maintain a library there is currently no mechanism to 
ensure that copies of all reports tabled in parliament get placed in the library.
165
 Observation 
indicates that much of the material in the library is out of date.
166
 
There is particular inadequacy in the area of committee resources. Whilst financial resources are 
committed for the sitting of committees and for committees to conduct activities, human resource 
support is lacking. One assistant clerk is responsible for all committees.
167
 The work of the 
committees is further hindered by frequent changes in the executive and government, as these 
result in the composition of committees changing. UNDP is currently supporting Vanuatu parliament 
to employ a technical advisor to support the work of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC).
168
 The 
functioning of committees has also been a particular focus of support via a parliamentary twinning 
programme with the Parliament of Queensland.
169
  
Summarised proceedings have not been published regularly. However, a new clerk was appointed 
in mid-2013 and he is working with the Hansard division to clear this backlog and improve reporting.   
Proceedings from 2007 to 2010 were published in August 2013.
170
 Improvements to the 
parliamentary sound system and recording should help to ensure the production of Hansards. The 
latest improvements, introduced after July 2013, include facilities to broadcast parliament live over 
the internet and television, as well as radio. The November 2013 sitting of parliament was the first to 
be broadcast in this manner.
171
   This project has been implemented by the New Caledonia 
Congress with the assistance of the Agence de Développement Economique de la Nouvelle-
Calédonie. 
Each member of parliament is provided with an office equipped with computer facilities. There is one 
legislative counsel to support the 52 members of parliament. In practice she supports the 
executive.
172
 Political factions do not maintain their own parliamentary researchers or support staff 
although, as discussed in the section on the executive, members of the executive are supported by 
political advisors. Members of parliament set their own representation and travel allowances which 
ensures their adequacy. Members of parliament are currently provided a representation allowance 
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of VT387,167 (US$3870) per month.
173
 This allowance combines their “salary” and an annual 
allocation of VT2 million (US$20,000) to be spent in their constituency.
174
 There is no requirement 
that members of parliament account for the constituency allocation in any way. There are also, 
apparently, proposals to raise the this allocation to VT10 million (US$100,000) for some, or all, 
members of parliament.
175
 As discussed in the foundations section, there is a concern that this leads 
to clientelistic politics, where candidates for election to parliament are voted for based on what they 
can give to their supporters, rather than what policies they advocate for national development. 
Street survey research conducted by National Integrity System researchers in late 2013 indicated 
that 90% of the 50 respondents thought that members of parliament were corrupt. Forty per cent 
(40%) wanted to see changes to the members of parliaments’ allocation.176 A follow up survey in 
January 2014 with a further 50 respondents indicated that 80% of respondents thought that 
members of parliament’ allocations were not allocated fairly, with a further 8% being unsure if 
allocation was fair or not. The main reasons why allocations were seen to be unfair were that people 
perceived that members of parliaments’ allocations were distributed only to voters/political 
supporters, or distributed only to families and friends (including wantoks and communities that were 
directly related to the member of parliament).
177
 A smaller survey was then conducted to find out if 
dissatisfaction was due to not receiving allocations. Of those that thought the allocation was unfair, 
61% had received goods or money from a member’s allocation.178 This suggests that people 
perceive the system as being flawed, even if they are personally benefitting from it. 
Concern has been expressed over the extent to which all members of parliament fully understand 
their duties.
179
 There have been calls to change the educational qualifications required to be eligible 
to stand as a candidate.
180
 A street survey carried out by researchers as part of the National Integrity 
System research indicates that there is considerable public support for this proposal.
181
 The issue 
was also debated in Vanuatu’s youth parliament in November 2013, with youth parliamentarians 
voting in support of a mock Bill to increase the educational qualifications required to be eligible to 
stand as a candidate for election.
182
 Training of members of parliament is limited. Whilst induction 
programmes have been conducted for new members following the 2008 and 2012 national 
elections, these programmes take place over a week, so are necessarily superficial.  
Independence (law) 
Score: 100 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE LEGISLATURE INDEPENDENT AND FREE FROM SUBORDINATION TO EXTERNAL ACTORS 
BY LAW?  
 
There are comprehensive laws seeking to ensure the independence of the legislature. 
Parliament has a fixed life of four years and can only be dissolved earlier by the vote of an absolute 
majority of members of parliament when three-quarters of members are present or by the president 
of the Republic of Vanuatu acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers. If parliament is dissolved 
                                                        
173
 Parliament (Members’ Expenses and Allowances) Amendment Act 2012. 
174
 www.facebook.com/notes/vote-against-merging-of-vanuatu-mp-allocation-and-salary/email-from-mp-ralph-
regenvanu/140403422677768 [accessed 27 February 2014]. 
175
 Opposition Office Press Statement, 4 February 2014. 
176
 www.dropbox.com/s/m7hza7n0j36axb6/Press5.pdf [accessed 11 March 2014]. 
177
 Transparency International Vanuatu Press Release 14 March 2014. 
178
 Ibid. 
179
 Interview of Louis Kalnpel, Clerk of Parliament with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 18 October 2013; Michael G Morgan, 
Integrating Reform: Legislative Needs Assessment, Republic of Vanuatu (Technical Report for UNDP, March-April 
2001). 
180
 Transparency Vanuatu, 2012 Vanuatu General Election, Election Observer Team Report (Port Vila: Transparency 
Vanuatu, 2013). 
181
 www.dropbox.com/s/2vl2oag1g3s7spy/Press2.pdf [accessed 11 March 2014]. 
182
www.parliament.gov.vu/Home%20Page%20Archived/2013/Youth%20Parliament's%20role%20in%20Political%20Pa
rty%20reform%20highlighted.html [accessed 27 February 2014]. 
  
39 NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT VANUATU 
 
 
early then, once a new parliament is established following elections, it cannot be dissolved in the 
first 12 months of its life.
183
 
In addition to the two ordinary sessions each year extraordinary sessions can be held at any time on 
the request of the speaker, the prime minister or the majority of members of parliament.
184
 In the 
event that the speaker refuses to call an extraordinary session the matter can, and has, been taken 
to court. 
The clerk prepares the agenda for each sitting day of parliament, although the speaker can add 
items.
185
 The speaker and deputy speakers are elected by parliament.
186
 Parliament also controls 
the establishment of parliamentary committees and the appointment of members to these 
committees.
187
 The committees can include standing committees and ad hoc committees.
188
 
As stated in the section on structure above, the Parliamentary Management Board is comprised of 
the speaker of parliament, the prime minister, the leader of the opposition and the parliamentary 
counsel. Administrative staff of parliament are appointed by this board, either directly or, in the case 
of the clerk, by the president on the advice of the board. 
Whilst police do not require special permission to enter parliament, ‘No member of Parliament may 
be arrested, detained, prosecuted or proceeded against in respect of opinions given or votes cast by 
him in Parliament in the exercise of his office.’189 Further, no member may be arrested or prosecuted 
for any offence during a session of parliament or one of its committees, unless authorised by 
parliament.
190
 
Independence (practice) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE LEGISLATURE FREE FROM SUBORDINATION TO EXTERNAL ACTORS IN PRACTICE? 
 
Whilst boycotts and other tactics can be used to attempt to undermine the legislature, the 
judiciary is active in ensuring that the Standing Orders of Parliament are adhered to.  
However, internal politicking undermines the separation of the executive and the legislature. 
In practice the president rarely exercises his power to dissolve parliament on the advice of the 
Council of Ministers. This last occurred in May 2004, when the prime minister was facing a motion of 
no confidence. In June 2011, when there were ongoing issues relating to the position of the prime 
minister
191
 there was some discussion of whether the president would dissolve parliament. This did 
not, however, occur. 
On a number of occasions the speaker has attempted to close sessions of parliament, or not call 
extraordinary sessions. This is often done to avoid debates on motions of no confidence either in the 
government or the speaker. In these instances matters can be referred to the court to ensure that 
parliamentary process is followed. Another common tactic to avoid the progress of debates is for 
factions to boycott sittings, thereby ensuring no quorum can be established. 
The executive (Council of Ministers) dominates the agenda of the legislature. In the past five years 
all Bills have originated with the government. Whilst there are sometimes complaints that Bills are 
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presented late, the unstable and frequently changing nature of Vanuatu’s executive means that it is 
not accused of undue interference. However, there are concerns about the lack of separation of the 
executive and the legislature.
192
 One way in which this is indicated is by the lack of debate on many 
Bills. It is not uncommon for a Bill to pass through all stages of the legislative process in one or two 
days.
193
  
The unstable nature of Vanuatu’s executive provides a significant threat to the independent 
functioning of the legislature. Motions of no confidence are frequent. Even if the prime minister does 
not change, changes in ministerial positions in order to alter the balance of power within governing 
coalitions are also frequent. When attention is focussed on internal politicking either legislative 
business does not proceed, or matters are not properly scrutinised. 
Governance 
Transparency (law) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT THE PUBLIC CAN OBTAIN RELEVANT AND 
TIMELY INFORMATION ON THE ACTIVITIES AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES OF THE LEGISLATURE? 
 
Despite the constitutional requirement that proceedings of parliament are to be held in 
public, other rules relating to the operation of parliament do not support transparency. 
The Constitution states that, ‘Unless otherwise provided proceedings of Parliament shall be held in 
public.’194 The Standing Orders provide that ‘visitors may be admitted only to such places as may be 
reserved for them by the speaker. Visitors shall be properly dressed and they shall remain seated 
and silent.’195 The speaker may also ‘order the withdrawal of visitors in special circumstances’196 
although special circumstances are not defined. 
The clerk is required to send members a list of Bills at least 15 days prior to the commencement of 
an ordinary parliamentary session.
197
 Copies of Bills, in English and French, must be made available 
to members at least 10 days prior to the session at which they are to be debated.
198
 There is no 
requirement that either the list of Bills or copies of Bills be made available to the public. Whilst 
documents to be tabled are provided in the daily agendas
199
 and tabled documents are to be 
recorded in the Minutes,
200
 again there is no requirement that daily agendas be made public.  
The law does not require verbatim recordings of sessions to be made. Nor does the law require that 
voting records must be made public. There is no provision on the Standing Orders for the public to 
directly submit written questions to the legislature. Whilst the issue of reviewing the Standing Orders 
was identified as a priority during the Comprehensive Reform Programme initiated in the late 1990s, 
revised Standing Orders still have not been introduced. 
Proceedings of standing committees are not open to the public other than during the hearing of 
evidence. Reports of standing committees are also confidential until they have been presented in 
parliament.
201
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There is no legal requirement that parliament provides annual reports in respect of its operations. 
Nor is there any requirement that members of parliament account for their representation 
allowances. 
Transparency (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT CAN THE PUBLIC OBTAIN RELEVANT AND TIMELY INFORMATION ON THE ACTIVITIES AND 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES OF THE LEGISLATURE IN PRACTICE? 
 
Whilst it is possible to view parliamentary sessions now, it is not easy to gain information 
prior to parliament sitting. There is also very little transparency in respect of the use of 
members’ representation allowances. 
As discussed above, major improvements with public access to parliament have occurred in late 
2013. Facilities to broadcast parliamentary sessions over the television and the internet have been 
installed. The November-December session of parliament was broadcast on radio, television as well 
as over the internet. The videoed sessions are archived on parliament’s website and available for 
anyone to access.
202
 
In the past there have been significant delays in the publication of Hansards, so the public has not 
been able to get timely access to records. Hansards, which are summarised records, are now 
available for sessions up to 2010.
203
 These contain brief voting records, in that members who vote 
against the Bill or abstain are recorded. Many Bills are passed unanimously, and records do not 
state which members were present during the vote. They also do not contain information on 
documents that have been tabled, although it is unknown if this is because documents are not 
tabled.
204
 
Gaining information prior to sessions is difficult. Whilst parliament does publish lists of Bills on its 
website, the Bills themselves are not made available to the public. Nor is information on documents 
to be tabled made available. Whilst the media reports on activities within parliament, this often is 
done after debates have taken place. As a result of being unable to access information prior to 
parliamentary sessions, media is unable to assist in generating public debate on matters that will be 
arising.
205
 In order to get Bills before sessions, reliance must be placed upon personal contacts. It is 
not usual for members of parliament to hold public meetings or consultations on matters, although 
this does sometimes occur. A notable instance prior to the November 2013 session of parliament 
was a series of public consultations by the Minister of Lands on proposed changes to land laws. It is 
not usual for members of public to submit questions via their elected representatives to be asked 
during legislative question time. 
Budgets of parliament are published as part of the annual government budget. There is no 
subsequent public reporting of how this budget is used.  
Whilst a small number of members of parliament have voluntarily published a statement of how they 
have spent their representation allowances, this is the exception, rather than the rule.  
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Accountability (law) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT THE LEGISLATURE HAS TO REPORT ON 
AND BE ANSWERABLE FOR ITS ACTIONS? 
 
Whilst parliament is accountable to the courts for the constitutionality of its decisions and 
must consult with the public on some amendments to the Constitution, accountability of 
individual legislators to other bodies such as the Office of the Auditor General and the Office 
of the Ombudsman is extremely limited. 
The only regular review of legislative activities is conducted by the auditor general as part of his 
general duty to audit and report to parliament and the government on public accounts.
206
 However, 
as discussed in the section on transparency above, there is no auditing of how individual members 
use their representation allowances. This is because they are paid as a “salary” so the powers of the 
auditor general only extend to ensuring that allowances have been paid to members.  
The Supreme Court has the authority to review any Bill that has been passed by the parliament.
207
 
This usually happens when Bills are referred by the president to the Supreme Court prior to their 
promulgation. However the Supreme Court can also review Acts that have been brought into force. 
The only time that public consultation is required by law is when a Bill to amend ‘a provision of the 
Constitution regarding the status of Bislama, English and French, the electoral system, or the 
parliamentary system’ is passed by parliament. Such a Bill can only come into law if it is supported 
by a public referendum.
208
  Following a constitutional amendment in December 2013 the 
Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs must be consulted on ‘‘any question relating to tradition and custom 
and land in connection with any bill before Parliament.’209 
The ombudsman is tasked to handle complaints regarding breaches of the leadership code and 
maladministration. The powers of the ombudsman are discussed further in the ombudsman section 
of this report. It can be observed that the ombudsman only has the power to make 
recommendations. As discussed in the judiciary section of this report, the judiciary is also active in 
overseeing the activities of the legislature, and, in particular, adherence to the Standing Orders. 
Accountability (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT DO THE LEGISLATURE AND ITS MEMBERS REPORT ON AND ANSWER FOR THEIR ACTIONS IN 
PRACTICE? 
 
Accountability to the court occurs when matters are placed before it. Little proactive 
accountability via other mechanisms occurs. 
There is very little consultation of the public by the legislature, either as a group or through individual 
legislators. Whilst standing committees are established to debate various issues, debate is often 
limited to the members of committees and does not enter the public domain. Indeed a recent survey 
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conducted by Transparency International Vanuatu indicated that improving consultations was the 
main measure that the public wanted the legislature to undertake.
210
 
Whilst the public can make complaints to the ombudsman, as discussed in that section, very little 
action occurs as the result of ombudsman’s reports. This may have contributed to the decline in the 
number of public complaints being made to the ombudsman.  
There is no regular reporting of the legislature either to the public, or to state bodies. However, Bills 
are regularly presented to the Supreme Court to determine their constitutionality. Further, as 
discussed in the section on the judiciary, active oversight of adherence to the Standing Orders 
occurs when cases are brought before the court. 
Constitutional immunity provisions in respect of liability for statements made during parliamentary 
debate are not often used. The last instance occurred in 2004, when the then prime minister was 
prosecuted for contempt of court for comments made during a parliamentary debate on a motion of 
no confidence. It was held that privilege applied.
211
  
Integrity (law) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE MECHANISMS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF MEMBERS OF THE 
LEGISLATURE? 
 
The Leadership Code Act is fairly comprehensive although the lack of legal provisions 
relating to public disclosure or other regular scrutiny of annual returns weakens their 
effectiveness as an accountability mechanism. 
The two main sources of integrity rules are the Standing Orders of Parliament and the Leadership 
Code Act.  The Leadership Code Act generally requires that, ‘A leader must behave fairly and 
honestly in all his or her official dealings with colleagues and other people, avoid personal gain, and 
avoid behaviour that is likely to bring his or her office into disrepute. A leader must ensure that he or 
she is familiar with and understands the laws that affect the area or role of his or her leadership.’212  
Leaders include, but are not limited to, members of parliament.  
Whilst members of parliament cannot hold public office
213
 there is no specific restriction on private 
sector activities. The Standing Orders do, however, require members of parliament to inform the 
speaker of political party affiliations and of ‘all companies, businesses or other organisations in 
which he has any pecuniary interest of any kind whether direct or indirect  as owner, employee, 
partner, shareholder or otherwise.’214 The speaker is required to keep records of all private sector 
interests
215
 and members are prohibited from participating in any debate or vote without first 
disclosing their interests.
216
 The Leadership Code Act also contains provisions relating to conflict of 
interest.  Leaders must disclose personal interests,
217
 must divest themselves of assets likely to 
create conflict with their duties
218
 and must not act in any matter where they have a conflict of 
interest.
219
 They are also restricted in accepting loans
220
 and limited in having beneficial interests in 
government contracts.
221
 There are, however, no post-employment restrictions. 
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In order to help ensure that leaders are not using their positions for personal gain they are required 
to make annual returns that disclose all major assets, liabilities, income, and major positions held.
 222
 
These annual returns must also be filed for their spouse, children and trusts of which they are 
beneficiaries.
223
  
These returns should record gifts and hospitality. Further, there is provision in the Act to regulate the 
receipt of gifts to the state,
224
 although no such regulations have been made. Accepting gifts under 
custom is not a breach if done openly and follows traditional practice.
225
 There is no requirement that 
a record of contact with lobbyists is kept. Annual returns are provided to the clerk of parliament who 
must keep them confidential, although they can be released to other parties (in particular the 
ombudsman) pursuant to an investigation or prosecution of breaches of the law.
226
 The law does not 
require them to be subject to regular scrutiny and the ombudsman is not permitted to scrutinise them 
in order to determine whether an investigation should be launched. The clerk must also publish in 
the Gazette, by March of each year, a list of those who have filed annual returns and those who 
have failed to do so.  
Breaches of the Leadership Code Act are criminal offences and can be prosecuted. 
Integrity (practice) 
Score: 0 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE INTEGRITY OF LEGISLATORS ENSURED IN PRACTICE? 
 
There is a complete absence of enforcement of the Leadership Code Act. 
Lists of leaders who have filed or not filed annual returns are not consistently published in the 
Gazette. Even when leaders fail to file returns and the list is published, no further action is taken. 
The last ombudsman’s public report on this topic was published in 2009 and related to 188 leaders 
who had failed to file annual returns in 2007.
227
 
Nobody is empowered in law to scrutinise the content of these returns unless an investigation for a 
breach of the Leadership Code Act has been commenced, and as a result there is no regular 
scrutiny of the content of annual returns. Therefore, even if they are filed, they are ineffective in 
practice as an accountability mechanism. 
Despite a number of ombudsman reports recommending that further action be taken due to 
apparent breaches of the Leadership Code Act, no prosecutions have been initiated. In the past five 
years reports which have recommended prosecution of members of the legislature for breaches of 
the Leadership Code Act  have included: a report on former member of parliament for breaches of 
the Leadership Code Act associated with his involvement in abetting forgery;
228
a report on a then 
member of parliament for breaches of the Leadership Code Act associated with his conviction for 
abetting an assault;
229
 a report on the Prime Minister and his cabinet for breaches of the Leadership 
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Code Act associated with not complying with the Government Contracts and Tenders Act;
230
 reports, 
in 2007, 2008 and 2009 recommending prosecution for leaders who have failed to file annual returns 
under the Leadership Code Act;
231
 and a report on misuse of personal office for private gain by the 
then Speaker of Parliament.
232
 
Role 
Executive oversight 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE LEGISLATURE PROVIDE EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT OF THE EXECUTIVE? 
 
Whilst the legislature has some power to scrutinise the executive, it is not consistent in 
fulfilling this role. Internal politicking and weak committee structures hinder the legislature 
from acting as an effective check on the executive. 
The legislature does not have the power to establish commissions of inquiry. Instead this power is 
vested in the minister of justice.
233
 The legislature can, however, establish ad hoc committees to 
investigate Bills or matters raised in motions.
234
 It can also establish a standing committee ‘in order 
to examine, enquire or consider any business, question or matter related to a ministry, department 
or service of the Government or the Republic of Vanuatu.’235 Although a number of standing 
committees are established they do not release regular reports which indicates the extent to which 
they provide effective oversight of the government.  
Whilst the legislature approves the national budget through Appropriation Acts, it is not very effective 
in scrutinising public expenditure. This is largely due to weaknesses in the functioning of the PAC 
and lack of parliamentary action when the PAC does report. Whilst the Parliament (Administration) 
Act requires all ministers to prepare an annual report for parliament
236
 recent Hansards have not 
recorded any public debate on these reports. Some decisions are, however, challenged.  In mid-
2013 the opposition sought judicial review over an agreement that the government had signed with a 
private company.
237
 Whilst the review was unsuccessful parliament has established an ad hoc 
committee to investigate the agreement. The opposition is not provided with counsel, and instead 
must engage private law firms to take actions for judicial review. This is costly, and reduces the 
extent to which judicial review is used. The absence of opposition counsel also means that the 
opposition is not routinely provided with independent technical advice on Bills.
238
 
The main mechanism for controlling the executive is the motion of no confidence. However, as 
discussed in the foundations section and the section above on independence, Vanuatu’s political 
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environment is very unstable. Motions of no confidence, or rumours of motions of no confidence, are 
frequent. In this environment, where members of parliament stand to gain by shifts in the 
government and executive posts, motions of no confidence are largely seen as a self-serving 
device, rather than a device to hold the executive to account. 
Legal reforms 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE LEGISLATURE PRIORITISE ANTI-CORRUPTION AND GOVERNANCE AS A CONCERN IN 
THE COUNTRY? 
 
Whilst a major international Convention in the area of anti-corruption has been ratified, there 
is no clear programme of developing national laws to respond to issues of corruption. 
The UN Convention against Corruption was ratified in 2010.
239
 However, no specific legislative 
reforms have occurred in furtherance of compliance with this Convention. Changes in government 
make it difficult for the legislature to embark on and adhere to a comprehensive anti-corruption law 
reform agenda, and also make it difficult to assess the degree to which there is commitment for such 
an agenda. The Carcasses government released a “100 day plan” when it first came into power. 
This plan contained a list of actions, some of which had a clear anti-corruption focus. Example 
actions included establishing a public concerns monitoring group comprised of both government and 
non-government representatives, extending the legal powers of the ombudsman, revising some 
provisions in the Leadership Code Act, and consultation with political parties on reform of the 
political system. 
240
 None of these actions were completed, however. That said, whilst the Carcasses 
government was ousted by a motion of no confidence in May 2014 the new Prime Minister Joe 
Natuman has indicated that the need to continue activities to reform the political system and 
enhance political stability remains a policy priority.
241
 
Whilst a number of positive law reforms are listed in the anti-corruption activities section, there have 
also been some reforms that appear to facilitate corruption. Somewhat controversial reforms include 
changes to passport laws. Vanuatu has historically been embroiled in a number of passport 
scandals, particularly relating to diplomatic passports.  A new Passports Act was introduced in 2009 
and a number of diplomatic passports were cancelled after this new law.
242
 However, in 2010 it was 
reported in the Daily Post that more non-citizens held diplomatic passports than citizens.
243
 In 2011 
the Passports Act was amended to allow non-citizens to hold Vanuatu diplomatic passports and this 
was seen by some as facilitating the corrupt sale of diplomatic passports.
244
 
Changes to laws surrounding election petitions have also been controversial. Whilst it has always 
been the case that election petitions on the grounds of improper conduct will only be successful if 
the improper conduct affected the result of the election, the law also used to provide that if a 
candidate were convicted of an election offence, then his or her election would be declared invalid. 
This provision was removed in 2012 and replaced with a much narrower provision relating to 
spending or allocating money during a set period around elections.
245
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Parliament should be the “hub” of accountability, with other agencies reporting to it. It should 
also be a source of information on activities, via annual and other reports presented to 
parliament. Currently it does not serve this function. Further, there is little communication 
between members of parliament and the public, and little public information on matters going 
before parliament. This may be, in part, due to the absence of a requirement in the Standing 
Orders that information, including copies of Bills be made publically available. Short time frames 
between when members receive Bills and parliament sits also hinder opportunities for 
consultation. It is recommended that the Parliamentary Management Board takes action to 
ensure that: 
 
a. Standing Orders are reviewed to include a requirement that lists of documents to be 
tabled, as well as Bills, are issued prior to parliamentary sessions, and that this list and 
all Bills be published to both members of parliament and the public. It is recommended 
that the Standing Orders be reviewed to ensure members have adequate time to 
consult (with technical advisors, the public and other stakeholders) on Bills. 
b. Procedures of parliament are reviewed to require that every report tabled in parliament 
is to be made available through the parliament library unless matters of national 
security require otherwise. 
c. Parliamentary committees are reviewed and strengthened to allow them to fulfil their 
role as an accountability mechanism. 
 
2. There is very limited training for members of parliament and little technical support. It is 
recommended that measures to increase both training of and technical support for 
parliamentarians be implemented. Training should include components related to ethics and 
integrity for members of parliament, as well as more mechanical training on processes and 
procedures. Technical support could be modelled on the Parliamentary Institute of Cambodia, 
an NGO that reviews all Bills and provides briefing papers to both government and opposition. 
 
3. There is concern about the extent to which members of parliament account for their own 
allowances. There has also been dissatisfaction at increases in members’ allowances. It is 
recommended that: 
 
a. An independent body to set the allowances (including salaries and sitting allowances) 
of members of parliament is established. This could possibly be modelled on New 
Zealand’s law. 
b. The matter of representation allowances, and how to control them, are reviewed. 
Options to consider include: 
 
i. Requiring members to publically account annually for their representation 
allowances. 
ii. Removing the distribution of representation allowances from the control of 
members and instead giving members a role as conduits of project proposals 
that are forwarded to the Parliamentary Management Board or another body to 
decide upon. 
iii. Providing allowances to political parties, rather than individual members, to 
distribute. 
 
4. In practice integrity mechanisms are almost entirely dysfunctional. In addition to 
recommendations made in the ombudsman’s pillar it is recommended that: 
 
a. The Leadership Code Act is revised to ensure that annual returns are scrutinised on an 
annual basis. 
b. Automatic penalties (such as ceasing to be paid salary) are implemented for leaders 
who fail to file returns. 
 
5. There is public interest in changing the law to require higher educational qualifications for 
candidates standing for election as members of parliament. The government should publically 
consult on whether it is appropriate to amend the eligibility criteria for candidates contained in 
the Representation of the People Act.  
  
48 NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT VANUATU 
 
 
 
6. Whilst the opposition acts as a check on the government (executive) to a degree, the opposition 
is not provided with legal support to do this. If it wants to challenge decisions by using judicial 
review processes it must engage private sector lawyers, which is costly. This limits the extent to 
which the legislature can act as a check on the executive. It is recommended that the 
Parliamentary Management Board develops and institutes a new position of opposition counsel. 
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VII.2. EXECUTIVE 
 
SUMMARY 
Overall pillar score: 34.7 
Dimension Indicator Law Practice 
Capacity 
50 
Resources -- 50 
Independence 75 25 
Governance 
29.2 
Transparency 25 25 
Accountability 50 25 
Integrity 50 0 
Role 
25 
Public sector management 25 
Legal system 25 
 
The executive or Council of Ministers is seriously affected in its operations by the instability that 
plagues the legislature. Frequent changes make it difficult to assess the extent to which the 
executive as an institution (rather than any individual Council of Ministers) fulfils its roles in respect 
of public sector management and development of a legal system that supports public accountability 
and anti-corruption. One concern regarding the operation of the executive is that political advisors 
who provide advice to the Council of Ministers and are also one of the main bridges between 
ministers and their ministries are not required to have any particular qualifications or expertise. 
There are also serious weaknesses in respect of transparency of decision making within the 
executive, accountability for decision making and integrity mechanisms. Some of these weaknesses 
relate to performance gaps in other institutions, such as the legislature, the supreme audit institution, 
law enforcement agencies and the ombudsman. As the executive is the institution that has the 
ultimate power to strengthen the performance of these institutions, this suggests that there is a lack 
of political will to implement change. 
STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION 
The executive branch of Vanuatu is made up of the prime minister and the Council of Ministers. The 
Council of Ministers is appointed by the prime minister. The total size of the executive cannot 
exceed a quarter of the number of members of parliament.
246
 In practice there are 12 ministries. 
Ministers are supported in their work by political advisors, who act as liaisons between, and monitors 
of, ministries. Political advisors also provide an important policy advice role to the Council of 
Ministers via the operation of the Development Committee of Officials (DCO), a body largely 
comprised of director generals and political advisors. 
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ASSESSMENT 
Capacity 
Resources (practice) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE EXECUTIVE HAVE ADEQUATE RESOURCES TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT ITS 
DUTIES? 
 
Whilst the Council of Ministers has sufficient financial resources and secretarial support, 
weaknesses within the political advisor system undermine the quality of technical support to 
the council. 
The Council of Ministers is supported by a secretary, who is appointed by the PSC and who is 
responsible for council minutes, keeping a register of council decisions
247
 and other administrative 
tasks.
248
 This level of secretariat support is adequate.
249
 
Technical support for decision making is provided by the DCO. This body is comprised of the 
director general of the prime minister's office, each director general of each ministry, a political 
advisor from each ministry, the director of the Department of Strategic Management and the 
secretary to the council.
250
 The DCO can also require that the attorney general and the chair of the 
PSC attend meetings and provide advice.
251
 Submissions will usually only be accepted for 
consideration by the DCO if there has already been consultation with other ministries and the 
submission has the support of the first political advisor from the ministry making the submission,
252
 
although these requirements can be waived if the matter is urgent.
253
 
The quality of the advice provided by the DCO is dependent upon the quality of the political advisors 
and director generals who comprise it. Whilst director generals are public servants,
254
 and are 
therefore subject to rules regarding appointment on merit and clear criteria (as discussed in the pillar 
on the public service) they are now appointed and terminated directly by the Prime Minister.
255
 This 
lack of independence may limit the extent to which director generals are willing to give advice which 
goes against the desires of their ministers. Further, political advisors are not public servants and are 
not subject to the same rule regarding appointment on merit. The Government Act provides that the 
Council of Ministers must convene a committee for determining the necessary qualifications for a 
political advisor
256
 and that this committee must approve political advisors before they can be 
appointed by a minister.
257
 However, this committee has not established clear criteria for the 
appointment of political advisors.
258
 This undermines the quality of technical advice given by political 
advisors as a whole, with quality varying considerably depending upon the individual.
259
 Concerns 
have also been expressed about the lack of educational qualifications of members of parliament
260
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and, as the executive is drawn from members of parliament, there is some concern about the 
capacity of ministers. This can result in the Council of Ministers acting as a “rubber stamp” for 
decisions that have already been made by the particular minister.
261
  
The law does not require all submissions to the council to go through the DCO, although before 
submissions can be considered by the council they must have advice from the attorney general on 
legal implications and advice from the director general of the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Management on the financial implications.
262
 
There is usually sufficient budget for Council of Ministers meetings. However, in 2013 two Council of 
Ministers meetings were held in the provinces.  The additional costs were unbudgeted for and as a 
result were financed from the operational budgets of different ministries and departments.
263
 Holding 
Council of Ministers meetings outside of Port Vila is an expensive exercise. Having Council of 
Ministers meetings in the provinces increases the connection between the central administration and 
the rural population. However, ministers (and other members of parliament) are meant to use their 
travel allowances to travel throughout the country and undertake consultations on particular ministry 
projects and activities. As such it is difficult to justify the cost of holding Council of Ministers 
meetings in the provinces at the expense of conducting projects and activities in the provinces.
264
 
Whilst the executive has sufficient financial resources, considerable resources are consumed by 
political advisors and political appointees. Each minister is usually permitted three political advisors, 
although this can be increased to four if a genuine need can be demonstrated. The deputy prime 
minister is permitted four political advisors and the prime minister is permitted five political 
advisors.
265
 Whilst the council committee on political advisors is meant to set terms and conditions of 
them,
266
 there is no set salary scale for political advisors and other political appointees. The law was 
changed in 2008 to allow political advisors to receive a higher salary than director generals.
267
 
These positions can be seen as a sinecure for political supporters.
268
 Each minister also has a 
number of political appointees, including an office supervisor, two secretary/typists, a housemaid 
and a gardener.
269
 There are no legal limits on the number of political appointees, and salaries are 
set by the prime minister through regulations made pursuant to the Official Salaries Act. Again these 
positions can be seen as sinecures for political supporters.
 270
 
Independence (law) 
 
Score: 75 
 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE EXECUTIVE INDEPENDENT BY LAW? 
 
There are a number of reasonable limits on independence of the executive, including laws to 
prevent individual ministers being affected by conflicts of interest and checks by the 
judiciary and the executive. There are, however, few limits on when the legislature can check 
the executive via the use of motions of no confidence.  
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The prime minister has the sole responsibility for establishing the executive and assigning their 
duties.
271
 The executive is not completely unfettered in the exercise of its powers. The judiciary 
provides a check to ensure that the actions of the executive comply with the law. The executive is 
also collectively responsible to parliament.
272
 The executive requires the confidence of parliament in 
order to pass government Bills. The ultimate check that the parliament has on the executive is a 
motion of no confidence.
273
 These legal checks are consistent with the principles of the separation of 
powers, although it can be observed that the only limit on the use of a motion of no confidence is 
that it must have been signed by one-sixth of the members of parliament in order to be accepted.
274
 
Other laws to protect the independence of the executive address the actions of individual ministers. 
The Leadership Code Act requires ministers to disclose conflicts of interest to the Council of 
Ministers. Ministers are not allowed to vote on matters where they have a conflict of interest.
275
 
Section 18(1) of the Leadership Code Act also provides that a person who becomes a leader in an 
area in which he or she has interests, either in a business or a personal capacity, which is likely to 
conflict with the leader’s official duty or duties then he must divest himself of those interests or 
resign from that position of leader.  Financial accountability laws for individual ministers, as 
discussed below should, in theory, act as a deterrent on interference via the payment of bribes. 
There are no limits on lobbying the executive. 
Independence (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE EXECUTIVE INDEPENDENT IN PRACTICE? 
 
Independence of the executive is defined as the executive being free to develop and 
implement policy that is in the national interest, rather than individual ministers being free to 
act in their own interests. The political environment in which the executive operates affects 
the ability of the executive to independently develop and implement policy that is in the 
national interest. 
The biggest challenge for the operation of the executive is that government is comprised of an 
unstable coalition. Motions of no confidence are common and usually reflect a desire to gain power, 
rather than concern about the policies and actions of the government. In order to maintain coalition 
relationships and avoid motions of no confidence shuffles in ministries are common. To illustrate, 
following the national election in October 2012 Sato Kilman became Prime Minister. In December 
there was a reshuffle to secure support of an independent candidate for the government. 
276
 In 
March 2013 six backbenchers and two government ministers, Thomas Laken and Marcellino Pipite, 
crossed the floor and Kilman resigned in order to avoid a vote of no confidence.
277
  A new 
government was formed with Moana Carcasses as Prime Minister. Both Laken and Pipite were 
given positions in Carcasses’ cabinet, although neither retained the same ministries.278 In the first 
four months of the Carcasses government three ministers were sacked.
279
. New appointment and 
reshuffles meant that in these four months four different people held the position of minister of 
justice.
280
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In February 2014 a motion of no confidence in the Carcasses government was announced.
281
 The 
motion was withdrawn after Carcasses ‘made an offer of four ministerial positions to members of 
parliament in the Opposition bloc.’282 This move was defended by the minister of lands as ‘being 
better than bribing people with money’.283 He did, however, acknowledge that, ‘To become a 
minister is an enticement for an MP, because you get an increase in salary, and you get to employ 
people, and of course you get to implement your policies.’284 This reinforces the perception that the 
Council of Ministers does not act on consensus and in furtherance of national policy, but instead 
ministers are able to act in their own self-interest.
285
 It also supports the perception that signing a 
motion of no confidence can be an opportunistic move providing leverage to negotiate different 
benefits, rather than a clear signal that the person will vote in support of the motion.
286
 
These threats to the independence of the executive as a policy driven body are internal, arising from 
the political economy of the legislature and the executive.  A further issue affecting independence is 
the extent to which Vanuatu is dependent on aid. Whilst this can both affect operation of ministries 
and the direction of government policy, aid from major bilateral donors, including Australia, is related 
back to the overarching government policy statement, the Priorities and Action Agenda.
287
 This 
external influence provides a degree of policy stability so is a positive constraint on independence. 
There is a perception that “Chinese money” and other money from international sources is used to 
fund motions of no confidence and other activities aimed at destabilising the executive.
288
 Such 
claims are not new.
289
 As there is no transparency in respect of funding to political parties or 
ministers, or decision making of the executive, it is not possible to assess the extent to which 
independence is affected by lobbying and/or bribes. 
Governance 
Transparency (law) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE REGULATIONS IN PLACE TO ENSURE TRANSPARENCY IN RELEVANT ACTIVITIES 
OF THE EXECUTIVE? 
 
There are few legal mechanisms in place for ensuring transparency of the executive, 
although there is limited transparency, in law, of government expenditure. 
The Government Act requires the secretary to the Council of Ministers to keep a written record of 
each council meeting.
290
 The Act further provides that the decisions of the council shall be recorded 
in writing and a copy provided to each minister and every ministry, department, state appointed 
office, agency, instrument, authority or corporation of government affected by or charged with the 
responsibility of implementing a decision.
291
 There is, however, no requirement that the cabinet 
meeting minutes are made available to the public. Nor are there freedom of information laws that 
permit the public to gain access to cabinet meeting minutes. Indeed, if the government changes, the 
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law prohibits the new cabinet from accessing previous council minutes unless the composition of the 
councils is substantially the same.
292
 Whilst the Parliament Administration Act requires ministers to 
provide an annual report to parliament, there is no requirement that these documents be tabled in 
parliament, or otherwise be made public.
293
  
The Public Finance and Economic Management Act provides for the budget process. Not less than 
14 days prior to the introduction of an Appropriation Bill the minister must provide to council for the 
budget year, and the two years following, a program of expenditure including the details of the 
estimated revenue of the state, the details of the expenditure estimates for each ministry and 
government agency, the state’s debt management responsibilities and where necessary the details 
of a financial plan to meet those responsibilities.
294
 The Council of Ministers is then required to 
return a fiscally responsible budget to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Management.
295
 As 
budgets must be passed by parliament, via an Appropriation Act
296
 they are public documents. At 
the end of each financial year financial statements should also be made public, as the Public 
Finance and Economic Management Act requires them and a report of the auditor general to be 
tabled in parliament.
297
  
Whilst the Leadership Code Act requires ministers and political advisors to make annual returns to 
the clerk of parliament disclosing their assets, as discussed in the section on the legislature these 
returns are not made public. Nor are they routinely scrutinised. 
Transparency (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THERE TRANSPARENCY IN RELEVANT ACTIVITIES OF THE EXECUTIVE IN PRACTICE? 
 
Whilst budgets are published, there is little other transparency in the actions of the 
executive, although individual ministers act transparently at times. 
Minutes of Council of Ministers meetings are not made public. Nor are decisions routinely 
communicated to the public. Assets of ministers and political advisors are not routinely disclosed to 
the public. Indeed, the list of political advisors is not publicised, although it is available on request 
from the office of the prime minister.
298
 Nor does the Government of Vanuatu website provide a 
current list of ministers or ministries, with most ministry pages last having been updated in 2011.
299
 
Annual reports of ministries are not routinely available to the public. Nor do all ministers report to 
parliament as required by the Parliament Administration Act.
300
 Some of these deficiencies have 
recently been acknowledged by the government and there are plans to improve online information of 
ministries by 2015. 
Budgets are made public, with budgets for 2010 to 2013 being available for download from the 
Government of Vanuatu website.
301
 However, as discussed in the section on the auditor general, 
financial statements and reports on the use of government money are not readily available. 
Whilst there is no transparency of the executive as a whole, individual ministers or ministries do, at 
times, act transparently. A recent example of this was widespread public consultations by the 
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minister of lands on proposed land reforms,
302
 although they have been criticised as not having been 
too rushed, and too “Vila-centric”, with reforms developed in the capital being explained to people in 
the outer islands rather than being consulted upon.
303
 
Accountability (law) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE HAVE TO 
REPORT AND BE ANSWERABLE FOR THEIR ACTIONS? 
 
Whilst the Leadership Code Act does provide a number of laws to punish leaders for 
wrongdoing, there are no requirements requiring members of the executive to account for 
their decisions to the public. 
The main accountability measure is the requirement that ministers must provide an annual report to 
parliament. These reports are then forwarded to the relevant parliamentary committee, but, as 
stated above, there is no requirement that these documents be tabled in, or debated by, 
parliament.
304
 There is no requirement that members of the executive give reasons for their 
decisions, or that they consult with the public or other special interest groups when proposing Bills or 
making other decisions. 
Whilst all legislation must be approved by parliament, many Acts give considerable powers to 
ministers to make subordinate legislation (regulations and orders). The only check on this law 
making power is that the Supreme Court can rule subordinate legislation to be unconstitutional.   
Commissions of Inquiry are another measure that can be used to hold members of the executive to 
account. These commissions are established by the minister for justice
305
 and have powers to 
compel attendance of witnesses.
306
 Reports are not binding nor are they required to make 
recommendations. Instead reports contain findings and reasons for conclusions.
307
  The Standing 
Orders of Parliament also permit parliamentary committees to be established to inquire into any 
matter, including the conduct of ministries.
308
 
As discussed in the section on the supreme audit institution, laws provide for annual audits of all 
public expenditure and also allow for performance audits. 
Accountability (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THERE EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT OF EXECUTIVE ACTIVITIES IN PRACTICE? 
 
There are numerous failures in the implementation of accountability mechanisms although 
judicial review of decisions of ministers occurs at times. 
In practice, accountability mechanisms have little effect. As discussed in the sections on the 
legislature, the ombudsman and law enforcement, the Leadership Code Act is not enforced. As 
discussed in the section on the supreme audit institution, financial accountability mechanisms are 
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not functioning effectively and there are insufficient resources to conduct detailed performance 
audits of ministries. As discussed in the section on transparency above, ministers do not always 
report to parliament. Further, if reports are made, parliamentary standing committees are ill 
equipped to scrutinise such reports.
309
  
Internal discipline of ministers by the prime minister is also weak. For instance, when Minister Harry 
Iauko was convicted for his role in the assault of a journalist
310
 he remained in the executive. 
Similarly, Minister Don Ken was charged with assault. Although he was not convicted of a criminal 
offence,
311
 criminal conviction is not necessary in order to face internal discipline. However, he 
remained on the executive. Ministers who are the subject of ombudsman’s reports are not routinely 
disciplined by the prime minister. 
Whilst, as discussed in the judiciary section, the opposition and individuals affected by decisions 
can, and sometimes do, take judicial  review cases to court, this form of oversight is reactive and 
limited. 
Integrity (law) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE MECHANISMS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF MEMBERS OF THE 
EXECUTIVE? 
 
A number of integrity mechanisms are contained in law, although the generic code of 
conduct is not entirely comprehensive and there is no specific code of conduct for members 
of the executive. 
The generic integrity framework for all leaders, provided under the Leadership Code Act applies. 
Provisions of this Act include that leaders must not be involved in the misuse of public moneys,
312
 
exercise undue influence over others,
313
 have or seek a beneficial interest in government 
contracts,
314
 and must comply with all laws that impose duties or responsibilities on leaders.
315
  
Compliance with laws relating to the public service, public finance, expenditure review and 
government contracts and tenders is specifically emphasised.
316
 They are required to disclose any 
conflicts to the prime minister and are not permitted to vote in the Council of Ministers on matters in 
which they have an interest. There is no separate, specific code of conduct for ministers. Breaches 
of these provisions are punishable by a fine not exceeding VT5 million (US$500,000) and/or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years.
317
 As discussed in the section on the legislature, 
leaders are also required to file annual returns.   
There are no limits on post-ministerial employment. However, there is limited “big business” in 
Vanuatu so ministers moving to appointments within industry are not a feature of Vanuatu’s political 
landscape. Nor are there any provisions that explicitly seek to protect whistle-blowers, although the 
law does prohibit ministers, including the prime minister, from attempting to interfere with public 
service employment and in the employment issues relating to the Teaching Service Commission, 
the Judicial Service Commission or the Police Service Commission.
318
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The Ombudsman Act also provides for the ombudsman to enquire into any case of an alleged or 
suspected discriminatory practice by a government agency and in respect of conduct of leader to 
enquire into any case of alleged or suspected breach of the Leadership Code.
319
  
Integrity (practice) 
 
Score: 0 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE INTEGRITY OF MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE ENSURED IN PRACTICE? 
 
Without accountability in practice, integrity mechanisms are ineffective. 
As discussed above, accountability is almost entirely lacking. In the absence of enforcement of the 
Leadership Code Act, it is ineffective. In the past year there have been no cases of ministers or 
former ministers being prosecuted for conflict of interest. Nor have any ombudsman’s reports on the 
conduct of ministers been released in the last year. 
Role 
Public sector management 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTED TO AND ENGAGED IN DEVELOPING A WELL-GOVERNED PUBLIC 
SECTOR? 
 
There is no consistent monitoring of performance within ministries and nor are there specific 
incentives to encourage good practice by public servants. 
Ministers are not permitted to interfere in employment decisions relating to the public service,
320
 
although ministers can inform the PSC, in writing, of employment issues that are affecting the 
implementation of government policy.
321
 Public servants, including director generals, directors and 
other public servants are subject to lawful directions of ministers.
322
 One of the roles of political 
advisors is to monitor the extent to which public servants comply with lawful orders.
323
  Ministries are 
expected to have in place a corporate plan together with a human resource development plan and 
an individual work performance and development plan for each staff member.
324
 Supervisors of staff 
are expected to have regular meetings to monitor the individual work-plans.
325
 This provides the 
basic framework for ensuring that the executive can effectively supervise the work of the public 
service. 
In practice, however, this framework does not work well. Whether there is effective oversight 
depends very much on the individual minister and director general.
326
 Whilst there should, ideally, be 
regular performance appraisals of staff and work outputs, with director generals producing reports 
for ministers, this does not happen consistently.
327
 The prime minister has the power to transfer 
senior public servants,
328
 including director generals. It is fairly common for director generals to be 
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transferred, leading to instability of senior management. As discussed above, the quality of political 
advisors is variable and they tend not to be actively involved in oversight of ministerial activities. The 
prime minister’s office did establish a monitoring and evaluation unit in 2006 for monitoring the 
implementation of policies in ministries, but this is not perceived to be effective.
329
 
The executive has not developed incentives such as transparency awards, monitoring systems or 
scorecards for public servants.
330
 
Legal system  
 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE EXECUTIVE PRIORITISE PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE FIGHT AGAINST 
CORRUPTION AS A CONCERN IN THE COUNTRY? 
 
Whilst the previous governing coalition led by Moana Carcasses had prioritised an anti-
corruption agenda and early indications appear that the recently installed governing coalition 
led by Joe Natuman will continue this agenda, instability within government and different 
priorities of previous governments makes it difficult to score the executive’s performance in 
the area of developing the legal system highly.  
As discussed in the section on the legislature, changes in government make it difficult for the 
executive to embark on and adhere to a comprehensive anti-corruption law reform agenda, and also 
make it difficult to assess the degree to which there is commitment for such an agenda. The former 
(Carcasses) government did release a 100 day plan that prioritised a wide number of anti-corruption 
initiatives.
331
 Few legislative changes have resulted from this, although significant reforms to land 
leasing laws, aimed at reducing corruption, were successfully championed by Minister of Lands 
Ralph Regenvanu.
332
 The recently installed (Natuman) government has stated that it is committed to 
moving forward with reforms aimed at increasing stability within the legislature,
333
 which is a key 
anti-corruption policy. 
The government of Prime Minister Sato Kilman, which came to power in 2011 and remained in 
power following the 2012 elections did not have a comprehensive anti-corruption plan, he also made 
various statements against corruption, particularly within the public service.
334
 Although the UN 
Convention against Corruption was acceded to under Kilman’s leadership, ratification had already 
occurred under the previous government led by Edward Natapei.
335
 Commentary by Transparency 
International Vanuatu maintained that in light of numerous reports of corruption within the 
government in the media such statements were merely lip service.
336
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. There is almost total lack of transparency in the policy direction and decision making of the 
executive and the operation of ministries. In order to address these issues is it recommended 
that: 
 
a. The Right to Information Bill must be enacted by parliament as soon as possible. 
b. The Government Act be revised to require that coalition Memoranda of Understanding 
(MOUs) and policies be made public by the Council of Ministers. 
c. The Government Act be revised to require that Council of Ministers minutes be made 
public, unless necessary to keep sections private for public security reasons. 
d. The Leadership Code Act annual reporting system be revised to include 
comprehensive declarations that are routinely inspected and made public. 
e. Annual reports of ministers be made public. 
f. The current government plan to improve websites be monitored in order to see whether 
websites contain policy statements, corporate plans that provide a clear statement of 
outputs and annual reports on outputs achieved, as related to plans. 
 
2. The Council of Ministers relies on the DCO, which is largely comprised of political advisors and 
director generals, for technical advice. There are, however, no specified requirements as to 
political advisors’ qualifications. It is recommended that minimum qualifications for political 
advisors are instituted, to ensure that such advisors have sufficient background to be able to 
provide technical advice. 
 
3. The liberal use of motions of no confidence without sound reasons based on national interests 
is the mechanism that creates instability with the executive. However, a blanket limitation on 
motions of no confidence for certain periods of time prevents their legitimate use in cases of bad 
governance, so is a problematic approach to controlling this problem. In order to address this 
the following options should be considered by the a body set up to publically develop political 
integrity laws and regulations: 
 
a. For a motion of no confidence to be in order, requiring that it needs to be justified on 
the basis of political reasons (such as breaches in MOU or breaches of Leadership 
Code Act). 
b. Introducing penalties for those who sign an unjustified motion of no confidence (such 
as a deduction from MPs salaries or losing one’s seat and requiring a by-election). 
c. Developing a party discipline system, including penalties for members who cross the 
floor without justifiable reason.   
 
i. Part of the development of a stronger party system may include funding 
parties, rather than individual MPs (via the MP allocation), with a discipline 
mechanism being to be cut off from party funding if the floor is crossed.  
 
4. Whilst laws have been implemented to control the number of political advisors, there are no 
similar controls on the number of political appointees and it appears that the number of such 
appointees is growing.  It is recommended that laws to control the number of political 
appointees be developed and implemented. 
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VII.3. JUDICIARY 
SUMMARY 
Overall pillar score: 45.8 
Dimension Indicator Law Practice 
Capacity 
62.5 
Resources 50 25 
Independence 100 75 
Governance 
37.5 
Transparency 50 50 
Accountability 25 25 
Integrity 50 25 
Role 
37.5 
Oversight of the Executive 50 
Corruption prosecution 25 
 
Vanuatu’s judicial system is generally respected as being impartial, independent and fair, even 
though there are few legal mechanisms to ensure the integrity of judges. The judicial system is 
active in overseeing the actions of the executive. It is less active in addressing corruption cases, 
although this is due, in large part, to cases not coming before the court. 
There is considerable concern about delays within the court system. These delays do not only affect 
corruption cases but can also result in parties in a wide range of cases being unable to gain justice 
via court orders when their rights have been violated. Whilst a range of actors contribute to delays, 
lack of resources and lack of accountability are specific factors affecting judicial and court staff. Lack 
of transparency can also affect monitoring of the progress of cases. These issues have been 
acknowledged by the Vanuatu judiciary and an extensive three year improvement plan was 
commenced in 2012. 
STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION 
Vanuatu maintains a common law judicial system. The court of first instance, with unlimited 
jurisdiction is the Supreme Court. There are two levels of subordinate courts – the Magistrates Court 
and the Island Courts. The highest court is the Court of Appeal. The main court registry is located in 
Port Vila. Additional registries are located in Luganville on Espiritu Santo, Lakatoro on Malekula, 
Isangel on Tanna, Ambore on Ambae, Loltong on Pentecost, and Sola on Vanua Lava in the Banks 
Group of Islands. There are currently six supreme court judges, all  based in Vila. In 2011 there 
were nine magistrates. One magistrate is located in each of Luganville, Lakatoro and Isangel, with 
the others located in Port Vila. Other locations, as well as housing island courts, are served by 
judges and magistrates going on circuit. The Court of Appeal is comprised of a panel of judges. 
Justices of the Supreme Court sit on the Court of Appeal. In addition judges from overseas, usually 
New Zealand or Australia, are appointed to the Court of Appeal. 
The chief justice has overall responsibility for the administration of the Supreme Court. Similarly the 
chief magistrate has specific responsibilities in respect of administration of the Magistrates Courts. 
They are assisted in these functions by the chief registrar. The Judicial Services and Courts Act 
(JSC Act) also requires the appointment of a master.
337
 Whilst the position of master is that of a 
court officer, rather than a judicial officer, the master can perform various administration related 
judicial functions, such as applications for direction on procedure and determination of taxation of 
costs. 
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Island Courts have very limited jurisdiction and are presided over by lay justices who are 
knowledgeable in custom. They are in turn supervised by supervising magistrates. Island Courts do 
not have any jurisdiction over corruption related offences. 
ASSESSMENT 
Capacity 
Resources (law) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE LAWS SEEKING TO ENSURE APPROPRIATE SALARIES AND WORKING CONDITIONS 
OF THE JUDICIARY? 
 
Whilst there are some laws requiring that the government allocate sufficient resources to the 
courts, there is no requirement that salaries must be adjusted to allow for inflation. 
The JSC Act contains schedules stating the salaries, allowances and benefits for judicial and court 
staff. These are set by the Judicial Service Commission. The JSC Act provides that the Government 
Remuneration Tribunal may review salaries, allowance and benefits every two years and make 
recommendations to the Judicial Service Commission. The Judicial Service Commission can then 
alter the schedules, although it is not permitted to alter them to the detriment any judicial officer.
338
 It 
is not, however, mandatory that reviews occur. Nor is it mandatory for the Judicial Service 
Commission to adjust salaries to allow for inflation. 
There is no requirement that the judiciary be provided a minimum percentage of the general budget. 
Instead the JSC Act provides that ‘The Government must ensure that there is a sufficient budget 
allocated for the operations of the Judicial Service and the Vanuatu Courts to enable the Judicial 
Service to perform its functions and each of the Courts to exercise its jurisdiction and powers as 
provided for under the Constitution, this Act and any other law’.339 The budget procedure is provided 
by the Public Finance and Economic Management Act.
340
 As part of this procedure budget 
submissions are prepared and advanced to the Ministers’ Budget Committee. ‘The Chief Justice has 
direct responsibility of the financial management of the Courts.  His Honour is assisted by the Chief 
Registrar and the Accountant.’ 341   There are no specified statutory limits on how the budget is to be 
apportioned. 
Resources (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE JUDICIARY HAVE ADEQUATE LEVELS OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES, STAFFING AND 
INFRASTRUCTURE TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY IN PRACTICE? 
 
There are significant resource gaps in respect of the number of judicial officers, the number 
of support staff and the adequacy of court infrastructure, including buildings and IT systems. 
The court system in Vanuatu faces significant resource challenges. A 2012 report prepared by the 
Pacific Judicial Development Programme (PJDP) notes that, ‘Every court visited suffered in some 
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significant way from a lack of funding, problems with accommodation, and lack of tools and 
equipment.’342 Most critical, maybe, is the fact that in 2007 the Supreme Court building in Port Vila 
burned down. The Supreme Court and Court of Appeal are still housed in temporary premises. This 
creates challenges in operations and efficiency. For instance, judges’ chambers are too small to 
comfortably hold records of files assigned to that judge.
343
 The court rooms and chambers are in 
separate locations, so moving from chambers to court takes time.
344
 In 2011 the court building in 
Luganville was burned down and was also relocated to temporary accommodation.
345
  
Whilst work is currently underway to computerise the court registry, the registry is currently 
maintained via uncoordinated and unstandardised individual systems, rather than by a centralised 
computerised system.
346
 The operation and reform of the registry is also hindered by the fact that 
‘the portfolio of the Chief Registrar is simply too large, making it difficult to cope with every day 
operations and to co-ordinate reform in a methodical way.’347 There is a need for more staff in both 
the Supreme and Magistrates Court Registries.
348
 
Once cases are assigned to an individual judge he or she assumes administrative responsibility for 
files. This, however, can create an onerous administrative burden on judges, which in turn reduces 
the time that judges have to spend on hearing cases and issuing decisions.
349
 There is a perceived 
need for strengthening administrative staff supporting judges.
350
 
The position of master exists, but the Chief Justice has faced difficulties in finding a person to fill this 
position.
351
 The position has been repeatedly advertised but it is thought that the salary is too low to 
attract applicants.
352
 No one has occupied this position since 2010.
353
  
The court has also faced difficulties in recruiting Supreme Court judges. In his 2013 Opening 
Speech of the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice observed that, ‘Judgeship positions have been 
advertised in the not-too-distant past, but no interest of note was expressed from the members of 
the local Bar. It has become clear that the position is not attractive. The need of the Judiciary is for 
the Government of Vanuatu to review the terms and conditions of the office of a Judge to make it 
attractive.’354 Judicial salaries and conditions were last reviewed in 2006.355 It can, however, be 
observed as a matter of transparency that salaries and conditions are found in the schedule to the 
JSC Act. No amendments to this schedule are listed in Vanuatu’s legislation and subsidiary 
legislation indexes. 
Currently the development of the courts is being supported by the PJDP. This programme is 
particularly focussing on improving case management. In addition to strengthening case 
management infrastructure, by helping to develop a centralised computer system, training for judges 
and court staff is occurring.
356
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Independence (law) 
Score: 100 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE JUDICIARY INDEPENDENT BY LAW? 
 
There are comprehensive laws seeking to ensure the independence of the judiciary. 
The judicial system is provided for in Chapter 8 of the Constitution. As well as establishing the 
superior court structure, including the Supreme Court
357
 and Court of Appeal
358
 the Constitution 
provides that village or island courts with jurisdiction over customary matters must be established.
359
  
Magistrates Courts are not provided for in the Constitution but are established under the JSC Act.
360
 
The chief justice is appointed by the president after consultation with the prime minister and leader 
of the opposition.
361
 Appointment of other judges and magistrates is done by the president acting on 
the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.
362
 The Judicial Service Commission is a 
constitutionally established body. Its membership consists of the minister responsible for justice as 
chairman, the chief justice, the chairman of the PSC and a representative of the National Council of 
Chiefs appointed by the council.
363
 There is no scope for public involvement or the involvement of 
the legal profession in the process of appointing judges. However, the judiciary does have 
involvement through the chief justice’s membership of the Judicial Service Commission. 
Requirements for appointment as a judge in the Supreme Court, including the need for judges to 
hold appropriate academic qualifications, sufficient experience and be of good character or standing 
are provided in the JSC Act.
364
 Magistrates must also be appointed on merit but the requirements for 
appointment only include holding a law degree or having suitable legal training or experience.
365
 
Judges and magistrates are appointed until they reach the age of retirement, although acting 
appointments can also be made for a fixed time.
366
 Judges can only be removed if they are 
convicted and sentenced for a criminal offence, if they have been found by the Judicial Service 
Commission to have committed an act, or acts, of gross misconduct, or on the grounds of incapacity 
or professional incompetence.
367
 The Constitution also prohibits the transfer of judges unless done 
by the president acting on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.
368
 
Judges and magistrates cannot be sued for any action done in good faith in exercise of their judicial 
duties.
369
 Further, any attempt to unduly influence a judicial officer is a criminal offence that carries a 
maximum sentence of a fine of VT500,000 (US$5,000) and/or imprisonment for one year.
370
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Independence (practice) 
Score: 75 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE JUDICIARY OPERATE WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM THE GOVERNMENT OR 
OTHER ACTORS? 
 
The general consensus is that the judiciary is independent although there has been one 
recent example of a judge being threatened and there is some concern that conflicts of 
interest may allow external actors to influence decisions.  
According to a recent review by the PJDP in Vanuatu ‘the judiciary and institution [of the courts] is 
regarded highly as fair, independent and of integrity.’371 It can be observed, however, that the Global 
Corruption Barometer research, discussed in the corruption profile chapter, indicates that public 
perceptions of corruption within the judiciary are increasing. It is not clear whether these perceptions 
are related to independence, or other aspects. 
Appointed judges are appropriately qualified. There are no recent examples of judges being 
removed from their positions, transferred or demoted. Nor have there been any changes to the 
foundations or legal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.  
Although there is no official interference in the operation of the judiciary, attempts at unofficial 
interference can occur. In April 2010 Justice Nevin Dawson, a New Zealand judge who was, at the 
time, serving a two year appointment on the Vanuatu bench, received death threats after releasing a 
coroner’s report that was critical of police and Vanuatu mobile force officers.372 Security measures 
were increased and he completed his term in Vanuatu.  
There have been no prosecutions for attempts to unduly influence judges. Whether this means that 
undue influence does not occur, or that it does not get reported is unclear. A recent Transparency 
Vanuatu report on the operation of the judiciary observes that whilst ‘there were no reports of 
judges, court staff or prosecutors accepting bribes in order to delay cases […], there were, however, 
some instances where conflicts of interest appeared to affect actions of police, prosecutors and 
judges.’373 This matter is further discussed in the section below on integrity mechanisms. 
Governance 
Transparency (law) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT THE PUBLIC CAN OBTAIN RELEVANT 
INFORMATION ON THE ACTIVITIES AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES OF THE JUDICIARY? 
 
Whilst court hearings are usually open and the law requires annual reports to be made 
publically available, there is little public transparency in respect of appointment and removal 
processes of judicial officers. 
General civil hearings occur in open court, unless the court orders otherwise.
374
 Election petitions 
must be heard in open court.
375
 Constitutional applications are to be held in open court, although the 
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public may be ‘excluded from a specific part of the hearing in exceptional circumstances if it is 
necessary to do so in the interests of the defence, safety, public order, public welfare or public 
health of Vanuatu.’376 Criminal cases are to be held in open court377 although a ‘judicial officer may 
for reasons of decency, security of the State or where otherwise authorised by law’378 restrict access 
to the court room. Judgments must be given to the parties and made available to the public.
379
 They 
are also to be written down as soon as possible.
380
  
The judiciary is required to provide the minister responsible for justice with an annual report within 
three months of the end of each financial year that contains information on staffing, court statistics 
and active committees.
381
 Whilst this report is required to provide ‘details of all the positions in the 
Judicial Service, indicating which were filled and for which parts of the year’,382 there is no express 
requirement that reasons for moving or removing judges be provided. There is also no requirement 
that this report be released to the public. The Judicial Service Commission is also required to 
prepare an annual report, which addresses, more broadly, issues related to ‘independence and 
efficiency of the administration of justice … any action needed to be taken to strengthen the 
operation of law … and reforms that may be needed to any laws.’383 This report must be produced 
within three months of the end of the year and must be tabled by the minister of justice in 
parliament.
384
 Again there is no requirement that these reports be made available to the public. 
As discussed in the section on integrity mechanisms below, judges are not required to make asset 
declarations to the Judicial Service Commission either during the appointment process or at any 
other time. Nor are judges required to make public asset declarations. 
Transparency (practice) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE PUBLIC HAVE ACCESS TO JUDICIAL INFORMATION AND ACTIVITIES IN PRACTICE? 
 
Whilst there is unofficial reporting of superior court judgments there is little reporting of 
subordinate court judgments. Annual reports of the judicial services and courts have 
recently been made available online but reports of the Judicial Services Commission are not 
available. 
Court proceedings are generally open to the public. Whilst official law reports are not regularly 
published, judgements are published on the Pacific Islands Legal Information Institute’s (PacLII) 
website. PacLII publishes laws, cases and legal material from around the region and is maintained 
by the University of the South Pacific. This is a somewhat ad hoc system that relies on the courts 
forwarding judgements to be published. Whilst Supreme Court and Court of Appeal judgements are 
usually published, very few Magistrates Court decisions are available. The Vanuatu judiciary does 
not maintain its own website. 
Until November 2013 the only annual report readily available to the public was the 2009 report. A 
recent Transparency report on the judiciary recommended that all annual reports be published on 
PacLII.
385
 By early December 2013 annual reports for 2010 and 2011 had been published on PacLII, 
with the 2012 report being published in early 2014.
386
 
 
A centralised case database is being 
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developed with the assistance of the PJDP and this is resulting in significant improvements on court 
statistics, including the number of cases received, finalised and pending for each court.  
Reports from the Judicial Service Commission cannot be found in the parliament library. Nor are 
they recorded in parliamentary minutes as having been tabled in parliament. 
Accountability (law) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT THE JUDICIARY HAS TO REPORT AND BE 
ANSWERABLE FOR ITS ACTIONS? 
 
Judges need to account for their decisions in individual cases. Whilst the Judicial Service 
Commission has the power to recommend the removal of judges it does not receive 
complaints from the public and there is no other independent body to receive public 
complaints about the judiciary. 
Judges are required to give reasons for their decisions. In respect of criminal cases, the Criminal 
Procedure Code provides that judgments ‘shall contain the point or points for determination, the 
decision thereon and the reasons for the decision’.387 The Civil Procedure Code similarly requires 
judgments to summarise findings of facts, law and give reasons for their decision.
388
 There are no 
specific consequences for judges if judgments fail to give reasons for decisions. However, the 
appeal process is robust and parties to cases would be able to appeal cases to higher courts if 
reasons were not given. Whilst there is no appeal from the Court of Appeal, the fact that appeals are 
heard by three judges provides an internal check on the issuing of decisions without reason. 
There is no procedure to allow the public to make complaints about the judiciary. The ombudsman 
does not have the jurisdiction to enquire into the actions of judges. Whilst the JSC Act establishes a 
Court Personnel Disciplinary Board
389
 this board only has jurisdiction over registry and other support 
staff within the court.
390
 Although there is no public avenue for laying complaints the Judicial Service 
Commission can recommend that the president suspends or removes magistrates for serious 
misconduct.
391
 Suspension is of limited consequence as a magistrate must receive full pay whilst on 
suspension.
392
 Judges of the Supreme Court can be removed by the president, on the advice of the 
Judicial Service Commission on the grounds of gross misconduct, incapacity or professional 
incompetence.
393
 There is no provision allowing for suspension of Supreme Court judges.  
Accountability (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT DO MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY HAVE TO REPORT AND BE ANSWERABLE FOR THEIR 
ACTIONS IN PRACTICE? 
 
Whilst Superior Court judges, when they issue written decisions, do provide reasons, the 
Judicial Service Commission is not seen to hold members of the judiciary to account for 
failures to issue decisions. 
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A recent Transparency Vanuatu report that was developed in response to concerns regarding 
delays within the judicial system noted a number of deficiencies in the operation of judicial services. 
Whilst a number of parties can cause delays during the court process, one particular issue identified 
was delays by judges in issuing judgments after trial has completed.
394
 This is not a new problem 
and has been openly discussed within the ministry of justice since 2011.
395
 Judges are not, however, 
being held to account by the Judicial Service Commission for such delays. This report also observed 
that the lack of a public complaints mechanism in respect of the judiciary is a significant problem and 
recommended that ‘further consultation is undertaken on whether it is desirable to have the judiciary 
fall within the scope of the Office of the Ombudsman, or whether an alternate complaints 
mechanism should be developed and implemented.’396  
No particular problems were identified in respect of reasons being given for decisions and Supreme 
Court and Court of Appeal level. However, as Magistrates Court judgements are not readily 
available
397
 it is not possible to assess whether magistrates are providing reasons for their 
decisions. 
Integrity (law) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE MECHANISMS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF MEMBERS OF THE 
JUDICIARY? 
 
There is a code of conduct for members of the judiciary but judges are not covered by the 
broader integrity requirements of the Leadership Code. 
Judges are not leaders for the purposes of the Leadership Code Act. As such they are not required 
to make asset disclosures or annual returns under this Act. Nor are they required to make asset 
disclosures to the Judicial Service Commission. There are no regulations preventing judges from 
receiving reimbursements, compensation or honoraria in respect of privately sponsored trips, or 
regulations governing the hospitality and gifts.  
There is a code of conduct for judges, which is based on the values reflected in the Banglore 
Principles of Judicial Conduct.
398
 This code is self-implemented and monitored, and there is no 
external body to which complaints about breaches of the code can be directed. There currently is no 
code of conduct for court staff. The JSC Act requires any judge who has a personal interest in 
proceedings or an actual or perceived bias to disqualify him or herself from proceedings.
399
 Parties 
to proceedings can apply to judges to disqualify themselves, and if the judge fails to disqualify him or 
herself, can appeal that decision.
400
 
Judges are prohibited from engaging in any paid work outside of the duties of their judicial offices 
without the consent of the Judicial Service Commission.
401
 There are, however, no post-employment 
restrictions of judges. 
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Integrity (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE INTEGRITY OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY ENSURED IN PRACTICE? 
There are some instances of members of the judiciary self-regulating to ensure integrity, but 
there is increasing lack of public confidence in the judiciary. 
A recent Transparency Vanuatu report on the judiciary did refer to one case study in which judges 
had removed themselves due to conflicts of interest.
402
 Parties do also appeal decisions due to 
perceived bias where judges have not disqualified themselves.
403
 
Vanuatu’s judiciary appears to be very conscious of the need to be seen to maintain professional 
distance, and self-regulates to maintain integrity. A recent example occurred in 2013, when former 
Minister of Health Don Ken invited court personnel to kava
404
 prior to a decision involving the 
prosecution of some of Ken’s supporters being given. This kava evening would have given Ken the 
opportunity to talk with the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice required Ken to apologise in open court 
and also made it clear that any future attempt to influence the court would result in imprisonment.
405
  
Whilst self-regulation is to be lauded, self-regulation to ensure integrity means that, in practice, 
judicial measures are untransparent. Further, judges do not declare assets and there is no other 
transparent mechanism to ensure that judges are not receiving gifts and hospitality. It may be this 
lack of transparency that is leading to increasing public perceptions that the judiciary in Vanuatu is 
corrupt. The Global Corruption Barometer uses a scale of 1 – 5, with 1 being not at all corrupt and 5 
being very corrupt, to rate public perceptions of corruption of particular institutions. In 2010/11 the 
judiciary rated 2.7. In 2013 this had increased to 3.3.
406
  
Role 
Executive oversight 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE JUDICIARY PROVIDE EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT OF THE EXECUTIVE? 
 
The judiciary is largely effective in providing oversight of the executive, but is dependent 
upon cases being brought before it. 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the executive.
407
 Applications for judicial review of 
decisions of the executive are fairly common. For instance, between 2012 and 2013 the Supreme 
Court published decisions relating to judicial reviews of decisions pertaining to the termination of an 
appointment to be a roving ambassador,
408
 the transfer of a director general,
409
 the signing of a 
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concession agreement to build an airport,
410
 a refusal to register an applicant as a charitable body
411
 
and the suspension of local government councils.
412
 The court also reviews decisions made by 
others such as the president of the Republic of Vanuatu
413
 and the Electoral Commission.
414
 
Vanuatu’s court is also particularly active in oversight of the proceedings of parliament, particularly 
in relation to motions of no confidence in the prime minister. As this affects the composition of the 
executive the court’s involvement in this area is an important aspect of executive oversight. A quite 
extraordinary series of cases occurred in 2011. As these cases both illustrate issues that can occur 
within parliament and the role of the court in controlling these issues a brief timeline of events is 
provided. 
 December 2010: Edward Natapei is replaced by Sato Kilman as prime minister following a 
vote of no confidence.  
 24 April 2011: The Supreme Court hears an application filed by Kilman relating to the 
legality of the Speaker’s decision to call an extraordinary session of parliament to debate a 
motion of no confidence in the Prime Minister and rules the Speaker’s decision is legal.415  
 24 April 2011: The extraordinary session of parliament session takes place. The motion of 
no confidence is passed and Serge Vohor is elected to replace Kilman as prime minister.  
 30 April 2011: The Supreme Court rules that the Speaker’s decision that the vote of no 
confidence was carried was correct.
416
  
 13 May 2011: The Court of Appeal rules that the vote of no confidence was not carried and 
Kilman was restored as prime minister.
417
  
 16 June 2011: The Supreme Court rules that the vote of no confidence in Edward Natapei 
that occurred in December 2010 was illegal, with the result being that Kilman’s election is 
held invalid and Natapei appointed interim prime minister until a new vote for prime minister 
can take place.
418
 
 17 June 2011: The Supreme Court rules that Kilman’s application to have parliament 
convened immediately is without legal basis.
419
 
 21 June 2011: Ministers appointed by Kilman on 2 December 2010 apply to the Supreme 
Court for an order that they were legitimate state ministers, despite being appointed by a 
prime minister who was subsequently held to be invalid. 
 22 June 2011: The Supreme Court rules that ministers appointed by Kilman did not 
legitimately hold their positions.
420
 
 26 June 2011: Parliament convenes and Kilman is elected prime minister.
421
  
 22 July 2011: The Court of Appeal rules that, in the extraordinary circumstances of this 
situation, the Supreme Court’s order to declare Kilman’s election on 2 December invalid 
and to reinstate Natapei as prime minister is set aside.
422
 
 
Since events relating to the position of prime minister in 2011 the court has continued to consider 
actions relating to parliamentary procedure and motions of no confidence. For example, in August 
2013 Prime Minister Kilman again returned to court to challenge a decision by the Speaker to close 
a session of parliament in order to avoid filing and debate on a motion to remove him.
423
 In 
December 2012 the court again reviewed the decision of the Speaker to refuse to convene an 
extraordinary session of parliament to debate a motion of no confidence.
424
 In March 2013 an 
                                                        
410
 Vanuaroroa v Republic of Vanuatu [2013] VUSC 182. 
411
 Union of Moderate Parties (Inc) v Minister of Finance [2012] VUSC 164. 
412
 SANMA Local Government Council v Wells [2012] VUSC 27. 
413
 See, for example, Steven v Chairman of Electoral Commission [2013] VUSC 111, relating to a refusal to accept a 
potential candidate’s application to run for election. 
414
 See, for example, Bong v President of the Republic of Vanuatu [2012] VUSC 157, relating to suspension of the 
Police Commissioner. 
415
 Kilman v Republic of Vanuatu [2011] VUSC 39. 
416
 Kilman v Speaker of Parliament of the Republic of Vanuatu [2011] VUSC 35. 
417
 Kilman v Speaker of Parliament of the Republic of Vanuatu [2011] VUCA 15. 
418
 Natapei v Korman [2011] VUSC 72. 
419
 Natapei v Korman [2011] VUSC 91. 
420
 Vanuaroroa v Natapei [2011] VUSC 92. 
421
 Radio New Zealand International, ‘Kilman elected Vanuatu PM – 10 days after ouster by court’ Radio New Zealand 
International Online 27 June 2011. 
422
 Kilman v Natapei  [2011] VUCA 24. 
423
 Kilman v Korman [2011] VUSC 227; Kilman v Korman [2011] VUSC 228. 
424
 Natapei v Wells [2012] VUSC 260. 
  
70 NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT VANUATU 
 
 
application was held relating to the Speaker’s decision to close a session of parliament so that 
debate on a motion of no confidence could not take place.
425
 
Whilst decisions can be appealed, once matters have been finally determined in court, orders are 
acted upon. However, as indicated by the discussion of political events in 2011 taking matters to 
court can be used as a delaying tactic to enable the executive to gather sufficient political support for 
the matter that was first being challenged. This means that once court orders are acted upon, 
changes in political support mean that the matter is no longer at issue.  Further, as discussed below, 
delays can affect a wide range of cases, including cases involving the review of executive decisions. 
Corruption prosecution 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE JUDICIARY COMMITTED TO FIGHTING CORRUPTION THROUGH PROSECUTION AND 
OTHER ACTIVITIES? 
 
The judiciary is largely reactive in its contribution to the fight against corruption as it is 
dependent upon cases being brought before it. It does not often use the “language of 
corruption” in discussing criminal cases that involve misuse of position for private gain. 
Statistics in annual reports do not provide separate information on corruption prosecutions. The 
judiciary is not actively involved in making recommendations relating to anti-corruption measures 
and reforms. 
The court is reliant on other bodies bringing corruption matters to court. As the Office of the Public 
Prosecutor is not very active in pursuing corruption cases, particularly against political leaders, the 
court is unable to be active in showing lack of tolerance for corruption via heavy sentencing. The 
main area that the court is active in hearing cases relating to corruption is in the area of election 
petitions, usually raised by unsuccessful candidates challenging the election of others. Although no 
petitions were successful following the 2012 national election, two petitions were successful 
following the 2008 national election.
426
 Whilst successful petitions lead to by-elections, as discussed 
in the section on the electoral management body, corresponding prosecutions for electoral offences 
are not presented to the court.  
In the past five years only three reported criminal cases have mentioned corruption. In 2013 a 
businessman was given a 16 months sentence, suspended for two years, for attempting to bribe a 
Value Added Tax (VAT) officer.
427
 That same year 13 supporters of member of parliament Don Ken 
were convicted of criminal offences under the penal code relating to attempts to destroy alleged 
evidence of corrupt practices during the national election. Offences included unlawful assembly, 
extortion, assault, threats to kill, false imprisonment and kidnapping. They were sentenced to 
imprisonment for two to three-and-a-half years depending on offences committed, although one had 
his sentence suspended due to specific family responsibilities.
428
 In 2013 the CEO of Air Vanuatu 
was convicted of nine counts of obtaining money by deception. He was sentenced to 12 months 
imprisonment, as well as ordered to pay compensation.
429
 In 2011, following a private prosecution, a 
lands department officer pleaded guilty to some improper dealings.
430
 No sentence has been 
published. 
Cases relating to misappropriation and fraud arise in the courts regularly, but usually occur in the 
context of private sector employees acting improperly, and are not discussed by the courts as 
corruption. 
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There is considerable concern about delays within the judicial system.
431
 These delays have a 
number of causes. Many causes are external to the judiciary and instead relate to the conduct of 
lawyers and court users. However, the ultimate result is that often justice is denied. These issues 
are systemic and do not only affect corruption related cases. That said, cases that disappear into the 
system may involve corrupt actions, but as they “get lost” no remedy is ever available, and no 
consequences for bad behaviour result. One particular corruption related case that has been caught 
up in delays is the attempt by the Ombudsman, in 1997, to initiate proceedings against various 
leaders pursuant to the Ombudsman Act 1995 when others did not act upon her reports. Following 
various interlocutory matters being heard in 2001,
432
 the case proceeded to trial in 2004. No decision 
has ever been issued, however.
433
 
The judiciary is committed to addressing these issues. The Court Improvement Plan 2012 – 2015 
contains a number of measures to improve efficiency. A case delay reduction project is currently 
being implemented.
434
 Broad improvements in the judicial system will enhance the processing of all 
cases, including corruption cases. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The issue of delays in service delivery and associated issues of lack of resources, lack of 
accountability and lack of transparency are being addressed under the Court Improvement Plan 
2012 – 2015. The Ministry of Justice should ensure that there is an independent evaluation of 
the implementation of this plan.  
 
2. There appears to be a public perception that the judiciary is becoming increasingly corrupt. In 
order to address this the judiciary should:  
 
a. Undertake public consultation on whether it is desirable to have the judiciary fall within 
the scope of the Office of the Ombudsman, or whether an alternate complaints 
mechanism should be developed and implemented.  
b. Institute a “customer service” feedback mechanism. 
c. Introduce a code of conduct for court staff. 
d. Increase public awareness on the code of conduct for judges. 
e. Introduce registers for gifts and hospitality. 
 
3. Whilst there is transparency in superior court decisions, there is little transparency in respect of 
the decisions of subordinate courts. It is recommended that all judgments, including 
Magistrates Court judgments should be published on PacLII. 
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VII.4. PUBLIC SECTOR 
SUMMARY 
Overall pillar score: 36.1 
Dimension Indicator Law Practice 
Capacity 
41.7 
Resources -- 50 
Independence 50 25 
Governance 
41.7 
Transparency 25 25 
Accountability 75 25 
Integrity 75 25 
Role 
25 
Public education 25 
Cooperate with external agencies in 
preventing/ addressing corruption 
25 
Reduce corruption risks by safeguarding 
integrity in public procurement 
25 
 
The public sector is widely perceived as facing issues relating to corruption. There is a reasonable 
legal framework for accountability and integrity of public servants. However, lack of implementation 
of the legal framework mean that in practice there is little accountability. In the absence of financial 
accountability mechanisms it is difficult to determine to what extent public service agencies are 
suffering from shortages of resources in undertaking activities, and to what extent mismanagement 
and corruption plays a role in limiting service delivery. In likelihood both contribute to weak service 
delivery by the public service. There are plans to strengthen the very limited extent to which the 
public service currently educates the public on corruption and cooperates with other agencies in 
addressing corruption. To date, however, little is done in these areas. Public procurement is not 
transparent and there are significant loopholes in the laws in this area. As a result public 
procurement processes are open to abuse. 
STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION 
The public service is comprised of a number of line agencies (departments and offices) that operate 
under the policy direction of the executive, through ministries. The central body for the management 
of most public servants is the Public Service Commission (PSC). There are other commissions, 
including the Judicial Service Commission, the Police Service Commission and the Teaching 
Service Commission which deal with the employment of specific groups of people paid out of public 
money.  The PSC is supported by a secretary, who is appointed by the commission, whose role is to 
provide secretariat and administrative support to the commission. The secretary is also the 
administrative head of the office of the PSC, which includes a number of support staff. 
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ASSESSMENT 
Capacity 
Resources (practice) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE PUBLIC SECTOR HAVE ADEQUATE RESOURCES TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT ITS 
DUTIES? 
 
The public service is provided with some financial, human and infrastructural resources. As 
well as resource gaps, inefficiency in managing resources can lead to ineffectiveness in 
carrying out public sector duties. 
Resource issues within some public sector agencies appear to hamper their work. For instance, in 
2010 the Ministry of Health faced a crisis when limited drugs were available. It was later established 
that budget issues contributed to this issue.
435
 Limited resources have been used to explain why the 
Public Works Department is unable to be more active in repairing roads.
436
 There are also concerns 
that limited financial resources hinder the PSC from performing its functions.
437
 In 2012 an issue of 
shortage of funds for teachers’ salaries in the Department and the Ministry of Education was 
raised.
438
 In the absence of detailed audit reports, including performance audits, it is difficult to 
assess the extent to which limited resources, as opposed to mismanagement of resources, hinders 
the work of public sector agencies. 
Wages in the public sector, particularly for low level employees, are low and insufficient to maintain 
a reasonable standard of living. At mid-range levels wages can make it difficult to attract the best 
staff to work within the public service.
439
 However, wage plus benefits packages at higher levels do 
make public sector packages attractive.
440
 It can also be observed that wages of those employed by 
the PSC are better than those employed by the Police Services Commission and Teaching Services 
Commission.
441
 The Government Remuneration Tribunal is a legal entity that has the job of 
determining wages.
442
 One issue with public sector wages is that the Government Remuneration 
Tribunal has not been very active in recent years, with the last wage review occurring in 2006. It was 
revitalised in 2013, so may become more effective.  
Measures have been introduced recently to increase capacity of public servants through training 
programmes. In particular the Vanuatu Institute of Public Administration and Management was 
established in 2011. 
The sustainability of public sector wages and public sector activities in general is questionable. As 
discussed in the foundations section, Vanuatu receives considerable aid support. It has a small 
private sector, which limits private sector derived tax revenue. If aid levels reduce, Vanuatu may find 
it difficult to maintain funding for current levels of public sector staffing.  With more effective and 
efficient management, it may, however, be able to maintain current levels of activities. For instance, 
whilst few auditor general’s reports have been produced, they consistently reveal misuse of 
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allowances and benefits, and overspending in this area, across a number of different agencies.
443
 
Better management to prevent, auditing to detect, and law enforcement to recover this misspending 
(and punish wrongdoers) would enhance the efficiency of use of resources. 
A number of people commented on the public service culture of requiring to be paid additional 
allowances to attend meetings and undertake other tasks which form part of a person’s job, for 
which the person is already being paid. This attitude is not limited to the public sector, but also 
“infects” other people who are being paid out of public money. This is a matter of lack of integrity, 
but it is thought to create a significant leakage of public funds. 
Independence (law) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR SAFEGUARDED BY LAW? ARE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES INDEPENDENT BY LAW?  
 
While there are some provisions allowing for the independence of the PSC and public sector 
employees, a number of loopholes exist within the legal framework and these can potentially 
be used to undermine independence. 
The legal framework provides a number of provisions relating to independence of the public sector. 
The Constitution provides that the PSC ‘shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other 
person or body in the exercise of its functions.’444 The Government Act prohibits ministers from 
interfering in employment decision of the PSC
445
 although, as noted elsewhere, the Constitution 
gives the prime minister the power to transfer senior public servants to equivalent positions.
446
 The 
guiding principles of the public service and the PSC include that the service is to be independent 
and perform functions in an impartial and professional manner and that the PSC is to make 
employment decisions based on merit.
447
  
The PSC is comprised of members (including the chair) who are appointed by the president on the 
advice of the prime minister for a term of three years.
448
 There is no requirement that the leader of 
the opposition or any other person be consulted, so the legal framework does not limit the possibility 
of “stacking” the PSC with political appointments. There are few limits on who can be appointed. 
Members of parliament of local government and the National Council of Chiefs are prohibited from 
holding positions on the PSC, as are people holding positions of responsibility within political 
parties.
449
 People must also be of good character and have experience in public sector management 
in order to be appointed.
450
  
Only the PSC has the power to terminate or demote public servants and must follow strict and 
detailed procedures laid out in the Public Service Act and Public Service Staff Manual. This protects 
most employees against political interference. The procedures do, however, require the director 
general to endorse decisions of selection committees.
451
 In 2011 the law changed to give the prime 
minister the power to hire and fire director generals.
452
 This essentially gives a person who is 
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potentially a political appointee power over the appointments process. The Constitution also permits 
the prime minister to transfer senior public servants to equivalent positions.
453
 
Public service employees’ obligations are stated in the Public Service Act to include following lawful 
orders, behaving honestly and with integrity, taking reasonable steps to avoid any conflict of interest 
(real or apparent) in connection with his or her employment, not making improper use of information 
or his or her duty, status, power or authority in order to gain or seek to gain a benefit or advantage 
for himself or herself or for any other person.
454
 
There is no legal regulation of parliamentary lobbying for publicly procured projects in plans, 
programmes and budgets. 
Independence (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE PUBLIC SECTOR FREE FROM EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE IN ITS ACTIVITIES? 
 
It is publically perceived that there is widespread political interference in the appointment, 
suspension and termination process of public servants. 
There is considerable public concern about political interference in the public service. In a street 
survey conducted in January 2014 by the National Integrity System researchers, 86% thought that 
there was interference. Comments indicated that interference both in appointments and service 
delivery were perceived to be occurring. The same survey also indicated that 85% of respondents 
considered nepotism to be a problem, with a further 10% being unsure if it was a problem. 80% also 
thought that nepotism was worse as compared to three years ago. Employment of siblings and 
children was seen to be a problem as was the practice of recruiting people from the same village or 
island to be employed at the same place. There was little confidence that appointments were being 
done on merit.
455
 
Whilst there is no wholesale exchange of public servants following changes in government, the 
prime minister controls the appointments of director generals, and director generals are able to wield 
considerable power in the appointments process, as they must endorse all appointment decisions 
made by selection committees.
456
 Director generals also have the power to suspend staff pending 
further enquiries. The Ministry of Health, which has a director general and three directors, has 
provided an ongoing example of interference in appointments, particularly through the misuse of the 
power to suspend staff. In November 2012 it was reported that the outgoing Director General had 
suspended or terminated the appointments of all Directors, with political interference alleged to be a 
motivator.
457
 In December 2012 a new Director General was appointed, but then quickly replaced by 
a person who had been terminated from employment within the ministry for inappropriate 
behaviour.
458
 By September 2013, when the ministry was led by a new Acting Director General, he 
again suspended all the Directors, for allegedly spurious reasons. Other staff, including the Acting 
Manager of Human Resources, were also suspended.
459
 In December 2013 it was reported that all 
medical personnel suspended by the Acting Director General were reinstated following a petition to 
the Prime Minister.
460
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Another example is the suspension in later 2012 and again in early 2013 of the Director of Ports and 
Harbours, allegedly for refusing to allow the yacht Phocea to leave the country in contravention of an 
order by the Prime Minister.
461
 The Phocea had been fraudulently registered and was at the heart of 
allegations of drug and arms smuggling, which would have given cause to doubt the lawfulness of 
the Prime Minister’s orders, although matters were never fully investigated and the truth of 
allegations remain unknown.
462
   The Director of Ports and Harbours was subsequently terminated 
by the PSC.
463
  
Also detailed, in the section on the electoral management body, is the transfer of the Principal 
Electoral Officer (PEO) at a sensitive time during the lead up to the 2012 national election. This 
transfer was done by the Prime Minister exercising the constitutional power to transfer senior public 
servants. 
Questions have been raised as to the independence of the PSC due to the appointments process 
that allows the prime minister to decide the members of the commission.
464
  
Whilst the public perception of political interference in the public sector is very negative, the 
Secretary of the PSC stressed that the public perception does not reflect reality, with appointments 
being based on merit and disciplinary actions and terminations being based on clear evidence of 
wrongdoing.
465
 
Governance 
Transparency (law) 
Score: 25   
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO ENSURE TRANSPARENCY IN FINANCIAL, HUMAN 
RESOURCE AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR?  
 
Job vacancies must be publically advertised, but there are a number of other significant gaps 
in laws relating to transparency of activities and information management within the public 
sector. 
In terms of overall reporting on activities of the PSC and public sector agencies, the chairman of the 
PSC must, within 90 days after the end of each financial year, furnish a report to the minister relating 
to the operations of the commission for that year. A copy of the report must be laid before the 
parliament within a set time.
466
 As proceedings of parliament are public,
467
 once reports are tabled in 
parliament they should be accessible to the public. Nothing is specified in law as to the content of 
this report. As discussed in the section on the executive, ministers are required to report annually to 
parliament on activities under their ministries, and it may be assumed that these reports would 
contain information on activities by all public sector agencies that fall under their ministerial portfolio. 
There is, however, no requirement that these documents be tabled in parliament, or otherwise be 
made public.
468
 Director generals are also required to provide corporate plans to the PSC
469
 and to 
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provide annual reports to the PSC.
470
 Again there is no requirement that these plans and reports be 
made public. 
Whilst a freedom of information law is currently in development there are currently no laws about 
how records in the public sector are managed and made public. As discussed below, whilst 
government tenders are usually required to be advertised, there are a number of loopholes that 
allow this process to be circumvented. There is also no requirement that a publically accessible 
record of awarded government contracts is made available.  
Although there are gaps in transparency at the activity-reporting level and in procurement, 
processes for appointing staff are somewhat more transparent. The Public Service Staff Manual 
contains detailed rules for advertising positions and the selection of staff.
471
 Positions need to be 
widely advertised, with closing dates usually being one month after the advert first runs.
472
 Director 
general positions are only required to be advertised for two weeks, however.
473
 All unsuccessful 
applicants must be informed in writing of this outcome,
474
 although reasons why applicants were not 
successful do not need to be given. There are strict limits on when staff already engaged within the 
public service can be promoted to positions or converted from casual to permanent staff without 
advertisement.
475
  
Members of the PSC, directors-general of ministries and directors of departments are leaders under 
the Leadership Code Act.
476
 Whilst the Leadership Code Act requires leaders to make annual 
returns to the clerk of parliament disclosing their assets, as discussed in the section on the 
legislature these returns are not required to be made public under the law. Nor is there any legal 
requirement for them to be routinely scrutinised. 
Transparency (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE PROVISIONS ON TRANSPARENCY IN FINANCIAL, HUMAN RESOURCE AND 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED?  
 
In practice, other than in respect of job advertisements, gaining information on the activities 
of the public sector is difficult and depends on goodwill relationships and/or what has been 
released to the media. 
There are significant gaps in information about the public sector in practice. As discussed elsewhere 
in this report the Leadership Code Act does not require public disclosure of annual returns of leaders 
and this information is not available in practice. The government website does not include any 
information about current tenders. A brief internet search only found tender information about 
projects in Vanuatu that were funded by aid donors such as the New Zealand Aid Programme or 
Agency Australian Aid. As discussed in the section below on public procurement, in the absence of 
a register of government contracts or other public information it is not possible to assess the degree 
to which tenders get advertised. In the absence of freedom of information laws the extent to which 
public sector agencies will disclose information held on citizens depends entirely on goodwill 
relationships. Whilst corporate business plans and other reports may be available on request, again 
this is largely dependent upon goodwill relationships.  
There is, however, one transparent area, that of job advertisements for public sector positions. 
These are advertised in the newspaper and online. As reported in the section on the media both 
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public and private media are also active in reporting on government activities. Whilst this is largely 
dependent upon the release of information by public sector agencies media does provide some 
(piecemeal) transparency in respect of government activities. There are also current initiatives to 
improve provision of information, both in relation to the PSC and in relation to public sector agencies 
generally, using the internet.
477
 
Accountability (law) 
Score: 75 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES HAVE TO 
REPORT AND BE ANSWERABLE FOR THEIR ACTIONS? 
 
There are fairly comprehensive legal measures to ensure that individual public servants are 
accountable for their actions. There are, however, gaps in relation to laws requiring public 
sector agencies to be accountable. 
The Public Service Act provides a comprehensive list of disciplinary offences.
478
 Whilst corruption is 
not specifically listed as a disciplinary offence, behaviour such as extortion, bribery, corruption and 
abuse of privileged state information would be considered improper conduct, which is a disciplinary 
offence. Disciplinary offences are dealt with, in the first instance, at ministerial level.
479
 In the event 
that the matter cannot be resolved (for instance if it is serious misconduct) then the matter is 
referred to the PSC, who may choose to dismiss the matter or refer it to a disciplinary board, which 
then makes recommendations to the PSC. In the event of serious misconduct the PSC also has the 
power to terminate employment without referring the matter to a disciplinary board.
480
 The board can 
make a number of recommendations, including to demote, suspend or terminate employment of a 
worker.
481
 Although a recent Public Accounts Committee report recommended that the PSC take 
action to recover misappropriated money
482
 the PSC does not have the power to apply criminal 
penalties and cannot require that an offender pay back misappropriated money.
483
 Instead it can 
refer matters to the police for investigation and criminal prosecution.  
Staff are, in law, subject to regular performance reviews.
484
 Although these reviews relate to the 
achievement of work plans more than detection of non-compliance with laws, they provide an 
opportunity for identifying gaps in performance that may signify corrupt behaviour. The requirement 
for signatures and oversight by the Ministry of Finance before public expenditure is approved
485
 
provides an avenue through which misappropriations can be detected. Auditor-general’s reports are 
also vital legally mandated mechanisms for financial accountability. An additional measure to help 
with the detection of corruption is that any public servant who sees an apparent breach of any law is 
under an obligation to report it, either to the PSC or his director general.
486
 Such whistleblowers are 
legally protected from any penalty unless it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the report was 
made maliciously.
487
 Public servants who report irregularities in relation to government contracts are 
also protected from being penalised.
488
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There is no formal mechanism for the PSC to receive complaints from the public. Instead the 
ombudsman is mandated to enquire into the conduct of any government agency or public servant,
489
 
and this provides a channel for public complaints. Senior public servants are also leaders for the 
purposes of the Leadership Code Act and can be investigated by the ombudsman for breaches of 
the Leadership Code.  
Although there are fairly comprehensive provisions for ensuring accountability of individual public 
servants, as discussed above, there are few requirements for public sector agencies to report 
directly to parliament. The main device for oversight and reporting is the conduct of financial and 
performance audits by the auditor general.
490
 
Accountability (practice) 
Score: 25  
TO WHAT EXTENT DO PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES HAVE TO REPORT AND BE ANSWERABLE FOR THEIR 
ACTIONS IN PRACTICE? 
 
Disciplinary proceedings for breaches of the employment relationship do occur to some 
degree, although other accountability mechanisms are not functioning. 
Accountability of public servants via disciplinary procedures is occurring to some degree. Whilst 
complaints are internally generated, in 2013 more than 70 disciplinary cases were received by the 
PSC.
491
 Only serious cases come to the PSC, with less serious cases being dealt with internally in 
ministries. There are no records of the number of less serious cases handled.  There are no 
statistics on the types of behaviours resulting in disciplinary complaints. Nor are there public records 
on the outcomes, although some staff were dismissed.
492
 It is not known how effectively 
whistleblower protections are operating, although there is a perception that there is a lack of moral 
responsibility on behalf of public servants (and others) to make reports.
493
 As discussed in the 
section on procurement at the end of this report, there appears to be little accountability in respect of 
public procurement. New performance management rules are being developed and, with the PSC 
expecting to implement them in July 2014 and these should, if properly implemented, enhance 
accountability.
494
 
There have been no prosecutions of public officers for receiving bribes in the past five years. Nor 
have there been any published decisions relating to prosecution of public officers for 
misappropriation.  
Accountability via the ombudsman’s office is limited. Complaints about the operation of government 
agencies (which may include actions of public servants or political appointees) account for the bulk 
of complaints received by the Office of the Ombudsman. In 2010 78% of complaints to the 
ombudsman related to government agencies acting in a poor fashion, as compared to 22% of 
complains relating to breaches of the Leadership Code.
495
 In 2011 62% complaints related to 
government agencies acting in a poor fashion.
496
 Since the beginning of 2010 the Office of the 
Ombudsman has issued eight reports. None of these dealt with instances of wrongdoing by public 
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servants. Ombudsman’s annual reports indicate that a number of complaints in respect of public 
servants have been dealt with by mediation, with the Office of the Ombudsman helping to correct 
actions and decisions of public servants.
497
 
One ombudsman’s report, in 2011, did address the actions of a Director General in using 
suspension as part of disciplinary proceedings against the then Director of Lands.
498
 The 
ombudsman’s report did not dispute any of the findings of wrongdoing by the Director. Instead, it 
said it found that natural justice had been breached by suspending the director general prior to a 
hearing by the PSC or a disciplinary board. Whilst the Public Service Staff Manual permits 
immediate suspension for serious misconduct, pending further processes, ‘The Ombudsman is of 
the opinion that this provision contradicts the Constitution as it does not take into account the 
individual’s right to natural justice.’499 Given that suspension is done prior to a decision-making 
process that usually involves the right to be heard occurring, it is not clear what this opinion is based 
on. This report hinders, rather than helps, the PSC and director generals in the use of disciplinary 
procedures to hold public servants accountable. There are, however, other cases where the PSC 
has terminated staff without a hearing, so concerns about natural justice are not entirely 
unfounded.
500
 
A number of public servants have been found, by the Office of the Auditor General (OAG), to have 
committed acts of financial wrongdoing (including receiving overpayments and misappropriating 
funds) and have faced consequences because of this. However, as the OAG is not up-to-date in 
conducting audits detection is delayed, which can make recovery or the imposition of penalties 
difficult. 
Integrity (law) 
Score: 75 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF PUBLIC SECTOR 
EMPLOYEES? 
 
There are a number of laws that set standards of integrity for public servants. These 
standards are fairly comprehensive. 
Senior public servants who are defined as leaders are required to adhere to the Leadership Code 
Act. As discussed in the sections on the executive and legislature this contains rules on conflicts of 
interest. 
All public servants are also subject to the provisions of the Public Service Act that provides, in part 
5, a code of conduct. This code of conduct prohibits receiving fees or rewards of any kind for 
performing duties as a public servant.
501
 It also requires public servants to take steps to avoid real or 
apparent conflicts of interest
502
 and not to make improper use of information.
503
 Public servants are 
required to make lawful use only of resources and public money.
504
 Misuse of government vehicles 
is a crime that attracts a spot fine of up to VT20,000 (US$200). It is also a disciplinary offence.
505
  
There is nothing specific in the code about the employment of family members, although if a 
member of the selection panel who makes recommendations to the PSC discovers that he or she 
                                                        
497
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498
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has a personal relationship with any applicant then he or she must step down from the panel.
506
 
There are no specific limits on being supervised by a family member. Whilst the Act prohibits public 
servants from engaging in other employment without permission
507
 there are no post-employment 
restrictions. Nor are there any laws requiring bidding or contracting documents in relation to public 
procurement to contain any special anti-corruption clauses. 
Both giving and receiving bribes to public officers is a criminal offence, which attracts a penalty of up 
to 10 years.
508
 If a public servant is convicted of any criminal offence the PSC may dismiss him or 
her, following standard disciplinary procedures.
509
   
Integrity (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE INTEGRITY OF PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES ENSURED IN PRACTICE? 
 
Despite the presence of integrity mechanisms in law, corruption is perceived to be a problem 
within the public sector in practice. Work is, however, underway to revise the code of 
conduct and the methods by which it is communicated to staff. 
There is a public perception that corruption within the public service is a problem. Transparency 
International’s Global Corruption Barometer study uses a score scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means not 
at all corrupt and 5 means extremely corrupt. The results of the Global Corruption Barometer 2013 
show that in Vanuatu the perception of corruption in public officials/civil servants was 3.9.
510
  
Agencies under the control of the Ministry of Lands have been particularly scrutinised for corruption 
recently. Investigations are currently ongoing in relation to allegations that a former minister of lands 
sold state owned land at discount rates to some staff of the Department of Lands and associated 
friends.
511
 The Ministry of Health has also been subject to scrutiny by a Commission of Inquiry, 
following a serious drug shortage in 2010. In addition to budget issues, a number of integrity related 
issues, including ‘the supplies system of recording [and] distribution … performance management, 
staff transparency, authoritarian management style, lack of reporting mechanisms, as well as 
understaffing, workplace attitudes and behaviour and language issues’512 contributed to this 
problem. Over the last year the crisis within health appears to have been deepening, with a number 
of changes at the level of director general and director, and the termination of contracts of some 
medical personnel. These two only serve as examples of perceived corruption within public sector 
agencies. It is not an overstatement to say that every week there is at least one news story 
published which alleges corruption or mismanagement within a public entity. 
Due to concerns within the PSC as to the effectiveness of the Code of Conduct the PSC is currently 
working on developing it further.
513
 A former secretary of the PSC commented that, ‘the existing 
code of conduct is not exactly a code of conduct and is not effective. There should be a specific 
code of conduct for all public sector employees, which must be very specific and clearly outlines 
how the public sector employees should behave and act.’514 
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There are gaps in training on ethical behaviour. Although the secretary to the PSC reported various 
training of staff, none of this was specifically related to the code of conduct.
515
 There is a haphazard 
approach to the communication of public sector core values. However, core values (the code of 
conduct) are included in appointment letters and there are plans to include them in orientation 
packages for news staff. There are also plans to develop a website for the PSC that employees can 
access and for this website to include a section on core values.
516
  
Role 
Public education 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE PUBLIC SECTOR INFORM AND EDUCATE THE PUBLIC ON ITS ROLE IN FIGHTING 
CORRUPTION? 
 
Whilst there are piecemeal efforts by some public sector agencies to educate the public 
about corruption, at the moment there are no widespread public sector activities in this area. 
The PSC does not have an education plan to educate the public in order to combat corruption. Nor 
does it make public information available about how to make complaints about corruption within the 
public service. As discussed in the section below it does, however, have a plan to increase co-
operation with communities. If this plan is implemented it will involve elements of public education. 
Some public sector agencies do conduct some public education. The Department of Customs and 
Inland Revenue runs a regular newspaper column that informs the public of activities and educates 
the public about laws. Whilst this column does not have a specific anti-corruption focus, it has been 
used to highlight corruption issues within public revenue gathering, such as the recent prosecution 
of a person for attempting to bribe a public officer.   
The Electoral Office is another public sector agency that has, in the past conducted public education 
activities in respect of correct behaviour during voting. As discussed in the section on the electoral 
management body, resource issues currently limit the extent to which the Electoral Office fulfils this 
role, however. 
Co-operate with public institutions, CSOs and private agencies in preventing/addressing 
corruption 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE PUBLIC SECTOR WORK WITH PUBLIC WATCHDOG AGENCIES, BUSINESS AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY ON ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES?  
 
There has been little co-operation of public sector agencies with other agencies on anti-
corruption activities although there are current plans to build co-operation in this area. 
Whilst co-operation between the PSC and others has not been done recent years it is incorporated 
in the Corporate Plan 2014-2016. This plan includes working with communities, the ombudsman and 
others on anti-corruption initiatives.
517
  As part of this plan community visits occurred in Santo in 
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March 2014, with further plans to undertake visits in Malekula in May 2014, depending upon 
budgets.
518
  
Whilst the PSC does follow up on ombudsman’s reports, there has been little communication about 
follow up actions taken in the past. For instance, as noted in the section on the ombudsman, in 2011 
the annual report of the office of the ombudsman noted that no action had occurred on one of the 
public reports issued that year.
519
 However, the PSC had in fact taken action in respect of a report 
detailing improper suspension of the director of the lands department.
520
 
One public sector agency is notable for taking a more co-operative approach, however. As noted in 
the section above, the Electoral Office is a public sector agency and has, in the past worked with 
NGOs on public awareness around corruption. It has also allowed NGOs and external agents to act 
as election observers, as discussed in the section on the electoral management body. The Ministry 
of Youth and Sport, through the National Youth Council, has also partnered with NGOs on anti-
corruption activities. 
Reduce corruption risks by safeguarding integrity in public procurement 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THERE AN EFFECTIVE FRAMEWORK IN PLACE TO SAFEGUARD INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES, INCLUDING MEANINGFUL SANCTIONS FOR IMPROPER CONDUCT BY BOTH 
SUPPLIERS AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS, AND REVIEW AND COMPLAINT MECHANISMS?  
 
Whilst there are some laws in the area of procurement, these contain significant gaps and 
weaknesses. Further, in the absence of public registers and statistics it is not possible to 
assess the extent to which good practice in public procurement is occurring. 
The Government Contracts and Tenders Act (GCTA) governs contracts with a value of over VT5 
million (US$50,000). Contracts for less than this amount are governed by the Financial Regulations 
made pursuant to the Public Finance and Economic Management Act. The government contracts 
process under the GCTA is controlled by the Tenders Board, a body made up of a chairperson, the 
director general of the ministry that is procuring the goods or services, or his representative; the 
director general of finance, or his representative; a representative of the ministry responsible for 
procuring the goods or service who has detailed knowledge of the requirements of the ministry in 
relation to the contract to be performed; and, where the government contract is of a value of VT10 
million (US$100,000) or more, a person with legal qualifications or experience appointed by the 
minister after consultation with the chairperson of the board.
521
 The chair is ‘appointed by the Prime 
Minister, after consultation with the leaders of every political party represented in parliament and a 
recognised representative of the private business sector’522 Members of the tenders board cannot 
participate in the tendering process for contracts for which they have a conflict of interest,
523
 which 
helps to protect independence. Although the board ‘is not to be subject to interference or influence 
from any person’,524 as discussed in above, director generals can be subject to external interference 
by their ministers, so the composition of the board means it is not entirely independent of potential 
government interference. Nor is the board entirely independent of the particular procuring body for 
any contract. 
The GCTA requires that any minister entering  a government contract must ‘use a competitive and 
transparent process when deciding who to award the contract to including where applicable, a 
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tender process as may be prescribed by this or any other Act or regulation.’525 Open bidding is 
usually required under the Tenders Regulations 1999,
526
 with tenders being advertised in the press 
and on the radio.
527
 International tenders are required if in the opinion of the board,
528
 ‘when it is 
unlikely that goods or services being purchased can be supplied at the best price or quality from 
within Vanuatu.’529 Any person inquiring about a tender must be supplied with key information,530 
although there is no requirement that clarifications and amendments during the bidding process to 
be shared among all bidders. The law does not provide a standard form for tenders. Nor does it 
require companies to have any code of conduct or any other anti-corruption policies before it can 
submit a tender. 
The Tenders Regulations 1999, made pursuant to the GCTA, provide exceptions to an open 
process. First, ‘the Tenders Board may approve another tender process for projects where a straight 
open and competitive tender process may not provide the best result in the opinion of the Tenders 
Board.’531 Whilst the Tenders Regulations provide alternative processes532 it is not mandatory to 
follow any of the alternative processes. If the board has decided that an open process is not 
appropriate then the only restriction on the process to be used is that it ‘must follow any guidelines 
or instructions issued by the director general of the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Management.’533 Second, the Tenders Regulations provide that ‘in the case of emergency 
expenditure, the Tenders Board may choose to recommend a Government Contract to the Council 
of Ministers without following the procedure set out in regulations 4 to 8. This may only be done 
when the urgency of the expenditure does not allow sufficient time for the full tender process to be 
carried out.’534 This second exception means that the entire tender process, from advertising to 
evaluation, can be avoided in emergency situations. 
In respect of evaluation the usual process is that before the board makes a decision, all correctly 
submitted tenders are given to ‘the appropriate technical officer’535 to be evaluated. There are no 
further laws for determining who the appropriate technical officer is or the qualifications he or she 
must hold. The Tenders Regulations provide a list of example evaluation criteria,
536
 although it is at 
the discretion of the technical officer as to what evaluation criteria are actually used.
537
 The technical 
officer provides a report back to the board. This report requires, amongst other things, a statement 
of the criteria used, an evaluation of each tender against the criteria and a statement of the technical 
officer’s preferred tender, with reasons why this is preferred.538 The board can then either ask for 
more information from the technical officer or make a recommendation to the Council of Ministers.
539
 
If the recommendation is declined then the Council of Ministers must give reasons,
540
 with the matter 
then being referred back to the board.
541
 
Neither the GCTA nor the Tenders Regulations require procurement award decisions to be made 
public. They also do not require the maintenance of registers and statistics on contracts. There is no 
procedure for members of the public or unsuccessful bidders to request a review of procurement 
decisions, although the Public Accounts Committee does have the records, minutes and decisions 
of the board.
542
 The GCTA also provides some protections for whistleblowers. Suspected breaches 
of the GCTA are to be reported to senior personnel within the Ministry of Finance, who must then 
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report the matter to the director general.
543
 The director general may then report the matter to the 
auditor general, the public prosecutor or the commissioner of police, although he is under no 
obligation to do so.
544
 Any whistleblower who is a public servant must not be victimised or 
discriminated against.
545
 There are no similar protections of whistleblowers who are not public 
servants, however.  
Breaches of the GCTA are criminal offences.
546
 The GCTA also makes it clear that any leader who 
is convicted of an offence under the GCTA who has also breached the Leadership Code Act is also 
subject to prosecution under that Act.
547
 There are no administrative penalties within the GCTA 
(such as losing one’s job or being prohibited from holding certain positions) that attach to successful 
prosecution under the GCTA. 
The GCTA only deals with the procurement process. There is no special process for monitoring 
government contracts. Instead payments must follow the procedures in the Public Finance and 
Economic Management Act and the associated Financial Regulations. The main monitoring device 
is audits by the auditor general, although in the past breaches of the GCTA has also been the 
subject of ombudsman’s reports.  
The rules for bidding on contracts with a value of less than VT5 million (US$50,000) are quite lax. 
‘The Financial Regulations do not currently require an authorised officer to obtain quotations for 
expenditure under VT100,000 (US$1,000). Furthermore, quotations are only required “wherever 
possible” for procurement between VT100,000 (US$1,000) and VT5 million (US$50,000). Allowing 
public procurement without ensuring that multiple quotations have been received increase the 
chance of corrupt activities and inefficient use of public funds.’548 The GCTA does, however, prohibit 
contract splitting in order to avoid the tendering process.
549
 
In the absence of publication of a public tenders register it is difficult to assess the degree to which 
the law (or good practice, in the event that there are gaps in the law) is being followed. The 
Transparency International Vanuatu Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre ‘has received a number of 
complains concerning contracts entered into by the Vanuatu Government that highlight serious 
deficiencies in the current public procurement laws.’550 In 2006, the European Union (EU) conducted 
a Public Expenditure Financial Assessment and allocated a score of D to procurement controls.
551
 
An assessment of public procurement in 2010 awarded Vanuatu a score of 0 on many indicators. 
Often the absence of statistics or data made it impossible to score performance.
552
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. The public sector suffers from very negative public perceptions as to its independence and integrity. 
Whilst these perceptions may not be entirely fair, and may be based on incorrect information, they 
need to be addressed. The following measures should therefore be implemented: 
 
a. The legislature should enact the Right to Information Bill, which will enhance 
transparency of public sector activities and decision-making. 
b. The PSC should publish a list of public servants, annually, who have been subject to 
disciplinary action (including the nature of the misbehaviour and the penalty applied, 
                                                        
543
 Section 13C(1) & (3), Government Contracts and Tenders Act [Cap 245].  
544
 Section 13C(4), Government Contracts and Tenders Act [Cap 245]. 
545
 Section 13C(2), Government Contracts and Tenders Act [Cap 245]. 
546
 Sections 14 and 15, Government Contracts and Tenders Act [Cap 245]. 
547
 Section 16, Government Contracts and Tenders Act [Cap 245].  
548
 Transparency International Vanuatu Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre, Reference to the Vanuatu Law Reform 
Commission on Public Procurement (Port Vila: Transparency International Vanuatu, 2013). 
549
 Section 13A, Government Contracts and Tenders Act [Cap 245]. 
550
 Transparency International Vanuatu Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre, 2013. 
551
 Comments of Francis Bryard on draft Transparency International Vanuatu Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre, 
Reference to the Vanuatu Law Reform Commission on Public Procurement.  
552
 Transparency International Vanuatu Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre, 2013.  
  
86 NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT VANUATU 
 
 
but possibly withholding names to protect privacy) in order to demonstrate that public 
servants who get caught for misbehaviour do face consequences. 
c. The PSC should actively run public awareness on what it does to ensure independence 
and integrity as part of its public education activities. 
d. The Council of Ministers should repeal the change in the law that allowed director 
generals to be appointed by the prime minister, rather than the PSC as this has created 
a public perception of political interference in the operation of the public sector. 
e. As part of the review of the Code of Conduct and ethical obligations of public servants 
the Public Service Commission should undertake a review of current practices relating 
to paying additional allowances for sitting on committees and performing other tasks 
that are part of regular employment. 
 
2. Another measure to address lack of public confidence in the public sector is to strengthen 
accountability. Strengthening accountability involves, in part, strengthening the Office of the 
Auditor General and the Office of the Ombudsman. Recommendations in respect of these pillars 
are discussed in the respective sections of this report. Strengthening accountability via internal 
public service mechanisms requires both an increase in reporting (which involves building 
personal integrity) and better enforcement. To achieve these it is recommended that: 
 
a. The PSC implements, as part of its orientation and ongoing education and training 
programmes, more information about the Code of Conduct and obligations to report 
breaches. It should also consider a reward system for those that actively participate in 
upholding the code of conduct. 
b. The PSC establishes a mechanism for the public to complain directly to the PSC about 
misbehaviour by public servants. 
c. The PSC is appropriately resourced to handle the processing of disciplinary complaints, 
terminations of employment and public servant grievances. 
 
3. Public procurement needs to be addressed. As there are many loopholes in the law a useful 
starting point would be for the Vanuatu Law Commission to review public procurement laws.  
 WHAT EXTENT DOES THE PUBLIC SECTOR INFO 
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VII.5. LAW ENFORCEMENT  
SUMMARY 
Overall pillar score: 32 
Dimension Indicator Law Practice 
Capacity 
41.7 
Resources -- 50 
Independence 50 25 
Governance 
29.2 
Transparency 25 50 
Accountability 50 0 
Integrity 50 0 
Role 
25 
Corruption prosecution  25 
 
Previous National Integrity System reports in 2004 and 2006 observed that the operation of the 
Vanuatu Police Force (VPF) was undermined by instability and politicisation in the post of the 
commissioner of police. In 2010 amendments were introduced to reduce the scope for interference 
in this appointment and there is some confidence that these measures have worked. Another 
longstanding issue is that police culture has allowed for cronyism in investigations, and brutality to 
replace sound investigation techniques. In December 2013 the government signed an agreement to 
establish an independent police complaints authority, which may go some way to addressing these 
underlying police culture issues. 
 
Whilst there have been positive developments in respect of the police, the Office of the Public 
Prosecutor is in disarray. In December 2013 the public prosecutor resigned rather than participate in 
a Commission of Inquiry that had been established to investigate allegations of corrupt practice and 
poor management. It took until April 2014 for an acting public prosecutor to be appointed. In this 
period there was a time when the Office of the Public Prosecutor was closed, with all prosecutors 
acting out of the State Prosecutor’s Office. 
STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION 
The head of the VPF is the commissioner of police. The commissioner of police is appointed by the 
president acting on the advice of the Police Service Commission. The VPF includes three arms; 
Police Headquarters, the Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF) and the Maritime Wing. Within Police 
Headquarters there is a Criminal Investigations Department, which has special units for Serious 
Crimes, Family Protection, Fraud and Drugs.   
 
The Public Prosecutor’s Office constitutes part of the Ministry of Justice. The public prosecutor is 
supported in her work by the deputy public prosecutor, assistant public prosecutors and state 
prosecutors, who are all appointed by the public prosecutor to conduct and appear in prosecutions 
on behalf of the public prosecutor.
553
 Whilst state prosecutors are police officers they are, by law, 
independent from the police and fall under the supervision of the public prosecutor.
554
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ASSESSMENT 
Capacity 
Resources (practice) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT DO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES HAVE ADEQUATE LEVELS OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES, 
STAFFING, AND INFRASTRUCTURE TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY IN PRACTICE? 
 
Law enforcement agencies receive funding through an allocation of a proportion of the 
annual state budget. Police Headquarters also receives significant support from Australian 
Aid. The Office of the Public Prosecutor is currently challenged by limited human and 
financial resources.  
The proportion of the budget allocated to law enforcement has been criticised in the past as not 
reflecting the importance of security. High ranking officers have previously pointed this out as a main 
constraint to maximising the effectiveness of law enforcement.
555
 In 2013, the overall budget 
expenditure of the VPF was VT734,759,488 (US$7,350,000) of which 87% was spent on salaries 
and allowances. Only 13% was left for operational expenses.
556
  It was further reported that in 2013, 
the VPF had a debt of more than VT80 million (US$800,000).
557
 Another issue is that that very little 
to none of the funding received by the government is being allocated to police stations outside of 
Port Vila, with officers in the outer islands at times having to ask clients to drive them to places in 
order to conduct investigations due to a lack of fuel.
558
  
There has been no salary increase for the VPF since 1997. Although many receive significant 
allowances for driving, or the status of inspector and detective on top of their base salary, their 
wages are poor compared to other public servants.
559
 A salary increase has been pending since 
October 2012 in response to which the Prime Minister in late 2013 announced that raises to VPF 
subordinate officers were to be facilitated by January 2014.
 560
 However, as there have been no 
budget increases made to accommodate for this change, the funds will need to come out of the 
operational budget and further decrease it.
561
 Despite low salaries the VPF has not had significant 
difficulty in attracting staff and currently has over 600 employed officers. Whilst recruitment is strong 
there are no clear career pathways for police, with set criteria based on education and experience 
for progressing up the ranks.
562
 
A significant source of out-of-budget funding is from the support of international partners such as the 
United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF)563 as well as Australian Aid 
through the VAPP, which aims to provide for the training and professionalisation of the VPF, 
infrastructure, assets and logistics, workforce renewal, and internal VPF governance.
564
 The VAPP 
has been providing funding for operational activities that approximately matches the current 
operational budget, which has been managed through the Australian Federal Police liaison office. It 
has also been providing significant resource support through training programs for police officers, 
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computer equipment for every province to improve case management systems, as well as building 
8-10 new police posts and stations in various islands in the past decade.
565
 Whilst the VAPP assigns 
advisors to the VFP this has not been without difficulty with 11 advisors being expelled from the 
country in 2012 in retaliation for a breach of protocol when an aide to the prime minister was 
arrested whilst travelling through Australia.
566
  
Likewise of concern is the severe lack of funding and resources experienced by prosecutors, which 
hinders their ability to work effectively. Often prosecutors are required to travel to attend court; 
however, because there has either been no vehicle available or no funds for fuel, there have been 
instances where they were forced to walk in bad weather conditions carrying all their files.
567
  
Furthermore, when the Magistrate and Supreme Courts are undertaking their tri-annual circuits 
around the country to the remote islands, prosecutors have, at times, been unable to attend court for 
these cases due to insufficient funds for travel.
568
 Offices are also lacking sufficient computer 
equipment and general supplies
569
 and because there has been no electronic database system 
developed for filing cases paper files have been stored in cabinets, which makes it very hard to find 
and follow up on matters.
570
 During January 2014 both the public prosecutor’s office and the state 
prosecutor’s office in Port Vila suffered from a prolonged electricity cut because of a failure to pay 
electricity bills, which severely affected their ability to continue working. This was not a lone 
occurrence.
571
 Frequently in the past the two offices have shared facilities to accommodate such 
circumstances.
572
    
The public prosecutor’s office and state prosecutors' office have also had difficulty in retaining 
trained lawyers as they have been tending to move to other legal arms of the government. This is 
partly attributable to the challenging work environment faced by prosecutors due to the nature of 
criminal proceedings and partly attributable to poor working conditions and low salaries compared to 
that being offered elsewhere, such as the State Law Office whose budget is six times larger than the 
Office of the Public Prosecutor.
573
  The Office of the Public Prosecutor was provided with some 
external support from Australian Aid in the past through the provision of some office supplies
574
 and 
the assignment of external advisors to the public prosecutor’s office and to the state prosecutor’s 
office.  Many of the staff in the public prosecutor’s office have relatively few years of experience.  
In December 2013 the Public Prosecutor resigned rather than face a Commission of Inquiry into 
allegations of mismanagement and inefficiency within the Office of the Public Prosecutor.
575
 An 
acting public prosecutor was appointed in April. 
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Independence (law) 
 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES INDEPENDENT BY LAW? 
 
Whilst laws have been amended to reduce the scope for political interference in the 
operation of the Police Service Commission there is still scope for interference to occur. 
Whilst prosecutors are guaranteed independence from external agencies, there is some 
scope for internal interference in activities.  
The law requires that every candidate for appointment to the VPF shall be a citizen of Vanuatu and 
possess any further qualification prescribed by the minister after consultation with the Council of 
Ministers.
576
 The Police Rules outline further requirements for recruitment and include criteria related 
to age, physical and mental fitness and education. There is also a requirement that recruits be of 
good moral character.
577
 The commission may, acting on the recommendation of the commissioner 
of police, approve the dispensing of one or more of the above-mentioned criteria when they consider 
a candidate to have special qualifications of value to the VPF.
578
  
The commissioner of police and three deputy commissioners are appointed by the president acting 
on the advice of the Police Service Commission.
579
 Other senior and subordinate officers are 
appointed by the Police Service Commission acting on the recommendation of the commissioner.
580
 
In 2010 the law was amended to provide criteria that the commissioner of police must meet in order 
to be eligible for appointment. These criteria include that ‘(a) the person is a citizen of Vanuatu; and 
(b) has served in a senior position within the Force for a period of at least seven years; and (c) 
preferably has a tertiary qualification in the area of policing, military, management or Law.’581 The 
citizenship criterion means that it is no longer possible to consider recruiting the commissioner of 
police from overseas. This limits the pool of possible applicants and may make it harder to find a 
suitably qualified and experienced individual who is independent. It can, however, be observed that 
there has been no non-citizen police commissioners in recent history. 
The Police Service Commission is comprised of five members who are appointed by the president 
acting on advice of the prime minister after consultation with the Council of Ministers.
582
 Whilst the 
chief justice and Public Service Commission each nominate a representative onto the Police Service 
Commission, as the appointments are determined by the prime minister, this body is not guaranteed 
independence in law. In 2010 the law was amended to provide that the Police Service Commission 
is not subject to the direction and control of any other person or body.
583
 The amendment also 
provided that ‘the Commission must have regard to the policies of the Government as 
communicated in writing to the Commission from time to time by the Minister.’584 Whilst there is 
some potential for political interference in the operation of the VPF it is a disciplinary offence for 
members of the VPF to participate in politics.
585
 
In contrast the Constitution provides that the public prosecutor shall not be subject to any external 
influence or control.
586
 The public prosecutor is appointed by the president on the advice of the 
Judicial Service Commission.
587
 The Judicial Service Commission is also guaranteed independence 
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in the Constitution.
588
  The deputy public prosecutor, assistant public prosecutors and state 
prosecutors are all appointed by the public prosecutor.
589
 There is no express requirement that the 
public prosecutor must appoint a deputy, or a minimum number of assistant and state prosecutors. 
The only requirements in respect of qualifications of the public prosecutor is that he or she must be 
a person who has been admitted to practise as a legal practitioner in Vanuatu, or any other country 
or countries, for a period in total of at least seven years. The deputy public prosecutor must have 
five years of experience. Assistant public prosecutors must have a law degree.
590
 The law further 
provides that the appointment must be made on merit following a fair and transparent selection 
process, but, however, does not specify anything further. There is no legislation or formal procedure 
by which prosecutors are promoted and as such there is no prosecutorial career based on objective 
criteria. There is only one public prosecutor’s office, which is located in Port Vila, and two state 
prosecutor’s offices, one in Port Vila and one in Luganville. Therefore, there are only a small number 
of prosecutor positions available and it is often the case that once appointed that person will remain 
in that position for a long time.
591
 For this reason, promotions are rare and it is difficult for 
prosecutors to progress through the hierarchy.  
The law provides that the public prosecutor may issue directions or guidelines with respect to the 
prosecution of offences to the deputy public prosecutor, assistant public prosecutors, state 
prosecutors, any other person acting on behalf of the public prosecutor and any person who 
conducts investigations in relation to offences.
592
 Although these guidelines are advisory in nature 
and thus not binding,
593
 if a prosecution in respect of an offence has been instituted by a person 
other than the public prosecutor, the public prosecutor may take over and assume the conduct of the 
prosecution,
594
 regardless of whether the person otherwise responsible consents.
595
 The public 
prosecutor may then decline to proceed further in the prosecution.
596
  
Independence (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES INDEPENDENT IN PRACTICE? 
 
The independence of law enforcement agencies is often compromised in practice due to both 
external political interference, internal factionalisation and personal connections.  
Although this was not always the case in the past, recently the appointment process of the VPF has 
generally been perceived to be in adherence with the legal and professional criteria.
597
 However, an 
area of ongoing concern is the extent of politicisation of the police force. There have been instances 
of direct external interference, for example, of officers being told by higher authorities not to 
investigate a case.
598
 Furthermore, there is a longstanding culture of politicisation within the VPF 
with noticeable divisions amongst members dependent upon allegiances to different senior officers 
or political powers.
599
 For example, during the transition between former Commissioner Bong and 
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current Commissioner Caulton there was a taking of sides amongst members of the VPF that 
caused internal tensions and hindered their ability to maintain independence in their work.
600
  
The appointments of prosecutors have been made on the basis of the prescribed legal criteria. 
Although political or other external interference is not as profound as with the police, it nevertheless 
remains a relevant issue. For example in 2011, the Public Prosecutor accused the then Minister of 
Justice and Daily Post publisher of using blackmail-style tactics to pressure her to allow an 
independent prosecutor to prosecute a case involving the alleged assault of the Daily Post publisher 
by the former Minister of Public Utilities and a group of his supporters. She reported being pressured 
by the Minister to step aside from the case for conflict of interest reasons and claimed she was 
blackmailed with front page claims on the Daily Post newspaper that she had been having an extra-
marital affair with someone who is a very close friend of the accused former Minister of Public 
Utilities.
601
  The Public Prosecutor also maintained that the Commission of Inquiry established to 
investigate her was an interference with her independence and this is why she chose to resign.
602
 
However, it should also be noted that by instituting a Commission of Inquiry the government was 
following a process which would have allowed fair consideration based upon interviews and 
investigation before determining whether to terminate the Public Prosecutor.  
A recent report by Transparency International Vanuatu into the functioning of the judicial system 
noted conflicts of interest affected the actions of police and prosecutors in some examined cases, 
with conflicts leading to non-appearance at court by prosecutors.
603
 Failures of police to execute 
summonses are also, sometimes, attributable to conflicts of interest.
604
 In Vanuatu’s close knit 
society it is very easy for personal connections to undermine the independence of law enforcement 
agents. 
Governance 
Transparency (law) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT THE PUBLIC CAN ACCESS THE 
RELEVANT INFORMATION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY ACTIVITIES? 
  
There are very limited provisions in the law that ensure the transparency of law enforcement 
agencies and personnel and grant public access to relevant information.  
There is no requirement in law for the public disclosure of certain aspects of police or prosecution 
work. Furthermore, there are no specific legal provisions for victims of crimes to access their case 
files. The commissioner of police, deputy commissioners, members of the Police Service 
Commission and the public prosecutor are leaders for the purposes of the Leadership Code Act,
605
 
so are required to file annual returns disclosing assets under that Act. 
The law does require that the public prosecutor must, within three months after the year’s end, 
prepare and give to the minister of justice an annual report with respect to the operations of the 
office. The minister must cause a copy to be laid before parliament as soon as possible and the 
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public prosecutor must cause copies to be distributed to the public within three months after it is 
tabled in parliament.
606
  
Transparency (practice) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THERE TRANSPARENCY IN THE ACTIVITIES AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES OF LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN PRACTICE? 
 
There is limited public disclosure of the activities and decision-making processes of law 
enforcement agencies although victims of crimes may be able to gain access to information 
on files related to their complaint if files proceed to prosecution. 
Some disclosure on general activities of the police is being done in practice. The VPF have a media 
department which publishes news on recent police activities as well as updates on administrative 
changes in a weekly column via the Daily Post newspaper.
607
 However, widespread access to 
information remains limited due to the newspapers being circulated primarily only in the urban 
centres and because there is no alternative source such as a website.  It has also been difficult for 
victims to access their case files from the VPF in practice and the police can use the Official Secrets 
Act to maintain confidentiality of files.
608
 Allegations of files frequently being intentionally misplaced 
are common.
609
 
In contrast to the VPF the Office of the Public Prosecutor does not independently publish any 
information on their activities nor do they participate within the media. Annual reports are not made 
available to the public. The judgements of most cases are available as public documents either on 
the PacLII website or for receipt upon request to the courts, although this is a function of the 
judiciary, rather than of the public prosecutor. In practice, if requested by the victim, prosecutors 
allow them access to their own files.
 610
    
Sometimes journalists attend court and report on high profile matters and The Independent 
newspaper has recently instituted a regular “court watch” column, although this appears to focus on 
sexual abuse cases. 
Accountability (law) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES HAVE TO 
REPORT AND BE ANSWERABLE FOR THEIR ACTIONS? 
 
There are limited legal provisions to ensure accountability of police and prosecutors. 
There is no independent mechanism for citizens to complain about the misconduct of police officers 
and the only complaint reporting mechanism in this regard is through the Internal Investigations 
Office, which is a department of the VPF. 
In most cases there is no legal requirement for prosecutors to give reasons to relevant stakeholders 
regarding their decision to prosecute or not. However, if a public prosecutor decides not to 
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prosecute a Leadership Code case following a recommendation by the ombudsman, she must both 
notify the prime minister and publish a notice in the Gazette explaining her decision.
611
  
The law permits victims of crimes to take a criminal action to court by way of private prosecution. 
This provides access to the justice system in the event that the public prosecutor is not able or 
willing to act.  
There is no complaint mechanism for prosecutors specifically. However, pursuant to section 8 of the 
Legal Practitioner’s Act any complaint concerning the conduct of a legal practitioner may be lodged 
in writing to the secretary of the Law Council containing specific allegations of misconduct that may 
consist of acts or omissions. The secretary shall investigate and report on the complaint to the 
Disciplinary Committee who has the power to strike off, suspend, impose a fine or reprimand a legal 
practitioner.
612
  
Corrupt activities engaged in by law enforcement officials who are defined as leaders including the 
commissioner and deputy commissioner of police, solicitor general, public prosecutor, public 
solicitor, members of the Police Service Commission and the commander of the VMF, constitute a 
breach under the Leadership Code Act.
613
 Complaints regarding these allegations can be reported 
to the ombudsman who then must investigate and report on the conduct of the leader.
614
 The public 
prosecutor must then consider the report and either refer it to the commissioner of police within 14 
days of receiving the report, if of the opinion that further investigation is required,
615
 or ensure the 
police force investigates the complaint and forwards the results within 60 days of the complaint 
being made.
616
 The commissioner must then decide, within three months of receiving the report, 
whether there are sufficient grounds for prosecution, or that the complaint is vexatious, frivolous or 
trivial. If deciding not to prosecute, the prime minister must be notified within seven days of the 
decision and a notice published in the Gazette within 14 days stating the decision and its reasons.
617
  
There is no immunity of law enforcement officials from criminal proceedings. However the law does 
provide that ‘no suit or other legal proceedings shall be instituted in any court of law against the 
Minister or the Commission or any other member of the VPF ... in respect of any act, matter or thing 
done or purported to be done or omitted to be done, in good faith, in the performance or exercise of 
any duty or power imposed or conferred under the Act.’618  
Accountability (practice) 
Score: 0 
TO WHAT EXTENT DO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES HAVE TO REPORT AND BE ANSWERABLE FOR THEIR 
ACTIONS IN PRACTICE? 
 
In practice there is almost no external accountability of law enforcement agencies for their 
actions. This issue is widespread across officers and prosecutors of all ranks and is 
primarily attributable to embedded police culture and a prosecutorial culture that is 
antithetical to accountability and lack of disciplinary mechanisms. 
The lack of an independent complaint reporting mechanism is a serious issue within law 
enforcement in Vanuatu. Essentially, the only avenue to make a complaint against a police officer is 
to a police officer, and not surprisingly, this system has not been effective.  It has been uncommon 
for these complaints to progress through to investigation. Instead complaints are sometimes ignored 
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or the file intentionally misplaced.
619
 Stemming from this is the further issue that most victims make 
the mistake of not requesting a copy of their complaint statement from the police and as such when 
the police fail to take action, the victim is unable to provide any material proof of such misconduct.
620
 
This has created an environment where police officers have little to no accountability for their actions 
in practice. Although some internal discipline is adopted, this normally involves suspension at its 
most serious, and officers are rarely dismissed or charged in criminal proceedings.
621
  
An example of this is the case of escaped prisoner John Bule, who died after sustaining multiple 
injuries while in police custody following his recapture in March 2009. A coroner’s inquest was 
conducted by New Zealand Justice Nevin Dawson, with the report highlighting abuse by the VMF.
 622
 
Intimidation during the inquest including a death threat against Dawson by a senior VMF officer also 
occurred.
623
  
In April 2013, the Court of Appeal gave judgment awarding damages to Mrs Dornic, Mr McNicol and 
Mr Warte for an incident that occurred in late 2001 involving several police officers acting outside of 
their lawful powers to assist their friend in a private dispute.
624
 Not only did this take 11 years for 
final determination in court, as of 2011 the police officers involved were still employed. Further 
examples of lack of accountability can be found in a recent Transparency International Vanuatu 
report into police brutality and torture.
625
 
In response to these issues, the VAPP has developed a new initiative to replace the Internal 
Investigations Office with an independent Professional Standards Unit. This was signed off by the 
Prime Minister in December 2013 and involves a new name, phone number, email address, office, 
signage and procedure to promote awareness and greater access by victims. An advisor will be 
assigned and new policies, training and assistance will be provided to improve accountability 
measures within the VPF via the Professional Standards Unit.
626
 It is, as yet, too early to assess the 
impact that this will have in practice. 
There has been longstanding controversy surrounding the independence of the public prosecutor 
herself. Several complaints were formally conveyed to the then Public Prosecutor Kayleen Tavoa in 
writing during December 2013 following which a Commission of Inquiry was set up to investigate 
whether there were grounds to substantiate her removal pursuant to section 18 of the Public 
Prosecutor’s Act. During a preliminary conference when she was asked whether she wished to 
dispute the complaints or to resign, she chose the latter. Consequently, the Commission of Inquiry 
deemed her resignation removed the need to advance the complaint
627
 and no further action was 
taken. This incident further demonstrates that it is rare for cases of improper conduct by police and 
prosecutors to be properly investigated or for those allegedly responsible for improper conduct to be 
brought to justice.  
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Integrity (law) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE INTEGRITY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES ENSURED BY LAW? 
 
The legal framework does provide for some integrity mechanisms for law enforcement 
agencies; however, this is not as strong as required, particularly with regard to prosecutors.  
There is a VPF Code of Ethics that states that each member shall uphold the law, have high moral 
values, act with fairness, exercise self-discipline and be responsible for their actions and treat all 
persons equally regardless of their gender, religion or birthplace, et cetera. This code is provided to 
officers alongside human rights and ethics training that is undertaken before commencing work as a 
police officer. However, this code acts as a guideline and there is no formal procedure in place to 
ensure this is adhered to.  
The Police Act does contain certain provisions outlining offences triable by the courts such as 
mutiny, failure to suppress riot or desertion, for which an officer may be arrested without warrant.
628
 
It also provides for disciplinary offences including engaging in any employment of office other than in 
accordance with his duties, involvement in a trade union or associated body, participating in a strike, 
accepting any gift of money or moneys-worth offered as payment for any service rendered or 
promised, losing or damaging arms and accoutrements and being absent from duty.
629
 There are no 
specific rules regarding conflict of interest of police but the Police Rules prohibit any act or omission 
likely to being discredit upon the force or any conduct, disorder or neglect to the prejudice of good 
order and discipline as a disciplinary offence.
630
  The law also provides that a member of the Police 
Commission, including the chairperson, must not be involved in any matter before the Police 
Commission in which he or she has a conflict of interest.
631
  
In regards to prosecutors, the law states that after consultation with the Law Society and the Law 
Council, the public prosecutor is required to issue a Code of Practice and Ethics for Prosecutors and 
must publish this in the Gazette.
632
 The public prosecutor’s employment may be terminated by the 
president in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission if absent for 14 
consecutive days in any period of 12 months without approval, engages in practice as a legal 
practitioner outside the duties of the office or any paid employment without the consent of the 
minister, or is convicted of an offence for a breach of the Leadership Code.
633
 There is also a 
provision that states that the public prosecutor may make a request to other prosecutors to perform 
his or her certain functions and powers because of the existence or possible existence of a conflict 
of interest.
634
 However, this is not mandatory provided the public prosecutor maintains 
independence as required by the Act.
635
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Integrity (practice) 
Score: 0 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE INTEGRITY OF MEMBERS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES ENSURED IN PRACTICE? 
 
There is a public perception that existing codes of conduct, conflict of interest policies and 
integrity bodies have not been effective in ensuring ethical behaviour by law enforcement 
officials. 
Despite the existence of integrity mechanisms for the police in law, they have not been upheld in 
practice due to a severe lack of accountability. There has been a persistent culture of impunity within 
the VPF. The public perceptions in that, because improper activities by senior level officers occur, 
despite new recruits receiving training on human rights, ethics and their duties and responsibilities 
as a member of the police force, they can become influenced by senior officers who are not 
modelling good behaviour.
636
  
With regards to prosecutors the laws, policies and training programmes are not as comprehensive. 
No code of ethics has been gazetted. As indicated by the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry 
in late 2013 to inquire into the activities of the Office of the Public Prosecutor, there is concern about 
the integrity of this office. This suggests that the current, limited, laws relating to integrity of the 
Office of the Public Prosecutor are ineffective. 
Role 
Corruption prosecution 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT DO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES DETECT AND INVESTIGATE CORRUPTION CASES IN THE 
COUNTRY? 
 
Members of the VPF and the public prosecutor are granted sufficient powers in law to 
undertake corruption detection effectively; however in practice, there are often political or 
otherwise external interferences as well as a misuse of power by law enforcement officials 
themselves, which hinders their effectiveness.  
An essential duty of the VPF is to maintain unceasing vigilance for the prevention and suppression 
of crime.
637
 They are employed throughout Vanuatu for the preservation of peace and maintenance 
of order, protection of life and property, enforcement of laws, prevention and detection of offences 
and the production of offenders before the court.
638
   
Police are granted the use of reasonable force in order to prevent crime or to effect or assist in 
effecting a lawful arrest; power to take photographs and fingerprints; power to inspect licences, 
power to lay information before a court and apply for a summons, warrant, search warrant or such 
other legal process; power to erect barriers and the power to enter premises in the case of threat to 
life or property.
639
 Section 12(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code further empowers any police officer 
to, without an order from a judicial officer, or warrant, arrest any person whom he suspects upon 
reasonable grounds of having committed a cognisable offence, including corruption-related offences 
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of corruption and bribery of officials under section 73(1) of the Penal Code Act. The police do not 
have any power to investigate breaches of the Leadership Code Act until a report by the 
ombudsman recommending prosecution is issued. Long delays between receiving complaints and 
issuing reports make it difficult for police to investigate matters. This is a matter that the VPF would 
like to see addressed.
640
 
The functions of the public prosecutor are to institute, prepare and conduct preliminary enquiries on 
behalf of the state and if requested by the attorney general to do so; to discontinue prosecutions 
regardless of who instituted them; give advice to any member of the VPF and any investigators in 
relation to investigations, proposed prosecutions or prosecutions if requested; provide assistance in 
obtaining search warrants; and prosecute breaches of the Leadership Code Act.
641
  
There have been several noteworthy prosecutions of corruption-related charges in the past 12 
months. In February 2013, through collaboration between the public prosecutor’s office and the 
Department of Custom and Inland Revenue, a prosecutor was allocated to the department to assist 
in the investigation of cases of bribery, fraudulent evasion of duties and other tax related offences. 
This resulted in the first charge of bribery being laid with respect of the Value Added Tax Act. The 
prosecution was successful and the court imposed a VT100,000 (US$1,000) fine.
642
 Another 
example is the successful prosecution of the Chief Executive Officer of the Airports Vanuatu Ltd for 
nine separate charges of obtaining money by deception in breach of section 130B(1) of the Penal 
Code Act.
643
 However, despite the numerous allegations of breaches of the Leadership Code Act, to 
date there have been no prosecutions under this Act.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. At the time of writing this report the Office of the Public Prosecutor is in some disarray. It is 
recommended that:  
 
a. The government re-establish the Commission of Inquiry to examine the activities of the 
Office of the Public Prosecutor, with the aim of developing recommendations to 
improve the processes and functioning of the office and reviewing the relationship 
between the office and state prosecutors. 
b. The report of the Commission of Inquiry be made public. 
c. The implementation of these recommendations be closely monitored by a body to be 
recommended by the Commission of Inquiry. 
 
2. A code of ethics for prosecutors is required by law and should be developed and gazetted as a 
priority. 
 
3. Activity to institute a VPF Professional Standards Unit has commenced. Further development of 
the Professional Standards Unit must be prioritised. 
 
4. Perceptions that political interference in high profile corruption cases results in misuse of police 
and prosecutorial powers and that personal connections result in misuse of police and 
prosecutorial powers should be addressed by: 
 
a. The VPF developing clear operating procedures for dealing with cases involved 
political leaders and cases involving potential conflicts of interest.  
b. The VPF clearly communicating these operating procedures to the public. 
 
5. The VPF is hindered in its ability to investigate breaches of the Leadership Code Act by having 
to wait until ombudsman’s reports have been issued. As part of a review of the Leadership 
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Code Act (as discussed in the section on the ombudsman) consideration should be given to 
expanding police powers to investigate criminal breaches of the Leadership Code. 
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VII.6. ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT 
BODY 
SUMMARY 
Overall pillar score: 40.2 
Dimension Indicator Law Practice 
Capacity 
33.3 
Resources --- 25 
Independence 50 25 
Governance 
41.7 
Transparency 75 25 
Accountability 75 50 
Integrity 25 0 
Role 
12.5 
Campaign regulation 0 
Election administration 25 
 
The electoral system in Vanuatu faces serious challenges. The main source of these challenges is 
lack of integrity of the electoral roll, which prevents some legitimate voters from being able to vote 
and also allows illegitimate votes to be cast. Another major gap, which is discussed further in the 
section on political parties, is that there is a total absence of regulation of campaign financing. There 
are also issues with lack of prosecutions for electoral offences. Offences that have allegedly 
occurred include bribery and threats of violence during elections.  
The Electoral Office lacks both financial and human resources. Human resources are also 
weakened by the fact that there have been changes in the position of the Principal Electoral Officer 
(PEO) during electoral periods. This is perceived as undermining independence of the Electoral 
Office. The integrity of staff of the Electoral Office has also been called into question. Whilst the 
Electoral Commission is under a legal obligation to produce reports after every election, reports are 
not regularly produced. 
None of these problems are new. Ongoing failure to address these problems undermines the extent 
to which there can be confidence that elections in Vanuatu are “free and fair”. 
STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION 
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional body. The Electoral Commission consists of a 
chairman and two other members appointed by the president of the Republic acting in accordance 
with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.
644
  The PEO is also provided for by the 
Constitution.
645
 The Representation of the People Act further provides for the functions and duties of 
the PEO in relation to preparing for and conducting elections. He or she has responsibility for the 
overall administration on the conduct of elections, under the direction of the Electoral Commission.
 
646
 The PEO heads the Electoral Office. 
The Electoral Office is stationed in Port Vila. The approved staffing of the Electoral Office is the 
PEO, a deputy electoral officer, a compiler, an assistant compiler and the secretary.
647
 In order to 
assist in voter registration, the PEO ‘appoints provincial and municipal executive officers as 
                                                        
644
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645
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646
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registration officers, who through their administrative structures appoint area council secretaries. 
The area council secretaries appoint their assistants to undertake registrations.’648  
ASSESSMENT 
Capacity 
Resources (practice) 
 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODY HAVE ADEQUATE RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE ITS 
GOALS IN PRACTICE? 
 
The Electoral Office has some resources but lacks human and financial resources to 
effectively maintain registrations and carry out education functions. Aid donors are currently 
supporting improvements to the electoral roll and have helped to fund elections in the past. 
The Electoral Commission and Electoral Office are financed through an annual appropriation from 
parliament. Budgets are sometimes not adequate to cover election costs.
649
 For instance, in 2002 
the Electoral Commission reported that of the requested VT40 million (US$400,000) to conduct the 
national election, only VT25 million (US$250,000) was approved. Donor funding and direct 
payments to suppliers funded the shortfall.
650
 Supplementary appropriations are also sometimes 
made.
651
 Budgets are sometimes not adequate for paying provincial registration officers and their 
assistants, which contributes to provincial electoral rolls not being consistently maintained.
652
  
An ongoing issue has been that the Electoral Office lacks resources and funding to undertake 
education campaigns.
653
 In the past, successful partnerships with NGOs have assisted in voter 
education programmes.
654
 Additional funds from donors to help in undertaking education campaigns 
are sometimes sought. Voter education campaigns are currently minimal in practice.
655
  
The Electoral Office continues to receive support and assistance through the Australian Government 
and the Australian Electoral Commission through the provision of office equipment and other 
financial support. In 2012 Australia’s contribution to the Vanuatu Electoral officer comprised 10% of 
the total budget.
656
 The office has also benefited from the Australian Electoral Commission through 
the establishment of the Generic Voter Registration System. Further upgrading of this system is 
underway and it is expected that by the 2016 national elections a computerised identification system 
using thumbprints and photographs will be in place.
657
 It can be noted that the Government of 
Vanuatu has tried to fund initiatives in this area in the past. In 2002 the Electoral Office was subject 
to an audit investigation in relation to a contract for the computerisation of the electoral roll. The 
Vanuatu government had invested over VT37 million (US$370,000) in this project but the 
                                                        
648
 Jeanette Bolenga, ‘Vanuatu: Limitations to the Independence of the EMB’ (Sweden: International IDEA, 2006) 248.   
649
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650
 Electoral Commission, Republic of Vanuatu: 6
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(Supplementary Appropriation 2008 Act 2009).  
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 Electoral Commission, 2002: 30; Interview of Lawson Samuel, former PEO with Sam Railau, Port Vila, 1 October 
2013. 
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computerised electoral roll was never delivered. Whilst this was the subject of an audit report and a 
Public Accounts Committee report no money has been recovered.
658
  
By April 2014 previous vacant positions of deputy PEO, compiler and assistant compiler had all 
been filled, but even with all posts filled there is insufficient staff to carry out all work.
659
 
Advertisements have now been published seeking applicants for the posts of compiler and its 
assistant.
660
 As discussed in the section on independence below, the position of the PEO has been 
unstable and this instability has hindered the work of the Electoral Office.  
The Electoral Office also lacks support staff in the provinces. Whilst the PEO appoints provincial 
registration officers who are in practice provincial and municipal executive officers, they in turn 
appoint their own assistants.
661
 When local government councils change there can be problems in 
maintaining accurate registrations because of lack of knowledge of provincial registration offices 
and/or their assistants.
662
  This leads to issues with accountability and transparency in provincial 
voter registration processes.
663
 
The physical office space of the Electoral Office has not been upgraded in years. The Electoral 
Office is located in a small wooden colonial era building and there are some concerns that it may not 
be a suitable environment for a computerised operation. 
Independence (law) 
 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODY INDEPENDENT BY LAW? 
 
There is the potential for interference as the Public Service Commission (PSC) controls the 
appointment of staff and the PEO can either be suspended by the PSC or transferred by the 
prime minister.  
Article 18 of the Constitution provides for a three member Electoral Commission. The chairman and 
the two members of the Electoral Commission are appointed by the president of the Republic on the 
advice of the Judicial Service Commission. No candidates for election to, or elected members of, 
parliament, local governments or the National Council of Chiefs are permitted to be members of the 
Electoral Commission. ‘Any person who exercises any position of responsibility in a political party’664 
is also prohibited from being a member. These restrictions are designed to ensure independence of 
the Electoral Commission. 
There are no similar guarantees of independence in respect of the position of PEO. The PEO is a 
public servant,
665
  and there are no special requirements for appointment or safeguards in respect of 
removal of the PEO. The PEO is therefore subject to suspension or dismissal by the PSC. Law 
requires appointment, suspension and dismissal to occur on the basis of merit or for cause only, and 
these processes protect independence.  The Constitution provides that, ‘Senior public servants in 
Ministries may be transferred by the Prime Minister to other posts of equivalent rank.’666 As the PEO 
is a senior public servant he or she may be subject to transfer.  
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Independence (practice) 
 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODY FUNCTION INDEPENDENTLY IN PRACTICE? 
 
External interference in the position of PEO by the prime minister has occurred. The 
Electoral Office is perceived to have been politicised and, as a result, is perceived to be 
unable to carry out its duties without bias.   
 
A comprehensive report on the independence of the Electoral Management Body observes that, 
‘despite its statutory independence, significant limitations exist, caused by issues of access to 
budget funds and the recruitment and termination of the appointment of electoral officers’.667  
 
Whilst staff of the Electoral Office are public servants and so are somewhat independent from direct 
interference, the position of PEO is subject to interference. In October 2012 the then PEO, Lawson 
Samuel, was removed from his position and replaced with an Acting PEO, Lionel Kaluat. In 
December Kaluat, who was only on short term secondment, was replaced by Etienne Kombe. In 
July 2013 Martin Tete was appointed Acting PEO.
668
 It was not until September 2013 that a new 
PEO, Charles Vatu, was appointed.
669
 Samuel was transferred to another post by the Prime Minister 
in accordance with Article 58(2) of the Constitution. One issue apparently motivating this transfer 
was the approval of candidates. The same day that Samuel was removed the Electoral Commission 
had published a list of 274 eligible candidates. Some prominent politicians’ names were missing 
from this list, apparently because they had outstanding debts owed to government agencies.
670
 
Following this on 13 October a second candidate list was published, this one containing 345 
names.
671
  
It should be noted that the law provides that the Electoral Commission determines validity for 
candidature and does not allow for any appeal process. Rather, ‘[t]he decision of the Electoral 
Commission that a candidature is valid or invalid shall be final and shall not be questioned in any 
proceedings whatsoever.’672 However, if the Electoral Commission ‘considers that a declaration of 
candidature is invalid by reason of a bona fide error… [it may] request the candidate to resubmit a 
valid declaration.’673 The PEO is the person who screens names and advises the Electoral 
Commission as to individuals’ eligibility.674   
Another issue allegedly motivating Samuel’s transfer was his control of proxy votes. It was reported 
that ‘prior to Lawson’s transfer out of the position of Principal Electoral Officer on the 10th October 
he had approved less than 100 proxy vote applications, and had refused 100’s of applications 
because they failed to meet the required criteria.’675 Subsequently a number of proxy votes were 
approved and there is a perception that some staff of the Electoral Office and registration officers 
had been pressured by politicians and had likely conflicts of interest in approving proxy 
applications.
676
  Proxy votes were critical for the re-election of some candidates and election 
observer reports noted that proxy votes are particularly subject to vote buying and other abuse.
677
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The removal of the PEO on the eve of a national election gives the impression that there is 
interference in the management of elections by politicians.
678
 
This is not the first time that there has been interference in the position of the PEO on the eve of an 
election. In 2002 the Director General of the Ministry of Internal Affairs attempted to suspend the 
PEO two weeks prior to the national election. The PEO sought an injunction to prevent this, as it 
would have been very disruptive to the election.
679
 
As discussed in the section on resources, above, the Electoral Commission or PEO does not have 
control over the appointment of assistants to registration officers. Nor is there any particular criteria 
for who can be appointed a registration officer, and in practice provincial and municipal executive 
officers fill these positions. 
Governance 
Transparency (law) 
 
Score: 75 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT THE PUBLIC CAN OBTAIN RELEVANT 
INFORMATION ON THE ACTIVITIES AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES OF THE ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT 
BODY? 
 
There are provisions that require the Electoral Office to provide information on activities and 
allow members of the public to check that information that the office holds is correct. 
However, the timeframe for the public to check that the roll information is correct is short.  
The law contains provisions for transparency of electoral rolls, candidates, polling stations, vote 
counting and results. The PEO is responsible for the production, distribution and publication of 
information to voters and the general public.
680
 The Representation of the People Act contains a 
number of provisions to ensure that the public get informed on certain activities of the office. Section 
16 (1) provide that the Electoral Office  must make a list of registered voters (the electoral list) 
available for inspection by the public for a period of at least two weeks every year. This is a short 
timeframe and does not necessarily allow for adequate public scrutiny of the roll. Copies are made 
available via all registration officers and via display in public places, which include local government 
offices and the Electoral Office. The purpose of opening the list for inspection is to allow people to 
apply for corrections to the list or electoral cards.  
Section 28 requires the Electoral Office to publish the list of candidates for election via display at 
Provincial Councils, parliament, the Electoral Office and any other places the Electoral Commission 
may direct. There is no requirement that the Electoral Office publishes the names of individuals 
whose candidature was declared invalid, or reasons for holding that they were ineligible to be 
candidates. Once the list of candidates is closed the PEO is required to publish information on the 
locations of polling stations and the times they will be open for.
681
 Public are permitted to be present 
at the counting of votes.
682
 At the end of the election the Electoral Commission must publish the 
results for each constituency.
683
  
In Vanuatu the Electoral Office has no role in monitoring party finances. Nor does any other body 
ensure transparency in this area. This is a critical deficiency and is addressed further in the section 
on political parties. 
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Transparency (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE REPORTS AND DECISIONS OF THE ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODY MADE PUBLIC IN 
PRACTICE? 
 
Whilst dates for elections, lists of candidates and polling information are well publicised, 
issues with the electoral roll suggest that the public does not find it easy to access the roll to 
check that information is correct. Lack of transparency in candidate screening decisions and 
votes counting processes has also been an issue recently.   
There is some transparency in practice. Whilst the Electoral Office does not maintain a website, 
schedules of dates are made available to the public when election dates are set.  Candidate lists 
and results are also published in government Gazettes. The media (including print media, online 
blogs and radio) is also active in publishing this information, although media is more active in 
reporting national election information than local election information. 
The period during which the electoral list is open for public inspection is set by law to be a minimum 
of a 14 day period,
684
 and the list is available at these times. However, as issues in the 2012 national 
election, relating to voters who had electoral cards but were not on the polling station lists and hence 
were ineligible to vote, demonstrated, members of the public do not, in practice, check and correct 
this list.
685
 Nor is there a call centre where voters can, at any time, check their registration status.   
In the 2012 national election members of the public were permitted to observe the first count. 
However, they were not able to observe the recounting process on which the final results were 
based.
686
 
As discussed in the section on independence, above, in the 2012 national election a number of 
candidates were initially not approved. No reasons were given for declining the candidature of each 
individual, although as a group it appeared that they were ineligible as they owed debts to the 
government. It is not clear what process was used to have candidates approved, as there is no legal 
appeals process.  
 
Accountability (law) 
 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT THE ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BOARD 
HAS TO REPORT AND BE ANSWERABLE FOR ITS ACTIONS? 
 
Whilst there are a number of legal lines of accountability, there is no requirement that regular 
annual reports be produced by the Electoral Office.  
The PEO is accountable to the Electoral Commission regarding the exercise of his functions.
687
 The 
legal framework ensuring transparency as provided under the Representation of the People Act 
[Cap 146] also helps to ensure accountability. In particular after every election the PEO must, within 
three months submit a report to the Electoral Commission.
688
 
 
The Electoral Commission shall not more than 3 months after receiving the report of the Principal 
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Electoral Officer make a report to Parliament concerning the conduct of the election which shall 
include a statement on the overall cost thereof, information on difficulties encountered and how they 
were dealt with and recommendations for improvements and changes in procedure for future 
elections.
689
 
 
There is, however, no express requirement that parliament must debate this report or that anyone 
else must act on it. There is also no express legal requirement that the Electoral Office produce 
annual reports.  
In terms of financial accounting, the PEO is accountable to the Office of the Auditor General. He or 
she must also comply with other laws regulating expenditure, including the Government Contracts 
and Tenders Act. As public servants the PEO and other staff of the Electoral Office are also 
accountable to the PSC.  
Public and candidates also have a mechanism by which the Electoral Office can be held to account. 
An election petition may be presented by people who are registered to vote at the election to which 
the petition relates, or by a person claiming him or herself to have been candidate at such 
election.
690
 Prior to 2012 an election would be held void if corrupt activities or non-compliance with 
the Act was of such a magnitude that it could reasonably be supposed to have affected the election 
or if a successful candidate were convicted in court of committing or attempting to commit a corrupt 
practice.
691
 
In 2012 the law was amended.
692
 Now, a candidate who has been convicted of committing a corrupt 
practice under Part 15 of the Representation of the People Act will not lose his or her seat. The 2012 
amendment also restricted the times when candidates payments would be considered to be bribery, 
by including a provision to the effect that an election will be declared invalid if it is proved that a 
candidate or his or her agent spent or allocated any money in the period between the end of 
parliament and polling day and that this expenditure or allocation affected the outcome of the 
election. Some exceptions are also permitted: custom gifts up to a value of VT1,000 (US$10); 
entertainment during campaign rallies; and food, drink, transport and accommodation to any person 
on polling day are allowed. Furthermore, food, drink, entertainment, transport or accommodation to 
candidates’ agents are permitted and there are no limits on the number of agents, or requirements 
that an approved list of agents be submitted before campaigning. These changes are a significant 
backwards step, as they provide “legal loopholes” that can be exploited in order to allow bribery 
outside of set times or affect voting via treating. 
Accountability (practice) 
 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODY HAVE TO REPORT AND BE ANSWERABLE FOR ITS 
ACTIONS IN PRACTICE? 
 
Whilst candidates can and do petition the Supreme Court when they perceive that electoral 
irregularities have affected election results and there is oversight of expenditure by the 
auditor general, the Electoral Office does not regularly produce reports after general 
elections.   
It has been observed that: 
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There are overlapping and multiple lines for reporting. The PEO reports to the Electoral 
Commission, the PSC, and the Minister and Director-General of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. These arrangements have had a negative impact on long-term capacity-building 
and institution-strengthening initiatives because they create confusion and conditions that 
are conducive to conflict, duplication of effort and political interference.
693
 
Reports on elections are not frequently presented to parliament, with the last official report on a 
national election being issued in respect of the 2002 election. This is publically available. A report on 
the 2008 election was prepared but has never been made publically available.
694
 It is understood 
that there have been advance payments made to two consultants tasked with drafting the report but 
the 2008 election report was never finalised.
695
 A report on the 2012 national election has been 
prepared
696
 but as of December 2013 it had not been tabled in parliament so was not publically 
available. Provincial and municipal election reports are being produced and are forwarded to the 
minister of internal affairs but are not made public.
697
 
As discussed in the section on the supreme audit institution, there are some delays in audits. 
However, the Electoral Office was subject to a special investigation in 2002, with a follow up in 
2007.
698
 In 2012 the PEO was suspended due to not following rules relating to government contracts 
when he failed to seek three quotes for the printing of ballot papers.
699
 He was subsequently 
reinstated. 
Election petitions occur regularly. Following the 2012 national election at least 11 electoral petitions 
were heard from different constituencies of Vanuatu. Grounds of petitions ranged from alleged 
bribery, treating, issues with counting and recording votes and irregularities in the electoral roll. 
Decisions on election petitions were somewhat delayed because of the number of cases that is 
listed before the Supreme Court, with judgment on the last petition being issued in May 2014, more 
than a year after the election took place. 
Integrity (law) 
 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE MECHANISMS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE ELECTORAL 
MANAGEMENT BODY? 
 
There are few laws that specifically relate to integrity of electoral officers.  
Vanuatu lacks a formal code of conduct for electoral officials. The general public service law 
contains integrity mechanisms that apply to members of the electoral administration. Part V of the 
Public Service Act provides for a code of conduct governing the actions and behaviour of the staff of 
the public service. Section 34 establishes general rules of conduct and requires public servants to 
perform their duties with care and diligence, to behave honestly and with integrity and to observe 
and comply with all applicable laws. Section 34(i) also provides that public servants must disclose 
and take reasonable steps to avoid any conflict of interest (real or apparent) in connection with his or 
her employment and use resources and public money in a lawful and proper manner. Breaches of 
the code are grounds for termination of employment.  
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Section 52 of the Representation of the People Act creates a number of offences relating to the 
conduct of electoral officers. These offences include allowing false records to be created, refusing to 
permit someone to vote and failing to count votes.  
Integrity (practice) 
Score:  0 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE INTEGRITY OF THE ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODY ENSURED IN PRACTICE? 
 
Despite some identification of wrongdoing by electoral officers there is no consistent 
sanctioning of misbehaviour.  
According to the outgoing Acting PEO there have been issues in regards to the reappointment of 
staff, which has raised some concern as to the integrity of the electoral officer and the PSC. In 2010 
there was a suspension of a senior staff member due to financial irregularities, but prior to the audit 
report being completed the PSC reinstated the staff member. Similarly, despite a PEO report 
detailing misappropriation of funds by two staff this matter never reached the PSC disciplinary 
board.
700
  
There have never been any prosecutions for electoral offences by electoral officers, despite issues 
in this area having been identified. The PEO, during the 2012 national election, conducted an 
internal inquiry into allegations relating to issuance of duplicate cards and recommended that the 
director general of internal affairs set up an immediate inquiry into the matter. He also recommended 
that offences be prosecuted.
701
 No public follow up in respect of these recommendations has 
occurred. 
Role  
Campaign regulation 
 
Score: 0 
DOES THE ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODY EFFECTIVELY REGULATE CANDIDATE AND POLITICAL PARTY 
FINANCE? 
 
Currently there is no law to allow for the Electoral Office, Electoral Commission or any other 
body to regulate candidate and political party finance.  
Under Vanuatu’s law the Electoral Office and the Electoral Commission do not have any role to play 
in regulating candidate and political party finance. Nor does anyone else have a specific role to play 
in this area. Candidates who held leadership for the purposes of the Leadership Code Act prior to 
announcing their candidature (for instance because they were political advisors to ministers or 
members of the previous parliament) would have been required to provide annual returns on income 
and assets disposed of in accordance with that Act, so some disclosures may have been made as 
part of this process. However, the intention of providing annual returns under the Leadership Code 
Act is not to regulate candidate finance. 
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Election administration 
Score: 25 
DOES THE ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODY ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS? 
 
Issues with the electoral roll, electoral offences and lack of confidence in the integrity of the 
Electoral Office significantly undermine the electoral process. 
The election process has drawn significant criticism in recent years. Whilst the 2012 national 
election was labelled “the worst ever” by former Prime Minister Edward Natapei, issues are 
longstanding.
 702
 
One of the main issues is lack of integrity in the electoral roll. It is widely acknowledged to be 
inaccurate, with deceased people not being removed and a number of people being registered more 
than once. The inflated roll creates an environment that enables fraud. It is alleged that some 
candidates use the proxy vote system, in which a person can nominate another voter to cast their 
vote for them on the election day, to enable deceased voters to vote. It also enables people to vote 
in more than one constituency.
703
 These problems are so deeply rooted that the PEO at the time of 
the 2012 national election recommended that ‘the current electoral roll be completely wiped out and 
that the Government starts a complete new roll in preparations towards the 2016 General 
Elections’.704 
As checking of voter identities is not always thoroughly done at polling stations, some people are 
thought to be able to vote twice. Whilst a simple system of dipping voters thumbs in ink after voting 
has been initiated this is not always done.
705
 
As well as the roll containing people who should not be there, in 2012 a number of people who 
should have been present on the roll were not listed or had errors in their voting cards. As there is 
no allowance for provisional voting in Vanuatu’s electoral laws this prevented some legitimate voters 
from voting.
706
 
Issues at polling stations included lack of facilities for disabled people and lack of secrecy of voting. 
Whilst initial counting was observed, observers were not permitted at recounting.
707
 
Election offences are not prosecuted. Whilst rumours of bribery, treating and other fraud abound, 
they are not well documented. The 2002 Election Observer Group report observed that 8% of 
people surveyed in Port Vila were directly offered a bribe, with a further 12% knowing someone who 
had been offered a bribe. Figures were lower on Tanna. Worryingly this report also identified that 
about 17% of respondents nationally either had been directly threatened with violence in relation to 
the election or know others that had been threatened with violence.
708
 A survey conducted by 
Transparency Vanuatu in 2013 indicates that there is considerable public will for stronger 
enforcement of these laws, both against those who offer bribes and those who receive them.
709
 
Independent observers are not consistently appointed to elections. When observers are appointed 
they tend to be located in Port Vila. Prior to the election of 2012 a request was made to the Electoral 
Office by Transparency Vanuatu to be part of an international team of observers. Unfortunately, they 
were unable to confirm whether or not this approval would be forthcoming.  Transparency Vanuatu 
                                                        
702
 Ibid. 
703
 These issues are detailed in Transparency Vanuatu, 2013; Norm Kelly, 2012; Electoral Commission, 2002; Shirley 
Randall (ed), 2002; Jeannette Bolenga, 2006. 
704
 Godwin Ligo, 2012. 
705
 Transparency Vanuatu, 2013. 
706
 Transparency Vanuatu, 2013; Norm Kelly, 2012. 
707
 Transparency Vanuatu, 2013. 
708
 Shirley Randall (ed), 2002. 
709
 Transparency Vanuatu, ‘Electoral Candidates and Integrity’ Vanuatu Daily Post 13 September 2013. 
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was advised a month out from the elections that it is the government who must request international 
observer teams to come and this request had not been made. It was only at the very last minute that 
Transparency Vanuatu received agreement from the Electoral Commission allowing Transparency 
Vanuatu to undertake an observer role as domestic observers.
710
 A further international observer 
was also permitted to observe, but as he was only one person the extent of his observations was 
limited.
711
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The most critical issue is the integrity of the electoral roll and the related issue of correctly 
identifying voters. As a matter of urgency the government must take measures to ensure that 
the content of the roll is accurate and that there is a system in place to ensure that people who 
present themselves to vote can be correctly identified. It is recommended that the electoral roll 
and voting system be computerised. It is also recommended that, as the current roll is so 
corrupt, an entirely new roll is constructed, rather than trying to clean up the existing roll. 
 
2. There are concerns about adequacy of training and control of regional registration officers. It is 
recommended that before a new roll is constructed, new registration officers must be put in 
place. Processes for the appointment and training of such staff must be reviewed by the PEO in 
conjunction with the Electoral Commission in order to develop specific recommendations for 
reform. These recommendations should include measures for ensuring political independence 
of registration officers, adequate training and adequate oversight. 
 
3. There should be a review of the Representation of the People Act in order to ensure that the law 
fully supports fair, transparent electoral processes. The first part of this review should involve 
collecting and assessing the numerous recommendations that have been made in election 
reports and election observer reports since 2002. Specific issues to consider in respect of voting 
and the electoral roll include: 
 
a. A review of control of electoral cards and proxy voting, which are seen to be major 
areas of abuse. 
b. The absence of provisional voting, which prevents legitimate voters with deficiencies in 
their registration from being able to vote. 
c. The question of whether voting should be compulsory. 
d. Whether a set timeframe by which all electoral petitions must be heard and decided 
upon is needed. 
 
4. The independence of the Electoral Office can be undermined due to the PEO and other 
electoral officers being public servants. This can both affect appointments and attempts to 
discipline staff. It is recommended that the Electoral Commission be given the power to directly 
recruit and discipline staff of the Electoral Office. 
 
5. Currently, in practice, the only consequence for committing an electoral offence is that a 
successful candidate may face an electoral petition. It is recommended that: 
 
a. Coordination between the Electoral Office, the police and the public prosecutor is 
strengthened in order to ensure that those committing electoral offences (including 
candidates, electoral officers, voters and others) are prosecuted. 
b. Consideration be given to banning a candidate from standing for elections for life if he 
or she is convicted of an electoral offence. 
 
6. In order to ensure ongoing monitoring of elections:  
 
a. The PEO and Electoral Commission should be reminded of their legal obligations to 
produce election reports in a timely manner. As part of a review of the Representation 
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of the People Act it should be made clear that these reports are to become public 
documents.  
b. The government should, in a timely manner, provide for observer groups comprised of 
international and domestic representatives at all elections, in order to ensure ongoing 
monitoring of election processes. 
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VII.7. OMBUDSMAN 
SUMMARY 
Overall pillar score: 37.5 
Dimension Indicator Law Practice 
Capacity 
41.7 
Resources --- 50 
Independence 50 25 
Governance 
45.8 
Transparency 50 75 
Accountability 50 25 
Integrity 50 25 
Role 
25 
Investigation 25 
Promoting good practice 25 
 
The Office of the Ombudsman was established in 1994. The first Ombudsman Act was passed in 
1995, but was repealed in 1998. A new Ombudsman Act, with more restrictive powers, came into 
force in 1999. The most significant restriction was that the power of the ombudsman to apply to the 
Supreme Court, for an order that recommendations be implemented in the event that the prime 
minister failed to act on recommendations within a set time frame, was removed. Since that time 
there have been a number of reviews and calls to revise and expand the power of the Office of the 
Ombudsman. The main reason for calls for review is the lack of consistent action in response to 
ombudsman’s reports. No changes have been made to the Ombudsman Act or the Leadership 
Code Act in response to reviews. 
It is not just the issue of legal power that restricts the operation of the Office of the Ombudsman. 
Staffing levels have been declining and there are limited resources to carry out public awareness 
functions. The number of public complaints received and the number of reports issued have also 
been declining.  
The fourth Ombudsman passed away in 2012, whilst in office and this has been somewhat 
disruptive. In March 2013 Kalkot Mataskelekele was appointed as the fifth Ombudsman. 
STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION 
The Constitution provides for a single ombudsman who has the power to enquire into the conduct of 
all public servants, public authorities and ministerial departments, with the exception of the president 
of the Republic, the Judicial Service Commission, the Supreme Court and other judicial bodies.
712
 
The Constitution also requires the ombudsman to take complaints related to citizens not being able 
to obtain government services in their choice of official language and to make reports in respect of 
multilingualism.
713
 
More detail as to the functioning of the Office of the Ombudsman and the ombudsman’s powers are 
defined by the Ombudsman Act and the Leadership Code Act.
714
  
The Office of the Ombudsman is the secretariat in charge of supporting the activities of the 
ombudsman. Offices are maintained in Port Vila and Luganville. The office is divided into two 
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714
 A useful descriptive overview of the legal framework governing the Ombudsman can be found in Michael Frahm, 
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divisions – the leadership code division and the maladministration division. Complaints in respect of 
multilingualism fall under the leadership code division.
715
 
ASSESSMENT 
Capacity 
Resources  
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES AN OMBUDSMAN OR ITS EQUIVALENT HAVE ADEQUATE RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE ITS 
GOALS? 
 
Funding levels and staffing levels have been decreasing and this is having a significant 
negative impact on the operations of the Office of the Ombudsman. 
As the chart below indicates, in the past five years government funding of the office has decreased 
significantly and is continuing to decline. The decrease of approximately VT12 million (US$120,000) 
between 2011 and 2012 occurred because allocated money had not been used to fill vacant staff 
positions. Money was therefore reallocated. The Office of the Ombudsman was anticipating a further 
VT4 million (US$40,000) cut in 2014 as they had been told that their budget is capped at 
VT36,972,000 (US$370,000) in the 2014 budgeting process.
716
 The reason for this cut is the Port 
Vila Office moved from private premises to government offices in December 2013, which has 
resulted in a significant rental savings.
717
  
 
A number of ombudsman’s annual reports have recommended moving the Port Vila Office from 
private to government premises in order to reduce operational expenses.
718
 However, implicit in this 
recommendation has been the idea that the operations/administration budget should remain at the 
same level, but that a saving in rental will allow the operations/administration budget to be more 
effectively utilised for other activities. The 2010 annual report commented that of the 2010 allocation 
of VT52,260,931 (US$523,000), VT37,677,922 (US$377,000) was allocated for staffing and 
VT14,582,939 (US$146,000) for administration and operations. Of the operations/administration 
budget VT5,304,000 (US$53,000) was spent on rent for offices, leaving just over VT9 million 
(US$90,000) for all other expenses and activities.
719
 The most significant area affected by the limited 
                                                        
715
 Interview of Alain Molgos, Director Leadership Code Investigation with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 10 September 2013.  
716
 Interview of Velma Karabani, Principal Investigator with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 10 September 2013. 
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Vanuatu I go long Palemen Januari-Disemba 2010  (Port Vila: Office of the Ombudsman, 2011) 18.  
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operations/administration budget is education. There is no budget allocated specifically for 
education or public awareness activities.
720
 
Staffing of the Office of the Ombudsman has steadily declined over the past 15 years. Currently 
there are 14 staff.
721
 Whilst some previous ombudsmen have failed to initiate recruitment procedures 
to utilise their staffing budgets,
722
 budgetary issues have recently hindered recruiting. Between 
December 2011 and June 2012 the office had three staff resign. One further staff member (the then 
Ombudsman) passed away. These staff were entitled to large severance allowances and/or other 
benefits. There is no provision for planned saving for the payment of allowances on termination 
within the government budget system.
723
 As a result much of the budget for staff in 2012 was spent 
on termination allowances, rather than recruitment.
724
  
 
There is some external perception that lack of resources is being used, to a degree, as an excuse 
for lack of activity.
725
 Declining numbers of complaints (discussed further below), which in turn leads 
to fewer investigation files, means that although the total number of staff has decreased the ratio of 
staff to files has increased since 1999, from 16 lawyers/investigators to 1092 investigations, or 1:68 
in 1999, to 6 lawyers/investigators to 217 files, or 1:36 in 2011.
726
 These figures exclude the 
ombudsman.  The first Ombudsman reported that in the late 1990s she had a budget of about VT30 
million (US$300,000) and still managed to receive the highest level of complaints recorded and to 
produce the most public reports.
727
  In 1999 the average time to make an initial response to 
complaints was one month and 86% of cases were closed within 18 months.
728
 The 2011 annual 
report lists the disputes resolved that year by mediation. The average length of time taken was 
about four years and three months.
729
 This is despite the fact that it was expected that giving the 
ombudsman power to mediate would result in quicker resolution of disputes.
730
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Independence (law) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE OMBUDSMAN INDEPENDENT BY LAW? 
 
There are legal regulations governing the appointment and removal of the ombudsman which 
protect independence; however there are some restrictions on what the ombudsman can 
investigate and the manner in which he or she can report.  
Article 65 of the Constitution guarantees the ombudsman’s independence. It provides that, ‘The 
Ombudsman shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or body in the 
exercise of his functions.’  
The ombudsman is appointed for a period of five years by the president in consultation with the 
prime minister, the speaker of parliament, leaders of other political parties represented in parliament, 
and the heads of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs, the local government councils, the Public 
Service Commission and the Judicial Service Commission.
731
 The requirement for the president to 
widely consult is intended to ensure that no individual political party can unduly influence the 
appointment of the ombudsman; although there has been one recommendation, in 2001, for the 
ombudsman to be appointed by a committee, rather than an individual.
732
 The Ombudsman Act 
provides further grounds for appointment, relating to knowledge of ni-Vanuatu culture, integrity, 
academic qualifications, political independence and high standing in the community.
733
 There is no 
limit on reappointment of ombudsmen. 
Under the Constitution the ombudsman can only be removed if he or she becomes disqualified to 
hold the position.
734
 Grounds for disqualification in the Constitution are if he or she ‘is a member of 
Parliament, the National Council of Chiefs or a Local Government Council, if he holds any other 
public office, or if he exercises a position of responsibility within a political party.’735 These grounds 
aim to ensure the ombudsman’s independence. Further grounds for termination are included in the 
Ombudsman Act. These include bankruptcy, incapacity, conviction of a criminal charge other than a 
traffic offence, a finding of gross misconduct or a conviction under the Leadership Code Act.
736
 
Incapacity must be supported by two medical certificates, one from a doctor of the president’s 
nomination and one from a doctor of the ombudsman’s nomination.737 Findings of gross misconduct 
must be made by at least three members of a tribunal made up of a representative from the 
Supreme Court, the attorney general, and two legal representatives, with one nominated by the 
prime minister and one by the leader of the opposition. The ombudsman must be heard and is 
entitled to representation in front of such a tribunal.
 738
 The president holds the power to dismiss, but 
can only exercise it after consultation with the same position holders consulted during 
appointments.
739
 These safeguards on termination help to guarantee that the ombudsman can carry 
out his or her duties without fear of losing his or her job.
740
  
His or her salary is determined by the president, in consultation with the PSC, but is statutorily 
guaranteed to be no less than that of a Supreme Court judge.
741
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Other aspects of independence that are legally protected are that the ombudsman is entitled to 
decide how to conduct proceedings
742
 and that the ombudsman and his or her staff are protected 
from legal liability in respect of any actions carried out in good faith whilst undertaking their jobs.
743
 
Even though the legal framework provides for a number of mechanisms aimed to ensure the 
ombudsman’s independence, there are some shortcomings that might threaten independence and 
impartiality. 
There are legal limits on how an ombudsman can write his or her reports. In particular he or she 
must not ‘produce reports containing inflammatory language not in keeping with the professionalism 
expected of the office.’744 This limit was introduced by the 1998 Act. 
There are also limits on what the ombudsman can investigate. The law prohibits the ombudsman 
from enquiring into ‘a matter that has previously been the subject of an enquiry by the Ombudsman; 
the reasons a recommendation of the Ombudsman has not been followed; and the action taken by a 
leader or person in charge of a government agency to give effect to a recommendation of the 
Ombudsman.’745 These limits are considerably more restrictive than what was provided in the 
original Ombudsman Act 1995. Under that Act in response to a report, the prime minister was 
required to provide information about the steps that were proposed in relation to the ombudsman’s 
recommendations. If there was no response the ombudsman was empowered to apply to the 
Supreme Court for an order that the recommendations be implemented.
746
 
Staff of the Office of the Ombudsman are appointed by the PSC in consultation with the 
ombudsman, but hold office under terms and conditions decided solely by the PSC.
747
  Prior to 1998 
the ombudsman had the direct power to recruit. 
Independence (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE OMBUDSMAN INDEPENDENT IN PRACTICE? 
 
Since law changes in 1998, which were political interventions to limit the power of the 
ombudsman, there has been no indication of overt political interference. However, 
decreasing budgets may be perceived as covert undermining of the ombudsman. Delays in 
recruiting staff are largely outside of the ombudsman’s control and have significantly 
affected the performance of the Office of the Ombudsman. 
The changes introduced by the 1998 Act have the potential to limit the independence of the 
ombudsman. Indeed the perceived intention of the 1998 Act was to fetter the ombudsman. In brief, 
these circumstances leading to the 1998 Act were that political leaders found the first Ombudsman 
too confrontational and threatening.
748
 The requirement that reports not include inflammatory 
language can be perceived as an attempt to limit confrontational reports.
749
   Removal of the power 
of the ombudsman to directly recruit: 
…creates the potential for employees of the Ombudsman to be intimidated where their work 
is critical of or threatens someone who has control over the employment of public servants. 
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It was strongly recommended by the advisor from Ombudsman Commission of Papua New 
Guinea that the hiring of Ombudsman’s employees be separate from the Public Service in 
order to avoid this very possibility.
750
 
Removal of the power to enforce recommendations via court action means that there is no 
mechanism to ensure recommendations are acted upon.
751
 
Subsequent to the changes in the law in 1998 there have been no examples of overt political 
interference. The Office of the Ombudsman is currently not subject to direct threats from 
politicians.
752
 The law restricting inflammatory language in reports has not created problems as 
reports are based on facts supported by evidence and law.
753
  
Lack of action on recommendations contained in ombudsman’s reports is something of a problem. 
The Office of the Ombudsman has received complaints about a lack of response to reports.
754
 As 
such the law restricting the ombudsman from enquiring as to why recommendations have not been 
followed or what actions have been taken in response to recommendations does create a practical 
restriction on its independence to investigate such complaints. 
Recruitment via the PSC can be a long, slow process.
755
 Delays in recruitment have affected the 
functioning of the Office of the Ombudsman. As an example of delays experienced, six positions 
(including legal officers, corporate service officers, a cleaner and a secretary) were advertised in 
August 2012. So far four of these positions have been filled, in December 2012, March 2013 and 
August 2013 (2 positions). Two positions were offered to candidates but they had found positions 
elsewhere and declined the offers.  One of the positions was filled internally, so out of the August 
2012 recruitment round for six staff the office ended up having three unfilled positions.
756
 Whilst 
there is no suggestion that delays have been a deliberate attempt to interfere with the office, delays 
in recruitment have had a significant impact on the office. Not recruiting staff in a timely manner also 
weakens corporate memory. New staff often come into positions that have been left unfilled for quite 
some time and suffer from lack of handover.
757
 Under the first Ombudsman Act the ombudsman did 
have the power to recruit and previous ombudsmen have recommended that this power be 
restored.
758
 Previous reviews have also recommended that the ombudsman’s power to directly 
recruit staff be restored due to the potential for interference with the independent functioning of the 
ombudsman.
759
 There is also support for this proposal within the PSC.
760
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Governance 
Transparency (law) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE THE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT THE PUBLIC CAN OBTAIN RELEVANT 
INFORMATION ON THE ACTIVITIES AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES OF THE OMBUDSMAN? 
 
Reports on enquiries generally must be made public. However, no specific information must 
be disclosed on complaints settled by mediation, and closed but unresolved disputes. Whilst 
annual reports must be issued, there is no clear deadline by which they must be issued. Nor 
is there legal regulation of public involvement in the activities of the Office of the 
Ombudsman. 
The Constitution requires that enquiries be carried out in private.
761
 The only documents on the 
ombudsman’s activities that are required to be made publicly available are reports on enquiries, 
although all or part of these can remain confidential on the grounds of national security or public 
interest.
762
 In order to be able to investigate sensitive topics the ombudsman needs to respect 
confidentiality so these limits are not an illegitimate hindrance on transparency. The grounds for 
keeping information confidential are further defined in s 26(2) of the Ombudsman Act, which also 
helps to ensure that information is not kept confidential without legal justification. 
The ombudsman has the power to attempt to resolve disputes by mediation.
763
 The law is not clear 
on whether issues resolved by mediation have to be reported on. 
Annual reports and other special reports are given to the prime minister for presentation in 
parliament,
764
 but there is no explicit requirement that these be made publically available. The Act 
does not provide a specific deadline by which annual reports must be presented. 
The ombudsman can establish his or her own proceedings in respect of: the methods by which 
complaints are acted upon; the scope and manner of enquiries to be made; and the form, frequency 
and distribution of his or her conclusions and recommendations.
765
 There is no requirement that the 
ombudsman publish general information on standard procedures developed by the ombudsman in 
respect of any of these things. Nor does the law establish a public council or regulate requirements 
for public consultation. 
Transparency (practice) 
Score: 75 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THERE TRANSPARENCY IN THE ACTIVITIES AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES OF THE 
OMBUDSMAN IN PRACTICE? 
 
Annual reports containing some data are available on request, but further enhancements as 
to the data contained in annual reports could be made. Publishing annual reports and other 
information about the operation of the Office of the Ombudsman would improve public 
access to information.  
                                                        
761
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The Office of the Ombudsman currently has no website, although this is in the business plan for 
2014.
766
 Public information is available on request from the office. Public reports and annual reports 
can be obtained, for a nominal fee (VT100 (US$1)) to help cover the costs of printing. Public reports 
are also available for download from PacLII, a freely accessible legal information site. However, this 
site is primarily intended for use by legal professionals, so may be difficult for the general public to 
access.  
No annual reports were issued between September 2001 and August 2004.
767
 Since then annual 
reports have been issued, sometimes with a small delay. For instance, the annual report for the 
period January to December 2011 was issued in June 2012.
768
 The annual report January to 
December 2012 has not been issued, as of September 2013. Annual reports are currently released 
only in Bislama. 
Annual reports provide information on the number of complaints received and the types of 
complaints received.  They also contain data on the number of complaints closed, resolved and kept 
open. Some reports contain information on some of the complaints that were resolved, but there is 
no information on the grounds for closing complaints. Data is not always consistently presented 
making it difficult to identify how many active cases the Office of the Ombudsman has. 
One issue that the Office of the Ombudsman faces in respect of consistent data collection and 
presentation is that it has an old case tracking or file management system. It has discussed the 
need to upgrade the system with the Pacific Ombudsman Alliance (POA) and hopes to be able to 
implement changes in this area in 2014.
769
 Whether this happens in 2014  is dependent upon the 
Ministry of Justice, which is implementing a file management system for all offices related to 
justice.
770
 
In recent years few public reports on specific investigations have been issued. Public reports on 
matters that are closed without being resolved or resolved via mediation are not made, although a 
brief summary of the nature of resolved issues may be available in the annual report.  
General information on processes for making complaints and what happens after complaints are 
made is not readily available. The University of the South Pacific Community Legal Centre produced 
a brochure several years ago on how to make a complaint to the ombudsman, but this has not been 
reprinted recently and is not widely distributed. 
The constitutional requirement that enquiries be conducted in private has been interpreted by the 
Office of the Ombudsman as meaning that third parties (such as lawyers or NGOs) are not permitted 
to assist individuals to make complaints.
771
 This also means that third parties are unable to assist 
individuals to follow up with the Office of the Ombudsman to find out about progress of their 
complaints. 
Accountability (law) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT THE OMBUDSMAN HAS TO REPORT AND 
BE ANSWERABLE FOR ITS ACTIONS? 
 
The law does not require reports to be debated in parliament, which weakens the legal 
accountability framework. 
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The ombudsman is accountable to the prime minister via annual reports and special reports. The 
prime minister in turn is required to present these reports to parliament.
772
 There are no specific 
requirements as to the content of these reports. It is left to parliament’s discretion to decide on 
whether or not to hold debates on the reports presented by the ombudsman.  
If the ombudsman is of the opinion that administrative injustice has occurred due to the content of 
national legislation, he or she must present a report to parliament and the attorney general.
773
 If 
apparent injustice has occurred due to the content of local level legislation the report is presented to 
the head of the local authority and the attorney general.
774
 There is no requirement that any action 
result from such reports. 
The ombudsman is also required to account to the Office of the Auditor General(OAG) in respect of 
expenditure.
775
 
Accountability (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE OMBUDSMAN HAVE TO REPORT AND BE ANSWERABLE FOR ITS ACTIONS IN 
PRACTICE? 
 
In practice parliament does not regularly debate reports of the ombudsman. However, there 
is accountability for expenditure via the Office of the Auditor General. 
Whilst reports are tabled in parliament they are not actively debated so the parliamentary 
accountability mechanism is ineffective. Parliamentary minutes from the past five years do not 
contain records of any debates on ombudsman’s annual reports. 
The Office of the Ombudsman is accountable to the OAG for expenditure. A compliance audit 
completed in 2006 found that the Office of the Ombudsman had overpaid allowances, overspent its 
budget and had not maintained a fixed asset register. The auditor general’s annual report observed 
that actions had been taken to recover overpaid allowances and establish a fixed assets register.
776
 
The review of the auditor general’s report by the Public Accounts Committee in 2011 confirmed that 
an assets register had been established and that overpaid allowances had been recovered.
777
 A 
further compliance audit of the years 2006 and 2007 was completed in 2010. This audit found 
significant underspending of the budget.
778
 As discussed above in the section on resources, 
underspending has resulted in the staffing budget for the office being reduced. The audit report also 
found that one staff member had been overpaid salary, although there is no comment on whether 
action had been taken to recover this overpayment.
779
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Integrity (law) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE OMBUDSMAN? 
 
Between general integrity laws and specific laws relating to the appointment of the 
ombudsman, integrity is assured, although there is no requirement that public declarations 
of assets be made, nor gift registers be kept. 
The Ombudsman Act lists requirements for appointment. These include political independence and 
integrity.
780
 The Ombudsman Act also provides special conditions for employment which include a 
prohibition on receiving any interest in any state property, or soliciting, accepting or receiving any 
other benefit in addition to his or her terms and conditions of employment.
781
  In addition to specific 
provisions in the Ombudsman Act the ombudsman is defined as a leader under the provisions of the 
Leadership Code Act.
782
 As discussed in the section of the legislature, this Act regulates a wide 
range of behaviours, including conflicts of interest, receiving gifts and misuse of office. Leaders are 
also required to provide annual returns of assets and liabilities to the clerk of parliament, although 
these returns are not made public. Breaches of this Act are criminal offences. 
Whilst the ombudsman usually investigates breaches of the Leadership Code Act, in the event that 
there is an allegation of a breach by the ombudsman the attorney general is empowered to 
investigate the breach.
783
 
Employees within the Office of the Ombudsman are public servants and are therefore subject to the 
public service code of conduct under the Public Service Act. As discussed further in the section on 
the public service this code contains broad rules relating to honesty and integrity. Breaches of the 
code are grounds for termination of employment. 
Integrity (practice) 
Score: 25  
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE INTEGRITY OF THE OMBUDSMAN ENSURED IN PRACTICE? 
 
There are no recent examples of the ombudsman being subject to investigations for lack of 
integrity, but it is difficult to determine whether this is due to the presence of integrity, or 
systemic failures in applying integrity mechanisms. 
Appointments processes are adhered to. The position of ombudsman has never been subject to 
investigations for breaches of the Leadership Code by the attorney general. There is no requirement 
that asset declarations under the Leadership Code Act be published and in practice the ombudsman 
has not voluntarily published asset declarations. As discussed further below, asset declarations are 
only verified if there are reasonable grounds to believe that there has been a breach of the 
Leadership Code Act. As such there has been no routine verification of the ombudsman’s asset 
declarations. There have been no recent instances of staff of the Office of the Ombudsman being 
subject to disciplinary action by the PSC.
784
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The Office of the Ombudsman has internal manuals for both investigators and administrative staff.
785
 
These are based on good practice principles and are intended to help to ensure day to day integrity.  
Role 
Investigation (Law and Practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE OMBUDSMAN EFFECTIVE IN DEALING WITH COMPLAINTS FROM THE PUBLIC? 
 
A low public profile in recent years has contributed to declining numbers of complaints. Lack 
of follow up on recommendations by other agencies also significantly hinders the 
effectiveness of the ombudsman. 
Long delays in completing investigations, combined with failures on behalf of other state institutions 
to act on the recommendations of the ombudsman, undermine the effectiveness of the office in 
dealing with complaints. Further, the ombudsman’s lack of legal powers in respect of inspection of 
asset declarations made under the Leadership Code Act undermines the effectiveness of the 
Leadership Code Act as an integrity mechanism. There has also been a significant decrease in 
public complaints being made to the Office of the Ombudsman. 
Complaints from the public can be made by telephone, writing a letter or visiting the office. 
Complaints also sometimes arise after the office makes public awareness visits to communities.
786
 
In 2010 and 2011 the most common method of making a complaint was by visiting the office, 
followed by writing a letter.
787
  As the ombudsman only has offices in the two urban centres and 
does not regularly make visits outside of these centres it is possible that complaints from other areas 
are not being heard. Certainly the data in 2010 and 2011 indicate that the vast majority of 
complaints arise from Shefa and Sanma provinces, where the two urban centres are located.
788
 
However, as the majority of government services are centred in the two urban areas it is also 
possible that there is simply less perceived corruption in rural areas, due in part to fewer 
government officials and services being located there. 
As discussed above in the section on transparency, current practice prevents NGOs or other actors 
from assisting complainants to make complaints in respect of maladministration. However, as the 
ombudsman must investigate all complaints in respect of breaches of the Leadership Code Act
789
 
NGOs can assist in making complaints in this area.  
 As the table below indicates, the number of complaints received by the Office of the Ombudsman 
has dropped significantly since the first Ombudsman’s term expired in 1999.  
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Part of the reason for this may be lack of public awareness on how to make a complaint. Whilst the 
procedure is not complicated, a small street survey conducted by the National Integrity System 
research team in Port Vila in August 2013 with 50 citizens (31 men and 19 women) indicated low 
levels of public awareness about the work of the ombudsman and how to make a complaint.
790
 
Whilst this data is based on a small sample and should be treated with the appropriate caution, it 
indicates that there is a significant gap in public awareness of this basic information. 
Low levels of complaints may also, in part, stem from a perception that there is no point in laying a 
complaint because the ombudsman cannot do anything.
791
 Because of the way that the data is 
presented in annual reports it is not possible to clearly identify how many complaints received in a 
year have been investigated.  In 2011 of the 40 complaints received from external sources three 
complaints were not investigated,
792
 although it is not clear from the annual report whether they were 
not investigated as being outside of the ombudsman’s jurisdiction, or for other reasons. Annual 
reports from the first five years of the operation of the office, which did record reasons for not 
investigating cases, indicated that lack of jurisdiction and the availability of other remedies were the 
main reasons for declining to investigate.
793
 
In 2011 the number of active investigation files was 217.
794
 This includes complaints received in 
years prior to 2011. In 2011 69 complaints were closed. Of these, three were the subject of public 
                                                        
790
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791
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reports and 18 complaints were resolved.
795
 The annual report contains a table briefly detailing 14 
complaints that were resolved.
796
 It can be assumed that the other four were legitimately kept 
confidential. The average length of time taken to resolve these complaints was about four years and 
three months.
797
 There is no further breakdown of reasons for why the other 48 complaints were 
closed.  
In the early years of operation of the Office of the Ombudsman, a high public profile was maintained 
through controversy generated by the issuing of many ombudsmen’s reports.798 As the table below 
indicates, the number of public reports issued has declined. This has had some impact on the public 
profile of the office.  
 
It should be remembered that the lack of reports does not mean that the Office of the Ombudsman 
is not doing its job.
799
 Part of its job is to resolve complaints, and matters resolved through mediation 
do not result in public reports being issued.  Indeed, given that a significant problem is the lack of 
follow up on public reports by government agencies, it could be considered strategic to put limited 
resources into complaints that can be resolved via mediation.   
The ombudsman is required to present public reports to the prime minister, the head of the agency 
concerned and the complainant.
800
 The prime minister or the head of the agency concerned must, 
within a reasonable time, notify the ombudsman in writing of any actions to be taken in respect of 
recommendations. The prime minister and/or the head of the agency concerned can also issue a 
written notice that no action is to be taken. No reasons need to be given for deciding not to act.
801
 
Where allegations of criminal wrongdoing are made the report is also presented to the commissioner 
of police and the public prosecutor.
802
 If the report identifies there has been a breach of the 
Leadership Code, the public prosecutor must decide within three months whether there is sufficient 
                                                        
795
 Office of the Ombudsman, 2012: 14. 
796
 Office of the Ombudsman, 2012: 16-23. 
797
 Based on the author’s own calculations. 
798
 See Edward R Hill, ‘The Vanuatu Ombudsman’ in Anita Jowitt and Tess Newton Cain (eds), Passage of Change: 
Law Society and Governance in the Pacific (Canberra: Pandanus Press, 2003) 71. 
799
 Interview of Velma Karabani, Principal Investigator with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 10 September 2013. 
800
 Section 29(2), Ombudsman Act [Cap 252]. 
801
 Section 32, Ombudsman Act [Cap 252]. 
802
 Section 31(1)(b),  Ombudsman Act [Cap 252]. 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number of public reports issued 
Source: Annual reports 
  
125 NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT VANUATU 
 
 
evidence to prosecute.
803
 If the public prosecutor decides not to prosecute he or she must publish a 
notice in the Gazette stating the reasons for not prosecuting.
804
 The only reasons for not prosecuting 
are lack of evidence or that a prosecution would be frivolous or vexatious.
805
  Where breaches of the 
Public Service Act have been identified the report is also presented to the PSC.
806
 
In 2011 the annual report observed that it was the first time that a recommendation to prosecute 
leaders for breaches of the Leadership Code Act has been acted on by the public prosecutor.
807
  No 
case eventuated as there was some concern that the person had already been prosecuted for the 
same action under the Penal Code, so bringing a subsequent action under the Leadership Code Act 
may have been perceived by the court to be an abuse of process.
808
 There have still never been 
prosecutions under the Leadership Code Act. Nor have there been notices published in the Gazette 
explaining reasons for not prosecuting. 
An interview with the Public Prosecutor indicated that part of the reason that criminal prosecutions, 
either under the Penal Code or the Leadership Code Act do not eventuate is that there needs to be 
sufficient evidence to prove matters beyond reasonable doubt.
809
 The Ombudsman Act provides that 
no statements given during the course of an ombudsman’s investigation can be used in a court of 
law.
810
 Whilst informants may be willing to talk to the ombudsman under conditions of confidentiality, 
when files have been referred by the public prosecutor to the police for further investigation, police 
have at times experienced difficulties in being able to gather evidence.
811
 
The issue of lack of action on ombudsmen’s reports is not new and was addressed in three external 
review reports of the Office of the Ombudsman issued between 2001 and 2004. Since 2009 four 
ombudsman forums have been held to identify strategies to respond to the issue. These strategies 
included improving coordination between the Vanuatu Police Force, the Office of the Public 
Prosecutor and the Office of the Ombudsman and amending the Leadership Code Act to clarify 
offences and processes. A proposal to introduce a new body – a Leadership Code Tribunal – to deal 
with less serious breaches and with the power to award disciplinary penalties has also been raised. 
This proposal has received support within ombudsman’s forums.812 One advantage it has over the 
current criminal prosecution approach is that the standard of proof could be lower.
813
 However it is 
not the only option. The alternative of expanding the power of the ombudsman in a similar manner to 
that found in Papua New Guinea under the Organic Law on the Ombudsman Commission 1998 was 
advocated by one interviewee as being a better approach. Other interviewees also commented on 
the need to explore further options. 
In 2011, the annual report of the Office of the Ombudsman noted that no action had occurred on one 
of the public reports issued that year.
814
 However, the PSC had in fact taken action in respect of a 
report detailing improper suspension of the Director of the Lands Department,
815
 so sometimes lack 
of communication about responses to reports rather than lack of response may be an issue. 
However, the other 2011 report, recommending that the Labour (Work Permits) act be revised, has 
not resulted in any law change.  
In addition to investigation complaints from the public the ombudsman investigates breaches of the 
Leadership Code Act and can commence investigations if he or she has formed a view on 
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reasonable grounds that a leader may have breached the Code.
816
 One of the key forms of 
accountability under the Leadership Code Act is that leaders must file annual returns.
817
 However, 
annual returns are filed with the clerk of parliament. The clerk is under a legal obligation to keep 
returns confidential unless an investigation has been launched.
818
 This means that the Office of the 
Ombudsman is unable to examine annual returns to identify whether there are reasonable grounds 
for launching an investigation for a suspected breach of the Leadership Code Act. The clerk of 
parliament is required to publish lists in the Gazette of leaders who have given or failed to give 
returns, so the ombudsman would be able to launch investigations of the leaders who did not file 
returns.
819
 This list is not always published. 
Promoting good practice  
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE OMBUDSMAN ACTIVE AND EFFECTIVE IN RAISING AWARENESS WITHIN GOVERNMENT 
AND THE PUBLIC ABOUT STANDARDS OF ETHICAL BEHAVIOUR? 
 
Limited public awareness activities take place due to resource constraints. 
Whilst annual reports recognise that promoting public awareness is part of the role of the 
ombudsman it is not specifically listed as a function of the office in legislation. Nor is the office 
provided with a specific budget to conduct education activities.
820
 In recent years the office has not 
been very active in raising public awareness. 
In 2013 talks were given at four secondary schools and also Correctional Services in Santo.
821
 The 
2011 annual report indicated that the Luganville office made presentations about the work of the 
office and the Leadership Code Act at five different secondary schools. The office in Port Vila took 
part in awareness activities on Anti-Corruption Day. Meetings were also held with the Port Vila and 
Luganville Municipal Councils to raise awareness of good conduct.
822
  
No public awareness activities were detailed in the 2010 annual report. In 2009 the only public 
awareness activities listed were a radio show in July
823
 and participation in Law Week, which is a 
regular event organised in part by the Vanuatu Law Society and involving many legal actors. Law 
Week activities took place in Vila and Tanna.
 824
   
There are also no systematic awareness activities aimed at promoting standards of ethical 
behaviour within government.
825
 Whilst public reports may raise some awareness of specific issues, 
and mediation of complaints may help agencies to identify correct behaviour in specific 
circumstances, there is no promotion of, for instance, the duties and obligations of leaders or ethical 
conduct of public servants. The Office of the Ombudsman and the PSC do not regularly liaise or 
work together to promote ethics within the public service.
826
 The Office of the Ombudsman has, 
however, been involved in the recent (2012) induction programme for new members of parliament, 
by contributing a session on the leadership code.
827
 In 2013 the Office of the Ombudsman 
participated in a joint Transparency Vanuatu/Vanuatu Parliament Youth Parliament, by providing 
                                                        
816
 Section 34(1)(b), Leadership Code Act [Cap 242]. 
817
 Part 4, Leadership Code Act [Cap 242]. 
818
 Section 32(2), Leadership Code Act [Cap 242]. 
819
 Section 32(3), Leadership Code Act [Cap 242]. 
820
 Interview of Kalkot Mataskelekele, Ombudsman with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 20 August 2013. 
821
 Interview Velma Karabani, Principal Investigator with Kibeon H Nimbwen, Port Vila, 2 May 2014. 
822
 Office of the Ombudsman, 2012: 7-9. 
823
 Office of the Ombudsman, Namba twelef (12) Aniuol Ripot blong Ombudsman blong Ripablik blong Vanuatu i go 
long Palemen Januari - Disemba 2009,  (Port Vila: Office of the Ombudsman, 2010) 16. 
824
 Ibid., 7-9. 
825
 Interview of Alain Molgos, Director Leadership Code Investigation with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 10 September 2013. 
826
 Interview of Laurent Rep, Secretary of Public Service Commission with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 30 August 2013. 
 
 
  
127 NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT VANUATU 
 
 
training to the 52 youth parliamentarians. The Office of the Ombudsman also participates in other 
NGO programmes by invitation.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. There are significant issues with the lack of action in response to ombudsman’s reports and 
recommendations. One reason for these issues is that gaps in the law allow recommendations 
to be ignored. The Ministry of Justice should follow up on existing proposals and 
recommendations to strengthen the law so as to ensure that concrete action on 
recommendations arises. Issues that should specifically be considered include: 
 
a. Whether power should be given to the ombudsman to refer matters to court if 
recommendations are not responded to. 
b. Whether establishing a new body – a  Leadership Code Tribunal -  is appropriate. 
c. Whether expanding the powers of the Office of the Ombudsman so that it becomes a 
commission, with police and prosecutorial powers, is appropriate. 
d. Whether the law should allow statements given during the course of ombudsman 
enquiries to be used as evidence in court. 
e. Whether the law should be amended to ensure that full copies of all annual returns 
provided by leaders under the Leadership Code Act be provided to the Office of the 
Ombudsman and/or scrutinised by a joint body including the ombudsman, the auditor 
general and the clerk of parliament. 
 
2. A reason for lack of action on recommendations is that there are weak links between the 
ombudsman and other agencies. Weak links with other agencies also hinders efficient public 
awareness activities. 
 
a. In order to facilitate successful criminal prosecutions, coordination between the Office 
of the Ombudsman, the police and the public prosecutor should be improved. 
b. In order to facilitate successful disciplinary actions against public servants and improve 
awareness amongst public servants, coordination between the Office of the 
Ombudsman and the PSC should be improved. 
c. In order to facilitate public awareness and ensure efficient use of resources, co-
operation between the Office of the Ombudsman and CSOs working in the field of good 
governance should be improved. 
 
3. The number of complaints received by the Office of the Ombudsman is declining and one of the 
causes of this is lack of education. The office also has no formal education or public awareness 
programme. In order to strengthen the education role of the Office of the Ombudsman: 
 
a. The Ombudsman Act should be revised to specifically list education as one of the roles 
of the office. 
b. Resources should be specifically allocated in a separate budget line for conducting 
education activities by the Ministerial Budget Committee. 
c. In order to ensure that resources are well utilised and agencies (including CSOs) are 
not duplicating education activities, coordination and co-operation between agencies 
who carry out public education activities in the broad field of integrity/anti-
corruption/legal literacy/ civic education should be strengthened. 
d. Co-operation between the PSC and the Office of the Ombudsman to strengthen 
awareness of integrity amongst public servants should be developed. 
 
4. Some investigations take a very long time to conclude. The Office of the Ombudsman should 
develop and publish expected timeframes for processing disputes. As investigations vary in 
complexity these will only be guidelines, but they will help complainants to monitor progress on 
complaints.  
 
5. Reporting of activities by the Office of the Ombudsman should be strengthened: 
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a. Resources and technical support to update the file management/case tracking 
database should be provided, either by the government, aid donors or other partners, 
as this will make it easier to collect data. 
b. Resources and technical support for the Office of the Ombudsman to develop and 
maintain a website should be provided, either by the government, aid donors or other 
partners. 
c. The law should be revised to further specify the required contents of annual reports. 
This will help to ensure that desired information is consistently provided.  
 
i. The annual report should include clear data on the number of complaints 
received in a reporting year, the number of received complaints not 
investigated and the reasons for not investigating.  
ii. Annual reports should also provide clear data on the number of current 
complaint files being processed in the office, the number of complaint files 
closed and the reasons for closure, the number of complaint files resolved, 
the method of resolution and the time taken to resolve the complaint.  
iii. Brief summaries of disputes resolved by mediation should also be provided, 
if there are no issues of confidentiality. 
 
d. The PacLII website currently publishes public reports, which makes them easily and 
freely available to the public. The Office of the Ombudsman should also supply annual 
reports to PacLII for publication. 
 
6. A cross cutting issue affecting both the OAG and the Office of the Ombudsman is the potential 
for interference or delays in staffing matters by the PSC. This issue has also been faced by 
other constitutional offices, and the solution has been to give other constitutional offices the 
direct power to recruit. The State Law Office Act provides an example of legislation that allows 
this. The law should be revised (possibly using the State Law Office Act or the Ombudsman Act 
1995 as a model) to give the Office of the Ombudsman the power to directly recruit staff. 
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VII.8. SUPREME AUDIT 
INSTITUTION 
SUMMARY 
Overall pillar score: 33.3 
Dimension Indicator Law Practice 
Capacity 
41.6 
Resources --- 25 
Independence 50 50 
Governance 
33.3 
Transparency 25 25 
Accountability 50 0 
Integrity 75 25 
Role 
25 
Effective financial audit 25 
Detecting & sanctioning 
misbehaviour 
25 
Improving financial management 25 
 
The Office of the Auditor General (OAG) is severely hindered by lack of staff. Less than a third of 
approved technical staff positions are filled. This has been a problem for a number of years and has 
led to backlogs in the conduct of audits. It has also limited the extent to which the OAG can 
undertake special investigations. Between August 2008 and November 2009 the position of auditor 
general was vacant.  
Despite the lack of staff, since the appointment of the new Auditor General in 2009 a number of 
positive changes have occurred. In 2011, with technical assistance from the EU, the OAG produced 
a Corporate Plan 2012 – 2016. This technical assistance also saw the development of a draft audit 
manual. The OAG is also provided with support by Australian Aid by way of an operating grant and 
funding an external advisor through the Pacific Technical Assistance Mechanism program. It is 
through this grant that the OAG are able to undertake training activities for staff, contract audits out 
to external firms and receive other forms of technical assistance. For example, in 2013 TeamMate 
software was reinstated and staff trained in its use. In 2012 the OAG presented an annual report 
covering the years 2005-2009 to parliament. This was the first such report produced since 2007. A 
report covering 2010-2012 is currently under preparation. 
Another significant problem for the OAG is that in order for its recommendations to be acted upon 
there needs to be a strong Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and/or other mechanisms to ensure 
recommendations are implemented. However, as discussed in the legislature section, the PAC does 
not operate consistently, and when it does produce reports, these recommendations are also not 
acted upon. As such the “accountability cycle” is incomplete. 
STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION 
The OAG is provided for in the Constitution.
828
 Further detail as to the functioning of the OAG is 
found in the Expenditure Review and Audit Act (ERA Act). This Act was passed in 1998 and 
amended in 2000. As well as detailing the operation of the OAG, this Act also covers the operation 
of the parliamentary PAC. 
                                                        
828
 Article 25, Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu. 
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The OAG is empowered to audit the central government, including constitutional agencies, 
ministries and departments, local level government, statutory bodies, state owned enterprises, 
statutorily established national councils and government operated tertiary (technical) educational 
institutions. It also audits donor funded projects and conducts special audit reviews or investigations 
into specific issues. Subjects for special audit reviews or investigations may be referred to the OAG 
by the PAC and can also be instituted directly by the auditor general. The ERA Act provides that the 
OAG must contract out at least 20% of its audits to external agents. At present all project audits and 
some financial audits are contracted out to private local accounting firms.  
The ERA Act provides that, ‘The Auditor-General must employ two competent external audit 
advisors for just that time necessary to offer advice and assistance in the discharge of the Auditor-
General’s functions including confirming adherence to standards, who together with the Auditor-
General will collectively be known as the Audit Commission.’829 Although no Audit Commission has 
ever been established, in recent years technical advisors have been provided to the OAG by the EU 
and Australian Aid and these advisors have provided the support which was, maybe, envisaged by 
parliament to be provided by the Audit Commission. 
ASSESSMENT 
Capacity 
Resources (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE SUPREME AUDIT INSTITUTION HAVE ADEQUATE RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE ITS 
GOALS IN PRACTICE? 
 
The OAG is managing to carry out some of its work. However, less than half of the technical 
staff positions are filled. Without aid donor support the OAG would not be able to perform 
one of its core operations, which is to contract out at least 20% of audit work.  
The auditor general and all staff of the OAG are public servants appointed by the PSC. One office is 
maintained. The Corporate Plan provides for a staffing level of 23 technical staff, including the 
auditor general.
830
  The Corporate Plan provides that the technical staff are to be organised into 
three audit teams comprised of a senior auditor, two auditors, two assistant auditors and two trainee 
auditors. These teams work under the principal auditor and the auditor general. The most significant 
issue that the OAG faces is a lack of staff. Whilst there is approval for 23 technical staff, only nine 
technical staff are appointed.
831
 There has never been sufficient budget allocated for 23 staff.
832
 Of 
those appointed, two are on study leave and are due to complete studies within the next two 
years.
833
 Between August 2008 and November 2009 the position of auditor general was vacant.
834
 
As a result of staff shortages only one audit team operates. 
Limited financial resources are not the primary reason for staff shortages. Staff shortages are largely 
due to lack of skills in the market. Only citizens can be appointed to permanent positions within the 
                                                        
829
 Section 21(4), Expenditure Review and Audit Act [Cap 241]. 
830
 Office of the Auditor General, Corporate Plan 2012 – 2106 (Port Vila: Office of the Auditor General, 2011), 9. 
831
 Ibid and interview of Beulah Daunakamakama, Office of the Auditor General Technical Advisor with Anita Jowitt, 
Port Vila, 20 August 2013. 
832
 Written comments from Brendan Toner, Systems Accounting Specialist  to Anita Jowitt, 10 September 2013. 
833
 Interview of Beulah Daunakamakama, Office of the Auditor General Technical Advisor with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 
20 August 2013. 
834
 Office of the Auditor General, Auditor General’s Annual Report to Parliament 2005 - 2009 (Port Vila: Office of the 
Auditor General, 2012), 6. 
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public service
835
 and there is a shortage of accounting degree qualified local staff. There is also a 
severe shortage of professionally qualified accountants.
836
 In May 2011 four positions were 
advertised (for two trainee auditors, one auditor and one senior auditor) but there was a lack of 
suitably qualified applicants for the positions.
837
 As a result not all positions that have been allocated 
funding are filled. Until these positions are filled government budgeting rules means that the 
government is not able to increase the already under-utilised staffing budget.
838
  
Lack of financial resources does, however, impact on the ability to attract staff. There is a perception 
that salaries within the OAG are not competitive for qualified or even partially qualified staff. The 
private sector tends to offer salaries which are higher than those found in the public sector.
839
 Whilst 
it is possible to recruit overseas staff on short-term contracts under the Public Service Staff 
Manual,
840
 expatriate staff are unlikely to be attracted by public (as opposed to private) sector 
salaries. 
The lack of staff prevents the OAG from being able to undertake audit activities in a timely manner. 
It also hinders the effective transfer of skills through technical assistance.
841
 
The OAG does not have the power to apply directly to parliament for additional resources. Instead 
the ERA Act provides that the PAC shall, after consultation with the auditor general, report to 
parliament on resources required by the OAG and advise whether additional resources are 
required.
842
 If the PAC is not active in this role it can effectively block allocation of sufficient 
resources. In practice the PAC does not currently function effectively to advocate for resource 
allocations.
843
 
Aid donor support allows the OAG to contract out some of its work to external agents and undertake 
other activities to assist in strengthening the office.  Examples of activities undertaken with aid 
support was the reinstallation and training on the latest audit management software in 2013 and 
ability for the OAG to contract out a highly sensitive investigation of the Vanuatu National Provident 
Fund (VNPF) in 2012. Australian Aid is also currently funding one technical advisor who is working 
with local staff to conduct audits.
844
 
Between 2010 and 2011 an EU funded consultant provided corporate support, which included the 
development of the Corporate Plan 2012 – 2016 and the development of an audit manual.845  
Independence (law) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THERE FORMAL OPERATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE SUPREME AUDIT INSTITUTION?  
 
The legal framework provides some measures to ensure political independence of the OAG, 
however there is the potential for interference as the PSC controls staffing.  
                                                        
835
 Article 57(2), Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu; Public Service Staff Manual 2008, chapter 3.5, 3.13. 
836
 Interview of Beulah Daunakamakama, Office of the Auditor General Technical Advisor with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 
20 August 2013; written comments from Nikunj Soni, founder of Institute of Public Policy to Anita Jowitt, August 21, 
2013; written comments from Brendan Toner, Systems Accounting  Specialist to Anita Jowitt, September 10, 2013. 
837
 Interview of Beulah Daunakamakama, Office of the Auditor General Technical Advisor with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 
20 August 2013. 
838
 Written comments from Ralph Regenvanu, Minister of Lands to Anita Jowitt, 28 September 2013. 
839
 Interview of Beulah Daunakamakama, Office of the Auditor General Technical Advisor with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 
20 August 2013. 
840
 Public Service Staff Manual 2008, chapter 3.4, 3.13. 
841
 Interview of Beulah Daunakamakama, Office of the Auditor General Technical Advisor with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 
20 August 2013. 
842
 Section 14(2)(f), Expenditure Review and Audit Act [Cap 241]. 
843
 Interview with Leon Teter, Assistant Clerk of Parliament with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 26 August 2013. 
844
 Interview of Beulah Daunakamakama, Office of the Auditor General Technical Advisor with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 
20 August 2013. 
845
 Ibid. 
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The Constitution provides that the auditor general ‘shall not be subject to the direction or control of 
any other person or body in the exercise of his functions.’846  
The auditor general is appointed by the PSC. Specific merit related criteria for appointment are 
stated in the ERA Act.
847
 His or her appointment is not subject to any specified set term. He or she 
can be removed by the PSC, in consultation with the PAC and the Council of Ministers, for 
‘incompetence, disability, bankruptcy, neglect of duty or misconduct.’848  
Other staff of the OAG are also appointed by the PSC. The PSC is legally empowered to set the job 
classifications and salary and allowance structure for staff of the OAG.
849
 This has the potential to 
interfere with the independence of the OAG as it directly affects the OAG’s ability to recruit and 
retain staff. 
The ERA Act provides, ‘No employee of the Office of the Auditor-General shall undertake, perform 
or engage in any duty or function that shall be inconsistent with the performance by the employee of 
the duties or functions imposed on that person pursuant to this Act.’850  This broad provision is 
intended to restrict all political or other activities which may interfere with staff of the OAG being able 
to act with neutrality. 
The OAG has the right to set its own programme and methods, although the PAC has the power to 
consider this programme and report to parliament. The PAC can direct the OAG to investigate 
specific issues, but does not have the express power to alter the OAG’s self-directed programme.851 
The OAG currently has draft legislation to replace the current ERA Act. The new legislation will 
effectively separate the PAC from the OAG and allow the OAG to separate itself from the PSC in 
order to enable more effective recruitment and retention of qualified resources.
852
 
Independence (practice) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE SUPREME AUDIT INSTITUTION FREE FROM EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE IN THE 
PERFORMANCE OF ITS WORK IN PRACTICE?  
 
External interference takes the form of inaction (difficulties in getting positions reclassified) 
rather than direct attacks or political interference.  
There are no examples of political interference in the activities of the OAG. Nor are there examples 
of political engagement by staff of the OAG. Whilst the power of the PAC could, in theory, be used in 
a non-partisan manner to direct the OAG to undertake specific investigations, in practice the PAC 
does not interfere with the functioning of the OAG.
853
   
The fact that the PSC, rather than the OAG, controls job grades and salary structures for staff of the 
OAG is perceived to be something of a challenge to independence in the sense that the PSC could, 
in theory, block the recruitment and advancement via defined career pathways of suitable staff. 
Whilst the PSC has not interfered in the operation of the OAG by, for instance, removing staff 
without justification, there is a perception that the involvement of the PSC in recruitment processes 
                                                        
846
 Article 25(6), Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu. 
847
 Section 26, Expenditure Review and Audit Act [Cap 241]. 
848
 Section 23, Expenditure Review and Audit Act [241]. 
849
 Chapter 2, Public Service Staff Manual 2008. 
850
 Section 29, Expenditure Review and Audit Act [241]. 
851
 Section 14(2), Expenditure Review and Audit Act [Cap 241] outlines the specific functions of the PAC and section 
15, outlines the PAC’s powers.  
852
 Interview of Beulah Daunakamakama, Office of the Auditor General Technical Advisor with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 
20 August 2013. 
853
 Ibid. 
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is a hindrance.
854
  Changes in job grades have been put forward to the PSC, however financial 
implications of reclassification of job grades has resulted in requests not being approved by the 
Ministry of Finance.
855
 It should be emphasised that even if positions were re-graded, skills 
shortages in the field of accounting in Vanuatu mean that there will still be difficulties in recruiting 
staff. It can also be noted that even if the OAG had the direct power to recruit, this would not 
necessarily solve the issue of the Ministry of Finance not approving positions.   
Governance 
Transparency (law) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT THE PUBLIC CAN OBTAIN RELEVANT 
INFORMATION ON THE RELEVANT ACTIVITIES AND DECISIONS BY THE SUPREME AUDIT INSTITUTION?  
  
Whilst there are requirements that the OAG makes audit reports available to relevant 
agencies, there is no legal provision for audit reports to be made public.  
The ERA Act provides that the OAG is required to report on all reviews, audits, inquiries and 
investigations to the minister of finance (who has responsibility for the OAG), the PAC and the head 
of the agency that is the subject of the report.
856
 It is also required to make an annual report to 
parliament.
857
  
There is, however, no express requirement that any reports be made available to the public. 
Transparency (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THERE TRANSPARENCY IN THE ACTIVITIES AND DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME AUDIT 
INSTITUTION IN PRACTICE?  
 
Whilst annual reports provide useful information they are infrequent and are not easily 
accessible through a website or in libraries. Audit reports are not released to the public as a 
matter of course. The PAC does not produce regular reports.  
Whilst the 2012-2016 Corporate Plan includes public relations and communications (audit 
awareness) as a goal of the OAG
858
 currently little activity has occurred in this area. Occasionally 
media carries stories in relation to high-interest special investigations
859
 and the OAG has reacted to 
press releases issued by Transparency Vanuatu.
860
 No systematic plan to regularly report on its 
activities is currently in place.
861
 The OAG does not maintain a website.  
Annual reports have been produced infrequently. The most recent annual report covering the years 
2005-2009 was presented to parliament in April 2012. Prior to that, the last annual report covering 
                                                        
854
 Ibid. 
855
 Interview of Laurent Rep, Secretary Public Service Commission with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 30 August 2013. 
856
 Section 32, Expenditure Review and Audit Act [Cap 241]. 
857
 Section 33, Expenditure Review and Audit Act [Cap 241]. 
858
 Office of the Auditor General, 2011: 22 – 24. 
859
 See, for example, Ricky Binihi, ‘Vanuatu National Provident Fund Subject of Auditor’s Probe’ Pacific Islands Report 
13 August 2012; http://vanuatudaily.wordpress.com/2012/07/27/talemaot-archive-lack-of-action-by-prime-minister-sato-
kilman-at-vanuatu-broadcasting-television-corporation/ [accessed 19 February 2014]; ‘VNPF Report Findings’ Vanuatu 
Daily Post Online 13 September 2013.  
860
 ‘Auditor General Says he Supports Transparency’ Vanuatu Daily Post Online 27 August 2013. 
861
 Interview of Beulah Daunakamakama, Office of the Auditor General Technical Advisor with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 
20 August 2013. 
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the years 1998-2004 was presented in November 2007. An annual report covering the years 2010-
2012 is currently under preparation. Annual reports are available on request from the OAG and are 
also distributed by the Ministry of Finance to all partners once they are approved.
862
 Whilst annual 
reports contain summaries of audit reports produced, the individual audit reports are not easily 
publicly available. 
Because there is no requirement that reports of special investigations be made available to the 
public there can be some confusion about whether these reports should be accessible by the public 
after they are tabled in parliament. This confusion is exacerbated by the fact that parliament does 
not make public a list of documents that have been tabled. Further, debate of reports by the PAC 
and in parliament is lacking.
863
  Meetings of the PAC are open to the public,
864
 however this fact is 
not widely known and dates of meetings are not well publicised. Whilst the PAC reports contain 
useful information on the investigations of the OAG, only four reports have been produced since 
independence, in 1980.
865
 
Accountability (law) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT THE SUPREME AUDIT INSTITUTION HAS 
TO REPORT AND BE ANSWERABLE FOR ITS ACTIONS? 
 
Whilst the OAG is required to report annually to parliament and the PAC, there are some 
gaps in the law in areas such as the content of annual reports, the time by which annual 
reports must be delivered and the process for debating annual reports.  
The OAG is required to present annual reports to the speaker of parliament, who is legally obliged to 
present these reports to parliament and to call for debate on them.
866
 There are no specific 
guidelines on what is to be contained in these reports. Nor is there a specific deadline by when 
annual reports must be submitted. 
All reports are also presented to the PAC. The PAC’s duties include reviewing and reporting to 
parliament on the adequacy of the OAG’s audit planned programme and external audit 
arrangements.
867
   
There is no specific provision allowing agencies to appeal or challenge audit results. However, when 
audit reports are considered by the PAC it calls for written statements from agencies involved in 
reports and also takes oral evidence from them before reaching conclusions and presenting PAC 
reports.
868
 This effectively acts as an appeal process. 
At present law does not provide for the OAG to be audited by an external auditing agency. 
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 Written comments from Nikunj Soni, Chair of the Pacific Institute of Public Policy to Anita Jowitt, 21 August 2013. 
863
 Interview of Leon Teter, Assistant Clerk of Parliament with Anita Jowitt, 28 August 2013. 
864
 Ibid. 
865
 Public Accounts Committee, 2011: 9. 
866
 Section 33(1), Expenditure Review and Audit Act [Cap 241]. 
867
 Section 14, Expenditure Review and Audit Act [Cap 241]. 
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 Public Accounts Committee, 2011: 10-13. 
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Accountability (practice) 
Score: 0 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE SUPREME AUDIT INSTITUTION HAVE TO REPORT AND BE ANSWERABLE FOR ITS 
ACTIONS IN PRACTICE?  
 
Annual reports have not been produced regularly and weaknesses in the functioning of the 
PAC and parliament mean that there is little accountability in practice.  
In practice accountability mechanisms do not function. The OAG has only produced two annual 
reports since 1999. Parliamentary debate on the reports did not occur.
869
 The PAC is largely 
inactive. As mentioned above, it has only produced four reports since independence. The most 
recent report, issued in December 2011, reviewed all twelve audit reports that were issued between 
2002 and 2007.
870
 This report did not make any comment of the functioning of the OAG. It did 
however produce recommendations in respect of ten of the audit reports. These recommendations 
supported the content of audit reports. The other two audit reports did not result in recommendations 
of the PAC as the PAC was satisfied with responses during the accountability phase.   
Integrity (law) 
Score: 75 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE MECHANISMS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE SUPREME AUDIT 
INSTITUTION?  
 
Both general and specific integrity laws apply to the OAG, although the law regulating the 
OAG does not provide for a detailed specific code of ethics.  
The ERA Act provides, ‘No employee of the Office of the Auditor-General shall undertake, perform 
or engage in any duty or function that shall be inconsistent with the performance by the employee of 
the duties or functions imposed on that person pursuant to this Act’.871  There are no further specific 
codes of ethics or rules of conduct regulating the OAG contained in the ERA Act. There is, however, 
an audit manual which includes ethical guidelines for the conduct of audits.
872
  
The ERA Act requires that, ‘[T]he Auditor-General shall … establish, review and regulate the 
procedures of the Office of the Auditor-General in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
practice.’873 As such it is expected that the OAG is governed by international auditing standards, 
which sets out the code of ethics that auditors should abide by. Ongoing training is required to 
ensure all staff are aware and follow the auditing standards.  
General integrity laws apply to the OAG. The auditor general is defined as a leader under the 
provisions of the Leadership Code Act,
874
 so must comply with the provisions of this Act. This Act 
regulates a wide range of behaviours, including conflicts of interest, receiving gifts and misuse of 
office. Leaders are also required to provide annual returns of assets and liabilities to the clerk of 
parliament. Breaches of this Act are criminal offences. The content of this code and its 
implementation in practice are discussed in further detail in the Legislature and Ombudsman pillars. 
The auditor general and other employees within the OAG are public servants and are therefore 
subject to the public service code of conduct under the Public Service Act. This code contains broad 
                                                        
869
 Interview of Leon Teter, Assistant Clerk of Parliament with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 28 August 2013. 
870
 Public Accounts Committee, 2011: 41. 
871
 Section 29, Expenditure Review and Audit Act [Cap 241]. 
872
 Interview of Beulah Daunakamakama, Office of the Auditor General Technical Advisor with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 
20 August 2013. 
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 Section 30(1), Expenditure Review and Audit Act [Cap 241]. 
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rules relating to honesty and integrity. The content of this code and its implementation in practice are 
discussed in further detail in the public sector pillar.  
There are no specific post-employment restrictions provided in law, either under the Public Service 
Act or the Leadership Code Act. 
Integrity (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE INTEGRITY OF THE SUPREME AUDIT INSTITUTION ENSURED IN PRACTICE?  
 
Whilst general integrity laws are not well enforced, the OAG, through its association with the 
International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), is actively working in a 
systematic and comprehensive manner to enhance compliance with international accounting 
standards. This work is in progress.  
A cross cutting issue affecting all pillars is that the Leadership Code Act is not effectively enforced 
(see discussion in the ombudsman section). The public service code of conduct is also not 
consistently enforced (see discussion in the public sector section). There have been no recent cases 
within the OAG of violations of codes of conduct or ethical standards which resulted in sanctions 
being applied. 
Despite the weak implementation of general integrity laws, the OAG, through its membership of the 
INTOSAI, is active in enhancing internal integrity and ensuring that staff are aware of, and trained in, 
issues of ethics for auditors.
875
 INTOSAI provides international audit standards, which include ethical 
standards relating to issues such as confidentiality and conflicts of interest.
876
 As part of international 
harmonisation activities, in March 2013 Vanuatu completed a report identifying the extent to which 
its audit practices comply with international standards.
877
 INTOSAI has anticipated that smaller and 
more resource-limited countries may not be able to comply fully with international standards, so it 
permits countries to provide national auditing guidelines in areas where compliance is lacking. 
Implementing the strategy will involve developing national auditing guidelines for Vanuatu.
878
 
Activities in this area are being done in conjunction with the Pacific Association of Supreme Audit 
Institutions.
879
  
  
                                                        
875
 Interview of Beulah Daunakamakama, Office of the Auditor General Technical Advisor with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 
20 August 2013, also see Office of the Auditor General, 2011: 24.  
876
 www.intosai.org/issai-executive-summaries/view/article/issai-200-general-standards-in-government-auditing-and-
standards-with-ethical-significance.html [accessed 19 February 2014]. 
877
 Ibid. 
Interview of Beulah Daunakamakama, Office of the Auditor General Technical Advisor with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 20 
August 2013. 
879
 See, generally, www.pasai.org/ [accessed 19 February 2014]. 
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Role 
Effective financial audit  
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE SUPREME AUDIT INSTITUTION PROVIDE EFFECTIVE AUDITS OF PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE? 
 
Whilst there have been improvements in the audit of public expenditure recently, lack of 
human resources and lack of education or awareness within government entities about audit 
procedures make it very difficult for the OAG to provide timely and effective audits.  
When the current Auditor General assumed his position in late 2009 the most recent audit opinion, 
released in 2007, covered consolidated government accounts from 1998 to 2004.
880
 The inherited 
backlog was not the fault of the Ministry of Finance, which had submitted consolidated accounts to 
the OAG. The audit of the 2005-2009 consolidated government accounts was released in early 
2012, with a disclaimer that it was not a full audit.
881
 The auditor general’s annual report indicated 
that auditing five years together was done in order to best manage limited resources and enable the 
OAG to focus on auditing the more recent 2010 and 2011 financial statements.
882
 By all accounts 
the current Auditor General is doing a creditable job of clearing backlogs in respect of consolidated 
government accounts.
883
 There is also a considerable backlog in auditing other entities outside of 
the central government. In August 2011 there was a back log of 277 outstanding audits.
884
 
Current audit practice does not have the OAG auditing individual ministries and departments that 
are included within the consolidated government accounts and this means that audit opinions do not 
thoroughly examine all levels of government.
885
 
The work of the OAG in auditing other bodies (including local authorities, statutory bodies and state 
owned enterprises) is hindered by a lack of awareness of what is required by these bodies and a 
lack of capacity to produce financial statements to be audited.
886
 
Audits of the consolidated government accounts are also hindered by information not being provided 
by third parties and ministries. Whilst financial data is available on the government financial 
information system, hard copy evidence is sometimes not produced on request.
887
 Whilst laws 
require that material be disclosed to the OAG, compliance with the law is lacking. This may be due 
to lack of awareness/education and cultural factors, rather than any deliberate attempt to obstruct 
the OAG, but it does hinder the ability of the OAG to perform its audit functions.
888
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 Office of the Auditor General, Auditor General’s Report to Parliament October 2007 (Port Vila: Office of the Auditor 
General, 2007).  
881
 Office of the Auditor General, Auditor General’s Report to Parliament 2005-2009 (Port Vila: Office of the Auditor 
General, 2012), 2-3. 
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There is little confidence that the PAC and/or parliament reads or acts upon audit recommendations 
and this undermines the practical effectiveness of any reports that are produced.
889
 
Detecting and sanctioning misbehaviour  
Score: 25 
DOES THE SUPREME AUDIT INSTITUTION DETECT AND INVESTIGATE MISBEHAVIOUR OF PUBLIC OFFICEHOLDERS 
AND CONDUCT INVESTIGATION ACCORDING TO DETECTED FACTS?  
 
Whilst the OAG does (within resource constraints) detect misbehaviour, lack of follow up by 
other agencies including the PAC means that implementation of recommendations is not 
consistent.  
There is no express statutory power for the OAG to take complaints or reports of irregularities 
directly from the public. Instead, this power is given to the PAC.
890
 The PAC can direct that special 
investigations occur. The auditor general can also institute special investigations.
891
 Detection of 
misbehaviour also occurs during compliance audits.
892
 
Since the current Auditor General assumed his position in late 2009 two special investigations (into 
the Department of Quarantine and Inspection Services and into the Vanuatu Broadcasting and 
Television Corporation (VBTC)) have been publicly reported.
893
 Both of these reports made a 
number of recommendations, but it is unclear what action, if any, has resulted from these 
recommendations. Another special investigation (into the VNPF) has recently been completed.
894
  
The 2005-2009 annual report also details irregularities arising from compliance audits of the 
Department of Civil Status, the Office of the Ombudsman, the State Law Office Trust Fund, the 
Vanuatu Agriculture College, the Department of Quarantine and Inspection Services and the 
Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs.
895
  
The OAG does not have the power to sanction misbehaviour, but it can make reports containing 
recommendations. It has no specific statutory power to compel other bodies to act upon its 
recommendations. Instead, the process is that the OAG reports to the minister of finance and the 
PAC. The OAG also reports to the person in charge of the body subject to the report and may 
require a response to be given within 14 days.  The PAC then has the power to conduct further 
enquiries if necessary and make a further report to the person in charge of the body subject to the 
report. This person must respond with written comments within 28 days. The PAC then also reports 
to parliament on its activities. Within six months, or longer if the PAC authorises, the person in 
charge of the body subject to a report must provide an update on action that was taken to rectify the 
problem, or reasons no action was taken.
896
 As noted earlier, significant downfall in recent times is 
that the PAC has not been operating effectively if at all. Further, when the PAC did produce a report 
in December 2011 no written responses to its recommendations were received within the 
timeframes provided by law.
897
 
                                                        
889
Comments in response to discussion paper. 
890
 Section 14(2)(h), Expenditure Review and Audit Act [Cap 241]. 
891
 Section 27, Expenditure Review and Audit Act [Cap 241]. 
892
 Office of the Auditor General, 2011: 13-14.  
893
 Office of the Auditor General, Auditor General’s Report to Parliament 2005-2009 (Port Vila: Office of the Auditor 
General, 2012), 28-30. 
894
 ‘VNPF Report Findings’ Vanuatu Daily Post Online 13 September 2013. 
895
 Office of the Auditor General, 2012: 32-37. 
896
 Section 16 (3A), Expenditure Review and Audit Act [Cap 241]. 
897
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Annual reports of the OAG observe that on some occasions public servants have been dismissed, 
but misappropriated money has not been recovered.
898
 The fourth report of the PAC made some 
recommendations which indicated that the PSC should ensure public servants who had 
misappropriated funds were criminally prosecuted and that as part of the criminal prosecution 
misappropriated money should be recovered.
899
 However, the PSC does not have the power to 
prosecute breaches of the Penal Code. Instead, this is a function of the Office of the Public 
Prosecutor. Nor does the PSC have the power to demand repayment of misappropriated funds 
during disciplinary procedures.
900
  
Improving financial management  
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE SUPREME AUDIT INSTITUTION EFFECTIVE IN IMPROVING THE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
OF GOVERNMENT? 
 
Whilst audit reports contain, where relevant, recommendations on how to improve financial 
management there is little systematic follow up by the PAC on whether recommendations are 
implemented.  
As already discussed, the lack of staff numbers within the OAG translates into fewer audit opinions 
being issued and capacity building efforts being hindered. Currently the focus is on compliance 
audits, not performance audits, which would address efficiency in the use of state money,
901
 
although compliance audits do address performance to a degree.
902
 Further, effectively improving 
financial management of government can only occur when the audit reports and recommendations 
are being tabled, debated and acted upon in a timely manner. Whilst the PAC remains ineffective 
and other agencies also do not consistently act in response to audit reports the “cycle of 
accountability” does not function and the effectiveness of the OAG is undermined.   
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Staffing issues within the OAG need to be addressed as a matter of urgency: 
 
a. Long-term measures need to be introduced to address skill shortages within Vanuatu, 
which are the underlying cause of the inability to recruit staff. Scholarships for tertiary 
study need to be directed to areas of specific need, including accounting. 
b. Until local skill shortages are addressed, the recruitment of non-citizens and increased 
contracting out of audits should be explored. 
 
2. A major problem is the lack of consistent action on audit reports. Addressing this problem may 
require better coordination between stakeholders. It may also require some legislative reform. 
The Corporate Plan 2012 – 2016 includes a proposal to introduce a National Audit Act. There is 
already draft legislation in this area. Before this legislation is finalised there should be 
consultation between the OAG, the PAC (including support staff), the PSC, the public 
prosecutor and other stakeholders as to whether further reforms are needed to the draft 
legislation or other Acts to ensure that recommendations of the OAG will be acted upon, 
particularly when criminal activities have been identified. 
                                                        
898
 See, for example, special audit reviews of Lycee Louis Antoinne de Bouganville, Rural Water Supply Unit, Santo 
East Junior Secondary School, Office of the Auditor General, Auditor General’s Report to Parliament October 2007 
(Port Vila: Office of the Auditor General, 2007), 41-42. 
899
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Committee, 2011: 22-23. 
900
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3. Current audit practice means that only consolidated government accounts are being audited 
and financial compliance audits are not being carried out at individual ministry and department 
level. Further performance audits are not being regularly carried out. Bearing in mind resource 
constraints the OAG should implement measures to ensure a rolling programme of compliance 
audits and performance audits of individual ministries and departments. 
 
4. The PAC’s roles include monitoring the performance of the OAG and ensuring that the OAG has 
adequate resources. The PAC should play a more active role in ensuring that adequate 
resources and technical support are provided to the OAG to assist it to comply with international 
audit standards as developed by INTOSAI and other goals as set out in the Corporate Plan 
2012 – 2016. The PAC should also more actively monitor the implementation of this plan and 
effective use of resources within the OAG. 
 
5. There is currently little public awareness of the work of the OAG or the recommendations it 
makes. Lack of transparency weakens accountability as it reduces both public awareness of the 
importance of correct management of public funds, and public demand that changes occur in 
response to recommendations. Any new law, or amendment to the existing law, should: 
 
a. Strengthen transparency of the OAG by clarifying when and how audit reports, annual 
reports and special investigation reports are to be made available to the public. 
b. Strengthen public involvement in the detection of financial irregularities by allowing the 
OAG to directly receive complaints from the public. 
 
6. Establishing a website for the OAG will help to improve access to information about the OAG 
and therefore transparency. This website should include audit reports or summaries of 
recommendations, annual reports, the Corporate Plan and reports on implementation of the 
plan. It should also include information for the public on what to do if they are aware or suspect 
irregularities in respect of the use of public money. 
 
7. A cross cutting issue affecting both the OAG and the Office of the Ombudsman is the potential 
for interference or delays in staffing matters by the PSC. This issue has also been faced by 
other constitutional offices, and the solution has been to give other constitutional offices the 
direct power to recruit. The State Law Office Act provides an example of legislation that allows 
this. The law should be revised (possibly using the State Law Office Act as a model) to give the 
OAG the power to directly recruit staff. 
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VII.9. ANTI-CORRUPTION 
AGENCIES 
Vanuatu does not have an anti-corruption institution in the sense of the definition 
used by Transparency International. 
 
According to the National Integrity System assessment methodology, an anti-corruption agency is: 
‘A specialised, statutory and independent public body of a durable nature, with a specific 
mission to fight corruption (and reduce the opportunity structures propitious for its 
occurrence in society) through preventive and/or repressive measures.’903 
Vanuatu ratified the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2010 and completed accession 
procedures in 2011. Article 6 of UNCAC prescribes that signatory states should have an 
independent preventive anti-corruption body or bodies. The activities of this body could include: 
developing laws and policies relating to anti-corruption; overseeing and coordinating the 
implementation of anti-corruption policies; increasing and disseminating knowledge about how to 
prevent corruption; and supporting the development of a government/non-government anti-
corruption coalition. 
Vanuatu does not have an anti-corruption institution in the sense of Article 6 of UNCAC although, as 
discussed in the section on the ombudsman this office does carry out some preventive functions in a 
limited way. Nor does Vanuatu have an anti-corruption institution that fits the broader definition used 
by Transparency International, which recognises that an anti-corruption institution may also have a 
repressive role. Again, as discussed in the section on the ombudsman, this office has no power to 
prosecute alleged corruption so is ineffective as a repressive body. 
An independent national anti-corruption agency could be important in providing expertise and 
advice. The agency could contribute to the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of the National 
Integrity System of Vanuatu by offsetting weaknesses in the system’s pillars. If a pillar’s own 
correction mechanisms fail or if other external correction mechanisms, including watchdogs such as 
the media or civil society, have limitations to effectively push for change, an anti-corruption agency 
may be able to do so. It would be necessary to clearly distinguish its powers and responsibilities 
from those of other agencies such as the ombudsman.  
However, a new organisational body would only be useful if there is interest on the part of the 
government and the ministries and political commitment to seeing the body operate effectively. 
Political support for integrity, adequate empowerment, resources and autonomy to operate are some 
conditions for an anti-corruption agency to be successful.   
In a small developing country like Vanuatu significant resource constraints exist. There are other 
institutions that could potentially be strengthened to become more effective and play a more active 
preventive role. Further, political, social and cultural factors mean that there is a significant gap 
between institutions as they “exist on paper” and institutions as they operate in practice. Vanuatu 
should therefore be cautious about diverting limited resources into establishing a new anti-corruption 
institution that may look good on paper but fail to operate in practice before first attempting to 
strengthen existing institutions and the co-ordination between them. 
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VII.10. POLITICAL PARTIES 
SUMMARY 
Overall pillar score: 40.2 
Dimension Indicator Law Practice 
Capacity 
87.5 
Resources 100 50 
Independence 100 100 
Governance 
8.3 
Transparency 0 0 
Accountability 0 0 
Integrity 25 25 
Role 
25 
Interest aggregation and representation 25 
Anti-corruption commitment 25 
 
Political parties in Vanuatu currently operate without direct state support or regulation.  Whilst lack of 
regulation result in very high scores in respect of independence it also undermines internal 
governance, as political parties are able to operate without any transparency or accountability in all 
spheres of their operation. For instance, political parties are not required to disclose income or 
expenditure, either during or between election periods. Parties tend not to publish policies as a 
matter of course outside of election years. Nor are party constitutions readily available. 
This uncontrolled political party environment is thought to contribute to Vanuatu’s increasingly 
fragmented political party environment. It is also thought to allow corrupt practices to flourish 
undetected, for instance through payments to political parties in order to influence them. 
There are currently activities by both the government and the opposition to develop reforms in 
relation to political integrity. Many of these reform proposals relate to improving governance of 
political parties. The recommendations of the 2014 Vanuatu National Integrity System report relating 
to political parties are, in part, drawn from proposals that have arisen in the course of high-level 
political discussions in this area. 
STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION  
Historically there were two dominant political parties in Vanuatu – the Vanua’aku Pati (VP) and the 
Union of Moderate Parties (UMP).  These parties were dichotomised into the party representing 
Anglophones (VP) and the party representing Francophones (UMP). VP dominated parliament, 
winning large majorities until the election in 1991. From the late 1980s these two parties, who have 
been referred to as the “mother parties”904 have become increasingly fragmented. The majority of 
political parties currently represented in parliament can trace their roots back to VP and UMP.
905
  
As a result Vanuatu now has a very fragmented political environment. More than 30 parties and a 
large number of independents contested the 2012 national election.
906
 A total of 16 parties were 
successful in having candidates elected, with four members of parliament standing as 
                                                        
904
 http://pacificpolicy.org/blog/2012/11/07/summary-analysis-of-party-political-platforms-english-version/#more-2299 
[accessed 11 March 2014]. 
905
 Anita Jowitt, Political Parties, National Integrity System Vanuatu Discussion Paper 8 (Port Vila: Transparency 
Vanuatu, March 2014). 
906
 http://pacificpolicy.org/blog/2012/11/15/the-waiting-game/ [accessed 11 March 2014]. 
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independents.
907
 The fragmented political party environment means that government is necessarily 
a coalition.  
ASSESSMENT 
Capacity 
Resources (law) 
Score: 100 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK PROVIDE AN ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE TO THE FORMATION 
AND OPERATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES? 
 
There are no significant restrictions on the formation and operation of political parties. 
The Constitution provides that, ‘Political parties may be formed freely and may contest elections. 
They shall respect the Constitution and the principles of democracy.’908 The Constitution also 
protects freedom of association.
909
 These provisions have been interpreted as not permitting any 
laws regulating political parties, although this has never been tested in court.  There are no limits on 
political parties’ ideologies, policies or other activities. Nor are there limits on the minimum number 
of founders or members to establish political parties. 
There is no specific legal process for establishing political parties. Instead they are able to register 
as charitable associations, following the process discussed in the section on civil society 
organisations. This process requires six members.
910
 If the registrar refuses to grant incorporation, 
the registrar must give reasons
911
 and the charitable association has the right to appeal to the 
minister of finance and economic management within 14 days.
912
 The minister may either refuse the 
appeal, or order the registrar to grant incorporation.
913
 This decision can be questioned in court on 
points of law.
914
  
There is no state support of political parties or individual candidates although, as discussed in the 
section on civil society, as charitable organisations they may be able to apply for tax exemptions. 
Although state funding may help to “level the playing field” and act as a disincentive to seeking 
funding from external sources that improperly influence political parties, in the current environment 
there is no accountability for political parties. There is no regulation of political party financing. For 
instance, there are no limitations on whom parties are allowed to receive funding from. Nor are there 
any limits on individual donations. In the absence of accountability mechanisms, including audited 
accounts, state funding of political parties would be a potential avenue for misuse of public 
money.
915
 
  
                                                        
907
 Ibid. 
908
 Article 4(3), Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu. 
909
 Article 5(1), Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu.  
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 Section 2(1), Charitable Associations (Incorporation) Act [Cap 140]. 
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Resources (practice) 
Score: 75 
TO WHAT EXTENT DO THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO POLITICAL PARTIES ALLOW FOR EFFECTIVE 
POLITICAL COMPETITION? 
 
The large number of political parties represented in parliament suggests that even in the 
absence of state support smaller parties are effectively able to campaign. Human resource 
constraints limit the extent to which political competition occurs on a considered policy 
basis. 
As discussed above, in Vanuatu political parties operate independently without state support. In the 
current unregulated environment, this largely avoids the potential for political parties to misuse 
public money.
916
 
Sources of funding include fundraising activities by members and investments. For example, the 
Secretary General of VP confirmed that VP’s financial resources derived from a long-term land 
investment, although VP is thought to be fairly unusual in deriving income from investments.
917
 In 
some parties a portion of MPs’ and provincial councillors’ salaries are also directed to party 
activities.
918
  Political advisors and political appointees may also direct some of their salary to their 
political party.
919
 Both the Labour Party and the Nagriamel Movement rely on member contributions 
and fundraisings.
920
 Fundraising activities are likely to be community based, for instance kava 
evenings and food sales that bring party supporters together. Parties do not receive funding from aid 
donors,
921
 although they may be involved in initiating projects that NGOs then carry out.
922
  No party 
interviewed admitted receiving private donations.
923
 There are, however, frequent rumours of parties 
receiving private funding and that this funding is used to encourage members of parliament to cross 
the floor in support of motions of no confidence.
924
 
Whilst considerable reliance on members’ fundraising activities suggests a lack of diversity of 
sources of funding there is considerable diversity of membership. Unlike in Europe, where 
membership of political parties is declining and, on average, less than 5% of voters are now party 
members,
925
 street survey research carried out by the National Integrity System researchers in 
Vanuatu suggests that parties have a broader membership base. Whilst the sample was small (50 
people), 28% indicated that they were members of parties.
926
 
There are no limits on the extent to which members of parliament are able to use their allowances to 
support political party activities. As a result small parties and newly formed parties without any 
representatives in parliament are likely to be more financially precarious as compared to those with 
representatives in parliament. However, in the absence of transparency as to political party accounts 
this is a supposition.  
There is no restriction on parties to access airtime during election campaigns. Nor are any parties 
provided state support during campaigns. In practice, the right to using media during election 
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 Lynn J Tane, ‘Can we Control Foreign Influence in Politics?’ Vanuatu Times 7–13 March 2014, 1; ‘Reports of foreign 
interference: Claims Opposition camp was “bankrolled”’ Independent 1 March 2014, 2; Jonas Cullwick, ‘Opposition paid 
bills for camp’ Vanuatu Daily Post 5 March 2014, 3. 
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campaigns is restricted by money, with wealthier parties having better access. There are also some 
ties between some private media outlets and politicians. For instance, Sabi Natonga of the National 
Community Association Party owns a newspaper a radio station and a website.
927
  As discussed in 
the section on media, public access to and use of media is somewhat limited. This fact, combined 
with the community based political environment in which personal connections are very influential on 
determining political party affiliation,
928
 means that inequities in being able to access media are not a 
significant outcome on election results. 
It is not only financial resources that affect the activities of political parties. As with CSOs, political 
parties are somewhat constrained by the limited human resource capacity of Vanuatu. This can 
affect activities such as the development of policy and the internal management of political parties. 
Independence (law) 
Score: 100 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE LEGAL SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT UNWARRANTED EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE IN 
THE ACTIVITIES OF POLITICAL PARTIES? 
 
The Constitution protects the free formation of political parties and there are no other 
specific laws on the monitoring of political party activities. 
There are no specific laws relating to state powers to monitor, investigate or dissolve political 
parties. As political parties tend to register as charitable associations they are subject to the 
oversight that applies to all such bodies. Whilst the law does not give power to the state to attend 
the meetings of charitable associations, if an incorporation was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation 
or mistake or any of the objects of the association become unlawful or the association is 
discriminating against any person, group of persons or class of persons or is being used for an 
unlawful purpose, or the association is not functioning properly in practice then the registrar may 
give the association 30 days to explain why it should not be dissolved.
929
 If cancellation then occurs 
the association can appeal the decision to the Supreme Court.
930
 As the Constitution protects the 
free formation of political parties so long as they are operating for democratic purposes
931
 any 
illegitimate interference in the operation of a political party pursuant to the laws on charitable 
associations would be unconstitutional. 
Independence (practice) 
Score: 100 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE POLITICAL PARTIES FREE FROM UNWARRANTED EXTERNAL INFLUENCE IN THEIR 
ACTIVITIES IN PRACTICE? 
 
There are no examples in the last five years of the state dissolving or prohibiting political 
parties. Nor are there examples of harassment and attacks on opposition parties by state 
authorities or other examples of state interference in the activities of political parties.  
The only recent incident of state interference in the formation of political parties occurred in 2012 
when a breakaway faction from UMP was not permitted to register a charitable association under 
the name of Union of Moderate Parties for Change. This decision was taken by the Registrar 
pursuant to section 52 of the Charitable Associations Act, which prohibits the issue of a certificate of 
                                                        
927
 PACMAS, Vanuatu State of Media and Communication Report 2013 (Port Vila: PACMAS, 2013) 3 – 5. 
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 See, further, foundations chapter. 
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incorporation in a name the registrar considers closely resembles that of another incorporated 
association. The decision was appealed to the Minister of Finance, who upheld the decision. The 
decision was then appealed to the Supreme Court, who again upheld the decision.
932
 This incident 
was not of great significance. The state did not attempt to prevent the new party from forming at all. 
Instead it intervened in order to reduce confusion that may be created in the minds of voters due to 
similarity of names.  The new party was not prohibited from registering under a different name and 
became known as the Reunification Movement for Change. 
There have been a number of instances in which political party members themselves have referred 
matters to court due to allegations of breaches of internal rules.
933
 As these are internal disputes, in 
which the court has acted impartially, they are not examples of external interference. 
Governance 
Transparency (law) 
Score: 0 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE REGULATIONS IN PLACE THAT REQUIRE PARTIES TO MAKE THEIR FINANCIAL 
INFORMATION PUBLICLY AVAILABLE? 
 
There are no laws requiring political parties to disclose any financial information.  
There are no laws requiring political parties to disclose information on government subsidies or 
private financing. Nor are there laws on disclosure of campaigning money received or money spent 
on political campaigns during election periods. 
Transparency (practice) 
Score: 0 
TO WHAT EXTENT CAN THE PUBLIC OBTAIN RELEVANT FINANCIAL INFORMATION FROM POLITICAL PARTIES? 
 
In the absence of laws requiring transparency of financial transactions it is not possible for 
members of the public to access financial information from political parties. 
Political parties do not make financial information available as a matter of course. Whilst members 
may be provided with some financial information during congresses
934
 and some of this may filter to 
the public, there are no channels for the public to seek financial information from parties. A further 
issue is that information provided to members and supporters is unlikely to have been audited.
935
 
Some parties may voluntarily provide information upon request, but in the absence of audited 
accounts it can be difficult for parties to meet requests. 
                                                        
932
 Union of Moderate Parties (Inc) v Minister of Finance [2012] VUSC 164. 
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The absence of laws means that it is impossible to verify the extent to which rumours and 
allegations of private donations to parties and parties making payments to members of parliament in 
order to cross the floor
936
 are accurate.  
Accountability (law)  
Score: 0 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS GOVERNING FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF POLITICAL PARTIES BY A 
DESIGNATED STATE BODY? 
 
There are no provisions that require political parties to maintain records on their finances 
and report on them. 
No state body is legally empowered to demand financial reports from political parties, either during 
or between election periods. Political parties are therefore not accountable in law for either 
donations or expenditures and face no consequences if they do not voluntarily disclose this 
information. 
Accountability (practice) 
Score: 0 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THERE EFFECTIVE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN PRACTICE? 
 
In the absence of laws requiring accountability political parties do not generally self-regulate 
to ensure accountability in practice. 
In Vanuatu, there is no designated state body that receives financial reports during and between 
elections.  However, some parties’ constitutions may require the production of audited accounts so 
there is some self-regulation in this area. For instance, the VP constitution requires the national 
accounts of the party to be audited annually.
937
 The extent to which self-regulation is effective is 
questionable, although in the absence of transparency this comment remains speculative. 
Integrity (law)  
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE ORGANISATIONAL REGULATIONS REGARDING THE INTERNAL DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE OF THE MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES? 
 
The internal constitutional basis of the main political parties requires democratic processes 
to select party leaders, although candidates for election tend to be selected. 
There are no laws regulating internal governance of political parties. However, the “mother parties” 
follow a model in which party leadership must be elected during party congresses.
938
  In the absence 
of constitutions from other political parties it is assumed that these parties have created an exemplar 
parties that have splintered off from them also follow. 
                                                        
936
 See, for example, Lynn J Tane, ‘Can we Control Foreign Influence in Politics?’ Vanuatu Times 7–13 March 2014, 1; 
‘Reports of foreign interference: Claims Opposition camp was “bankrolled”’ Independent 1 March 2014, 2; Jonas 
Cullwick, ‘Opposition paid bills for camp’ Vanuatu Daily Post 5 March 2014, 3. 
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Candidates for election are selected in two main ways. Either the party leadership must endorse 
them, as currently happens with the Graon mo Jastis Pati
939
 and used to happen with VP,
940
 or 
Regional Coordination Committees can select them, as happens with VP currently.   
Integrity (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THERE EFFECTIVE INTERNAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN 
PRACTICE? 
 
Leadership of political parties can be beset by internal disputes that undermine democratic 
governance. Such disputes can also contribute to fragmentation. 
Whilst the major political parties do hold party congresses and the leadership of political parties is 
elected in these, issues of political party leadership are somewhat frequent subjects of court 
challenges. In the past five years both UMP and VP have been rocked by challenges, in which one 
faction has claimed that the current party leadership is illegitimate due to internally developed 
political party procedures not being adhered to.
941
 The fact that matters get referred to court 
indicates a somewhat opportunistic approach towards claiming party leadership and leads to splinter 
parties when leadership positions cannot be gained through legitimate party processes. 
As discussed below many political parties lack technical capacity to develop policies. One result of 
this is that individual party leaders who have stronger technical capacity are able to capture the 
policy development process. Members often have little input into policy formation. A street survey of 
50 people conducted by National Integrity System researchers in Port Vila in January 2014 indicated 
that only 14% of respondents who were party members had any input into developing policies.  
Role 
Interest aggregation and representation 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT DO POLITICAL PARTIES AGGREGATE AND REPRESENT RELEVANT SOCIAL INTERESTS IN THE 
POLITICAL SPHERE? 
 
The fragmented political party environment, lack of technical capacity within political parties 
to develop policy statements, and cultural practices that support a clientelistic relationship 
between political parties and society, all hinder the development of policy based politics. 
As discussed above political parties in Vanuatu are fragmented, with many parties being 
descendants of the two mother parties. The Pacific Institute of Public Policy observes that, ‘Many 
say that most policy platforms of splinter groups are carbon copies – cut and pasted from those of 
the original ‘mother parties’ like the Vanua’aku Party (VP) and the Union of Moderate Parties (UMP). 
In some respects this is true.’942 A further hindrance to political parties developing distinct political 
platforms is that ‘apart from a few well-established political parties, many newer ones seem to lack 
the necessary technical capacity to be able to craft simple, concrete and yet workable policy 
platforms that capture and address the aspirations and the key needs of the people.’943 Whilst brief 
                                                        
939
 http://www.graonmojastis.org/pati-bakgraon [accessed 26 February 2014].  
940
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942
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February 2014]. 
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 Ibid. 
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outlines of key policy points are often to be found on election posters, it is much less common for 
parties to have fuller written statements of policy. 
Rather than there being specific interest groups who dominate political parties, parties can be 
dominated by prominent charismatic politicians, who have often split from the mother party when 
they have been unable to assume desired leadership positions. In general, a charismatic leader 
tends to rely on support for him or her as a person rather than support for policies, which 
undermines policy-based political parties. Further, as discussed in the foundations section, 
fragmentation within politics has, to a degree, been influenced by traditional culture and the 
traditional “big man” model of authority in which power may be gained by developing influence 
through exchange.
944
 This affects the perception of the role of political leaders. Rather than 
implementing nationally focused policy, members of parliament are ‘expected to provide access to 
resources and “development” funds. Indeed, all members of parliament act as central nodes in 
networks of distribution and exchange focused on access to state resources.’945 This clientelistic 
dynamic undermines the operation of policy or values-based politics. 
One advantage of the personalised nature of Vanuatu’s political parties is that members/supporters 
are more likely to have direct ties (whether family ties or other personal connections) with the 
political party leadership. As discussed above, a street survey conducted by National Integrity 
System researchers suggests that political party membership is high. Further, 43% of political party 
members indicated that they were aware of what their party’s policies were. Whilst this suggests that 
parties do have a considerable degree of legitimacy, it must also be remembered that in the 
environment of relatively low education where parties lack the technical capacity to develop sound 
policy statements, party members may also lack the capacity to assess policy statements from the 
perspective of national, rather than personal, interest. 
There is no formal linkage between political parties and civil society. As discussed in the section on 
civil society organisations, government tends to view CSOs as “foreign”, or with different agendas. 
However, some political parties do, at times, work with CSOs. As mentioned above, parties may 
support the development of CSO projects for donors to fund. When interests align there may also be 
collaboration in developing policy statements.  
Anti-corruption commitment 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT DO POLITICAL PARTIES GIVE DUE ATTENTION TO PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE FIGHT 
AGAINST CORRUPTION? 
 
In the absence of clear policy statements it is somewhat difficult to ascertain the extent to 
which parties are committed to an anti-corruption agenda. Nevertheless, in the 2012 election 
two parties that won significant numbers of seats did have detailed policies relating to anti-
corruption and the current governing coalition also appears to be committed to instigating 
reforms. 
In the absence of published political party manifestos it can be difficult to assess the extent to which 
political parties prioritise anti-corruption. Further, the coalition government environment means that, 
often, individual parties are unable to have their policies reflected in government reforms, which are 
instead based upon compromise and consensus. However, an assessment of political party policies 
in the lead up to the 2012 national election only identified three parties as having detailed action 
statements in respect of leadership and corruption.
946
 Policies of these parties included: 
                                                        
944
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945
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Economic Bulletin 40, 45. 
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enacting legislation to control political party formation and require political parties to declare their 
sources of funding; establishing additional anti-corruption agencies; and controlling political advisors 
and political appointees.
947
 
A number of parties also had policies in the area of governance reform. Whilst not all of these 
policies would be positive anti-corruption measures, they included reconsidering the number of 
seats in parliament and introducing controls to reduce the likelihood of motions of no confidence.
948
 
VP in particular campaigned on a platform of anti-corruption, with posters reflecting that this was 
their key policy point. 
Given the frequent changes in government outside of the election, governing coalitions that have an 
anti-corruption agenda necessarily make piecemeal changes. A number of reforms have been 
discussed for years (see, for instance, proposals to reform the laws relating to the ombudsman and 
Leadership Code discussed in the section on the ombudsman) without any change occurring. 
However, the former Carcasses government had a large enough majority to be able to pass 
constitutional amendments and has restarted dialogue on reforming political party regulation.
949
 The 
current Natuman government has indicated commitment to continuing reforms in this areas and 
there is some hope that a suite of anti-corruption reforms will be passed.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Governance of political parties is particularly weak. It is recommended that the government 
establish a transparent committee to lead law reform activities to address this issue and ensure 
transparency of political parties. Once law reform proposals have been developed it is further 
recommended that the legislature enacts new laws in this area and that the government then 
implements the new laws. These law reforms should cover, as a minimum, the following: 
 
a. Mandatory disclosure of party income and expenditure via annual audited accounts 
which are made public. 
b. Mandatory disclosure of all party income and expenditure during the election 
campaigning period via audited accounts which are made public. 
c. mandatory filing of policy platforms with a central body, with the central body to provide 
a public access point to information on policies for the public. 
d. Mandatory filing of constitutions with a central body, with the central body to provide a 
public access point to political party constitutions for the public. 
e. Disclosure rules for independent candidates. 
 
2. Before any consideration can be given to public funding of political parties, accountability 
mechanisms must be established. Further controls should also be considered. These include 
setting minimum requirements for eligibility for funding (such as receiving a threshold of 5% of 
votes in national elections), only reimbursing stated expenses on production of receipts/audited 
accounts and stopping funding if audited accounts are not received. 
 
3. As technical capacity limits the extent to which parties can develop policy statements and 
internal governance structures, it is recommended that aid donors, in consultation with political 
parties and parliament: 
 
a. Assess the extent to which technical assistance to develop political parties’ capacity in 
these areas is required. 
b. Following this assessment, support the provision of relevant technical assistance in this 
area. 
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4. The large number of parties and independent candidates contesting elections is contributing to 
the fragmented and clientelistic political environment. However, restricting the number of parties 
is undemocratic so is not a good approach to addressing this issue. Instead laws to create 
disincentives to candidates who do not have considerable popular support from contesting 
elections should be developed and enacted by the legislature. Law reform options that should 
be considered include: 
 
a. Raising the number of supporters that must endorse a candidate before he or she is 
eligible to stand for election. 
b. Raising the fee for candidates. 
c. Raising the number of members required to establish a political party. 
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VII.11. MEDIA 
SUMMARY 
Overall pillar score: 41 
Dimension Indicator Law Practice 
Capacity 
31.3 
Resources 25 50 
Independence 25 25 
Governance 
41.7 
Transparency 25 50 
Accountability 50 50 
Integrity 50 25 
Role 
50 
Investigate & expose cases of corruption 50 
Inform public on corruption 50 
Inform public on governance issues 50 
 
There is considerable diversity within Vanuatu’s media landscape and reporting is not dominated by 
any political perspective. Commercial media frequently publishes corruption related stories, although 
reporting tends to be superficial. Media is also active in relaying government press releases, which 
serves to inform the public on governance issues and activities.  
However, media faces a number of challenges in being able to fulfil its “watchdog” role within the 
National Integrity System. There are a limited number of qualified and experienced journalists. 
Intimidation of journalists occurs regularly. Cultural factors hinder the criticism of leaders. There is 
no freedom of information law. Licensing laws potentially allow for the minister in charge to impose 
restrictive conditions on broadcast activities. All of these factors contribute to an environment that 
discourages investigative journalists. Internal governance is also weak. Whilst there is a voluntary 
code of media ethics there is no media regulatory body that can enforce ethical standards and 
practices. As a result there is no way to ensure that transparency, accountability and integrity 
mechanisms contained within this code affect media practices. 
STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION 
Vanuatu’s media can be divided into five categories: publically owned local media; commercial local 
media; community local media; church media; and international media. Publically owned local media 
consists of one television station and two radio stations. Privately owned media includes two 
national radio stations, three newspapers, one television station and a number of media websites. A 
community radio station that broadcasts over parts of Tafea Province also operates. International 
media, which broadcasts in Vanuatu but does not include locally generated content, includes two 
television stations (China Central Television and the Australia Network). Church media consists of 
two television stations maintained by international churches and one church owned radio station.
950
 
There is no legislated body that oversees media standards. Whilst the Vanuatu Broadcasting and 
Televisions Corporation (VBTC) issues licenses for broadcasters, licensing is a revenue gathering 
activity. The Media Association of Vanuatu (MAV) is an NGO that was formed in 2006. It is a 
voluntary body that assists in developing media, for instance through development of a media code 
of ethics.  
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It can be noted that internationally there is increasing attention on social media and its role in citizen 
engagement and developing democratic practice. In Vanuatu, where penetration of the internet is 
currently low and access to the internet is currently expensive, the development of social media 
strategies has deliberately not been a focus of this section of the report or recommendations. 
ASSESSMENT  
Capacity 
Resources (law) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK PROVIDE AN ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE TO A DIVERSE 
INDEPENDENT MEDIA? 
 
The law potentially restricts the establishment of both print and broadcast media, but does 
not regulate for media standards. 
There are no particular licensing requirements for print based media.  Whilst print media 
organisations must hold a business license to operate, the process for gaining a business license is 
the same as for businesses engaged in other activities.  The Newspaper (Restriction of Publication) 
Act prohibits non-citizens from owning or publishing a newspaper within Vanuatu unless they have 
approval from the minister responsible. This Act does not provide criteria for the minister to consider 
in deciding whether to grant approval. Nor does it provide an appeal process, although the generic 
court judicial review process for appealing administrative decisions could be used to appeal a 
negative decision. 
Broadcasters must apply for a specific license from the minister responsible.
951
  The Broadcasting 
and Television Act does not provide any criteria the minister must consider in deciding whether to 
grant a license. The minister can also impose special conditions as part of the licensing process.
952
 
The minister can, at any time vary license conditions
953
 and can revoke a license on a broad range 
of grounds.
954
 Again the law does not specify an appeals process, although judicial review through 
the courts could be used. 
Whilst licensing contains potentially restrictive provisions, in other areas there is little regulation. 
There are no restrictions on acting as a journalist. Nor is there regulation of online media activities. 
There is no legislated body that oversees issues of media standards, which could help to ensure 
diverse responsible media. 
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Resources (practice) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THERE A DIVERSE INDEPENDENT MEDIA PROVIDING A VARIETY OF PERSPECTIVES?  
 
Whilst there are a variety of media sources, they are centred in Port Vila and social and 
political interests from outside of Port Vila are underrepresented. The lack of qualified 
journalists is another practical resource issue.  
Whilst there is a considerable diversity of types of media and mixes of ownership (government, 
commercial, community, church and international) some observations can be made. First, some 
owners control more than one type of media. For instance, the owners of the Daily Post operate the 
Vanuatu Daily Post Newspaper, the Daily Post website and Buzz FM Radio. Sabi Natonga is 
recorded as the owner of the Vanuatu Times newspaper, Capitol FM Radio, and a news website.
955
 
Having the same owners of multiple media sources reduces diversity. Second, church media does 
not carry local news content. Third, the government does not maintain print-based media, so this 
medium is private sector dominated.  If one of the functions of government media is, or should be, to 
create a journalistic record, then the lack of a government issued newspaper is something of a gap.  
Fourth, as media production is almost entirely centred in the capital, Port Vila, the social and political 
interests of those outside of the capital are under-reported. 
People outside of urban centres may also have difficulty in accessing media. Only 20% of the 
population watches television weekly. Twenty-eight per cent (28%) access newspapers weekly.
956
 
Distribution of newspapers is a commercial decision and costs versus returns limit the extent to 
which newspapers are distributed rurally. A recent report observes that, ‘One of the biggest 
challenges in Vanuatu is reaching the dispersed population, especially those who live on the outer 
islands. This affects broadcasting in terms of reach, and presents challenges in the regular 
maintenance of equipment.’957 Only 44% listen to radio regularly. Internet usage is also currently 
low, with 8% regularly accessing the internet. There is, however, very good mobile phone coverage, 
with 76% of households having a mobile phone.
958
  
It is not just the spread of ownership that is necessary for a diverse independent media. Well trained 
journalists are also necessary.  Both the 2004 and 2006 National Integrity System reports noted that 
there was a lack of trained journalists. Since 2006 the Vanuatu Institute of Technology has 
established certificate and diploma programmes in journalism in an initiative to address this issue. 
The first graduates of these programmes were produced in 2010.  
In the absence of government regulation of media standards, self-regulation is important. To this 
end, MAV, which grew out of the Port Vila Press Club, was established in 2006. MAV has very 
limited resources and relies on the support of volunteers.
959
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Independence (law) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE LEGAL SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT UNWARRANTED EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE IN 
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MEDIA? 
 
The law potentially allows for significant interference with broadcasters. Further, the law 
does not promote freedom through measures such as freedom of information, although 
reforms are currently in progress. 
Freedom of expression is enshrined in the Constitution.
960
 However, there are no specific laws 
protecting media freedom or editorial independence. There are no laws allowing access to 
information. Whilst a Right to Information Policy was approved by the government in August 2013
961
  
and the Right to Information Bill was listed for debate in parliament in November 2013, it was 
withdrawn by the Attorney General for further corrections before it was discussed.
962
 In April 2014 
the government Right to Information Policy was officially launched.
963
 There is an Official Secrets 
Act which allows the government to restrict access to a wide variety of material. 
Censorship is not expressly stated to be illegal. As discussed above, licensing of broadcasters is 
done at the discretion of the minister concerned. As the minister also has discretion to impose 
conditions it would be possible for the broadcasting license procedure to regulate content. As the 
minister can vary conditions and can also suspend or revoke broadcasting licenses, the law 
effectively allows the government to control the content of broadcasters. Newspapers are not, 
however, subject to the same licensing controls. Although, as noted above, foreign owned 
newspapers must be given ministerial permission to operate, there are no provisions to allow the 
minister to impose conditions on the operations of either foreign owned or locally owned 
newspapers. 
There are no libel statutes. Instead English common law applies to create a civil tort of defamation. 
Criminal defamation, which requires a malicious intent to expose a person to public hatred, 
contempt or ridicule, or harm to their reputation, is a crime.
964
 
Independence (practice) 
Score: 25  
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE MEDIA FREE FROM UNWARRANTED EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE IN ITS WORK IN 
PRACTICE? 
 
Whilst incidents are not frequent there is a consistent record of attacks on and threats to 
journalists. More subtle intimidation also occurs at times. 
Although laws relating to broadcasters create the potential for significant interference in broadcast 
operations through the restriction of licences, in practice no instances of this occurring in the past 
five years have been reported. Whilst it was reported in January 2013 that the government ordered 
one of the commercial radio stations, Capitol FM, to stop broadcasting, the reason for this order was 
that the radio station had not paid its broadcasting licence fee since 2010. Although the Prime 
Minister had also expressed concerns about broadcasting standards, there was no attempt to 
impose specific restrictions on the operation of Capitol FM. Commentary from Radio Australia and a 
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New Zealand based media lecturer noted that the issue was about licensing and ‘shouldn't be 
muddied by debate about press freedom’.965  Whilst Capitol FM has remained on air it is not clear 
whether its broadcasting licence has now been paid.  
In 2010 some members of MAV campaigned for the publisher of the Vanuatu Daily Post, Marc Neil-
Jones, to be denied a broadcasting licence for a new radio station, Buzz FM. The ostensible ground 
for MAV opposition to this new radio station was that ‘indigenous culture needed to be protected’966 
although MAV has been affected by internal conflicts and disputes and motivations may also have 
been more personal.
967
 It can be observed that Marc Neil Jones is a naturalised Vanuatu citizen. 
Despite this opposition, Buzz FM was granted a broadcasting licence. 
Although there have been no issues with restrictions of broadcasting licenses, a recent report on 
media freedom in the Pacific observed that, in Vanuatu ‘blatant intimidation [of journalists] continues 
with near impunity’.968 A number of examples of harassment of journalists have been reported in the 
past five years. In May 2013 a sub-editor of The Independent newspaper, Gratien Tiona, was 
arrested for the offences of terrorist activity, seditious publication and making threats, following a 
comment he wrote on a social media site and a subsequent complaint made by the Prime Minister 
to the police.
969
 The journalist was released without charge after 30 hours. In August 2011 
journalists at the VBTC reported that the then Minister of ni-Vanuatu Business had entered the 
newsroom and demanded that they censor a story, leading to concerns of ongoing intimidation.
970
 In 
March 2011 the Publisher of the Daily Post was assaulted, with the then Minister for Public Utilities, 
Harry Iauko, being involved in the assault. In January 2009 the publisher of the Daily Post was badly 
assaulted by police following press coverage of issues within correctional services.
971
 Transparency 
Vanuatu reported four incidents of threats against staff following news items between 2010 – 
2013.
972
 In only one of these instances did any criminal action result.  Iauko was convicted for his 
role in assaulting the Publisher of the Daily Post and made to pay a fine of VT15,000 (US$150). 
Previous National Integrity System reports noted issues with irresponsible reporting. The absence of 
an enforceable code of conduct means that there is a blurred line between subtle intimidation of the 
media and legitimate calls for self-regulation. In April 2011 Iauko raised a proposal to make a media 
code of ethics law.
973
 The context in which Iauko raised the proposed law reform illustrates subtle 
intimidation through the threat of introducing laws that could be used to censor the media.  The 
former Carcasses government had made statements about the need for “responsible media 
reporting” in relation to stories such as rumours of a motion of no confidence and allegations of sale 
of passports by the government.
974
 Whilst these statements can be perceived as well-intentioned 
attempts to call for responsibility within the media, they can also be perceived as attempts to shut 
down news stories that the government sees are damaging to it. It is not only the government that 
engages in “warning” the media. For example, in 2013 the General Manager of Airports Vanuatu Ltd 
condemned consultants and the media for reporting that the main international runway was not up to 
international standards.
975
  
The previous National Integrity System reports noted that self-censorship sometimes occurred, 
either due to fear, or due to cultural factors that discourage public criticism of leaders. As occasional 
attacks continue to occur it is reasonable to assume that self-censorship remains something of an 
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issue. Indeed the MAV reaction to Tiona’s arrest is indicative of an environment in which self-
censorship is rife: ‘We as professional media are aware of the risks and dangers of speaking out … 
we all have a responsibility to think before we speak and to consider the possible consequences… 
We urge our media colleagues and all citizen journalists and commentators … to consider their 
safety when making public comment.’976 
Governance 
Transparency (law) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS TO ENSURE TRANSPARENCY IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MEDIA?  
 
There are no laws relating to transparency of ownership, reporting or editorial policies 
although there are limited provisions in the voluntary Vanuatu Media Code of Ethics and 
Practice. 
There are no specific laws requiring media outlets to disclose their ownership, or other interests, 
although if they are structured as companies then they must comply with general company laws 
regarding filing of accounts and other documents.  
The MAV Code of Ethics has some provisions relating to transparency. Subterfuge in obtaining 
information is to be avoided,
977
 editorial
978
 and advertising
979
 content must be clearly distinguished 
from news reports, and financial interests in stories must, where appropriate, be disclosed to 
readers.
980
 Whilst other personal interests or conflicts of interest in respect of stories need not be 
disclosed to the public, journalists must make their editor or supervisor aware of such interests.
981
 
However, as noted above, this Code of Ethics is not enforceable. 
Transparency (practice) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THERE TRANSPARENCY IN THE MEDIA IN PRACTICE? 
 
Whilst most media outlets do not undertake proactive measures to be transparent, media 
operates within a small society and in practice, information on ownership and staffing is 
known. Industry wide editorial policies are available on request. 
Although not legally required to do so, the small size of Vanuatu means that ownership of media 
outlets is public knowledge and can also be found in other places, such as the Vanuatu State of 
Media and Communication Report 2013, produced by the Pacific Media Assistance Scheme 
(PACMAS), a 10 year project funded by Australian Aid. Only The Independent newspaper routinely 
publishes information about its internal staffing. However, print stories are often published with 
journalists’ names in by-lines. Broadcast presenters identify themselves by name.  
No media outlets make information on their reporting and editing policies publically available as a 
matter of course and tend to use the Vanuatu Media Code of Ethics and Practice rather than having 
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internally developed editorial policies. As at December 2013 this Code is no longer available online, 
although it is available on request from MAV or individual media outlets. 
Accountability (law)  
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE LEGAL PROVISIONS TO ENSURE THAT MEDIA OUTLETS ARE ANSWERABLE FOR 
THEIR ACTIVITIES?  
 
No statute laws are in place to ensure the accountability of media employees. The 
unenforceable nature of the Vanuatu Media Code of Ethics and Practice limits its 
effectiveness as an accountability mechanism. 
As already noted, the VBTC does not have a statutory role in the regulation of private media.
982
 
There is no statutory press council or broadcasting regulatory authority.  
The voluntary Vanuatu Media Code of Ethics and Practice requires media outlets to provide a fair 
opportunity to reply to individuals and organisations that have been the subject of criticism, 
allegations or editorial comment.
983
 The Code of Ethics also requires media outlets to correct 
erroneous information and, if appropriate, publish apologies.
984
 MAV has no complaints procedures 
established and this Code of Ethics is not otherwise enforceable. 
If erroneous information has been published then the media outlet can be subject to a lawsuit for 
breach of the common law of defamation. As correcting information may defeat a defamation action, 
threats of a lawsuit may lead to a correction being published. 
Accountability (practice) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT CAN MEDIA OUTLETS BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE IN PRACTICE?  
 
In general, media outlets do not have to answer for their activities, although they actively 
respect the right of reply. 
Although there is a lack of legal accountability mechanisms, print media will often cover stories over 
several days with other sides giving their position in reaction to the initial story. Letters to the editor 
are also frequently used to provide a reply. Whilst these actions help to correct erroneous 
information and help to avoid defamation actions they do not result in individuals or outlets being 
held to account. 
In the last five years only one case involving alleged defamation by a media outlet has been the 
subject of a published court decision, although the court ruled that no defamation had occurred.
985
 
MAV does not advertise itself as a complaints body although it was willing to informally receive a 
complaint about racism in reporting in late 2013.
986
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Integrity (law)  
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF MEDIA EMPLOYEES?  
 
There are some integrity mechanisms within the voluntary Vanuatu Media Code of Ethics and 
Practice, but there are no integrity mechanisms in law. 
There are no specific integrity mechanisms in law.  The voluntary Vanuatu Media Code of Ethics 
and Practice applies to all members of MAV, and all local commercial and public media outlets have 
at least one member of MAV. The Code of Ethics contains some integrity measures. As noted above 
conflicts of interest must be declared to editors or supervisors and financial interests may be 
required to be disclosed to readers.
987
 Journalists should not allow themselves to be influenced by 
gifts and must declare gifts to their editor or supervisor.
988
 There are a number of provisions related 
to integrity in respect of information gathering practices, including prohibitions on using 
harassment
989
 and subterfuge,
990
 limitations on interviewing children
991
 and limitations on paying 
people involved in criminal activities for stories.
992
 Journalists are required to protect their sources.
993
 
There are also a number of provisions related to integrity in respect of presenting news stories, with 
the overarching ethical principles being that reports must strive for accuracy, fairness and balance
994
 
and must maintain standards of taste and decency.
995
 
The Code of Ethics does not discuss in-house mechanisms that media outlets should establish in 
order to promote ethical conduct. Media outlets are small and in-house ethics committees do not 
formally exist.  
Integrity (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE INTEGRITY OF MEDIA EMPLOYEES ENSURED IN PRACTICE? 
 
Whilst some work is underway in respect of developing media policy to strengthen integrity 
mechanisms, currently little is done to ensure integrity of media actors and to sanction 
misbehaviour.  
It is difficult to assess the extent to which journalists follow a code of conduct. Examination of news 
stories suggests that multiple sources are not consistently used. The Pacific Freedom Forum, a 
regional body, noted a breach of ethics relating to decency in 2010, when a newspaper contained a 
photo of a dead child on the front page.
996
 It does not, however, consistently monitor the adherence 
of media to ethical standards.  
MAV is not currently running any training on media ethics for working journalists, although it does 
provide input into journalism training courses.  MAV has also been developing a Media Development 
                                                        
987
 Section 18(c) and section 19(b),Vanuatu Media Code of Ethics and Practice.  
988
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989
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Policy in conjunction with the government. PACMAS has run some training at a regional level on 
media ethics. 
Role 
Investigate and expose cases of corruption practice 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE MEDIA ACTIVE AND SUCCESSFUL IN INVESTIGATING AND EXPOSING CASES OF 
CORRUPTION?  
 
Lack of capacity, interference with media and cultural factors all hinder in-depth investigative 
journalism on cases of corruption. 
Independent print media is the main source of information about cases of corruption. News reports 
tend to “fill in the facts” of rumours of corrupt activities and there are frequent stories that have a 
corruption related angle. Whilst this approach has the advantage that a wide range of potentially 
corruption related activities are uncovered, it has the disadvantage that reporting tends to be quite 
superficial.  As noted in the 2004 National Integrity System report, ‘journalists print stories that are 
reported to them, rather than uncovering stories themselves.’997 There is no established tradition of 
investigative journalism, in which journalists follow and develop a story over a period of time and 
synthesise different sources of information and viewpoints into a cohesive and comprehensive story.  
There are a number of factors that contribute to the lack of investigative journalism. As discussed 
above, training for journalists is limited. As journalists do not specialise this limits their ability to 
develop specific technical knowledge to be able to effectively and correctly report on some issues. 
Threats against journalists lead to self-censorship and cultural factors also inhibit criticism of 
leaders.  The lack of freedom of information laws can make it difficult to obtain official documents. 
Further, investigative journalism takes considerable time and media outlets do not have the 
resources to commit to sustained investigations that may not result in stories.
998
 No local media 
outlets have a specific focus on investigative journalism. 
Inform public on corruption and its impact 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE MEDIA ACTIVE AND SUCCESSFUL IN INFORMING THE PUBLIC ON CORRUPTION AND ITS 
IMPACT ON THE COUNTRY?  
 
No media in Vanuatu currently runs specific programmes aimed at educating the public on 
corruption, its costs and how to curb corruption, although some media supports NGO 
activities in this area. 
Some media organisations support NGO activities aimed at educating the public about corruption. 
For instance, both the Vanuatu Times and the Vanuatu Daily Post newspapers provide a free 
weekly newspaper page to Transparency Vanuatu. Transparency Vanuatu also pays for weekly 
radio broadcasts on Capitol FM. However, there are no specific programmes initiated by the media 
to educate the public on corruption, its impact on the country, or how to curb it. 
As discussed above, media outlets do, however, provide superficial coverage of a wide range of 
corruption related news stories. Whilst stories do not necessarily explicitly address why behaviour 
                                                        
997
 Newton Cain and Jowitt, 2004: 25. 
998
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was corrupt and what the impacts of the behaviour were, the ongoing reporting of incidents does 
keep corruption in the public eye. 
Inform public on governance issues 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE MEDIA ACTIVE AND SUCCESSFUL IN INFORMING THE PUBLIC ON THE ACTIVITIES OF 
THE GOVERNMENT AND OTHER GOVERNANCE ACTORS?  
 
Both public and privately owned media is active in informing the public on regular activities 
of the government, although media tends to relay government press statements, rather than 
actively reporting on issues so coverage is not entirely comprehensive. 
Media, rather than official government information sources, is usually the first place to look for 
information on government activities. The news content of publically owned media is dominated by 
coverage of government events and activities. Reporting tends to involve relaying government press 
releases and statements, rather than critical assessment of activities. As such it is reactive rather 
than proactive, so coverage is not necessarily comprehensive. However, the media is non-partisan 
and will also broadcast press releases from the opposition. As all public media is broadcast only, a 
lasting print record of public media coverage of government activities is not produced.  
Private print-based media also often runs stories based on official press releases and statements. 
Again these will often be relayed, rather than actively analysed and reported on. They do, however, 
create a lasting record of selected government activities.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The lack of enforcement hinders the effectiveness of governance mechanisms. It may also 
contribute to interference in the media due to there being no legitimate mechanism for laying 
complaints about irresponsible reporting. Government regulation could lead to concerns 
regarding censorship so self-regulation is preferable. MAV is in the process of developing a 
complaints mechanism and the government and aid donors should support this. At the same 
time MAV should support proposals to develop a Pacific-wide media ombudsman as having a 
regional body to appeal to reduces the  risk of intimidation of any locally established media 
complaints authority,. 
 
2. The Vanuatu Code of Media Code of Ethics and Practice should be reviewed by an independent 
expert to ensure that it contains comprehensive provisions in respect of transparency, 
accountability and integrity. 
 
3. Threats against media freedom are an ongoing issue, with laws potentially allowing interference 
in broadcasting and physical threats against journalists being somewhat routine. In order to 
address this, in addition to establishing a complaints mechanism, the following should occur: 
 
a. In order to build pressure against government threats, MAV Vanuatu should maintain a 
record of threats against journalists and build links with international and regional 
media freedom watchdogs in order to ensure that these threats are publicised 
internationally. 
b. The Law Reform Commission should review the Broadcasting and Television Act and 
the Newspaper (Restriction of Publication) Act with the aim of removing limits and/or 
clearly specifying ministerial powers in respect of restricting media activities. 
 
4. It has been suggested that building collaborative journalism practices may help to strengthen 
investigative journalism in an environment where capacity and resources are lacking. The 
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Vanuatu Institute of Technology should consider including a module on developing collaborative 
investigative journalism practices in its journalism certificate and diploma courses. 
 
5. The legislature should enact the Right to Information Bill as soon as possible and donors 
support its effective implementation as this will make it easier for investigative journalists to 
access information.  
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VII.12. CIVIL SOCIETY 
SUMMARY  
Overall pillar score: 41.7 
Dimension Indicator Law Practice 
Capacity 
62.5 
Resources 75 25 
Independence 100 50 
Governance 
25 
Transparency - 25 
Accountability - 25 
Integrity - 25 
Role 
37.5 
Hold government accountable 25 
Policy reform 50 
 
There are few civil society organisations (CSOs) in Vanuatu that have a specific anti-corruption 
mandate, although many of them do address issues of governance more generally. CSOs face 
challenges due to the general issue of limited human resource capacity within Vanuatu. This affects 
the ability of CSOs to deliver outputs and also limits the ability of CSOs to operate with good internal 
governance practices. Internal governance mechanisms are variable and very much depend upon 
the individual CSO. The geography of Vanuatu also makes it difficult for CSOs to effectively and 
sustainably engage with communities throughout the country or to mobilise the public to demand 
that government is held accountable for its actions. Another issue which makes it difficult for CSOs 
to effectively fulfil their role within the National Integrity System is that there is no forum through 
which CSOs and government can engage.  
STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION 
Faasau-Pasikala classifies CSOs that can be found within Vanuatu as follows: 
1. Community-based organisations (CBOs) 
2. Charitable associations  
3. Companies established for charitable or other useful purposes  
4. Other organisations governed by specific laws (including religious associations)  
5. International organisations working within Vanuatu (such as Oxfam or Save the Children)
999
 
CBOs are usually formed by groups of men, women and youth from the villages. For instance, many 
villages will have women’s groups, youth groups and other community governance groups such as a 
water supply committee. These represent CSOs that are created by written or oral agreement 
between its members, but are not registered or incorporated under any statute. They are particularly 
important for community governance. Religious associations are also very important at the 
community governance level. Christianity is now intertwined with tradition and in relation to 
customary social systems ‘[r]eligious affiliation is second in importance only to kinship and 
neighbourhood ties.’1000 As a result religious leaders often play a traditional leadership role. Further, 
CBOs based on religious affiliation are common. Whilst formally registered non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) will frequently interact with CBOs and religious associations when carrying 
                                                        
999
 Amelia Fasi Pasikala Faasau, Report on Laws Affecting Civil Society in Vanuatu (Washington, D.C.: International 
Center for Not for Profit Law, 2004), 4-5 
1000
 Lamont Lindstrom, ‘Vanuatu’ in Ember and Ember (eds) Countries and their Cultures (USA: Macmillan Reference, 
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out “grass-roots level” activities, both usually operate outside of the more formalised CSO sector so 
are not discussed specifically in the analysis of CSO capacity or governance in this report. 
Instead, this report focuses on the formalised NGO sector, which is primarily comprised of 
associations registered under the Charitable Associations Act and includes international NGOs 
operating within Vanuatu. This formalised sector is primarily Port Vila based. It can be divided into 
two layers: international NGOs with a local Vanuatu office and “home-grown” NGOs. 
The umbrella body for NGOs and CBOs in Vanuatu is the Vanuatu Association of Non-Government 
Organisations (VANGO). It was formed in 1991 and had 123 registered members in August 
2012.
1001
 Its primary role is to help ‘NGOs and CBOs to initiate action, give voice to their concerns 
and work collaboratively with other development actors for just and sustainable human 
development.’1002 VANGO has, however, suffered from issues of weak governance so has not been 
active in fulfilling this role in some time. An extraordinary general meeting of VANGO was held in 
December 2013 as a ‘step forward in the progress of the rehabilitation of VANGO.’1003  
ASSESSMENT  
Capacity 
Resources (law) 
Score: 75 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK PROVIDE AN ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE TO CIVIL SOCIETY?  
 
The various laws concerning the establishment and operation of CSOs are simple and easy 
to follow. They also leave significant room for the various organisations to make their own 
rules and regulate their internal procedures as set out in their constitution or memorandum 
of association.  
 
The Constitution of Vanuatu recognises that all persons are entitled to the freedom of assembly and 
association ‘subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and to the legitimate public 
interest in defence, safety, public order, welfare and health.’1004   
The most common type of CSO in Vanuatu is the charitable association, incorporated as a legal 
entity pursuant to the Charitable Associations (Incorporation) Act. This procedure is simple, quick 
and inexpensive. A committee of a charitable association, provided there are not less than six 
members, can apply to the registrar (Vanuatu Financial Services Commission (VFSC)) for a 
certificate of incorporation as a corporate body.
1005
 This application must contain an application form 
that is signed by not less than half the members of the committee and states the name of the 
committee, a registered office, and the names, addresses and occupations of the members.
1006
 It 
must also be accompanied by a signed statement of assets and liabilities and a certified copy of the 
articles of association.
1007
 The Charitable Associations (Incorporation) (Fees) Regulation 1982 
                                                        
1001
 ‘VANGO Announces New Board and Directors’ Vanuatu Daily Post Online 24 August 2012. 
1002
  Ibid. 
1003
 Glenda Shing, ‘Weak Governance within VANGO Board’ Vanuatu Daily Post Online 10 December 2013. 
1004
 Section 5(1)(h), Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu.  
1005
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prescribes the fees payable as VT5,000 (US$500) for an application for incorporation and VT5,000 
(US$500) for a certificate of incorporation.
1008
  
 
If refusing to grant incorporation, the registrar must give reasons
1009
 and the committee has the right 
to appeal to the minister of finance and economic management within 14 days.
1010
 The minister may 
either refuse the appeal, or order the registrar to grant incorporation.
1011
 This decision cannot be 
questioned in court except on a point of law.
 1012
  Alternatively, a CSO can be registered as a 
company pursuant to the Companies Act. This procedure, being significantly more complex and 
expensive, is much less common.  
 
There are also other types of associations which are governed by specific laws such as the Vanuatu 
Red Cross Society Act, the Trade Unions Act, and membership organisations which are established 
through legislation such as the Legal Practitioner’s Act and the Health Practitioner’s Act. 
Furthermore, although there are many international CSOs that operate within Vanuatu, they are not 
required to register pursuant to any legislation and are established under an MOU with the 
Government of Vanuatu, or through a bilateral or multilateral agreement which exists between the 
government and the organisation’s home government or head organisation.1013  
 
Vanuatu has no income tax, capital gains tax, or other forms of direct taxation. There is only indirect 
taxation through the form of Value Added Tax (VAT) and import and custom duties. The Import 
Duties (Consolidation) Act as amended by the Import Duties (Consolidation) (Amendment) Act 2009 
makes an exemption for any goods imported by or donated to the Vanuatu Red Cross Society for 
their use or for free distribution in emergencies; certain trophies, sports equipment, uniform, medals 
and decorations; and specified church and school supplies.
1014
 Being the only forms of government 
taxation, VAT and duties are relatively high and thus, if granted, the exemptions are of significant 
benefit to CSOs. The authority to determine exemptions rests with the director of customs. VAT is 
also exempted, where an organisation is eligible for import tax exemptions,
1015
 for the supply of 
goods or services that are gifted to a non-profit body and are intended for use in carrying out the 
non-profit body’s objectives.1016 International CSOs are exempted from VAT and import duties if this 
is provided for in the MOU signed between the government and that particular organisation.
1017
 
Resources (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT DO CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS HAVE ADEQUATE FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES TO 
FUNCTION AND OPERATE EFFECTIVELY?  
 
Diverse funding sources are available to CSOs, however, these are often uncoordinated and 
short term in nature. Furthermore, the capacity of local CSOs to make efficient and effective 
use of these financial resources is very limited due to the lack of skilled and experienced 
staff.  
 
In general, CSOs in Vanuatu are almost exclusively reliant on external funding sources;
1018
 the 
primary donors being foreign governments and multilateral agencies such as Australian Aid, the 
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New Zealand Aid Programme, the EU and various UN agencies. Although there are a relatively 
large number of donors, it is not uncommon for an organisation to become highly dependent on one 
source, so that, for example if Australian Aid suddenly decided to cut all funding, many of the CSOs 
would face serious concerns.
1019
   
 
The extent to which CSOs can rely on local sources is extremely limited and does not amount to any 
significant proportion of total funding. Whilst some organisations may occasionally receive a small 
grant of funds from the government, or support through the provision of supplies, there is no formal 
method of applying for funds nor is there a specific budget allocation for CSOs. As such, this 
process is governed by informal rules and is generally up to the discretion of the relevant 
authority.
1020
 There are also some private philanthropic donors comprised of groups of business 
people or certain local companies that provide some direct funding or assistance through fundraising 
activities. However, this is usually motivated by private interests and is thus focused narrowly on 
marketable causes such as education or health, and involves only small scale funding or scholarship 
programs.
1021
  
 
Some organisations do generate revenue from services, products, or rent from assets. For example, 
one of the largest and most reputable local CSOs, WanSmolBag, sells CDs, DVDs, scripts and 
books containing their work and also provides theatre services.
1022
 The Vanuatu Red Cross Society 
has sold donated goods (such as clothing) and held events such as gala nights for fundraising 
purposes.
1023
 Some organisations such as the Vanuatu National Council of Women also obtain 
regular income from renting out land or parts of buildings that they own.
1024
    
 
Overall, the availability and diversity of funding varies significantly for the different types of 
organisations. For example WanSmolBag, has Australian Aid and the New Zealand Aid Programme 
as their core funders, and 20 other organisations as donors for various projects past and present.
1025
 
In contrast, it would be common for smaller community-based organisations to struggle with funding 
or be solely reliant on funding channelled through churches or other organisations. Although donors 
don’t necessarily “pick favourites”, certain donors and CSOs tend to form strong partner 
relationships and thus it is common for one organisation to benefit from the continuous support of 
one or more specific donors whilst others struggle to gain funds.
1026
 This is generally based on merit, 
as understandably, donors prefer organisations that have a track-record of successful projects, good 
accounting procedures and are reputable within the community.
1027
 However, some donors place 
extremely onerous requirements on CSOs that involve a lot of documentation and technical 
language that local community organisations may struggle to comply with.
1028
  
 
The current system of funding is largely a top-down process.
1029
 Organisations compete to make 
their projects more suitable to what the donors want as opposed to what the people need. This 
contributes to a lack of co-ordination amongst CSOs and CSOs getting involved in causes that are 
outside their constitutional mandate in order to gain funding.
1030
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Whilst formal NGOs face resource constraints the volunteer and membership base of community 
based organisations in general is very strong and comprises a valuable resource. Many large scale 
projects are made possible through the hundreds of volunteers around the country who are actively 
engaged in community level governance, through structures that often have some degree of 
customary basis, and the day-to-day work of community based organisations, particularly churches, 
which have the full support of the people.
1031
 This environment is fostered by Vanuatu’s culture 
being focused on a strong sense of community and social obligation to others, as well as the very 
strong commitment that many people place with religious and faith-based organisations.  These 
cultural factors are discussed further in the foundations section.  
 
Despite this, CSOs are significantly restricted in capacity due to a lack of skilled and experienced 
staff. This stems from a county wide problem where few people who enter the workforce have 
completed tertiary or even secondary education. Furthermore, CSOs struggle to attract and retain 
skilled staff in the absence of core funding. Firstly, because most donor funds are allocated to the 
project and not necessarily to staffing, the pay is often relatively low. Secondly, there is a lack of job 
security as once a project is completed, there is no guarantee that a newly funded project will take 
off in its place.
1032
 For these reasons it is difficult to attract staff to CSO roles and even more so, it is 
difficult to retain them as they often decide to move to a better paying agency (typically international 
organisations but also the public or private sector) once the opportunity arises.
1033
 This issue is a 
necessary consideration for donors when considering the implementation of projects. It is 
recommended that donors need to provide core funding in order to ensure that organisations can 
sustain their advocacy and campaign work to promote long-term impacts. In the absence of this, civil 
society workers should be compensated for this lack of security with higher pay or further supportive 
and incentive measures.
1034
 
Independence (law) 
Score: 100 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE LEGAL SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT UNWARRANTED EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE IN 
THE ACTIVITIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS?   
 
Vanuatu’s Constitution provides the ultimate safeguard against unwarranted external 
interference and there are currently no other laws or regulations to restrict this freedom. 
Article 5(1)(h) of the Constitution protects the right to freedom of assembly and association. This 
right is only ‘subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and to the legitimate public 
interest in defence, safety, public order, welfare and health.’1035 
There are also no regulations governing CSOs including any that stipulate state membership on 
CSO boards or any that require mandatory state attendance at CSO meetings. As discussed above 
registration is a straightforward process and there are clear appeals processes if applications are 
denied. Vanuatu does not have a Privacy Act and there is no law that discriminates against CSOs in 
respect of privacy. Under the Charitable Associations (Incorporation) Act, the register of 
incorporated associations and any documents filed therein are available for inspection upon 
payment of a VT500 (US$5) fee.
1036
 This is similar to provisions under the Companies Act that 
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permit any person to inspect the register and/or receive a copy of any documents kept by the 
registrar of companies on payment of a fee of VT3,500 (US$35).
1037
 
Independence (practice) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT CAN CIVIL SOCIETY EXIST AND FUNCTION WITHOUT UNDUE EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE?  
 
CSOs in Vanuatu are relatively free to operate without undue government interference. 
However there are many invisible or subtle pressures placed on the people that hinder their 
ability to speak out against the government.  
 
CSOs face little direct government interference. In the past five years there have been no reported 
cases of CSOs being denied registration as a charitable association. There have been instances of 
verbal threats being made in response to making public comments or publications expressing 
criticisms against the government.
1038
 These incidents are generally not formally reported as it is 
unlikely that any proper and impartial investigation will take place. However, it is more often that the 
government uses subtle methods of interference such as exclusion from the political processes or 
more generally through ignoring requests and refusing to co-operate.
1039
 Any further level of action 
is extremely rare. In the past five years, there have been no reported cases of detention, arrest, 
imprisonment, deportation or physical harm by the national government of a civil society actor 
because of their work. 
 
Despite this, there are many more underlying causes attributable to civil society actors being 
restricted from speaking and acting out. The most significant of these are cultural influences. CSO 
employees, members and volunteers are generally made up of Vanuatu citizens whose role within 
the CSO does not separate them from external relationships and social obligations.
1040
 Being part of 
a very small and close-knit community, people often face invisible barriers to speaking out because 
of consequences that it may have on their personal and social environment. This is a big problem in 
Vanuatu, as the social obligation to protect your family and community comes before a moral 
obligation to speak out against wrongs.
1041
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Governance 
Transparency (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THERE TRANSPARENCY IN CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS? 
 
Organisations do not make strong efforts to make their information readily available, with 
constraints on resources and the geography of the country making this very difficult.  
Overall, there is very little transparency of CSOs in Vanuatu. Laws do not require annual reports or 
financial statements to be produced by charitable associations. Although large international 
organisations such as the Red Cross, Oxfam, Save the Children and Youth Challenge have well-
developed websites that provide a comprehensive overview, the section of their site dedicated to 
Vanuatu specifically is usually very brief and provides only generalised information. Some larger 
local chapters or organisations such as Transparency International Vanuatu or Wan Smolbag do 
have websites that provide regular updates on news, projects and publications; however the majority 
of other organisations do not have a website at all. This can be attributed to the use and access of 
internet not being widespread across the country and a lack of staff with the technical knowledge to 
set up and maintain such systems. Some organisations do provide regular updates on their activities 
to the public through other forums such holding workshops and events, publishing newsletters or a 
column in the newspaper, and via radio broadcasts. However, due to the geography of the region 
with majority of the population living in villages on the outer islands, it is very difficult and often not 
economically practicable to make information easily accessible to the general public.  
Annual reports, financial statements, or the composition of boards are not information that is readily 
available to the public. Some organisations do create annual reports; however they are generally 
only provided to members,
1042
 or are only available as hard copies in their office to be provided on 
request.
1043
 Moreover, financial statements are created for the primary purpose of fulfilling an 
obligation to donors and as such are not seen as necessary to disclose to the public. A further 
barrier to a more transparent civil society is the competition amongst CSOs for donor funds. This 
creates an environment where CSOs are reluctant to divulge too much information on projects or 
funding and hinders effective collaboration.
 1044
  
Accountability (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS ANSWERABLE TO THEIR CONSTITUENCIES?  
 
The extent to which CSO boards provide effective oversight of organisational activities 
varies significantly from one organisation to another. Significant problems arise due to a lack 
of human resources, inadequate training and ineffective internal procedures for ensuring 
accountability. 
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 Interview of Marie-Noelle Ferrieux Patterson, Chairperson of Transparency International Vanuatu with Jessica Kim, 
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 Interview of Nelly Willie, Vanuatu Country Representative of the Pacific Leadership Program with Jessica Kim, Port 
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At present, CSOs are primarily accountable to their donors, as this is where they receive their 
funding. When funding is based upon specific projects donors are only able to scrutinise those 
projects and are not in a position to hold the functioning of the CSO as a whole to account.
1045
 
The effectiveness of CSO boards in providing oversight of organisational activities can be described 
as being highly uneven. Some organisations have board members who are highly knowledgeable, 
skilled, experienced and engage meaningfully in monitoring activities, whilst others are not even 
clear on what their role is as a board member.
1046
 They are often not provided with sufficient 
knowledge about the organisation’s activities,1047 and the extent of their involvement is often not 
more than the one hour meeting they attend four times a year.  This problem arises from a general 
lack of capable individuals to comprise all the boards of the numerous organisations, a lack of 
training and clear division of roles between management and the board, and often a lack of incentive 
for board members to be more active as they are normally taking on their role in a volunteer capacity 
on top of their normal job
1048
. Some boards do include members from outside the organisation and it 
is recommended that having a facility where organisations can draw on experienced external 
advisors when needed as well as obtain training for their board members and staff would be 
beneficial, particular to smaller local CSOs.
1049
 
The relationship between boards and members also varies. There are no laws requiring, for 
example, annual general meetings to be held to elect boards of charitable associations. 
Integrity (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE INTEGRITY OF MEDIA EMPLOYEES ENSURED IN PRACTICE?  
 
There are no regulations that monitor and assess the integrity of civil society as a whole. 
Some organisations have established internal rules and procedures to self-regulate; 
however, the existence and effectiveness of such procedures varies per organisation.  
There is no sector wide code of conduct for CSOs in Vanuatu.  
Most organisations do not have a formal process for self-regulation. However, larger CSOs do have 
some form of internal rules that govern the duties of staff and a procedure for investigating and 
sanctioning misbehaviour of staff on integrity issues
1050
 as well as a procedure for reviewing 
performance.
1051
 Furthermore, (in large part because it is usually a requirement in order to gain 
donor funding) most organisations have a chronology and/or strategic plan for each project and 
adherence to this is monitored as an ongoing process or through an interim and final review.
1052
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 Interview of Nelly Willie, Vanuatu Country Representative of the Pacific Leadership Program with Jessica Kim, Port 
Vila, 21 January 2014. 
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 Interview of Mikaela Nyman, Development Counsellor New Zealand High Commission with Jessica Kim, Port Vila, 
23 January 2014. 
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Some larger organisations do undertake formal reviews that assess the integrity of the whole 
organisation; however, this can only be done every few years due to the high costs associated.
1053
  
Role 
Hold government accountable 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE CIVIL SOCIETY ACTIVE AND SUCCESSFUL IN HOLDING GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABLE 
FOR ITS ACTIONS?  
 
Civil society as a whole is not highly active in its efforts to hold the government accountable 
for its actions. There are some advocacy and public awareness campaigns however these 
efforts have seen relatively low success in compelling the government to take positive 
action. 
Overall, the role of civil society in Vanuatu as a public watchdog is not very strongly developed. 
Although many CSOs may address governance issues as a by-product of their other activities, the 
main organisations with a focus on targeting issues of corruption are Transparency Vanuatu and 
Youth Against Corruption.  
The government tends to ignore CSOs whenever it can and thus it has been difficult for CSO 
advocacy to translate into positive government action. This is attributable to the ‘poor working 
relationship between civil society organisations and government’1054 which is due, in part, to funding 
being largely sourced from abroad. Because of this CSOs can be seen as having foreign interests 
and viewed by the government with a general sense of distrust.
1055
 The lack of an effective 
ombudsman, as discussed elsewhere in this report, means that CSOs have little recourse if 
government agencies do not act. However, with enough persistence, concentrated efforts and 
focused action, it is sometimes possible for CSOs to have an impact.
1056
  
A recent example of a high-profile and successful activity in this regard involves a legal action 
supported by Transparency Vanuatu that led to a court decision in late 2013 that stopped around 
100 cases of “green” public land being unlawfully leased out by the Minister of Lands to related 
individuals. 
Civil society advocacy campaigns, public education and public engagements with regard to anti-
corruption occur but, due in part to geographical issues, such activities are often not very 
widespread or sustained. Public education is often based around elections, with little ongoing civic 
education between elections. Although there have been successful partnerships between the 
Electoral Commission and NGOs such as WanSmolbag and Transparency Vanuatu, which have led 
to widespread education, their “events focus” makes it very difficult to create strong and sustained 
results. Some CSOs such as Youth Against Corruption and Transparency Vanuatu are beginning to 
use social media to increase public engagement. However, as noted in the section on media in this 
report, public use of the internet is still very limited so social media strategies also have limited 
impact.
1057
 
Another issue that limits the effectiveness of CSO advocacy and education is that outside of people 
who are already engaged in the broader “donor community”, the role of CSOs may not be well 
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 Interview of Marie-Noelle Ferrieux Patterson, Chairperson of Transparency International Vanuatu with Jessica Kim, 
Port Vila, 22 January 2014. 
1054
 Morgan, 2013.  
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 Ibid.  
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understood and CSOs may not be well recognised. A street survey conducted with 50 people in Port 
Vila in January 2014 by researchers as part of this National Integrity System assessment indicated 
that whilst 14% responded that they were members of NGOs, knew what NGOs do and had 
participated in NGO activities in the past year, there was considerably lower awareness amongst 
non-members of NGOs. Whilst only 14% of non-members had never heard of the term NGOs, only 
7% knew what NGOs did, with 86% saying they did not know what the role of NGOs was and a 
further 7% being unsure of the role of NGOs. Less than 5% of non-members of NGOs had been 
involved in any NGO activity in the past year. 
Policy reform 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS CIVIL SOCIETY ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN POLICY REFORM INITIATIVES ON ANTI-CORRUPTION?  
 
In general, CSOs have been unsuccessful in engaging with the government on anti-
corruption policy reforms. 
VANGO does have an MOU with the government and is the “CSO voice” on some government 
committees, such as the committee to revise the Priorities and Action Agenda, which is the national 
development policy.
1058
 Currently the extent to which VANGO effectively communicates with, and 
coordinates CSO views is limited, however, and this can leave some CSO’s feeling left out of policy 
conversations.
1059
 
The development of the right to information policy is the leading example of successful CSO 
engagement with government on anti-corruption policy. The development of this policy was largely 
led by the Media Association of Vanuatu, with Transparency International Vanuatu also being a 
main driver from the outset. CSO activities eventually led to a government/non-government 
committee being established within the Office of the Prime Minister to develop government 
policy.
1060
 
Although the development of the right to information policy is an excellent example of successful 
policy engagement, CSOs face many barriers to engaging in active anti-corruption reform 
discussions due to a lack of funding and resources, and more significantly due to not being 
considered by the government as a legitimate stakeholder in the policymaking process.
1061
 Whilst 
“good governance” is an area that donors are willing to fund projects in, and products of projects 
may contain recommendations related to law reform, these proposals often seem to be ignored. As 
discussed in the section on the legislature, the law-making process often does not allow for public 
engagement on any proposed law reforms, which makes it difficult for civil society to engage in 
debate on government-led reform initiatives. 
1062
 
A Law Commission has been established as a government agency and Transparency International 
Vanuatu has submitted a number of proposals for anti-corruption reform to the Law Commission in 
order to try to encourage the development of an anti-corruption law reform agenda. This body is, 
however, new and has not yet commenced any specific anti-corruption law reform programme. 
There is no national anti-corruption commission that allows civil society and government to 
collaborate in ongoing discussion of anti-corruption reform. In early 2013 it was announced in the 
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 Interview of Charlie Harrison, Interim Chief Executive Officer Vanuatu Non Government Organisation with Sam 
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media that ‘NGOs and CBOs comprising VANGO have united to form a Task Force [called the 
Vanuatu Corruption Commission] of committed organisations and individuals determined to 
eliminate political and public service corruption’.1063  This CSO taskforce is no longer functioning 
although VANGO is working with Youth Against Corruption to develop training on the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption.
1064
  
Training and awareness raising on issues of corruption do not directly engage the government on 
anti-corruption policy reform, but can indirectly affect policy development by increasing 
conversations about corruption issues and desired policy responses. The work VANGO is currently 
undertaking with Youth Against Corruption can be considered indirect policy development. Other 
recent examples of this sort of activity, which involved partnerships with CSOs and government 
agencies include the Youth Parliament and the Youth Justice Forum. The Youth Parliament, held in 
October 2013 was a partnership between the Vanuatu parliament, Transparency International 
Vanuatu and the National Youth Council raise discussion of integrity pledges for members of 
parliament and qualifications of parliamentarians.
1065
 The Youth Justice Forum, is an ongoing 
partnership between WanSmolbag, the University of the South Pacific and the government which 
aims to both raise awareness amongst youth and generate policy discussion.
1066
 
There are also successful partnerships between CSOs and government on areas that do not have 
an anti-corruption agenda. These include the Vanuatu Climate Adaptation Network and the Vanuatu 
Humanitarian Team.
1067
 Although they are not anti-corruption focussed, such partnerships demonstrate 
good participatory governance and provide an avenue for CSO input into policy dialogue more broadly. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Civil society organisations work more effectively when they work collaboratively. Addressing 
common issues collaboratively utilises scarce resources efficiently and can help to develop 
more sustainable and widespread activities. It is recommended that: 
 
a. Vanuatu civil society organisations seek to work together collaboratively (and build on 
existing examples of effective collaboration) to better represent the priorities of their 
constituents and to engage more effectively with government and other decision makers 
regarding  legislation and policy development and to monitor government service provision 
and expenditure. 
b. VANGO works to support non-government organisation and community based 
organisation collaboration and capacity development through coordination and 
organisational strengthening activities specifically:  
 
i. development of a NGO code of conduct which covers, amongst other things, issues of 
transparency to the public and accountability to members and works with members to 
assess adherence to it. 
ii. Provision of support to smaller local organisations to assist them in meeting the NGO 
code of conduct in order to help facilitate integrity building as opposed to merely 
imposing regulations. 
iii. seeking funding to become an effective and functioning body that supports NGOs to 
work together.   
 
c. Aid donors seek ways to increase collaboration between CSOs when projects are being 
funded. 
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2. Currently there is no clear forum for government/CSO dialogue on anti-corruption initiatives. It is 
recommended that the Vanuatu Government establish a national integrity committee made up 
of both government and non government representatives and that this committee develops an 
anti-corruption/national integrity strategy, using the outcomes of the 2014 National Integrity 
System report as a starting point for this strategy. 
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VII.13. BUSINESS 
SUMMARY 
Overall pillar score: 32.7 
Dimension Indicator Law Practice 
Capacity 
43.8 
Resources 50 50 
Independence 50 25 
Governance 
41.6 
Transparency 50 50 
Accountability 50 50 
Integrity 25 25 
Role 
12.5 
Support for/engagement with civil society 0 
Anti-corruption policy engagement 25 
 
Previous National Integrity System reports indicated that the domestic private sector is not really 
perceived within Vanuatu as a pillar with a role to play in anti-corruption activities. This perception 
does not mean that private business should not have a role to play in relation to national integrity. 
The relationship between private business and corruption is multi-layered. For instance, businesses 
can be affected by lack of integrity in other institutions. As such, a streamlined business environment 
that reduces the possibility for external interference is desirable. Businesses can also contribute to 
domestic corruption, for instance by offering bribes to avoid laws or speed up transactions. Whilst 
there are many allegations of this occurring, particularly in relation to dealings with land, 
prosecutions for such behaviours are uncommon. As discussed in the sections on the executive and 
political parties, there is concern that businesses can affect politics through making payments to 
parties or individual politicians, but there are no laws to help regulate this.  
Vanuatu has a sizeable international financial services sector. Private sector business can also 
contribute to global corruption, through enabling activities such as money laundering. However, as 
the focus of this report is about Vanuatu internally this section focuses on domestic business 
operations. There is no separate analysis of Vanuatu’s place in the global business environment.   
The majority of domestic businesses in Vanuatu are small and do not have publically traded shares. 
This probably explains why relatively little attention has been given to the corporate governance 
environment. Many small businesses operate informally and/or are not established as companies so 
are not subject to the corporate governance regime. This lowers the scoring of Private Business as 
a whole. It can be observed that if the assessment in this report focussed solely on formal sector 
companies the scoring may have differed.  
STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION 
Business activity in Vanuatu can be stratified into three layers: the formal sector, the informal sector 
and the sub-informal sector. The private formal sector has been defined as including private sector 
businesses that have a turnover of VT4 million (US$40,000) or more and are registered for value 
added tax (VAT or are VAT exempt.
1068
 The formal sector can be contrasted with informal sector 
businesses, which has been defined to be businesses with a turnover of less than VT4 million 
(US$40,000). In the informal sector ‘typically employee numbers are low and labour is often 
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provided by (sometimes unpaid) family members.’1069 Despite their small size informal sector 
businesses are also meant to hold operating certificates and to adhere to other laws, including 
employment laws. In addition to the formal and informal sectors there is a “sub-informal sector”. As 
the 2006 Household Income and Expenditure Survey observes ‘many households in essence 
operate small businesses selling agricultural and other commodities produced in the home as the 
goods are marketed and sold on a regular basis. But most of these households would not consider 
themselves to be operating a business, mostly because they do not have a business license.’1070  
Few statistical surveys of the private sector have results which are publically available, with the last 
labour market survey occurring in 2000. Lack of statistical surveys, coupled with the lack of licensing 
of all but formal sector businesses makes it difficult to state the proportion of businesses operating 
within each layer.  The formal sector is relatively small and is largely concentrated in the urban 
areas of Port Vila and Santo. In 2000 about 10,000 workers were employed within the private formal 
sector and just under 1000 business licenses were issued.
1071
 As noted in the foundations section, 
the majority of the labour force is engaged in subsistence or subsistence plus surplus agriculture. 
All businesses that hold business licenses are automatically members of the Vanuatu Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (VCCI). The VCCI is funded by government directing a percentage of 
business license fees to it. It employs a number of staff. Staff operate under the direction of an 
elected Council, made up of representatives from different business sectors. This body advocates 
for business, works to develop the private sector environment and represents business interests in 
policy debate. 
ASSESSMENT  
Capacity 
Resources (law) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK PROVIDE OFFER AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR THE 
FORMATION AND OPERATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL BUSINESSES?  
 
The ease of establishing and operating a business depends on the size of the business, the 
structure of the business (company or other) and whether the business is fully owned by a 
citizen or is partially or fully owned by a foreign investor.  The processes for large foreign 
owned companies with foreign employees, which face the most complicated procedures 
processes, could be streamlined. 
The process for establishing small businesses is straightforward. In 2010 the law changed so that 
businesses that turnover less than VT4 million (US$40,000) do not need business licenses.  Instead, 
such businesses must hold a business operation certificate, issued by the local government 
authority in which the business operates.
1072
 As VT4 million (US$40,000) is the minimum business 
turnover for compulsory VAT registration, most businesses who operate under a business operation 
certificate do not register for, or pay, VAT.  In 2013 the law was again amended to require 
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businesses with a turnover of less than VT4 million (US$40,000) to hold business licenses,
1073
 
although this law has not yet been gazetted.
1074
 If these small local businesses operate under a 
name other than the surname of the owner, then they are meant to register their business name in 
accordance with the Business Names Act.
1075
 
Businesses with a turnover of more than VT4 million (US$40,000) are required to have business 
licenses. For businesses operating within municipalities, the minister of finance (rates & taxes) 
issues those licenses. Businesses operating in other localities have licenses issued by the relevant 
provincial authority. Prior to having a business license issued, businesses must register business 
names with the Vanuatu Financial Services Commission (VFSC). Registering names and obtaining 
licenses is a simple process, with documentation usually being ready within seven days of the 
receipt of application forms and the application fees. If a business chooses to incorporate as a 
company then it must register with the VFSC.
1076
 If it has employees then it must also register with 
the Vanuatu National Provident Fund (VNPF).
1077
 The World Bank Doing Business survey (2013) 
indicates that there are 8 steps, taking 35 days, to set up a domestic company with domestic 
employees.
1078
 This resulted in a rank of 116/185 for ease of setting up a business in this Survey.
1079
 
Foreign investors are also required to have foreign investment approval certificates.
1080
 These are 
issued by the Vanuatu Investment Promotion Authority (VIPA). The process is fairly straightforward. 
The application requires the investor to show that he or she has a certain level of investment in the 
country. As certain industries are reserved for citizens only, the applicant must also provide a 
business plan that indicates that he or she is establishing a legitimate business.
1081
 Non-citizen 
investors must seek residency permits from Immigration.
1082
 Whilst investors do not require work 
permits, work permits must be sought from the Department of Labour for non-citizen employees.
1083
 
Once a business has been established there are some ongoing requirements. Business licenses 
must be renewed annually. If the business is structured as a local company then it must also submit 
an annual return and renew its company registration. If turnover is more than VT20,000,000 
(US$200,000) it must also submit a set of audited accounts.  VIPA approval certificates, if required, 
must also be renewed annually. Work and residency permits for non-citizens must also be 
renewed.
1084
  
The process for going into liquidation or winding down a company is regulated by the Companies 
Act.
1085
 The World Bank Doing Business Survey 2013 ranks Vanuatu’s insolvency procedures at 
57/185, with a recovery rate for investors being 42.7 cents on the dollar.
1086
 
Common law governs contracts and civil procedure rules provide enforcement procedures. The 
Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 came into force in 2011, strengthening the legal framework 
for the enforcement of intellectual property rights.  
The Constitution guarantees that only customary land owners can hold land.
1087
 Non-customary 
owners can, however, lease land. These leases are tradable under the regime established by the 
Land Leases Act. 
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Resources (practice) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE INDIVIDUAL BUSINESSES ABLE IN PRACTICE TO FORM AND OPERATE EFFECTIVELY?  
 
Whilst establishing a business is not unduly costly it can take time. Property rights can be 
insecure and compliance checking is not rigorous. 
 
Records on the numbers of business operating certificates issued are unavailable and it is not 
known how many small informal businesses comply with the law. Even if such businesses do 
comply, costs are low (VT10,000 (US$100) for the initial business name with an ongoing VT5,000 
(US$50) per year to maintain the business name)
1088
 with business operating certificates being 
issued for free. 
 
For businesses requiring business licenses the cost of the annual business license varies depending 
upon the nature of the license and the turnover of the business. As an example of the ranges of 
license fees, for a D1 Importer license, the fee ranges from VT20,000 (US$200) per annum for 
businesses with a gross turnover of between VT4 million (US$40,000) and VT10 million 
(US$100,000), and up to VT1 million (US$10,000) per annum for businesses with a gross turnover 
of more than VT200 million (US$2 million).
1089
 The cost of registering a local company starts at 
VT30,000 (US$300) although businesses do not need to use a company in order to operate.
1090
 Re-
registration fees are paid annually. Initial applications for foreign investment applications, where 
required, cost VT25,000 (US$250), with an annual renewal cost being VT10,000 (US$100).
1091
 
 
In terms of time, prior to having a business license issued, businesses must register business 
names with the VFSC. Whilst the turnaround time to register a name is meant to take seven working 
days, in practice it can take several weeks.
1092
 It takes five days for a business license to be 
issued.
1093
 If foreign investment approval is required, VIPA has instituted procedures to ensure a 
turnaround of 15 days.
1094
 
 
Engaging local employees is a straightforward procedure. As Vanuatu does not maintain income 
tax, only national provident fund contributions must be paid. Work permits for foreign employees 
cost VT210,000 (US$2,100) per year, with residency permits costing a further VT57,600 (US$570) 
per year.
1095
 
 
One issue for foreign investors is that, although VIPA approves applications, it is not a “one-stop 
shop”. Investors still have to deal with the VFSC for registration of business names and company 
incorporation, rates and taxes for the payment of licenses, immigration for residency permits and 
labour for work permits for foreign employees.  
 
As discussed in the section on the judiciary, there can be considerable delays in obtaining court 
decisions. There is no small claims tribunal or other small claims procedure. There is also 
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considerable confusion as to the process for the enforcement of decisions.
1096
 This creates 
insecurity of contract arrangements for companies doing business. Although new intellectual 
property laws have been brought into force, Vanuatu currently lacks the infrastructure to administer 
these laws. It is too early to assess whether the intellectual property framework will be effective. 
 
Protection of property rights can also be problematic. Rights in respect of land also create 
difficulties. Uncertainty about the identification of customary land owners can make it difficult for 
investors to lease land that has not previously been the subject of a registered lease.
1097
 Even 
where registered leases exist, at times customary land owners do not recognise the leaseholders’ 
rights.
1098
 One reason for this is that the leasing process is an area where corruption may exist. For 
instance, the wrong people may have been negotiated with and paid for the lease.
1099
 There have 
also been many allegations of the ministers of lands improperly issuing leases.
1100
 Another 
corruption related issue that can create insecurity of leaseholders’ property rights is that lease 
money may not properly be distributed amongst customary land owners, leading to 
disgruntlement.
1101
 In late 2013 significant land reform laws were passed by parliament.
1102
 It is 
hoped that these will help to address the issues surrounding corruption in the land leasing,
1103
 
although it is too early to assess the impact of these. Amendments to these laws are progressing 
through the first ordinary session of parliament for 2014.
1104
    
Independence (law) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE LEGAL SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT UNWARRANTED EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE IN 
ACTIVITIES OF PRIVATE BUSINESSES? 
 
In the event of undue external interference in the operation of a business the main remedy 
available is to seek judicial review of the administrative decision in court. 
 
Public officials are involved at almost all the stages of business start-up and operation. As noted 
above, the VFSC is involved in issuing business licenses and registering companies. The 
Department of Customs and Inland Revenue issues business licenses, administers VAT and 
administers import duties. The Department of Immigration issues residency permits. The 
Department of Labour issues work permits. VIPA issues foreign investment approval certificates. 
The VNPF collects mandatory superannuation payments. Businesses operating in specific areas, 
such as telecommunications or broadcasting, may also have other requirements to meet. As 
discussed in the section on Media, broadcasters required licenses from the Vanuatu Broadcasting 
and Television Corporation in order to operate. The Telecommunications and Radio 
Communications Regulator (the TRR) issues licenses for telecommunications (phone and internet 
service providers) radio spectrum and radio apparatus activities.
1105
 Whilst the Utilities Regulatory 
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Authority (URA) does not issues licenses, it is involved in ‘regulating prices, service standards, and 
market conduct and consumer protection’1106 in relation to electricity and water suppliers.  
 
Whilst regulations do not specifically allow businesses to seek compensation in the event of undue 
external interference, it is possible to seek judicial review of administrative decisions via the 
courts.
1107
 It is also possible to lay a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. The ombudsman 
has the power to mediate complaints, which may result in compensation, or can issue public 
reports.
1108
 Public reports are only recommendatory and will not directly result in compensation 
being paid. 
Independence (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE BUSINESS SECTOR FREE FROM UNWARRANTED EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE IN 
ITS WORK IN PRACTICE? 
 
The legislature can, and does, introduce major law reforms that impact upon the activities of 
the business sector without any prior discussion. There is also some fear of complaining 
about abuse of office in case negative consequences to business result. 
 
A survey of hospitality and retail businesses conducted by the Vanuatu Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (VCCI) in 2013 indicated that only 6% of businesses identified government corruption as 
having a significant impact to their operations, with a further 8% identifying commercial legal and 
contract laws as having a considerable impact.
1109
 Conversely, 52% businesses identified 
government corruption as having no impact on their business.
1110
 
 
On the other hand, the VCCI survey identified employment laws as being a major concern for the 
private sector.
1111
 The cause of the concern about employment laws is an illustration of how the 
legislature can use its power to introduce changes to the detriment of the private sector. Major 
reforms introduced in 2008 resulted in an increase in annual leave and maternity leave allowances 
and an increase of up to 300% in severance allowances.
1112
 No prior public discussion of the law 
changes occurred and the changes appeared to have their roots in the unstable political 
environment, discussed in the foundations, legislature and executive sections. The government that 
passed the Employment (Amendment) Act 2008 had formed in late September 2008 and had 
already been reshuffled to defeat a motion of no confidence in October. By the time of the first 
reading of the Employment (Amendment) Bill 2008 on 19 November, there had been a number of 
other rumours of motions that never got as far as a parliamentary vote. On 26 November, six days 
after the vote of the Employment (Amendment) Bill 2008, then Prime Minister Edward Natapei 
survived his second vote of no confidence. This led to a suspicion that the Bill was a trade off by the 
government coalition to support the 2008 reform in order to avoid losing a vote of no confidence. 
Such a situation is an archetypal illustration of the “horse-trading” that can plague Vanuatu politics 
and result in ‘the attention of members of parliament [being diverted] from their institutional roles as 
law makers, overseers of government, and representatives.’1113  
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Another example of how public officials can exercise their power to the detriment of the private 
sector is through changes to reserved categories of business licenses. These changes can be done 
by Ministerial Order and occur without consultation.  There have been some concerns expressed by 
investors that law changes (for instance to the categories of reserved activities) may result in them 
“losing their businesses”.1114 It has also been observed that, ‘Expats or foreigners feel that they are 
discriminated against, and that the attitudes of locals toward them and their hard work are immature 
and unfounded. They do not feel that the government is doing its job, and they feel strongly that 
there are many side transactions.’1115  
 
Whilst it may be maintained that such law changes are not an infringement to the rule of law and are 
simply the legitimate exercise of political power, the process by which changes are introduced (one 
without consultation), the retrospective effect of some changes, and the extensive impact of such 
changes on businesses contribute to a sense of uncertainty in respect of the environment for doing 
business. 
 
There are anecdotes of businesses being required to pay fines without any legal basis. In instances 
reported, businesses have succumbed to paying fines as they were concerned about the impact on 
their business had they pursued further enquiries into complaints.
1116
 There have also been 
instances of companies being deregistered for failing to pay annual renewal fees on time without 
prior notification. Whilst this is legal, usual practice has been to allow for late payment if a late 
penalty is paid, so to change usual practice and deregister without prior notification may be 
perceived as illegitimate interference, rather than simply a change in practice to ensure better 
compliance with law.
1117
  
Governance 
Transparency (law) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS TO ENSURE TRANSPARENCY IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE 
BUSINESS SECTOR? 
 
Whilst most company records can be publically searched small companies are not required 
to provide audited accounts.  
 
The extent to which there is financial transparency depends upon the nature of the business. There 
are no requirements regarding transparency of sole traders. Partners are required to account to 
each other but are not required to undertake any particular auditing procedures.
1118
 
 
Whilst there is no public stock exchange, companies that operate locally are required to file annual 
returns with the VFSC.
1119
  This gives standard information about the company as at a specified 
annual date, such as the number of issued shares.  If the company’s turnover exceeds VT20 million 
(US$200,000) in any year, it must have audited accounts and must file the audited accounts with the 
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Registrar of Companies.
1120
  All the above information is available for public inspection at the 
Registrar’s Office.  
 
Until 2010 the Companies Act provided that exempted companies that do not carry out any 
operations within Vanuatu did not need to be audited nor file annual accounts, and thus could file a 
simpler annual return.
1121
 In order to gain access to records of exempted companies a court order 
was needed.
1122
 In 2010 exempted companies began to operate under the International Companies 
Act.
1123
 Documents held by the VFSC in respect of international companies can be inspected
1124
 
although nothing in this Act requires the filing of annual accounts or returns. 
 
Financial institutions are required to be licensed by the Reserve Bank pursuant to the Financial 
Institutions Act.
1125
 They operate under the supervision of the Reserve Bank. The law requires audit 
reports to be produced each financial year. However, the Reserve Bank has the discretion to waive 
the requirement if they are satisfied that the report on the annual balance sheet and the accounts of 
the licensee has been made by an auditor and is in compliance with the relevant laws in the 
jurisdiction in which they were incorporated. 
1126
 Reports must be published in the Gazette in order 
that they are publically available.
1127
 
 
There are no statutory codes of conduct for accountants although it is reported that, ‘Vanuatu is 
currently at Stage II of adopting [International Financial Reporting Standards] IFRS, where the use 
of IFRS is permitted.
1128
 Specifically, International Public Sector Accounting Standards are applied 
to unlisted companies when preparing for their financial statements.
1129
 
Transparency (practice) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THERE TRANSPARENCY IN THE BUSINESS SECTOR IN PRACTICE?  
 
Companies report to the VFSC and the public can obtain records through them, but 
companies do not usually take any other measures to report information on corporate 
responsibility to the public. 
 
Information on local companies including names of directors, contact details and annual reports, is 
available from the VFSC. The VFSC website also lists auditors who have been approved under the 
Companies Act to conduct company audits. With the absence of a professional Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in Vanuatu, this ensures that auditors do possess appropriate qualifications. 
The VFSC does not routinely verify financial records, but if any audit certificates are qualified, 
financial records will be investigated further. 
 
The extent to which large corporations report on corporate responsibility and sustainability activities 
in relation to countering corruption depends on the individual company. Some small companies 
publish corporate governance statements and financial statements on their websites.
1130
 However, it 
is more common to find such statements from regional banking institutions such as Westpac and 
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ANZ, who maintain their headquarters in Australia. It is the exception, rather than the rule, to find 
companies voluntarily reporting on corporate responsibility and anti-corruption activities. 
 
The URA helps to ensure transparency in respect of electricity and water providers by publishing 
copies of concession agreements.
1131
 It also maintains an open and consultative approach when 
undertaking reviews of matters such as electricity pricing and publishes review reports, performance 
reports and audit reports of regulated utilities on its website. The TRR plays a similar role in helping 
to ensure transparency of telecommunications and radiocommunications providers, by publishing 
lists of license holders,
1132
 and publishing press releases on activities in the sector. It does not, 
however, publish performance reports or audits on businesses that it regulates. 
Accountability (law)  
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE RULES AND LAWS GOVERNING OVERSIGHT OF THE BUSINESS SECTOR AND 
GOVERNING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES?  
 
Laws relating to corporate governance are old but require some internal corporate 
governance. There are also some external oversight mechanisms. 
 
In 2012 a new Companies Act was passed, and in 2013 a Companies (Insolvency and 
Receivership) Act was passed. Neither have come into force yet, however. Vanuatu’s company laws 
are therefore still based on old laws from the UK.
1133
 Before a company can be formed a 
memorandum and articles of association must be filed, stating the initial directors, share capital and 
subscribers.
1134
 Companies can be registered as private companies if they do not intend to invite the 
public to subscribe for shares or debentures.
1135
 Private companies do not have to produce a 
prospectus. If, however, the company is going to offer shares or debentures to the public then it 
must issue a prospectus, which must first be approved by the minister responsible. The content of 
the prospectus is defined in statute.
1136
 Directors’ reports to shareholders via annual general 
meetings and shareholders can also require extraordinary general meetings to be called.
1137
 
 
There is no public stock exchange and Vanuatu’s companies are overseen by the VFSC. The 
minister can appoint an inspector to investigate a company if there are any allegations of oppression 
of members or fraudulent activities.
1138
 If the inspector identifies fraud then the minister can bring a 
court action on behalf of the body corporate in the public interest.
1139
 The minister can also appoint 
an inspector to investigate ownership.
1140
 
 
Regulated utilities are provided with additional oversight via the URA which, amongst other things, 
monitors compliance with concession agreements and monitors performance.
1141
 The TRR provides 
oversight in its sector. For example, the 2014 workplan includes assessing compliance with quality 
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of service guidelines and coverage maps. The 2014 workplan also includes the development of 
additional regulatory tools that will increase accountability.
1142
 
 
Accountability (practice) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THERE EFFECTIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN COMPANIES IN PRACTICE?  
 
The VFSC ensures that domestic companies comply with accountability laws in order to 
continue with registration although the quality of that compliance is not assessed, and some 
sectors have additional accountability requirements. 
 
Many companies in Vanuatu are either family owned or small private companies, with owners 
themselves self-managing companies. Corporate governance in such an environment tends to be 
somewhat informal, although the VFSC does ensure that companies file returns as required.
1143
 
Large corporations tend to be overseas owned and governed by external corporate governance 
models. There have been no reported examples of inspections for fraud under the Companies Act in 
the past five years and it appears that annual returns are not subject to checking. Large corporations 
tend to be overseas owned and governed by external corporate governance models.  
 
The URA and TRR are active in oversight of their respective sectors.
1144
 As utilities are still 
effectively monopolies although different companies operate in different geographical locations, and 
telecommunications were, until 2008, a monopoly, additional accountability mechanisms in these 
sectors is particularly appropriate. 
 
Integrity mechanisms (law) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE MECHANISMS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF ALL THOSE ACTING IN THE 
BUSINESS SECTOR?  
 
Whilst there are criminal laws that prohibit bribery within Vanuatu and laws to regulate 
financial transactions have recently been significantly strengthened, voluntary mechanisms 
such as codes of conduct are generally absent. 
 
Other than laws related to the reporting of financial transactions, there are no sector wide anti-
corruption codes of conduct either entered into voluntarily or created by law. The Government 
Contracts and Tenders Act does not require bidders for public contracts to have ethics programmes 
or codes of conduct in place.
1145
 Even in professions that are totally or partially self-regulating, like 
lawyers and health professionals, there are no written codes of conduct. 
 
The Financial Transactions Reporting Act, the Proceeds of Crime Act the Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters Act and the  Counter Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime Act together 
form Vanuatu’s suite of laws against money laundering and financing of terrorism. These laws were 
introduced in 2000 as part of the Comprehensive Reform Programme to address concerns that 
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Vanuatu’s tax haven was being used as a venue for money laundering. Reforms to the latter three 
Acts were passed by parliament in 2012 and ‘significantly strengthen Vanuatu’s AML/CFT legal 
framework and in particular, explicitly provide for money laundering as a predicate offence and the 
prosecution of money laundering offence for proceeds of crime generated by a predicate 
offence.’1146 The FTRA requires financial institutions to maintain records and report suspicious 
transactions to the Financial Intelligence Unit, and acts as a code of conduct for financial institutions 
in respect of suspected money laundering.
1147
  
 
The Penal Code prohibits the bribery of public officials, with the maximum penalty of imprisonment 
for 10 years.
1148
 Corporations, as well as individuals, can be held liable for bribery.
1149
  However, the 
law is only applicable to public officials of the Republic of Vanuatu. There are no laws prohibiting 
bribery of officials of other countries, either within or outside of Vanuatu. 
 
Whilst some companies have their own codes of conduct (for example, ANZ Bank, Westpac Bank), 
these are the exception rather than the rule. The URA and the TRR are active in developing codes 
of conduct and practice standards in their sectors. The TRR has issued guidelines in respect of 
advertising, quality of service, competition, consumers and consultation.
1150
 The URA has issued 
performance standards in a number of areas and is active in regulating prices.
1151
 Whilst the TRR 
and the URA do not have “anti-corruption” guidelines per se, good practice underlies all their 
regulatory activities. 
Integrity mechanisms (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE INTEGRITY OF THOSE WORKING IN THE BUSINESS SECTOR ENSURED IN PRACTICE?  
 
Whilst businesses will seek to sanction employee misbehaviour that directly impacts upon 
them, there are few other indicators of the operation of integrity mechanisms in practice. 
There have, however, been improvements in the implementation of laws relating to reporting 
of financial transactions. 
 
In the absence of integrity mechanisms in law, it is difficult to monitor integrity mechanisms in 
practice. As discussed in the section on the judiciary, misuse of position by private sector employees 
or office holders for financial gain is regularly prosecuted as misappropriation, fraud or forgery, 
therefore sanctions for lack of employee integrity that affect businesses directly are applied. Whilst 
there has been one recent instance of a prosecution for bribery,
1152
 bribery is not regularly detected 
and prosecuted. The Global Corruption Barometer 2013 reports that 13% of respondents from 
Vanuatu had paid a bribe to obtain a government service, which suggests that undetected bribery is 
occurring.
1153
 However, it is not clear how many respondents were from the private sector.  
 
The lack of integrity mechanisms is a particular concern because of weaknesses in integrity 
mechanisms in respect of payments to leaders and the absence of integrity mechanisms in relation 
to electoral campaign financing and political party financing. Whilst some parties do, or have had, 
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close ties with private businesses it is not possible to monitor the extent to which private businesses 
do, in fact, impact upon other institutions within the National Integrity System. 
 
Despite this, there does not seem to be major public concern with corruption in the private sector. 
The Global Corruption Barometer 2013 ranks the perception of corruption of various sectors on a 
scale of 1 – 5. Private businesses rank 3.1154 Only NGOs, the media and religious bodies had a 
better ranking in relation to the extent to which they were perceived to be corrupt. 
 
No solely locally based Vanuatu companies have signed the UN Global Compact or the World 
Economic Forum Partnering Against Corruption Initiative. However, some multinational companies 
with branches in Vanuatu that have signed initiatives. For instance, Westpac is a participant in the 
UN Global Compact.  
 
There have, however, been significant improvements in the implementation of the FTRA since the 
last National Integrity System report in 2006. Staffing levels of the Financial Intelligence Unit have 
increased and this law is now being actively implemented.
1155
 The URA and the TRR, both 
established in 2008, help to ensure integrity of operations in their respective sectors by monitoring 
performance and issuing guidelines. 
Role 
Support for/engagement with civil society 
Score: 0 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE BUSINESS SECTOR ENGAGE WITH/PROVIDE SUPPORT TO CIVIL SOCIETY ON ITS 
TASK OF COMBATING CORRUPTION? 
 
In general, the business sector does not engage with or provide support to civil society in its 
task of combating corruption. 
 
There is limited support by businesses to civil society to combat corruption. Transparency 
International Vanuatu has received some funding from individual businesses, however, such 
arrangements are not the norm. Instead, business support for civil society activities is focussed on 
activities such as sports, the ambulance and medical services, and animal welfare. Attempts to seek 
private sector funding for the Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre have not yet resulted in any private 
sector donations. 
 
In 2013, Transparency Vanuatu launched the Business Principles for Countering Bribery Project 
with the Private Sector through a series of workshops and the distribution of CD-ROMs. The 
workshops were reasonably well attended,
1156
 suggesting that if CSOs engage the private sector in 
areas not related to financial support the private sector may be somewhat receptive.  However, no 
follow up has yet been conducted to see what impact, if any, the workshops and distribution of CD-
ROMs had.  
 
It can be observed that the VCCI in itself acts somewhat like a CSO. All business license holders 
are members of the VCCI. This body represents and advocates for business interests and is active 
in training.
1157
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Anti-corruption policy engagement 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE BUSINESS SECTOR ACTIVE IN ENGAGING THE DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT ON ANTI-
CORRUPTION?  
 
The business sector actively engages with government on a number of issues. Whilst anti-
corruption is not a specific area of engagement, good governance that is conducive to a 
good business environment is an area of central concern.   
The VCCI is not a participant in the UN Global Compact, which ‘asks companies to embrace, 
support and enact, within their sphere of influence, a set of core values in the areas of human rights, 
labour standards, the environment and anti-corruption.’1158 Nor are there any companies that 
operate solely in Vanuatu who are participants in the UN Global Compact. 
The VCCI does consider issues of corruption to a degree. Some of its training courses include units 
on business ethics. It also works to encourage businesses to comply with laws.
1159
 Further, the 2013 
members’ survey gauged members concern regarding corruption. However, as reported above, 
corruption was not perceived to be a large issue and the VCCI currently does not publically engage 
the government using the “language of corruption”. In part, this may be due to a desire to maintain 
harmonious relationships with the government.
1160
  Whilst corruption related issues may arise when 
the private sector engages with the government on particular law or policy initiatives, labelling 
certain actions as corrupt may be inflammatory and therefore counter-productive to private sector 
interests. That said, the VCCI is actively represented in a number of government committees and 
actively lobbies for a good business environment. As corruption is not conducive to a good business 
environment this lobbying is underpinned by a good governance agenda.
1161
 
One issue faced by the VCCI is that when it engages with consultation on policy matters there is 
often little response from government.
1162
 Another issue is that consultation is often a “one-off” 
event. There is no ongoing discussion to ensure that law reforms reflect the result of the 
consultation. This can lead to the sense that consultation is being done for the sake of appearances, 
to show aid donors and others that the private sector has been consulted, rather than a 
communicative process to develop reforms taking into account a wide range of views. As discussed 
in the section on the legislature, there is no process to ensure that the public, including business, 
can easily get copies of bills before they are debated in parliament.   
The VCCI nominates a representative or representatives onto a number of statutory boards, 
including the Vanuatu National Provident Fund, the Vanuatu Agricultural Development Bank, the 
Vanuatu Investment Promotion Authority and Airports Vanuatu Limited. The presence of an 
experienced business person should provide benefit to these boards, by ensuring that there is 
someone with practical business acumen to contribute to discussions. Currently, however, nominees 
put forward by the VCCI to some boards are being rejected, whether or not there is statutory power 
for the minister to do so.
1163
 This limits the ability of business to engage in policy discussion in 
respect of these specific boards. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Business is currently not seen to be having a clearly defined role within Vanuatu’s National 
Integrity System. It is recommended that the VCCI be recognised as a non-governmental 
partner on all national integrity initiatives. 
 
2. The VCCI should encourage and support local businesses to undertake voluntary anti-
corruption initiatives, such as disclosing donations to political parties and developing statements 
of corporate responsibility. 
 
3. The VCCI has limited resources to engage in sustained policy discussion. In conjunction with 
the Standing Orders of Parliament being reviewed, which should enhance opportunities for 
consultation, the VCCI should be provided with sufficient resources to be able to engage in 
ongoing policy discussion. 
 
4. Where statute provides for a representative of business nominated by the VCCI to be on a 
board, ministers should accept a minuted recommendation from the VCCI Council as to the 
business nominee unless there are specific reasons why acceptance would be unlawful. 
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VII.14. CUSTOMARY AUTHORITIES 
INTRODUCTION 
This pillar focuses specifically on the constitutionally mandated structures and duties of the National 
Council of Chiefs or Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs which are developed further in the National 
Council of Chiefs Act 2006. In December 2013 a number of constitutional amendments affecting the 
powers and duties of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs were passed by parliament.
1164
 The role of 
the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs is to ‘discuss all matters relating to custom and tradition and … 
make recommendations for the preservation and promotion of ni-Vanuatu culture and 
languages.’1165 It must also be consulted on ‘any question relating to tradition and custom and land 
in connection with any bill before Parliament.’1166 
Under the Constitution there are three other areas where customary authorities are provided a 
specific role.  First, the Constitution requires that, ‘Parliament shall provide for the establishment of 
village or island courts with jurisdiction over customary and other matters and shall provide for the 
role of chiefs in such courts.’1167 In partial fulfilment of this constitutional requirement,1168 in 1983 
parliament passed the Island Courts Act. This Act provides for the establishment of Island Courts, 
presided over by ‘three justices knowledgeable in custom for each island court at least one of whom 
shall be a custom chief residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.’1169 Each court is 
supervised by a supervising magistrate.
1170
 These are hybrid courts that form part of the judiciary 
and have jurisdiction over low-level criminal and civil matters within the western legal system, rather 
than dispensing “custom justice”.1171  As they form part of the judiciary their operation is noted in that 
pillar. 
Second, parliament may ‘provide for persons knowledgeable in … custom to sit with the judges of 
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal and take part in its proceedings.’1172 Again this relates to 
the operation of the judiciary so is not further discussed here. 
The final area where the Constitution provides a role for customary authorities is land matters. All 
land in Vanuatu ‘belongs to the indigenous custom owners and their descendants’1173 and ‘the rules 
of custom shall form the basis of ownership and use of land in the Republic of Vanuatu.’1174 The 
Constitution requires that in the event of disputes as to customary ownership, ‘Parliament by 
enactment shall formalise the recognition of appropriate customary institutions or procedures to 
resolve land ownership or any disputes over custom land.’1175 Island Courts originally had 
jurisdiction over customary land disputes. A more complex customary land dispute resolution 
structure was established by parliament in 2001, when the Customary Land Tribunal Act was 
passed.
1176
 In December 2013 the Customary Land Tribunal Act was repealed and a new land 
disputes structure was introduced by the Custom Land Management Act 2013. This Act was 
gazetted in February 2014, but amendments are proceeding through the First Ordinary Session of 
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Parliament for 2014. Whilst customary authorities have a significant part to play in custom land 
management, the law is in flux. It is therefore premature to analyse this area. 
SUMMARY 
Overall pillar score: 45.8 
Dimension Indicator Law Practice 
Capacity 
37.5 
Resources 50 25 
Independence 50 25 
Governance 
50 
Transparency 50 50 
Accountability 50 50 
Integrity 75 25 
Role 
50 
Demanding accountability from public duty 
bearers 
25 
Promoting community interests and 
integrity in local governance 
75 
 
Customary authorities are integral to community governance and help the state to ensure that order 
is maintained throughout the country. However, customary governance structures are facing challenges 
caused by changes due to introduced systems. These changes, which are related to factors including the 
commercialisation of customary land, increasing urbanisation, and people living in nuclear families rather 
than as part of an extended grouping have created confusion as to who are legitimate customary authority 
holders, and the extent of their authority.  
At a national level customary authority is organised within the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs. The 
constitutional role of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs in respect of being consulted by parliament has 
recently been expanded, and this enhances the formal extent to which the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs 
will be able to hold the legislature to account.  This body faces a number of challenges, however. It lacks 
resources to be able to fulfil its roles and to support local Councils of Chiefs to develop. It also lacks 
independence, as the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs does not determine its own secretariat.  
STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION 
The Constitution provides for the establishment of the National Council of Chiefs, or Malvatumauri 
Council of Chiefs.
1177
 This body is comprised of custom chiefs elected by their peers from district 
councils of chiefs.
1178
  It has ‘general competence to discuss all matters relating to custom and 
tradition and may make recommendations for the preservation and promotion of ni-Vanuatu culture 
and languages.’1179 Until the 2013 constitutional amendments, consultation with the Malvatumauri 
Council of Chiefs on Bills before parliament was not mandatory. The 2013 Constitutional 
amendments made consultation on all Bills relating to land, tradition and custom compulsory. 
Further detail as to the structure and organisation of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs is found in 
the National Council of Chiefs Act 2006. This Act establishes 20 Island and 2 Urban Councils of 
Chiefs, which in turn elect the 31 members of the National Council of Chiefs.  In addition to its 
constitutional duties, the National Council of Chiefs Act 2006 provides additional functions for the 
Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs in respect of maintaining registers of Island and Urban Councils of 
Chiefs, and providing assistance to these local level councils. The Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs 
elects its chairman, who is also referred to as the president. The Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs is 
provided with a secretariat, in the form of a chief executive officer and other staff, all of whom are 
                                                        
1177
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public servants.
1180
 The president maintains an office within the secretariat, which is located in Port 
Vila.   
Whilst the National Council of Chiefs forms the formal national structure, customary authorities work 
in their communities in accordance with customary practices. These are, usually, not written down. 
Further, Vanuatu is home to over 100 distinct indigenous cultures, and does not have a single 
homogeneous “custom”. This means that the structure and organisation of customary authorities at 
the community level varies. Whilst there is enormous variety, some commonalities can be identified. 
These include the central importance of kinship ties. Family and supra-family groupings are headed 
by authority figures, which may be elected or selected, based on personal characteristics.
1181
 
Positions of authority are, generally, earned rather than inherited.
1182
 Customary order is 
characterised by ‘the emphasis on peace and harmony in the community, on restoring relationships, 
on the use of chiefs to facilitate agreement, [and] community involvement in the processes’.1183 In 
this section customary authorities at the community level are assessed as a whole, in respect of 
generalities. 
ASSESSMENT  
Capacity 
Resources (law) 
Score: 50 
IN LAW, DO CUSTOMARY AUTHORITIES HAVE RESOURCES TO DISCHARGE THEIR DUTIES?  
 
The law does provide some resources for the operation of the Malvatumauri Council of 
Chiefs but does not specify what activities must be funded by the government. 
The National Council of Chiefs Act 2006 provides that the funds of the Malvatumauri Council of 
Chiefs can come from government appropriations and other sources.
1184
 It does not specify that any 
particular level of support must be provided by the government, or that any particular activities must 
be funded. 
Council members are paid a monthly allowance of 30,000 vatu (US$300) and a gratuity of 250,000 
vatu at the end of their term (US$2,500). There are also set sitting and subsistence allowances for 
each day the council sits.
1185
 Chiefs who are on local level Councils of Chiefs but are not on the 
National Council of Chiefs are not provided with any allowances.
1186
 The president of the 
Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs receives an annual salary pursuant to the Official Salaries Act [Cap 
168]. 
The law provides that a chief executive officer (CEO) must be appointed by the PSC.
1187
 Other staff 
can also be appointed, but no other staffing positions are specified in law.
1188
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 Part 4, National Council of Chiefs Act 2006. 
1181
 Anita Jowitt, Yoli Tom’tavala and Joseph Foukona, Customary law and public health (Technical paper prepared for 
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 Lamont Lindstrom, ‘“Big Man” A Short Terminology’ (1981) 83(4) American Anthropologist 900.  
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Resources (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT DO CUSTOMARY AUTHORITIES HAVE ADEQUATE RESOURCES TO EFFECTIVELY DISCHARGE 
THEIR DUTIES? 
 
Whilst the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs receives some support for operations from 
government and project support from external agencies, resource issues limit the extent to 
which the central administration can support activities and development throughout the 
country. 
In 2013 the Government Appropriation to the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs was VT42,485,289 
(US$425,000). Approximately 34% of this amount was used for members’ allowances, with 13% 
being used for funding of Island and Urban Councils of Chiefs, 19% being used for staff of the 
Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs Office and 3% for capital expenditure. The remainder was used for 
operational expenses.  
There are concerns from within the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs that resources are insufficient. 
Current public servants working within the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs administration are the 
CEO, one secretary, two drivers, one gardener and one customary land officer, who is engaged on a 
fixed-term contract.
1189
  
In both 2013
1190
 and 2014
1191
 the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs requested the government to 
provide more financial and administrative support to the office because the present administrative 
and financial support by the government is inadequate to enable the council to provide effective 
service delivery to the people and the country. Much of the budget is used for transport to the annual 
council meeting. There are very limited resources for ongoing communication and support through 
travel to the islands, phone calls, or even mail.
1192
 This hinders the ability of the central 
administration to provide support and development for customary authorities operating in the 
islands. Nor are there any resources for district or area level Councils of Chiefs to operate.
1193
 The 
Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs is currently negotiating an agreement with Telecom Vanuatu Ltd that 
will allow free or reduced cost calls between chiefs and other government agencies to help address 
some of these issues.
1194
 
The 2013 land reforms placed the customary land management office under the Ministry of Lands, 
despite the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs wanting the customary land management office to 
remain under the Malvatumauri.
1195
 It can be noted that these laws are currently in flux, but if these 
changes occur this will result in further resource limitations for the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs. 
The Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs is currently being provided resources under the Australian Aid 
funded Vanuatu Land Programme to work with fieldworkers from the Vanuatu Cultural Centre to 
begin to identify “nakamals” as specified under the Customary Land Management Act.1196  
The Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs does receive technical support from sources other than the 
government. For instance, the World Justice Project is delivering a Chiefs Legal Education Pilot 
Programme, which aims to train chiefs in areas such as good governance, customary law, 
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 Interview of Steve Namali, National Custom Land Officer Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs with Anita Jowitt, Port 
Vila, 9 May 2014. 
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1192
 Interview of Steve Namali, National Custom Land Officer Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs with Anita Jowitt, Port 
Vila, 9 May 2014. 
1193
 Ibid. 
1194
 Interview of Irene Luan, CEO of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 9 May 2014. 
1195
 Jonas Cullwick, ‘Malvatumauri wants to look after Customary Land Management Office’ Vanuatu Daily Post Online 
14 March 2014. 
1196
 Interview of Irene Luan, CEO of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 9 May 2014. 
  
193 NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT VANUATU 
 
 
constitutional law, human rights and drafting by-laws.
1197
 This activity supports Recommendation 6 
of the “Malvatumarui Council of Chiefs Roadmap”, a list of resolutions developed in 2011 which 
provides the current policy direction of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs.
1198
 
Independence (law) 
Score: 50 
IN LAW, HOW INDEPENDENT ARE CUSTOMARY AUTHORITIES FROM THE INFLUENCE OR INTERFERENCE OF 
OTHER AUTHORITIES?  
 
There are some legal protections of independence, but the secretariat is not under the direct 
control of the Council of Chiefs. 
Members of the National Council of Chiefs are constitutionally guaranteed protections that are 
similar to parliamentary privilege. They may not be arrested, detained, prosecuted or proceeded 
against in respect of opinions given or votes cast by in the council in the exercise of office and 
during a session of the council except with the authorisation of the council in exceptional 
circumstances.
1199
 
The process of selecting customary leaders to Councils of Chiefs is left to custom, although there 
are limits to ensure independence from external influences. In particular a member of a Council of 
Chiefs, either at National, Urban or Island level is not allowed to hold an executive position in a 
political party or a senior church position. Another bar to being a member of the Councils of Chiefs is 
having contested a local or national government election.
1200
 
Whilst the minister may make regulations relating to the operation of the Malvatumauri Council of 
Chiefs, these regulations are only to be made on its advice.
1201
 
The CEO and other staff of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs are appointed by the PSC so are not 
under the direct control of the Council of Chiefs.
1202
 Further, as discussed in the section on the 
Public Sector, whilst laws should guarantee that public servants are appointed on merit and should 
not be subject to interference, some loopholes exist. 
Independence (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE CUSTOMARY AUTHORITIES INDEPENDENT IN PRACTICE?  
 
Because the central secretariat is not accountable to the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs it 
can lead to divergence between the views of the chiefs and the actions of the secretariat. 
There is concern that the having the CEO being appointed by the PSC undermines the 
independence of the secretariat. The operational structure is that the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs 
is made up of customary leaders selected through customary methods. They in turn select their 
president and an Executive Council. The CEO of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs, as the head of 
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the secretariat, should act on the instructions of the Executive Council and be accountable to it. 
However, as the CEO is appointed by the PSC the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs does not have 
the power to hold the CEO to account. This can lead to divergence between the secretariat, which in 
practice controls funding, and the Council.
1203
  The structure of having a centralised secretariat 
based in Port Vila may also undermine the authority of local level Councils of Chiefs, where 
customary authority should reside. Former President Chief Alguet has stated that the ‘Malvatumauri 
is an “ear” that the government will use to listen to custom. It is not a custom authority therefore it 
should not be giving orders to custom Chiefs.’1204 These issues have been recognised and in 2013 a 
review of the National Council of Chiefs Act commenced.
1205
 
There is also concern that the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs can be co-opted for other agendas. 
This has been particularly apparent in respect of land reforms. Customary land ownership is a very 
sensitive issue. Following a National Land Summit in 2006 a number of resolutions were made. 
These were developed into the Vanuatu Land Sector Framework. Pursuant to this in 2011 the Mama 
Graon Project was launched.
1206
 This project, which was funded by AusAID and theNew Zealand 
Aid Programme and implemented by an Australian company, was initially supported by the 
Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs. Later the former President of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs, 
who was asked to resign as it appeared that he had been receiving too much from the Mama Graon 
Project,
1207
 withdrew his support as he felt he has been misinformed about the project.
1208
 There 
were subsequent criticisms that the Mama Graon Project was ‘trying to get Malvatumauri to become 
another propaganda machine.’1209  
Governance 
Transparency (law) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT THE PUBLIC CAN OBTAIN RELEVANT AND 
TIMELY INFORMATION ON THE ACTIVITIES AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES OF THE CUSTOMARY 
AUTHORITIES? 
 
There is limited transparency of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs in law, but customary 
practice ensures transparency of customary authorities at community level.  
The Council is required to provide an annual report on its activities to the minister,
1210
 but there is no 
requirement that this report is made public. Internal rules of the council require Urban and Island 
Councils of Chiefs to provide quarterly reports to the central administration,
1211
 but again there is no 
requirement that these are published.   
There are no specific written rules on the relationship between Urban and Island Councils of Chiefs 
and the public. Instead, this follows customary practice. Whilst customary practice varies throughout 
the country, one feature of customary governance is the use of regular public meetings. 
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Transparency (practice) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT CAN THE PUBLIC OBTAIN RELEVANT AND TIMELY INFORMATION ON THE ACTIVITIES AND 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES OF CUSTOMARY AUTHORITIES IN PRACTICE?  
 
Whilst formal annual reports are not readily available, customary practice means that 
customary authorities act in a largely transparent manner in respect of their communities, 
through mechanisms such as community meetings. 
Annual reports are produced for the minister.
1212
 Some key resolutions or policy decisions are 
written down and are available on request from the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs or the relevant 
Council of Chiefs. Examples of this include the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs Roadmap
1213
 and the 
Vaturisu Design, a document released by the Vaturisu (Efate Island Council of Chiefs) about land 
policy.
1214
 
The relationship between customary authorities and communities tends to be quite open. The 
Alternative Indicators of Wellbeing study indicated that only 22% of surveyed communities in 
Vanuatu did not have community meetings.
1215
 Attendance at community meetings is also high, with 
only 8% reporting that they did not attend meetings.
1216
 Only 8% reported that they had a low level 
of trust in community leaders.
1217
 As trust is built, in part, on having faith that leaders are “doing the 
right thing”, which in turn relies on some knowledge of what leaders are doing, this level of trust 
suggests that there is a reasonable level of transparency in the activities of customary authorities. 
This is further supported by the finding that only 10% of chiefs were not thought to be good at 
communicating with community members.
1218
 
It can be observed that the Alternative Indicators of Wellbeing study did not specifically ask about 
the formal Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs structure.  However, the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs 
is drawn from customary authorities that operate within custom in their communities. As custom is, 
generally, fairly transparent, it can also be assumed that there is transparency if community 
members want to ask chiefs about the activities of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs. That said, 
resource issues limit communication from the central administration to local councils and may mean 
that council members may not always be aware of central activities. This is reflected in the 
recommendation in the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs Roadmap  to ‘strengthen the consultation 
process from the national to the village level.’1219 
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Accountability (law)  
Score: 25 
IN LAW, ARE THERE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT CUSTOMARY AUTHORITIES REPORT AND ANSWER 
FOR THEIR ACTIONS?  
 
The Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs secretariat is required to be accountable to the 
government but there are no legal requirements that members of the Malvatumauri Council 
of Chiefs be accountable to their communities. 
As stated above, the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs must provide annual reports to the minister. It 
is also required to produce annual financial accounts that are subject to annual audits by the Office 
of the Auditor General.
1220
 Council members are expected to report quarterly, although this is not 
specified in law. 
Council members are elected every five years.
1221
 There is no set procedure for this election. The 
process follows custom,
1222
 and custom varies throughout the country. 
There are no specific requirements in law that council members report to their communities. 
However, it can be observed that, in customary practice, customary leaders rely on widespread 
support for their positions.
1223
 Leaders who do not carry out their duties in an appropriate manner 
will not have support and will therefore lose authority. 
Accountability (practice) 
Score: 50 
TO WHAT EXTENT DO THE CUSTOMARY AUTHORITIES REPORT ON AND ANSWER FOR THEIR ACTIONS IN 
PRACTICE?  
 
Some formal reporting occurs and some customary mechanisms act to hold customary 
authorities to account, but it is not clear how accountable customary leaders must be to their 
communities. 
Annual reports and audited financial statements are produced.
1224
 Quarterly reports from local 
Councils of Chiefs to the secretariat are not always produced.
1225
   
In 2012 the President of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs stepped down. This decision was 
reported to have been based on concerns within the council that the President had not acted in 
accordance with customary values so should, in the appropriately customary manner, humbly 
withdraw from his position of leadership.
1226
 This suggests that customary accountability 
mechanisms amongst members of the National Council of Chiefs do operate.  
It is less clear to what extent customary accountability mechanisms operate at the community level. 
Street survey research carried out as part of this National Integrity System assessment indicated 
that, of 50 respondents, 60% thought that chiefs act in their own interest rather than the community 
interest. In respect of land disputes 64% thought chiefs act unfairly. Whilst this is a small Port Vila 
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based sample, it suggests that there is some dissatisfaction with chiefs. This data can be contrasted 
with the findings of the Alternative Indicators of Wellbeing survey, which indicated that, nationally, 
23% had a high level of trust and 67% had a medium level of trust in community leaders.
1227
 The 
Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs Roadmap recognises that there is a need to strengthen the custom 
governance system,
1228
 and this would include strengthening accountability.
1229
 
Integrity (law) 
Score: 75 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THERE MECHANISMS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF CUSTOMARY 
AUTHORITIES? 
 
Integrity mechanisms exist both in state law and customary practice. 
Members of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs are leaders under the Leadership Code Act. They 
must behave fairly and honestly in all their official dealings with colleagues and other people, avoid 
personal gain, and avoid behaviour that is likely to bring their office into disrepute.
1230
 They are also 
required to file annual returns. 
Custom also expects integrity in its chiefs. Chief Tepahae, writing about customary authority on 
Aneityum, lists the qualities a chief must have, including the ability to listen, respect for others, being 
humble, not being selfish or greedy, being reserved, and not being quick to anger.
1231
 If these 
qualities are not displayed then the people’s trust will be withdrawn and a chief will lose his position. 
Whilst different islands have different ways of attaining the position of chief and retaining it, as a 
generalisation the position is founded on respect derived from personal integrity. 
Integrity (practice) 
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE INTEGRITY OF CUSTOMARY AUTHORITIES ENSURED IN PRACTICE?  
 
State laws designed to uphold integrity do not function and customary integrity mechanisms 
are facing significant challenges due to lack of clarity about who legitimately holds 
customary authority. 
As discussed elsewhere in the report, the Leadership Code Act does not operate well in practice.  
The assumed customary integrity mechanisms are also not functioning well at the moment. One of 
the major challenges facing the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs is the ascertainment of chiefly 
titles.
1232
 Identifying customary authorities and restoring them to their rightful place and ascertaining 
chiefly titles are two of the recommendations of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs Roadmap.  
As chiefs are defined by place, determining customary titles also relates to identifying customary 
land boundaries. The commercialisation of land helps to confuse both the identification of chiefs and 
the role of chiefs. Recent research conducted on Tanna indicates that people would sign customary 
land owner identification documents as “chiefs”, with no verification of the authenticity of this claim 
                                                        
1227
 Vanuatu National Statistics Office and Malvatumauri, Alternative Indicators of Well-being for Melanesia Vanuatu 
Pilot Study Report, 2012 (Port Vila: Vanuatu National Statistics Office and Malvatumauri, 2012) 63. 
1228
 Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs: 2011, recommendation 9. 
1229
 Interview of Irene Luan, CEO of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 9 May 2014. 
1230
 Section 3, Leadership Code Act [Cap 240].  
1231
 Tepahae, 1997: 1. 
1232
 Interview of Irene Luan, CEO of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 9 May 2014. 
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and that chiefs would sign on apparent behalf of a group of people with no consultation. There were 
also allegations of chiefs being bribed to sign.
1233
  This report also noted ‘there is little evidence of 
fraudsters being called to account through either customary or civil action.’1234 These problems are 
widespread throughout Vanuatu and undermine the integrity of customary authority.
1235
  
Role 
Community mobilisation to demand accountability from duty bearers and promote integrity  
Score: 25 
TO WHAT EXTENT DO CUSTOMARY AUTHORITIES PROVIDE SUPPORT TO THEIR SUBJECTS TO DEMAND 
ACCOUNTABILITY FROM AND PROMOTE INTEGRITY AMONG PUBLIC DUTY BEARERS?  
 
Changes to the Constitution will enhance the ability of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs to 
hold law-makers to account. 
It is not clear the extent to which customary authorities should get involved in national politics. Direct 
involvement by the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs through mechanisms such as standing in 
elections and holding political office is not permitted.
1236
 Further, there is a view that, ‘It is not the 
role of the National Council of Chiefs to tell the government to “pull up its socks”.’1237  That said, 
holding leaders to account “in the custom way” by ‘invit[ing] the government to its nakamal and 
communicat[ing] matters about custom’1238 is seen as a legitimate role and one where the 
Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs could do more.
1239
 The recent constitutional changes, which make it 
mandatory for the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs to be consulted on any law change that may have 
implications for custom, embeds the requirement for dialogue. Whilst this process will not 
necessarily help in holding leaders to account if laws are made in opposition to the Malvatumauri 
Council of Chiefs’ views, the process implicitly suggests that the views of chiefs will be taken into 
account in the law-making process. There is scope for expanding and clarifying the process for 
consultation of chiefs by the legislature, to give chiefs more power to hold the legislature to account. 
Chiefs do, at times, tell people how to vote in national elections. Street survey research conducted 
as part of this National Integrity System assessment indicated that 36% of the 50 respondents had 
been instructed in how to vote, with comments suggesting that this percentage would be higher in 
rural areas.
1240
 Whilst this can be seen as an interference with the democratic process, it can equally 
be seen as a chief exercising his power to hold politicians to account by withholding support. This is 
an area where education is needed. As indicated in the discussion on integrity in practice above, 
introduced systems are placing pressure on customary authorities and the legitimate roles of 
customary governance and leadership are blurred. Part of establishing clarity in respect of 
customary leadership involves clarifying the boundaries and intersections between the modern 
democratic state and customary authority. 
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 Rod Nixon, Leisande Otto and Raewyn Porter, Wan sip plante kapten: leasing on Tanna island, Vanuatu (World 
Bank Justice For the Poor Research Report, May 2012) 21. 
1234
 Ibid, 30. 
1235
 Interview of Irene Luan, CEO of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 9 May 2014; Sarah 
Kernot and Lai Sakita, The role of chiefs in Peacebuilding in Port Vila (State Society and Governance in Melanesia 
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 National Council of Chiefs Election Regulation Order 2007. 
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function-says-govt-public-relations-officer-patunvanu.html [accessed 10 May 2014]. 
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Community representation and promotion of integrity in local governance structures  
Score: 75 
TO WHAT EXTENT DO CUSTOMARY AUTHORITIES REPRESENT COMMUNITY INTERESTS AND PROMOTE 
INTEGRITY IN LOCAL/COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES? 
 
At a community level customary authorities are integrally involved with community 
governance and, when they function well, promote a high degree of integrity.  
Customary authorities are integral to providing local governance structures. Outside of the urban 
areas, where there is very limited presence of the state, customary authorities work with other 
community structures including women’s groups, youth groups and church groups to maintain 
community governance.
1241
 As discussed above, consensus derived through community meetings is 
an integral part of the operation of customary authority, and this consensus nature means that 
community interests are represented. 
This harmonious ideal should not be overstated, however. As discussed in the section on integrity in 
practice there is considerable confusion as to who the legitimate customary authorities are in many 
areas and what the legitimate scope of their power is. There is also some lack of trust in customary 
authorities. Further, when the cash economy intersects with customary governance, for example 
through transactions involving customary land, customary authorities can act without integrity, which 
undermines community governance. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Customary governance is facing challenges caused by changes due to introduced systems. 
Until these challenges are addressed customary authorities will suffer from weakened 
foundations. The government and/or aid donors should ensure that the Malvatumauri Council of 
Chiefs is provided with sufficient resources to enable travel to allow chiefs to come together 
and, in the customary way, have discussions to rethink and rediscover customary governance 
and leadership.  This process should include establishing who the correct holders of chiefly titles 
are. 
2. Although the Constitution provides that the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs should be 
independent, the current National Council of Chiefs Act 2006 sets down a structure that 
interferes with independence. The 2013 review of the National Council of Chiefs Act should be 
acted upon by the government, with the Act being repealed or amended. 
3. Urban and Island Councils of Chiefs may lack support or technical capacity to remain 
accountable and transparent through the filing of quarterly reports, and the central 
administration lacks resources to provide this support. The government and/or aid donors 
should provide technical assistance to develop guidelines for reporting and to train Council 
members in reporting and provide ongoing support for reporting. 
4. The constitutional role of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs in respect of being consulted by 
Parliament is being expanded. Guidelines need to be developed, possibly as part of the review 
of Standing Orders, to ensure that: this consultation is done transparently; that sufficient time is 
given for consultation; and that, if required, sufficient technical resources are provided to allow 
the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs to engage fully on issues referred to it. 
  
                                                        
1241
 Interview of Irene Luan, CEO of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs with Anita Jowitt, Port Vila, 9 May 2014. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
SUMMARY OF SCORES 
Each of the pillars of Vanuatu’s National Integrity System has been assessed along three 
dimensions that are essential to is ability to prevent corruption:  
 its overall capacity, in terms of resources and independence 
 its internal governance regulations and practices, focusing on whether the institutions in 
the pillar are transparent, accountable and act with integrity 
 its role in the overall integrity system, focusing on the extent to which the institutions in 
the pillar fulfil their assigned role with regards to preventing and fighting corruption 
 
The graphic below shoes the aggregate scores of each of the pillars performance in these three 
areas. This clearly indicates that there are significant weaknesses across all pillars of Vanuatu’s 
National Integrity System. 
 
 
 
In some respects this is not surprising. Vanuatu is a developing country that has been independent 
for less than 35 years. The scores within the National Integrity System framework are not, however, 
adjusted to take these factors into account. Instead the framework presents ideal standards for all 
countries. As such they are aspirational.  Low scores are not about “blaming” any particular 
institution for underperformance. Instead they should be used to help identify key areas where 
improvements are needed.   
One should be cautious of over-reliance on the aggregate scores. For instance, the aggregate 
scores appear to indicate that political parties are one of the best scoring pillars. A closer 
examination shows that this is because political parties score very highly in the area of capacity, 
which is comprised of assessments of independence and resources. Political parties also score the 
lowest in respect of governance, which assesses transparency, accountability and integrity. An 
imbalance of this nature, where there is considerable capacity, but there is almost no governance is 
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problematic as there is no way to ensure that resources are being managed appropriately and that 
independence is being exercised responsibly.  
The aggregate scores provide a snapshot of performance that may be useful in beginning to identify 
trend across pillars and can be examined in different ways to identify trends in areas of strengths 
and weaknesses.  
One trend that can be observed is that most pillars score better in respect of their capacity than they 
do in respect of fulfilling their roles. This is something of a concern it suggests that pillars are not 
performing to capacity. 
The aggregate data can also be examined in other ways. The table below presents the scores by 
law and by practice. 
 
 
What this table shows is that, in almost all areas, the legal framework is stronger than the practical 
situation. This suggests that the question of how to strengthen Vanuatu’s National Integrity System 
is not going to be solved simply by making more laws. Rather, more attention needs to be given to 
how to improve implementation of and compliance with those laws in practice. 
This is not to say that improvements to laws are not needed. The Transparency International scoring 
framework provides that any score above 40 is moderate: 
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VERY STRONG 
 
81-100 
 
STRONG 
 
61-80 
 
MODERATE 
 
41-60 
 
WEAK 
 
21-40 
 
VERY WEAK 
 
0-20 
 
In almost all areas laws are considered to be of moderate strength. Improving practice in conjunction 
with improving laws is needed. 
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND CHANGES IN PILLARS 
The pillar reports allow strengths and weaknesses or areas for improvement in pillars to be 
identified. As Vanuatu conducted National Integrity System studies in 2004 and 2006 it is also 
possible to identify key changes. It is important to remember that no pillar stands on its own. Just as 
low scores are not about blaming pillars for underperformance, low scores are never “the fault” of 
any one pillar. Instead there are a multitude of complex interactions and externalities that affect each 
pillar’s performance. The reports allow coordination issues to be identified.   
The tables below summarise key strengths, areas for improvement, coordination issues and key 
changes for each pillar individually. They also relate the pillar recommendations to the areas for 
improvement and, where coordination issues are addressed within the pillar’s recommendations 
rather than in the recommendations of another pillar, to the coordination issues. It can also be noted 
that sometimes coordination issues will be addressed in recommendations arising in relation to other 
pillars. 
Recommendations are found at the end of each pillar section. For ease of reference the full list of 
recommendations by pillar is also provided at the end of the conclusion.  
Legislature 
Strengths  Individual members of parliament are provided with a range 
of resources, including offices, computers and travel 
allowances. 
 The independence of parliament is guaranteed in law. 
 Parliament maintains twinning relationships and other links 
with a number of overseas legislatures and these 
relationships are very useful in providing ongoing support 
and development for the Vanuatu legislature. 
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Areas for 
improvement 
 Public consultation by members of parliament is weak. 
 
 The legislature lacks technical capacity to be able to fulfil its 
role as the central law making and accountability body, and 
in particular committee structures do not operate effectively. 
 Members’ allocations encourage clientelistic politics. 
 Rec 1(a); rec 
2 
 Rec 1(c); rec 
2; rec 5 
 
 Rec 3 
Coordination 
with other 
pillars 
 The legislature is the hub of accountability and should 
receive and debate reports from a wide number of agencies. 
This should also ensure transparency for a wide number of 
agencies. The legislature currently does not debate reports, 
nor does it make reports tabled in parliament accessible 
through its library, which undermines accountability and 
transparency of a wide number of agencies.  
 Whilst members of parliament are leaders under the 
Leadership Code Act and should be accountable through the 
Office of the Ombudsman, weaknesses in law and practice 
mean that members of parliament are not effectively held to 
account.  
 Weaknesses in the electoral system undermine the extent to 
which elections are used to hold mp’s to account. 
 The judiciary has a role in overseeing the activities of the 
legislature and cases are actively brought before it. 
 Motions of no confidence (instability in the executive) 
undermine activities of the legislature. 
 Rec 1(a); rec 
1(b); rec 1(c); 
rec 2 
 
 
 Rec 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Rec 6 
 
 
Changes 
since 
2004/2006 
 The Parliament Administration Act came into force in 2006, 
defining internal governance structures. 
 Since November 2013 parliament sittings have been 
broadcast live over internet and television. 
 In 2010 changes to how members allocations were paid 
reduced clarity over the use of members allocations. 
 
 
 
 
 
Executive 
Strengths  The Council of Ministers has sufficient financial and 
secretarial resources. 
 There are, in law, a number of accountability and integrity 
mechanisms contained within the Leadership Code Act. 
 The Government Act provides a clear structure for the 
executive to work within. 
 
Areas for 
improvement 
 Technical support for the Council of Ministers largely 
depends upon political advisors, and there are no specified 
qualifications required in order to hold this post. 
 There is little transparency in respect of actions of the 
Council of Ministers or policies of governing coalitions. 
 Fragmentation within the legislature (due in part to increases 
in the number of political parties) results in coalition 
governments, which are inherently unstable and frequent 
motions of no confidence undermine stability of the 
executive. 
 The number of political appointees appears to be growing. 
 Rec 2 
 
 Rec 1 
 
 Rec 3 
 
 
 
 Rec 4 
Coordination 
with other 
pillars 
 Whilst the executive are leaders under the Leadership Code 
Act and should be accountable through the Office of the 
Ombudsman, weaknesses in law and practice mean that the 
executive is not effectively held to account.  
 The executive is not active in ensuring implementation of  
ombudsman’s recommendations.  
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Changes 
since 
2004/2006 
 The number of parties represented in coalitions is increasing. 
 Instability within the executive is an ongoing problem and is 
increasing. 
 The former (Carcasses) Government released a 100 Day 
Plan containing a number of integrity/anti-corruption 
initiatives and there appears to be political commitment to 
continue this agenda. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judiciary 
Strengths  Courts are generally perceived as being impartial, 
independent and fair (although this may be changing). 
 Courts are active in overseeing the actions of the legislature, 
executive and other agencies when cases are brought 
before the court.  
 The Court of Appeal settles cases rapidly. 
 
Areas for 
improvement 
 There is a public perception that courts are becoming 
increasingly corrupt.  
 There is no mechanism for receiving public complaints about 
judges or court services. 
 Transparency of decision making in subordinate courts is 
very limited. 
 Delays in decision making can occur (although this is 
currently being addressed as part of the Court Improvement 
Plan). 
 Rec 2 
 
 Rec 2(a)  
 
 Rec 3  
 
 Rec 1 
 
Coordination 
with other 
pillars 
 The judiciary relies on other parties to bring cases relating to 
corruption to court. Weaknesses in law enforcement and the 
capacity of others to bring decisions for judicial review limits 
the extent to which the judiciary hears corruption related 
cases. 
 
Changes 
since 
2004/2006 
 In 2007 the court house in Port Vila and in 2011 the court 
house in Santo burned down. 
 In 2012 a court improvement plan which deals widely with 
issues of accountability, integrity and service delivery was 
launched and a number of changes have been implemented.  
 
 
 
Public sector 
Strengths  There is a reasonable legal framework for accountability and 
integrity of public servants. 
 Some public servants are held accountable via disciplinary 
actions. 
 The public service is reasonably well resourced. Efficient 
management of resources is usually more of a priority than 
allocating more resources. 
 
Areas for 
improvement 
 There are currently no ongoing programmes to encourage 
ethical behaviour by public servants. 
 There is only limited engagement of the public about 
corruption by the public sector.  
 There is no public mechanism to make complaints about 
public servants. 
 Public procurement needs to be addressed in law and 
practice. 
 Perceptions of political interference, nepotism and lack of 
integrity in the public service need to be addressed. 
 The allowance structure may encourage lack of integrity. 
 Transparency is hindered by difficulties in accessing 
information. 
 Rec 2(a) 
 
 Rec 1(c) 
 
 Rec 2(b) 
 
 Rec 3 
 
 Rec 1 rec 2(c) 
 
 Rec 1(e) 
 Rec 1(a) 
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Coordination 
with other 
pillars 
 Whilst senior public servants are leaders as defined by the 
Leadership Code Act, weaknesses in both the law and 
practice of the annual reporting system for leaders 
undermines the operation of this integrity mechanism. 
 There is a “natural grouping” of the ombudsman, the auditor 
general and the PSC, as promoters and overseers of good 
conduct by public servants. There should be regular 
cooperation between these agencies. 
 
Changes 
since 
2004/2006 
 In 2011 the law changed to give the prime minister the power 
to appoint and terminate director generals. 
 The PSC is currently working to improve the public service 
code of conduct. 
 There are plans to develop a website for PSC, and for this 
website to include a section on the core values of PSC as 
well as the PSC manual, PSC instructions and PSC 
circulars.    
 In 2012 the Vanuatu Institute of Public Administration and 
Management was established  to provide functional and 
development training for public servants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Law enforcement 
Strengths  Longstanding support of the Vanuatu Police Force by 
AusAID and other partners has resulted in improvements in 
training, resources and operational practice. 
 There is a Police Code of Ethics. 
 
Areas for 
improvement 
 A review of the operations of the Office of the Public 
Prosecutor is urgently needed. 
 Perceptions that political interference in high profile 
corruption cases and/or personal connections results in 
misuse of police and prosecutorial powers should be 
addressed.  
 There is a perception that law enforcement agencies are not 
held accountable by internal disciplinary procedures. 
 Corruption prosecutions are hindered by the fact that the 
VPF are not empowered to investigate breaches of the 
Leadership Code Act in the absence of an ombudsman’s 
report 
 Rec 1 
 
 Rec 4; rec 2 
 
 Rec 3 
 
 Rec 5 
Coordination 
with other 
pillars 
 Whilst senior police officers and the Public Prosecutor are 
leaders as defined by the Leadership Code Act, weaknesses 
in both the law and practice of the annual reporting system 
for leaders undermines the operation of this integrity 
mechanism. 
 Whilst the police came under significant criticism in a 2009 
coroner’s report and were the subject of an ombudsman’s 
report in 2010, no public action was taken in response to 
these reports.  
 Prosecutors rely on the courts to manage cases and hear 
cases in a timely manner, although this usually does not 
result in problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Rec 3 
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Changes 
since 
2004/2006 
 In 2010 the Police Act was amended to provide that the 
Commissioner of Police must be a citizen of Vanuatu. 
 In 2013 the Government signed an agreement to establish 
an independent police complaints authority. 
 In late 2013 the Public Prosecutor submitted her resignation, 
and in April 2014 an Acting Public Prosecutor was appointed. 
 After a period of instability in the position of police 
commissioner, in 2013 a Police Commissioner was 
appointed. 
 There have been increases in funding to the VPF to 
accommodate training and professionalisation of the VPF, 
infrastructure development and internal VPF governance. 
 The Australian Aid Stretem Rod blong Jastis programme 
provides funds to strengthen the Office of the Public 
Prosecutor and the VPF. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Electoral Management Body 
Strengths  Candidates themselves help to ensure electoral rules are 
complied with through the liberal use of electoral petitions, 
although it can be observed that electoral petitions are not 
always processed in a timely manner. 
 There are a number of legal lines of accountability of the 
Electoral Office. 
 Despite enormous challenges elections occur, are largely 
peaceful and, in national elections, there is good voter 
turnout. 
 
Areas for 
improvement 
 Until the integrity of the electoral roll is ensured it is not 
possible to say that Vanuatu has free and fair elections. 
 A number of laws, including (but not limited to) laws in 
relation to proxy voting, laws protecting the independence of 
the principal electoral officer and laws relating to election 
petitions need to be reviewed.  
 The Electoral Commission should deliver reports after every 
election, and these reports should be made public. They 
should also be scrutinised by parliament, in order to ensure 
that legal lines of accountability operate in practice. 
 The government should ensure that there is timely provision 
for international and domestic observers to observe all 
elections. It can be noted that observers are usually 
permitted although arrangements can be “last minute”. 
 There is no regulation of campaign financing.  
 Training and control of regional registration officers is weak. 
 Rec 1 
 
 Rec 3; rec 4 
 
 
 Rec 6(a) 
 
 
 
 Rec 6(b) 
 
 
 
 
 Rec 2 
Coordination 
with other 
pillars 
 Voting in elections is part of civic responsibilities. All pillars 
and other institutions such as the education system have a 
role in promoting civic responsibilities. 
 The Electoral Office effectively uses the media to notify 
people of polling dates, candidate lists and electoral results. 
 Crimes committed under the Representation of the People 
Act are not prosecuted, which suggests better coordination 
between the Police, the Office of the Public Prosecutor and 
the Electoral Office/Electoral Commission is needed.  
 There have been successful partnerships with civil society 
organisations to deliver voter education programmes. 
 The Electoral Office is subject to external audits by the 
Auditor General and has been the subject of an audit 
investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Rec 5 
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Changes 
since 
2004/2006 
 Changes to the Representation of the People Act in 2012 
made it more difficult to succeed in an electoral petition 
alleging corrupt practices. 
 Changes to the Representation of the People Act in 2007 
allowed people who reside out of the Port Vila and Luganville 
municipal boundaries, but work inside of the municipal 
boundaries to vote within the Port Vila and Luganville 
constituencies. 
 There were changes to the position of the principal electoral 
officer during the lead up to the 2012 national election, and 
for a number of months this position was only filled on an 
acting basis. 
 A generic voter registration system is being introduced, with 
plans to computerise the electoral roll by 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ombudsman 
Strengths  Not subject to direct political interference. 
 Public reports are freely available. 
 The Office of the Ombudsman will work with civil society 
organisations in conducting public awareness activities. 
 
Areas for 
Improvement 
 Public reports are often not acted upon and there is no 
mechanism to prevent ombudsman’s recommendations from 
being ignored. 
 File management needs to be improved, in order to address 
both delays and accurate reporting of activities, although it 
can be noted that there are plans for the file management 
system to be upgraded in 2014. 
 The role of the ombudsman is promoting good practice 
(including providing education and public awareness about 
how to make complaints with the Office of the Ombudsman) 
needs to be specifically recognised and endorsed. 
 Whilst the ombudsman is a leader as defined by the 
Leadership Code Act, weaknesses in both the law and 
practice of the annual reporting system for leaders 
undermines the integrity of the office.  
 Transparency could be improved 
 Rec 1 
 
 
 Rec 4; rec 
5(a) 
 
 
 Rec 3 
 
 
 
 Rec 1 
 
 
 
 Rec 5 
Coordination 
with other 
pillars 
 The Office of the Ombudsman is hindered by lack of action 
on recommendations contained in ombudsman’s reports 
from other pillars such as the public prosecutor, relevant 
government agencies and members of the executive. 
 The functioning of the Office of the Ombudsman has been 
hindered by slow recruitments by the PSC.. 
 Lack of scrutiny of ombudsman’s annual reports by 
parliament reduces accountability. 
 There is an opportunity for the Office of the Ombudsman and 
the Public Service Commission to work together to promote 
ethics in the public service, although currently these 
agencies do not work together in this area. 
 CSOs can work with the Office of the Ombudsman to 
promote good governance 
 Rec 2(a) 
 
 
 Rec 6 
 
 
 Rec 2(b); 3(d) 
 
 Rec 2(c); 3(c) 
Changes 
since 
2004/2006 
 There has been a decline in the number of complaints 
received by the Office of Ombudsman and the number of 
public reports issued, although it can be noted that some 
complaints are being resolved via mediation, which does not 
result in public reports being issued. 
 Staff levels have declined significantly. 
 Annual reporting has improved, although annual reports are 
still delayed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Supreme Audit Institution  
Strengths  There are no examples of direct political interference in the 
operations of the OAG. 
 Changes since 2009 (see changes below) indicate that the 
OAG is strengthening its operations. 
 At times audit recommendations have resulted in the public 
servants having their employment terminated. 
 
Areas for 
improvement 
 The OAG is severely hindered by lack of staff. This situation 
reflects a general skills shortage within Vanuatu. 
 There is a backlog of audits, audit reports and annual 
reports. 
 Current audit practice limits the level at which compliance 
audits are undertaken and limits the number of performance 
audits undertaken. 
 There are no express legal provisions in place to allow for 
audit reports to be made public, or for the public to make 
complaints directly to the OAG. 
 Rec 1(a); rec 
4 
 Rec 1(b) 
 
 Rec 3 
 
 
 Rec 5; rec 6 
Coordination 
with other 
pillars 
 Whilst the auditor general is a leader as defined by the 
Leadership Code Act, weaknesses in both the law and 
practice of the annual reporting system for leaders 
undermines the integrity of the OAG. 
 The PSC does use audit reports as the basis for staff 
disciplinary actions, but does not have the power to order 
recovery of misappropriated money, Misappropriations are 
instead recovered as part of criminal actions initiated by the 
Office of the Public Prosecutor. 
 The OAG relies on a strong Public Accounts Committee, 
situated within the legislature, in order to ensure that 
recommendations are acted upon. Currently the Public 
Accounts Committee does not operate effectively.  Further, 
the Public Accounts Committee relies upon others to act on 
its recommendations. Little action resulted from the last 
Public Account Committee report, issued in December 2011. 
 The OAG relies upon the Ministry of Finance submitting 
consolidated government accounts. These accounts are up 
to date. 
 The OAG relies on the PSC for recruitment of staff. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Rec 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Rec 7 
Changes 
since 
2004/2006 
 In 2009 a new Auditor General was appointed. 
 Since 2009 technical assistance has improved planning and 
operations of the OAG. 
 Backlogs in audits and annual reporting are in the process of 
being cleared. 
 The OAG is actively working to ensure compliance with 
international accounting standards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political Parties 
Strengths  There appears to be relatively high levels of political party 
membership and public involvement in political parties. 
 Parties operate independently without state support, and the 
larger number of active political parties that are successful in 
contesting elections indicates that lack of state support does 
not create significant barriers. 
 The state does not restrict the formation of political parties. 
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Areas for 
improvement 
 There are no laws allowing for transparency and 
accountability in respect of political party financing or 
campaign financing of both political parties and independent 
candidates.   
 Some political parties may lack technical capacity to develop 
policy statements and internal governance structures. 
 There are concerns that the increasing number of political 
parties and independent candidates is contributing to 
fragmentation and instability, although it should also be 
noted that direct regulation of the number of political parties 
interferes with fundamental principles of democracy and any 
regulation of the formation of political parties must be 
approached with caution. 
 Rec 1 
 
 
 
 Rec 3 
 
 Rec 4 
Coordination 
with other 
pillars 
 The state does not fund political parties. 
  The number of political parties represented within parliament 
directly impacts on the constitution of the government and is 
thought to contribute to instability of the government. 
 Political party members themselves refer matters to court in 
the event of allegations of breaches of internal rules. 
 Rec 2 
Changes 
since 
2004/2006 
 There has been an increase in the number of political parties 
contesting elections and the number of political parties 
represented in government. 
 Some political parties have included the need for political 
party regulation in their policy platforms. 
 There appears to be an increase in the number of internal 
governance disputes within political parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Media 
Strengths  There is a wide spread of ownership of print and broadcast 
media. 
 The media is active in relaying information about government 
activities to the public. 
 The media regularly reports about allegations of corruption. 
 Media organisations support NGO activities aimed at 
educating the public about corruption. 
 There is a voluntary industry code of ethics and practice. 
 
Areas for 
improvement 
 The Media Association of Vanuatu lacks resources to ensure 
that there are mechanisms for receiving and responding to 
complaints about the Vanuatu Media Code of Ethics and 
Practice.  
 Investigative journalism needs to be developed further. 
 There is no right to information law. 
 The industry code of ethics and practice could be reviewed 
to ensure that it is sufficiently comprehensive. 
 Rec 1 
 
 
 
 Rec 4 
 Rec 5 
 Rec 2 
Coordination 
with other 
pillars 
 Media outlets support civil society organisations’ anti-
corruption activities by providing free publication of public 
education and awareness material. 
 Threats to and intimidation of journalists reduce 
independence of the media. Intimidation of journalists can 
come from the government.  
 Media is active in publishing information about government 
activities. 
 
 
 
 Rec 3 
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Changes 
since 
2004/2006 
 The Media Association of Vanuatu has formalised its 
structure and registration. 
 The Vanuatu Institute of Technology has established 
certificate and diploma programmes in journalism. 
 There has been an increase in the number of media outlets 
in Vanuatu. 
 A Right to Information Bill has been drafted and was listed 
for debate in the November 2013 Parliament session, 
although it was withdrawn to allow for some further review. 
 A Right to Information Policy was adopted by the 
Government in April 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Civil Society 
Strengths  NGOs are free to operate without undue government 
influence.  
 A variety of aid donors operate in Vanuatu to support NGO 
activities. 
 NGOs can and do form successful short term partnerships 
with government agencies to conduct advocacy and public 
awareness campaigns on specific issues. 
 NGOs have established groups with formal and informal 
networks  at the community level.   
 
Areas for 
improvement 
 There is no voluntary or mandatory code of conduct for 
CSOs in Vanuatu, which could cover matters such as 
accountability to members and transparency of activities.     
 There is a lack of overall coordination between NGOs and 
also between NGOs and government, although there are 
some good examples of where CSO collaboration and 
engagement with government has been very effective.  
 There is no forum where NGOs and government can interact 
on anti-corruption issues. 
  Rec 1(b) 
 
 
 Rec 1(a); rec 
1(b)(iii); rec 
1(c) 
 
 Rec 2 
Coordination 
with other 
pillars 
 CSOs should be viewed as a partner in policy development, 
education and community outreach programmes by all other 
pillars. 
 
Changes 
since 
2004/2006 
 In December 2013 an extraordinary general meeting to 
rehabilitate VANGO, the umbrella body for NGOs and 
community based organisations.    
 There are specific examples of CSO collaboration and 
coordination which also contribute to effective engagement 
between civil society and government for example the 
Vanuatu Climate Adaptation Network (VCAN), the Right to 
Information Committee and other emerging sector focused 
networks.  
 In 2012 an attempt was made to set up an NGO Anti-
Corruption Committee. Whilst this attempt was short-lived, it 
stands as a clear expression of will to coordinate to address 
corruption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business 
Strengths  The legal framework in place for the establishment of 
business is relatively straightforward and allows for some 
transparency and accountability. 
 The Vanuatu Chamber of Commerce and Industry provides a 
consolidated voice for business advocacy. 
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Areas for 
improvement 
 The perception that the domestic private sector is not a 
partner with a role to play in reducing corruption in Vanuatu 
needs to change.  
 Business currently does not undertake any coordinated anti-
corruption initiatives. 
 Whilst private sector development is recognised as being a 
key driver of national development business lacks resources 
to be able to engage in sustained policy discussion. 
 Rec 1 
 
 
 Rec 2 
 
 Rec 3 
Coordination 
with other 
pillars 
 Business should be represented on the boards of a number 
of statutory bodies, which provides business with an avenue 
to engage in policy discussion and assist with stability. 
 Businesses have to interact with a number of government 
agencies in order to maintain licenses. These interactions 
can be inefficient and there is global concern that the need 
for a large number of interactions can increase opportunities 
for the payment of “speed money” and other petty forms of 
corruption. 
 Business can be impacted by lack of consultation by the 
legislature during law reform processes and lack of 
consultation or prior notification by members of the executive 
when regulations are made. 
 Business currently does not tend to partner with and support 
CSOs’ anti-corruption activities. 
 In the event of undue external interference, it is possible for 
businesses to seek judicial review of administrative decisions 
via the courts. 
 Rec 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Rec 1 
Changes 
since 
2004/2006 
 Regulatory authorities have been established to oversee 
telecommunications and utilities. 
 The Financial Intelligence Unit has been significantly 
strengthened, both in terms of human resources and in 
relation to legal frameworks. 
 
 
 
Customary authorities 
Strengths  Customary authorities can and do operate independently of 
the state and without state support. 
 Customary authorities are familiar to most in Vanuatu, and 
are widely respected. 
 Customary authorities are the basis of much order in 
Vanuatu, particularly in places where the state has little 
presence.  
 The nature of customary authority means that there is a high 
degree of transparency and accountability built into the 
exercise of authority at the community level. 
 
Areas for 
improvement 
 External influences, and in particular the potential for giving 
customary land monetary value, make it important to clearly 
establish who are the correct chiefs, and what are  the 
correct authorities of chiefs, in order to minimise potential 
exploitation and abuse. 
 The intersection or legitimate relationship between 
customary authority and state authority is not always clear. 
 The secretariat of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs lacks 
resources. 
 The secretariat of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs is not 
appointed by the Council, which raises issues of 
independence. 
 Rec 1 
 
 
 
 
 Rec 1 
 
 Rec 1,3, 4 
 
 Rec 2 
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Coordination 
with other 
pillars 
 At a community level, chiefs coordinate with women’s 
groups, youth groups, religious groups, and others to ensure 
community governance. 
 The Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs has a constitutional 
advisory role in respect of the legislature. 
 Chiefs do, at times, instruct people on how to vote in 
national elections. 
 
 
 
 Rec 4 
Changes 
since 
2004/2006 
 In December 2013 the requirement for the legislature to 
consult with the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs  was made 
mandatory in respect of law changes affecting custom and 
custom land. 
 In December 2013  the Customary Land Management Act 
was passed, which, once it comes into operation, will 
change processes in respect of customary land dispute 
resolution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
POLICY THEMES AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Whilst this report does list recommendations by pillar, addressing recommendations in a holistic 
manner is necessary to bring about change. Some common themes in issues across pillars can be 
identified. Common themes are: 
The functioning of most pillars is weakened by failures within the legislature and executive to play 
their role in the “cycle of accountability” and to maintain a stable policy direction. These failures 
largely stem from lack of POLITICAL INTEGRITY. Unless lack of political integrity is addressed it 
will be impossible to consistently develop laws, policies and practices that support national integrity. 
There are significant gaps in the legal frameworks for ACCOUNTABILITY of institutions and 
individuals and the practical implementation of those frameworks. Accountability mechanisms act to 
reduce the gap between law and practice. Unless accountability mechanisms are strengthened laws 
will continue to have little impact on practice. 
Laws and practices tend not to support TRANSPARENCY of actions by institutions and individuals. 
Transparency increases detection of bad behaviour, which in turn enhances accountability. Unless 
transparency is improved it will remain difficult to hold institutions and individuals to account and to 
develop public will for change. 
In many instances it would be unfair to attribute weak performance to intentional corruption. Instead 
technical knowledge and, more fundamentally, an embedded understanding of roles, responsibilities 
and good practice is often lacking. This indicates a lack of HUMAN RESOURCE CAPACITY. As 
well as developing specific human resource capacity, all reforms and strategies to strengthen 
national integrity should be designed to be achievable within Vanuatu’s resource constraints. 
National integrity ultimately rests on each person’s internal ethical foundation. This gives rise to an 
embedded understanding of roles, responsibilities and good practice. AWARENESS to engage both 
“hearts and minds” is critical. Whilst it is easier to build knowledge of rules, systems and behaviours, 
developing internal ethical awareness that is appropriate to a modern democracy must not be 
overlooked. 
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Many good changes are already taking place to advance these policy themes. For instance: the 
Vanuatu Institute of Public Administration and Management is building human resource capacity 
within public servants; in February 2014 the then government commenced discussion with political 
parties regarding building political integrity; ombudsman’s forums have developed several law 
reform options for strengthening accountability; in 2014 the government adopted a Right to 
Information Policy. All of these activities (and many more positive changes are listed throughout the 
report) suggest that there is growing awareness of issues, and that individuals are making personal 
ethical commitments to national integrity.  
This National Integrity System assessment should be read as a call to continue ongoing activities 
and proposals to build national integrity. It is widely acknowledged that Vanuatu is currently facing a 
crisis in political integrity. Fragmentation of political parties, ongoing instability in government and 
serious deficiencies in the electoral system are some of the problems that are openly acknowledged 
by both the government and the opposition to be issues that must be addressed as a matter of 
urgency. The apparent political will to take steps to address issues of political integrity is an 
encouraging sign and this National Integrity System assessment add another voice to the call to 
finally take significant action in this area. Significant action cannot be piecemeal. Instead it requires 
the holistic reform of political parties, the legislature, the executive, the electoral management body 
and the ombudsman. As such this report makes the following five priority recommendations: 
 
 
In order to enhance political integrity the government must take action as soon as possible 
to:  
 
 
1. develop laws to regulate political parties and independent candidates for election, and in 
particular party finances and campaign finances. 
 
 
2. implement an accurate electoral roll and voting system which is not subject to abuse.  
 
 
3. revise the Standing Orders of Parliament, regulation of members’ allocations and rules about 
the use of motions of no confidence. 
 
 
4. revise the Ombudsman Act and Leadership Code Act to expand the Ombudsman’s powers and 
ensure that there are consequences  for breaches of the Leadership Code. 
 
 
5. enact the Right to Information Bill and the Government Act to ensure transparency of the 
executive. 
 
 
 
Building national integrity needs to involve everyone. Even well-intentioned changes are likely to be 
treated with suspicion if they are made by politicians behind closed doors. Further, public 
involvement in processes to develop change builds awareness and commitment to the values that 
the changes intend to support. As such, all of these changes should be made in a transparent and 
consultative manner which builds both awareness of roles, responsibilities and good practice within 
a democracy and public and political will for change. This is particularly important as some of these 
changes may require amendments to the Constitution which will need to be supported by a public 
referendum.  
 
A large number of more specific recommendations lie behind these five priority recommendations. 
Most of these recommendations are not new, but have instead been talked about for a decade or 
more. Vanuatu needs to move beyond talk, and take action. There can be a tendency to establish 
committees, taskforces and working groups that quickly lose momentum. The advisory group 
recommended the Year of National Integrity as the principle recommendation in order to capitalise 
on momentum that has been generated both within and outside of this assessment to take action. 
This was strongly endorsed at the validation workshop. A Year of National Integrity sends a clear 
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message that this is something Vanuatu is committed to, as the explicit ethical foundation of the 
country. It also provides a clear timeframe for action, which creates a degree of urgency. 
 
 In order to continue momentum that currently exists in Vanuatu’s political environment and which 
has been developed whilst undertaking this National Integrity System assessment, the key activities 
for taking the recommendations in this report forward are: 
 
 
1. The Vanuatu government must establish a national integrity committee made up of both 
government and non-government representatives. The national integrity committee must 
develop and implement a plan for strengthening national integrity, using the outcomes of this 
report as a starting point for this plan.  
 
 
2. The government should declare 2015 to be the Year of National Integrity and the national 
integrity committee should use this as a focus for implementing changes. 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendations have been listed at the end of each detailed pillar report. They also, briefly, 
outline the key issues being addressed. It should be remembered that the recommendations only 
draw out the key issues, and other areas for reform can also be drawn from the text of the pillar 
reports. The recommendations have been restated in the conclusion for ease of reference, and also 
to allow readers to compare themes in recommendations across pillars, should they wish to do so. 
Foundations 
1. Politics are affected by clientelistic relationships, which are not conducive to developing a 
policy-led democratic political system.  The members of parliaments’ allocations reinforce 
clientilism as does the system of political appointees, discussed later in the section on the 
executive. Clientilism (or more broadly the wantok system) affect other pillars also.  When 
implementing reforms to pillars, the potential impact of clientilism and ways in which clientilism 
may be reduced should always be considered. 
2. Vanuatu’s society is patriarchal. Gender imbalances affect women in a number of ways, 
including through underrepresentation in politics. When implementing reforms to pillars, 
increasing gender equity, particularly in the political sphere, should always be considered.   
3. Vanuatu’s domestic economy is limited, and this contributes to inequality of service delivery. All 
measures to build national integrity and address corruption should bear in mind the need to 
promote a strong domestic economy and reduced inequality of service delivery. 
4. Vanuatu’s traditional culture remains strong, and community governance engages many 
people. The potential for working with community governance structures (including women’s 
groups, youth groups, religious/faith based groups and chiefly structures) to build commitments 
to national governance should be taken into account when developing all measures to build 
national integrity and address corruption. 
Legislature 
1. Parliament should be the “hub” of accountability, with other agencies reporting to it. It should 
also be a source of information on activities, via annual and other reports presented to 
parliament. Currently it does not serve this function. Further, there is little communication 
between members of parliament and the public, and little public information on matters going 
before parliament. This may be, in part, due to the absence of a requirement in the Standing 
Orders that information, including copies of Bills be made publically available. Short time frames 
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between when members receive Bills and parliament sits also hinder opportunities for 
consultation. It is recommended that the Parliamentary Management Board takes action to 
ensure that: 
 
a. Standing Orders are reviewed to include a requirement that lists of documents to be 
tabled, as well as Bills, are issued prior to parliamentary sessions, and that this list and 
all Bills be published to both members of parliament and the public. It is recommended 
that the Standing Orders be reviewed to ensure members have adequate time to 
consult (with technical advisors, the public and other stakeholders) on Bills. 
b. Procedures of parliament are reviewed to require that every report tabled in parliament 
is to be made available through the parliament library unless matters of national 
security require otherwise. 
c. Parliamentary committees are reviewed and strengthened to allow them to fulfil their 
role as an accountability mechanism. 
 
2. There is very limited training for members of parliament and little technical support. It is 
recommended that measures to increase both training of and technical support for 
parliamentarians be implemented. Training should include components related to ethics and 
integrity for members of parliament, as well as more mechanical training on processes and 
procedures. Technical support could be modelled on the Parliamentary Institute of Cambodia, 
an NGO that reviews all Bills and provides briefing papers to both government and opposition. 
 
3. There is concern about the extent to which members of parliament account for their own 
allowances. There has also been dissatisfaction at increases in members’ allowances. It is 
recommended that: 
 
a. An independent body to set the allowances (including salaries and sitting allowances) 
of members of parliament is established. This could possibly be modelled on New 
Zealand’s law. 
b. The matter of representation allowances, and how to control them, are reviewed. 
Options to consider include: 
 
i. Requiring members to publically account annually for their representation 
allowances. 
ii. Removing the distribution of representation allowances from the control of 
members and instead giving members a role as conduits of project proposals 
that are forwarded to the Parliamentary Management Board or another body to 
decide upon. 
iii. Providing allowances to political parties, rather than individual members, to 
distribute. 
 
4. In practice integrity mechanisms are almost entirely dysfunctional. In addition to 
recommendations made in the ombudsman’s pillar it is recommended that: 
 
a. The Leadership Code Act is revised to ensure that annual returns are scrutinised on an 
annual basis. 
b. Automatic penalties (such as ceasing to be paid salary) are implemented for leaders 
who fail to file returns. 
 
5. There is public interest in changing the law to require higher educational qualifications for 
candidates standing for election as members of parliament. The government should publically 
consult on whether it is appropriate to amend the eligibility criteria for candidates contained in 
the Representation of the People Act.  
 
6. Whilst the opposition acts as a check on the government (executive) to a degree, the opposition 
is not provided with legal support to do this. If it wants to challenge decisions by using judicial 
review processes it must engage private sector lawyers, which is costly. This limits the extent to 
which the legislature can act as a check on the executive. It is recommended that the 
Parliamentary Management Board develops and institutes a new position of opposition counsel. 
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Executive 
1. There is almost total lack of transparency in the policy direction and decision making of the 
executive and the operation of ministries. In order to address these issues is it recommended 
that: 
 
a. The Right to Information Bill must be enacted by parliament as soon as possible. 
b. The Government Act be revised to require that coalition Memoranda of Understanding 
(MOUs) and policies be made public by the Council of Ministers. 
c. The Government Act be revised to require that Council of Ministers minutes be made 
public, unless necessary to keep sections private for public security reasons. 
d. The Leadership Code Act annual reporting system be revised to include 
comprehensive declarations that are routinely inspected and made public. 
e. Annual reports of ministers be made public. 
f. The current government plan to improve websites be monitored in order to see whether 
websites contain policy statements, corporate plans that provide a clear statement of 
outputs and annual reports on outputs achieved, as related to plans. 
 
2. The Council of Ministers relies on the DCO, which is largely comprised of political advisors and 
director generals, for technical advice. There are, however, no specified requirements as to 
political advisors’ qualifications. It is recommended that minimum qualifications for political 
advisors are instituted, to ensure that such advisors have sufficient background to be able to 
provide technical advice. 
 
3. The liberal use of motions of no confidence without sound reasons based on national interests 
is the mechanism that creates instability with the executive. However, a blanket limitation on 
motions of no confidence for certain periods of time prevents their legitimate use in cases of bad 
governance, so is a problematic approach to controlling this problem. In order to address this 
the following options should be considered by the a body set up to publically develop political 
integrity laws and regulations: 
 
a. For a motion of no confidence to be in order, requiring that it needs to be justified on 
the basis of political reasons (such as breaches in MOU or breaches of Leadership 
Code Act). 
b. Introducing penalties for those who sign an unjustified motion of no confidence (such 
as a deduction from MPs salaries or losing one’s seat and requiring a by-election). 
c. Developing a party discipline system, including penalties for members who cross the 
floor without justifiable reason.   
 
i. Part of the development of a stronger party system may include funding 
parties, rather than individual MPs (via the MP allocation), with a discipline 
mechanism being to be cut off from party funding if the floor is crossed.  
 
4. Whilst laws have been implemented to control the number of political advisors, there are no 
similar controls on the number of political appointees and it appears that the number of such 
appointees is growing.  It is recommended that laws to control the number of political 
appointees be developed and implemented. 
Judiciary 
1. The issue of delays in service delivery and associated issues of lack of resources, lack of 
accountability and lack of transparency are being addressed under the Court Improvement Plan 
2012 – 2015. The Ministry of Justice should ensure that there is an independent evaluation of 
the implementation of this plan.  
 
2. There appears to be a public perception that the judiciary is becoming increasingly corrupt. In 
order to address this the judiciary should:  
 
a. Undertake public consultation on whether it is desirable to have the judiciary fall within 
the scope of the Office of the Ombudsman, or whether an alternate complaints 
mechanism should be developed and implemented.  
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b. Institute a “customer service” feedback mechanism. 
c. Introduce a code of conduct for court staff. 
d. Increase public awareness on the code of conduct for judges. 
e. Introduce registers for gifts and hospitality. 
 
3. Whilst there is transparency in superior court decisions, there is little transparency in respect of 
the decisions of subordinate courts. It is recommended that all judgments, including 
Magistrates Court judgments should be published on PacLII. 
Public sector 
1. The public sector suffers from very negative public perceptions as to its independence and 
integrity. Whilst these perceptions may not be entirely fair, and may be based on incorrect 
information, they need to be addressed. The following measures should therefore be 
implemented: 
 
a. The legislature should enact the Right to Information Bill, which will enhance 
transparency of public sector activities and decision-making. 
b. The PSC should publish a list of public servants, annually, who have been subject to 
disciplinary action (including the nature of the misbehaviour and the penalty applied, 
but possibly withholding names to protect privacy) in order to demonstrate that public 
servants who get caught for misbehaviour do face consequences. 
c. The PSC should actively run public awareness on what it does to ensure independence 
and integrity as part of its public education activities. 
d. The Council of Ministers should repeal the change in the law that allowed director 
generals to be appointed by the prime minister, rather than the PSC as this has created 
a public perception of political interference in the operation of the public sector. 
e. As part of the review of the Code of Conduct and ethical obligations of public servants 
the Public Service Commission should undertake a review of current practices relating 
to paying additional allowances for sitting on committees and performing other tasks 
that are part of regular employment. 
 
2. Another measure to address lack of public confidence in the public sector is to strengthen 
accountability. Strengthening accountability involves, in part, strengthening the Office of the 
Auditor General and the Office of the Ombudsman. Recommendations in respect of these pillars 
are discussed in the respective sections of this report. Strengthening accountability via internal 
public service mechanisms requires both an increase in reporting (which involves building 
personal integrity) and better enforcement. To achieve these it is recommended that: 
 
a. The PSC implements, as part of its orientation and ongoing education and training 
programmes, more information about the Code of Conduct and obligations to report 
breaches. It should also consider a reward system for those that actively participate in 
upholding the code of conduct. 
b. The PSC establishes a mechanism for the public to complain directly to the PSC about 
misbehaviour by public servants. 
c. The PSC is appropriately resourced to handle the processing of disciplinary complaints, 
terminations of employment and public servant grievances. 
 
3. Public procurement needs to be addressed. As there are many loopholes in the law a useful 
starting point would be for the Vanuatu Law Commission to review public procurement laws.  
Law enforcement 
1. At the time of writing this report the Office of the Public Prosecutor is in some disarray. It is 
recommended that:  
 
a. The government re-establish the Commission of Inquiry to examine the activities of the 
Office of the Public Prosecutor, with the aim of developing recommendations to 
improve the processes and functioning of the office and reviewing the relationship 
between the office and state prosecutors. 
b. The report of the Commission of Inquiry be made public. 
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c. The implementation of these recommendations be closely monitored by a body to be 
recommended by the Commission of Inquiry. 
 
2. A code of ethics for prosecutors is required by law and should be developed and gazetted as a 
priority. 
 
3. Activity to institute a VPF Professional Standards Unit has commenced. Further development of 
the Professional Standards Unit must be prioritised. 
 
4. Perceptions that political interference in high profile corruption cases results in misuse of police 
and prosecutorial powers and that personal connections result in misuse of police and 
prosecutorial powers should be addressed by: 
 
a. The VPF developing clear operating procedures for dealing with cases involved 
political leaders and cases involving potential conflicts of interest.  
b. The VPF clearly communicating these operating procedures to the public. 
 
5. The VPF is hindered in its ability to investigate breaches of the Leadership Code Act by having 
to wait until ombudsman’s reports have been issued. As part of a review of the Leadership 
Code Act (as discussed in the section on the ombudsman) consideration should be given to 
expanding police powers to investigate criminal breaches of the Leadership Code. 
Electoral management body 
1. The most critical issue is the integrity of the electoral roll and the related issue of correctly 
identifying voters. As a matter of urgency the government must take measures to ensure that 
the content of the roll is accurate and that there is a system in place to ensure that people who 
present themselves to vote can be correctly identified. It is recommended that the electoral roll 
and voting system be computerised. It is also recommended that, as the current roll is so 
corrupt, an entirely new roll is constructed, rather than trying to clean up the existing roll. 
 
2. There are concerns about adequacy of training and control of regional registration officers. It is 
recommended that before a new roll is constructed, new registration officers must be put in 
place. Processes for the appointment and training of such staff must be reviewed by the PEO in 
conjunction with the Electoral Commission in order to develop specific recommendations for 
reform. These recommendations should include measures for ensuring political independence 
of registration officers, adequate training and adequate oversight. 
 
3. There should be a review of the Representation of the People Act in order to ensure that the law 
fully supports fair, transparent electoral processes. The first part of this review should involve 
collecting and assessing the numerous recommendations that have been made in election 
reports and election observer reports since 2002. Specific issues to consider in respect of voting 
and the electoral roll include: 
 
a. A review of control of electoral cards and proxy voting, which are seen to be major 
areas of abuse. 
b. The absence of provisional voting, which prevents legitimate voters with deficiencies in 
their registration from being able to vote. 
c. The question of whether voting should be compulsory. 
d. Whether a set timeframe by which all electoral petitions must be heard and decided 
upon is needed. 
 
4. The independence of the Electoral Office can be undermined due to the PEO and other 
electoral officers being public servants. This can both affect appointments and attempts to 
discipline staff. It is recommended that the Electoral Commission be given the power to directly 
recruit and discipline staff of the Electoral Office. 
 
5. Currently, in practice, the only consequence for committing an electoral offence is that a 
successful candidate may face an electoral petition. It is recommended that: 
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a. Coordination between the Electoral Office, the police and the public prosecutor is 
strengthened in order to ensure that those committing electoral offences (including 
candidates, electoral officers, voters and others) are prosecuted. 
b. Consideration be given to banning a candidate from standing for elections for life if he 
or she is convicted of an electoral offence. 
 
6. In order to ensure ongoing monitoring of elections:  
 
a. The PEO and Electoral Commission should be reminded of their legal obligations to 
produce election reports in a timely manner. As part of a review of the Representation 
of the People Act it should be made clear that these reports are to become public 
documents. 
b. The government should, in a timely manner, provide for observer groups comprised of 
international and domestic representatives at all elections, in order to ensure ongoing 
monitoring of election processes. 
Ombudsman 
1. There are significant issues with the lack of action in response to ombudsman’s reports and 
recommendations. One reason for these issues is that gaps in the law allow recommendations 
to be ignored. The Ministry of Justice should follow up on existing proposals and 
recommendations to strengthen the law so as to ensure that concrete action on 
recommendations arises. Issues that should specifically be considered include: 
 
a. Whether power should be given to the ombudsman to refer matters to court if 
recommendations are not responded to. 
b. Whether establishing a new body – a  Leadership Code Tribunal -  is appropriate. 
c. Whether expanding the powers of the Office of the Ombudsman so that it becomes a 
commission, with police and prosecutorial powers, is appropriate. 
d. Whether the law should allow statements given during the course of ombudsman 
enquiries to be used as evidence in court. 
e. Whether the law should be amended to ensure that full copies of all annual returns 
provided by leaders under the Leadership Code Act be provided to the Office of the 
Ombudsman and/or scrutinised by a joint body including the ombudsman, the auditor 
general and the clerk of parliament. 
 
2. A reason for lack of action on recommendations is that there are weak links between the 
ombudsman and other agencies. Weak links with other agencies also hinders efficient public 
awareness activities. 
 
a. In order to facilitate successful criminal prosecutions, coordination between the Office 
of the Ombudsman, the police and the public prosecutor should be improved. 
b. In order to facilitate successful disciplinary actions against public servants and improve 
awareness amongst public servants, coordination between the Office of the 
Ombudsman and the PSC should be improved. 
c. In order to facilitate public awareness and ensure efficient use of resources, co-
operation between the Office of the Ombudsman and CSOs working in the field of good 
governance should be improved. 
 
3. The number of complaints received by the Office of the Ombudsman is declining and one of the 
causes of this is lack of education. The office also has no formal education or public awareness 
programme. In order to strengthen the education role of the Office of the Ombudsman: 
 
a. The Ombudsman Act should be revised to specifically list education as one of the roles 
of the office. 
b. Resources should be specifically allocated in a separate budget line for conducting 
education activities by the Ministerial Budget Committee. 
c. In order to ensure that resources are well utilised and agencies (including CSOs) are 
not duplicating education activities, coordination and co-operation between agencies 
who carry out public education activities in the broad field of integrity/anti-
corruption/legal literacy/ civic education should be strengthened. 
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d. Co-operation between the PSC and the Office of the Ombudsman to strengthen 
awareness of integrity amongst public servants should be developed. 
 
4. Some investigations take a very long time to conclude. The Office of the Ombudsman should 
develop and publish expected timeframes for processing disputes. As investigations vary in 
complexity these will only be guidelines, but they will help complainants to monitor progress on 
complaints.  
 
5. Reporting of activities by the Office of the Ombudsman should be strengthened: 
 
a. Resources and technical support to update the file management/case tracking 
database should be provided, either by the government, aid donors or other partners, 
as this will make it easier to collect data. 
b. Resources and technical support for the Office of the Ombudsman to develop and 
maintain a website should be provided, either by the government, aid donors or other 
partners. 
c. The law should be revised to further specify the required contents of annual reports. 
This will help to ensure that desired information is consistently provided.  
 
i. The annual report should include clear data on the number of complaints 
received in a reporting year, the number of received complaints not 
investigated and the reasons for not investigating.  
ii. Annual reports should also provide clear data on the number of current 
complaint files being processed in the office, the number of complaint files 
closed and the reasons for closure, the number of complaint files resolved, 
the method of resolution and the time taken to resolve the complaint.  
iii. Brief summaries of disputes resolved by mediation should also be provided, 
if there are no issues of confidentiality. 
 
d. The PacLII website currently publishes public reports, which makes them easily and 
freely available to the public. The Office of the Ombudsman should also supply annual 
reports to PacLII for publication. 
 
6. A cross cutting issue affecting both the OAG and the Office of the Ombudsman is the potential 
for interference or delays in staffing matters by the PSC. This issue has also been faced by 
other constitutional offices, and the solution has been to give other constitutional offices the 
direct power to recruit. The State Law Office Act provides an example of legislation that allows 
this. The law should be revised (possibly using the State Law Office Act or the Ombudsman Act 
1995 as a model) to give the Office of the Ombudsman the power to directly recruit staff. 
Supreme Audit Institution 
1. Staffing issues within the OAG need to be addressed as a matter of urgency: 
 
a. Long-term measures need to be introduced to address skill shortages within Vanuatu, 
which are the underlying cause of the inability to recruit staff. Scholarships for tertiary 
study need to be directed to areas of specific need, including accounting. 
b. Until local skill shortages are addressed, the recruitment of non-citizens and increased 
contracting out of audits should be explored. 
 
2. A major problem is the lack of consistent action on audit reports. Addressing this problem may 
require better coordination between stakeholders. It may also require some legislative reform. 
The Corporate Plan 2012 – 2016 includes a proposal to introduce a National Audit Act. There is 
already draft legislation in this area. Before this legislation is finalised there should be 
consultation between the OAG, the PAC (including support staff), the PSC, the public 
prosecutor and other stakeholders as to whether further reforms are needed to the draft 
legislation or other Acts to ensure that recommendations of the OAG will be acted upon, 
particularly when criminal activities have been identified. 
 
3. Current audit practice means that only consolidated government accounts are being audited 
and financial compliance audits are not being carried out at individual ministry and department 
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level. Further performance audits are not being regularly carried out. Bearing in mind resource 
constraints the OAG should implement measures to ensure a rolling programme of compliance 
audits and performance audits of individual ministries and departments. 
 
4. The PAC’s roles include monitoring the performance of the OAG and ensuring that the OAG has 
adequate resources. The PAC should play a more active role in ensuring that adequate 
resources and technical support are provided to the OAG to assist it to comply with international 
audit standards as developed by INTOSAI and other goals as set out in the Corporate Plan 
2012 – 2016. The PAC should also more actively monitor the implementation of this plan and 
effective use of resources within the OAG. 
 
5. There is currently little public awareness of the work of the OAG or the recommendations it 
makes. Lack of transparency weakens accountability as it reduces both public awareness of the 
importance of correct management of public funds, and public demand that changes occur in 
response to recommendations. Any new law, or amendment to the existing law, should: 
 
a. Strengthen transparency of the OAG by clarifying when and how audit reports, annual 
reports and special investigation reports are to be made available to the public. 
b. Strengthen public involvement in the detection of financial irregularities by allowing the 
OAG to directly receive complaints from the public. 
 
6. Establishing a website for the OAG will help to improve access to information about the OAG 
and therefore transparency. This website should include audit reports or summaries of 
recommendations, annual reports, the Corporate Plan and reports on implementation of the 
plan. It should also include information for the public on what to do if they are aware or suspect 
irregularities in respect of the use of public money. 
 
7. A cross cutting issue affecting both the OAG and the Office of the Ombudsman is the potential 
for interference or delays in staffing matters by the PSC. This issue has also been faced by 
other constitutional offices, and the solution has been to give other constitutional offices the 
direct power to recruit. The State Law Office Act provides an example of legislation that allows 
this. The law should be revised (possibly using the State Law Office Act as a model) to give the 
OAG the power to directly recruit staff. 
Political parties 
1. Governance of political parties is particularly weak. It is recommended that the government 
establish a transparent committee to lead law reform activities to address this issue and ensure 
transparency of political parties. Once law reform proposals have been developed it is further 
recommended that the legislature enacts new laws in this area and that the government then 
implements the new laws. These law reforms should cover, as a minimum, the following: 
 
a. Mandatory disclosure of party income and expenditure via annual audited accounts 
which are made public. 
b. Mandatory disclosure of all party income and expenditure during the election 
campaigning period via audited accounts which are made public. 
c. Mandatory filing of policy platforms with a central body, with the central body to provide 
a public access point to information on policies for the public. 
d. Mandatory filing of constitutions with a central body, with the central body to provide a 
public access point to political party constitutions for the public. 
e. Disclosure rules for independent candidates. 
 
2. Before any consideration can be given to public funding of political parties, accountability 
mechanisms must be established. Further controls should also be considered. These include 
setting minimum requirements for eligibility for funding (such as receiving a threshold of 5% of 
votes in national elections), only reimbursing stated expenses on production of receipts/audited 
accounts and stopping funding if audited accounts are not received. 
 
3. As technical capacity limits the extent to which parties can develop policy statements and 
internal governance structures, it is recommended that aid donors, in consultation with political 
parties and parliament: 
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a. Assess the extent to which technical assistance to develop political parties’ capacity in 
these areas is required. 
b. Following this assessment, support the provision of relevant technical assistance in this 
area. 
 
4. The large number of parties and independent candidates contesting elections is contributing to 
the fragmented and clientelistic political environment. However, restricting the number of parties 
is undemocratic so is not a good approach to addressing this issue. Instead laws to create 
disincentives to candidates who do not have considerable popular support from contesting 
elections should be developed and enacted by the legislature. Law reform options that should 
be considered include: 
 
a. Raising the number of supporters that must endorse a candidate before he or she is 
eligible to stand for election. 
b. Raising the fee for candidates. 
c. Raising the number of members required to establish a political party. 
Media 
1. The lack of enforcement hinders the effectiveness of governance mechanisms. It may also 
contribute to interference in the media due to there being no legitimate mechanism for laying 
complaints about irresponsible reporting. Government regulation could lead to concerns 
regarding censorship so self-regulation is preferable. MAV is in the process of developing a 
complaints mechanism and the government and aid donors should support this. At the same 
time MAV should support proposals to develop a Pacific-wide media ombudsman as having a 
regional body to appeal to reduces the  risk of intimidation of any locally established media 
complaints authority,. 
 
2. The Vanuatu Code of Media Code of Ethics and Practice should be reviewed by an independent 
expert to ensure that it contains comprehensive provisions in respect of transparency, 
accountability and integrity. 
 
3. Threats against media freedom are an ongoing issue, with laws potentially allowing interference 
in broadcasting and physical threats against journalists being somewhat routine. In order to 
address this, in addition to establishing a complaints mechanism, the following should occur: 
 
a. In order to build pressure against government threats, MAV Vanuatu should maintain a 
record of threats against journalists and build links with international and regional 
media freedom watchdogs in order to ensure that these threats are publicised 
internationally. 
b. The Law Reform Commission should review the Broadcasting and Television Act and 
the Newspaper (Restriction of Publication) Act with the aim of removing limits and/or 
clearly specifying ministerial powers in respect of restricting media activities. 
 
4. It has been suggested that building collaborative journalism practices may help to strengthen 
investigative journalism in an environment where capacity and resources are lacking. The 
Vanuatu Institute of Technology should consider including a module on developing collaborative 
investigative journalism practices in its journalism certificate and diploma courses. 
 
5. The legislature should enact the Right to Information Bill as soon as possible and donors 
support its effective implementation as this will make it easier for investigative journalists to 
access information.  
Civil society 
1. Civil society organisations work more effectively when they work collaboratively. Addressing 
common issues collaboratively utilises scarce resources efficiently and can help to develop 
more sustainable and widespread activities. It is recommended that: 
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a. Vanuatu civil society organisations seek to work together collaboratively (and build on 
existing examples of effective collaboration) to better represent the priorities of their 
constituents and to engage more effectively with government and other decision makers 
regarding  legislation and policy development and to monitor government service provision 
and expenditure. 
b. VANGO works to support non-government organisation and community based 
organisation collaboration and capacity development through coordination and 
organisational strengthening activities including:  
 
i. Development of a NGO code of conduct which covers, amongst other things, issues of 
transparency to the public and accountability to members and works with members to 
assess adherence to it. 
ii. Provision of support to smaller local organisations to assist them in meeting the NGO 
code of conduct in order to help facilitate integrity building as opposed to merely 
imposing regulations. 
iii. Seeking funding to become an effective and functioning body that supports NGOs to 
work together.   
 
c. Aid donors seek ways to increase collaboration between CSOs when projects are being 
funded. 
 
2. Currently there is no clear forum for government/CSO dialogue on anti-corruption initiatives. It is 
recommended that the Vanuatu Government establish a national integrity committee made up 
of both government and non government representatives and that this committee develops an 
anti-corruption/national integrity strategy, using the outcomes of the 2014 National Integrity 
System report as a starting point for this strategy. 
Business 
1. Business is currently not seen to be having a clearly defined role within Vanuatu’s National 
Integrity System. It is recommended that the VCCI be recognised as a non-governmental 
partner on all national integrity initiatives. 
 
2. The VCCI should encourage and support local businesses to undertake voluntary anti-
corruption initiatives, such as disclosing donations to political parties and developing statements 
of corporate responsibility. 
 
3. The VCCI has limited resources to engage in sustained policy discussion. In conjunction with 
the Standing Orders of Parliament being reviewed, which should enhance opportunities for 
consultation, the VCCI should be provided with sufficient resources to be able to engage in 
ongoing policy discussion. 
 
4. Where statute provides for a representative of business nominated by the VCCI to be on a 
board, ministers should accept a minuted recommendation from the VCCI Council as to the 
business nominee unless there are specific reasons why acceptance would be unlawful. 
Customary authorities 
1. Customary governance is facing challenges caused by changes due to introduced systems. 
Until these challenges are addressed customary authorities will suffer from weakened 
foundations. The government and/or aid donors should ensure that the Malvatumauri Council of 
Chiefs is provided with sufficient resources to enable travel to allow chiefs to come together 
and, in the customary way, have discussions to rethink and rediscover customary governance 
and leadership.  This process should include establishing who the correct holders of chiefly titles 
are. 
2. Although the Constitution provides that the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs should be 
independent, the current National Council of Chiefs Act 2006 sets down a structure that 
interferes with independence. The 2013 review of the National Council of Chiefs Act should be 
acted upon by the government, with the Act being repealed or amended. 
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3. Urban and Island Councils of Chiefs may lack support or technical capacity to remain 
accountable and transparent through the filing of quarterly reports, and the central 
administration lacks resources to provide this support. The government and/or aid donors 
should provide technical assistance to develop guidelines for reporting and to train Council 
members in reporting and provide ongoing support for reporting. 
4. The constitutional role of the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs in respect of being consulted by 
Parliament is being expanded. Guidelines need to be developed, possibly as part of the review 
of Standing Orders, to ensure that: this consultation is done transparently; that sufficient time is 
given for consultation; and that, if required, sufficient technical resources are provided to allow 
the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs to engage fully on issues referred to it. 
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